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P R E F A C E 
 
 
 
Because Jean de la Rochelle has remained in the background to some of the more 
well-known authors of the later thirteenth century, such as, for instance, Thomas 
Aquinas and Bonaventure, the aim of this study is to highlight the contribution made 
by him and his contemporaries to philosophical thought in the light of the new Greek 
and Arabic translations. This was a very specific moment in the history of medieval 
philosophy when Avicenna, rather than Aristotle, was the preferred philosopher of 
many writers of the early thirteenth century. That he is the philosopher for Jean will 
become clear throughout our study. His aim would seem to have been to transmit all 
the views on the soul that were known at this time. His range of sources certainly 
testifies to the breadth of his knowledge as he appeals to a wide range of authorities: 
Augustine, (also the Pseudo-Augustine’s work De Spiritu et Anima), Philip the 
Chancellor and John Damascene, on the theological side; and, on the philosophical 
side, he appeals to Avicenna and Aristotle (the latter to a limited degree). It is only 
by looking back to this very specific moment in time that we can begin to realise the 
impact that follows in its wake. Jean’s Summa is testament to the moment when the 
new Arabic sources facilitated access to the classical texts and to its own medical 
tradition which far outweighed that of Western Europe.  
 
The accusation could be made against Jean that he misunderstood a theory or 
that he deliberately digressed from the original text of a specific author, but equally it 
could be stated that it is often the misunderstandings and digressions that can be of 
great benefit to a philosophical discussion. This could certainly be the case with 
regard to the doctrine of ‘Avicennised Augustianism’, which would not be what 
vi 
 
Avicenna intended by the doctrine, yet it does reveal, as Hasse states, the sagacity of 
the scholastic writers.1 Hasse also highlights the difficult task of the theologians who 
confronted and mastered the task of assimilating the philosophical works into their 
Summae and commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. It is remarkable that a 
theologian, such as Jean, managed to integrate, considering the constraints of his 
office, the new sources and, in doing so, to create a certain freedom for his 
successors. Confronted with the medical tradition, Jean was one of the first to 
appreciate the value of the new learning and the need to formulate an account of the 
complex philosophical-theological enigma of the soul. 
 
The expansion of thought which occurred in this period owes much to the 
activity of translating. Jean, in turn, must also be recognised for his work of 
assimilation and transmission of new ideas to his successors, for his personal 
engagement with and interpretation of three of the most significant writers on the 
soul at this time (Augustine, John Damascene, and Avicenna). He certainly deserves 
his place in the formation of the philosophical anthropology of the thirteenth century; 
and it is hoped that this study will also contribute towards gaining a better 
understanding of the philosophical background to the mind of the greatest thinker of 
this period, Thomas Aquinas.  
 
 
 
                                                
1 Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West (London – Turin: The Warburg 
Institute – Nino Aragno Editore, 2000). 
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION 
 
 
My translation of Jean de La Rochelle’s Summa De Anima is a work in progress.  To 
be found in Appendix (I) to this study is a draft translation of some central passages 
from this author’s text.  Appendix (II) provides an outline of the chapter headings of 
the table of the contents of the Summa de Anima. It is hoped to produce a 
publishable, complete translation of this treatise in English, making it available to a 
wider audience. The work of translating has been helped by a French translation of 
the text.1  At times, I have relied upon the French text where the meaning in the Latin 
was either obscure or difficult to follow. English translations of the works of John 
Damascene and of the Pseudo-Augustine’s De Spiritu et anima are also available. 
They provided a sense of the author’s original thought, if not the correct translation 
of a word. My aim is to translate, in a literal sense, as far as this is possible, to enable 
the reader to follow the English translation and the original Latin passages as they 
are presented by Jean de La Rochelle.   
 
 
 
                                                
1 Somme de L’âme, Introduction, traduction et notes par Jean-Marie Vernier (Paris: Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 2001). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With the arrival of the Greek and Arabic writings into the Latin West in the 
thirteenth century, in particular works by Avicenna and Aristotle on the soul, a new 
challenge presented itself to the existing understanding of the ‘soul’ of the writers 
and scholars of that century. This study focuses on the work of Jean de la Rochelle, 
one of the most influential writers in thirteenth-century psychology, and author of 
two works on the soul, the Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae1 
(written about 1233–5) and the Summa de anima (written about 1235–6) the second 
of which is the subject of our study.2  Psychology of the soul at this time ‘relates to 
the outline of a doctrine on man, of medical, biological origins complementary to the 
traditional theological anthropology of Augustinian school’.3 However, it is not 
about the soul alone; it also studies life in its various manifestations, appetition, the 
powers of the soul and the relationship between man’s body and soul.  
 
The Summa de anima of Jean de La Rochelle represents a very specific 
moment in the history of medieval philosophy. The very breadth of his sources is 
testimony to that century’s engagement not only with the works of Aristotle and 
Avicenna but also with the patristic authorities of Augustine and John Damascene. It 
was not only moral psychological works which were coming on stream at this time 
but medieval students were also introduced to the works of ‘natural philosophy’.  As 
                                                
1 Jean de La Rochelle, Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae, Texte Critique Avec 
Introduction, Notes, et Tables. Publié par Michaud-Quantin (Paris: Vrin, 1964). 
2 Jean de La Rochelle, Summa de anima, Texte Critique Avec Introduction, Notes et Tables, ed. by 
Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995). 
3 Romana Martorelli Vico, ‘Virtutes et Potentiae: The Medical-Biological Tradition in the Formation 
of the Philosophical Anthropology of the Thirteenth Century’, Analecta Husserliana, 74 (2002), 307–
318 (p. 317). 
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one commentator succinctly puts it, summing up this newly emerging ‘scientific 
outlook’ of the century on man: 
 
On this subject, in particular, a series of texts extending from Aristotle’s 
psychological and biological thought (De anima and De animalibus) to the 
medical texts of Hippocrates, Galen, and Avicenna, translated from Greek 
and Arabic between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, represent the re-
emerging ‘scientific’ outlook of that century, which enriched with new topics 
the great issues connected with man, supplementing the religious and 
theological tradition based on Saint Augustine’s theology and on Peter 
Lombard’s Sententiae.4  
 
This encounter provoked huge interest in the study of human nature, and so, as 
Romana Martorelli Vico also notes, ‘a new anthropological reflection took shape’.5  
 
Understandably, therefore, as a theologian interested in the study of human 
nature, Jean would have wanted to engage in the debate regarding the powers of the 
soul in light of the vegetative, sensitive and rational faculties from the peripatetic 
point of view.  It offered a new way of understanding both the physical and the 
spiritual natures of man, and a new way of classifying the powers of the soul and 
those of the body.  In his treatise, Jean engages with the new physiological accounts 
of man and discusses the vegetative and sensitive powers, examining in detail the 
powers of the soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine, John Damascene and 
Avicenna in the second Consideratio of the treatise.  
 
Jean does not say ‘anything specific about the purpose of his book’.6  It can 
be assumed, therefore, that he wanted to give an exposition of all the accounts of the 
soul which were known at this time. The text was, without doubt, very valuable to 
                                                
4 Vico, p. 308. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Hasse,  p. 49. 
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his contemporaries since Jean can be credited with providing very precise accounts 
of the new knowledge. He saw the new wave of Greek and Arabic thinking as 
challenging his Christian beliefs, but he realised the importance of assimilating and 
making use of what was to become an indispensable contribution to medieval 
philosophy.    
 
Early medieval psychology, ultimately, goes back to Plato and Aristotle, but 
how did the soul become the central focus in the medieval understanding of man? 
How did the Greek understanding of man influence the traditional biblical 
understanding of man? The concept of man in the Bible is one of unity as the living 
body is considered to be a manifestation of the soul. We only need to remember the 
second Person of the Trinity, the ‘Word made flesh’, to appreciate that the scriptural 
understanding of man includes both the physical and the spiritual as a unity. In 
contrast to this Judeo-Christian viewpoint, the Greek concept of man, as portrayed in 
Plato’s Phaedo, is one in which soul and body are regarded as having two distinct 
natures. As Bernard McGinn states, ‘The unity of man in Platonic thought (to choose 
the most influential classical system) is the unity of the soul as the intelligible 
principle of order behind the appearances of the body’.7 Yet, despite this difference, 
both traditions emphasise that man must take responsibility for himself, and so, as 
McGinn also notes, the Greek sense of responsibility ‘is conditioned by an 
intellectualism that equates the right with the rational, while the Biblical sense of 
responsibility is seen in terms of unquestioning obedience to the will of God.’8 What 
stands out, however, and what perhaps brings us nearer to understanding why the 
study of the nature of the soul becomes the central preoccupation in the thirteenth 
                                                
7 Bernard McGinn, Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology (Michigan: Cistercian 
Publications, 1977), p. 3. 
8 Ibid., p. 3. 
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century, is that the emphasis now lay on the inner man, the higher part of man, the 
part that would endure. The emphasis was not on the resurrection of the body, but on 
the immortality of the individual soul. Thus the question of immortality, that is to 
say, the question whether the human soul continues to exist after the death of the 
body, or not, generates their philosophical anthropology. Another significant effect 
of the interaction between the Christian thinkers and Platonic philosophy is, of 
course, the use and deployment of the concept of image (eikon) which was central to 
Augustine’s explanation of man’s relation to God.    
 
Augustine, then, in many respects, is ‘the most important influence on how 
medieval philosophy developed in the Latin West’.9 Jean de La Rochelle, it would be 
fair to say, appeals to his Augustinian heritage first and foremost. Indeed, it is 
arguably the case that Jean, amongst others at this time, could be said to have helped 
bring about a revival of Augustine’s teachings on the soul in light of the reception of 
the De anima of Aristotle and that of Avicenna. Augustine’s theory of the soul is 
largely Platonic in origin; man is viewed by him as a ‘soul using a body’, as is his 
definition of the human soul, quoted by Jean in his Summa, as ‘a rational substance 
designed to rule the body’. In his later writings, nonetheless, Augustine tries to 
explain the union of soul and body in man such that a human being is a rational 
substance composed of body and soul, thus, as he argues in his De Trinitate, ‘If we 
should define a human being such that a human being is a rational substance 
                                                
9 John Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 29. 
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consisting of soul and body, there is no doubt that a human being has a soul which is 
not the body and has a body which is not the soul.’10   
 
Jean also follows Augustine’s views on the question of the origin of the soul; 
the immortality of the soul; its incorporeality; its presence in the body and movement 
according to place; the soul as the image of God.  All of these doctrines held great 
weight down through the centuries, and just as much as the new philosophical wave 
of thinking was enthusiastically welcomed, so, too, theology enjoyed something of a 
renewal in the twelfth century. Augustine’s theory that the soul is subject to change 
and that God alone is immutable is clearly present in Jean’s treatment of man’s 
ability to err, which Jean explains, further, by making a distinction between the 
‘essential’ and the ‘accidental’ nature of the soul; on the one hand, Jean argues, it is 
essential to the soul to be rational, but, on the other hand, it is accidental to the soul 
to be just. Augustine’s influence on Jean can be seen also with regard to his 
reflections on the nature of the body as something that is extended in space, in 
comparison to the soul whose nature is unextended.   
 
It was Augustine’s search for meaning and his famous method of ‘interiority’ 
that led to his conviction that the intelligible world was of far more importance than 
either the physical or sensible world. This conviction stemmed from his encounter 
with the writings of Plotinus (c. 205–70), Porphyry (c. 232–303), Marius Victorinus 
(fl. 360’s) and also, most notably, St Paul. Much discussion has been given to 
Augustine’s conversion in 386 AD to Christianity and to the question whether his 
conversion to Platonism was generated by his conversion to Christianity, or vice 
                                                
10 Roland Teske, ‘Augustine’s Theory of Soul’, in Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. by  
Eleonore Stump & Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 116–123 
(p. 116). (De Trin. 15.7.11). 
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versa, but it would appear to be the case that he was converted to both Christianity 
and Platonism around the same time. From this time onwards, however, the two most 
important themes in philosophy for Augustine were the immaterial realities of God 
and the human soul.11 The Neoplatonism of Plotinus offered Augustine a belief in a 
non-material world. This leads him to his philosophical proof for the incorporeality 
of the soul. Augustine, nevertheless, eventually separated himself from both Plato 
and Plotinus in that he tried to solve the body/soul dichotomy. He never solved the 
problem, however, of how an immaterial substance unites with the substance of the 
body to produce a third substance, the unity of body and soul. Augustine did not hold 
a ‘faculty psychology; there are no distinct operative powers in the Augustinian 
soul’.12 For Augustine, rather, the whole soul is memory, the whole soul is 
understanding, the whole soul is will. Thus, although the union of the body and soul 
is not without difficulty, he takes up an interesting position with regard to the union. 
Referring to ‘the doctrine of the two natures united in the person of the Word made 
flesh’, Augustine argues that there can be no a priori objections to a doctrine which 
posits the unity of body and soul on philosophical grounds. This was a Neoplatonic 
argument known as a ‘union without confusion’ explanation, but eventually 
Augustine declared it to be incomprehensible.  
  
Jean’s first Consideratio of the Summa, therefore, is testament to the esteem 
and following which Augustine gained, in particular with regard to his Trinitarian 
psychology. There were, nevertheless, other routes through which theories of the 
soul reached the medieval scholars. Some, mentioned by name in Jean’s Summa, 
                                                
11 Teske, p. 118. 
12 ‘This [Augustine’s] is a trinitarian psychology in which the diversity of functions of remembering, 
knowing and willing does not entail any real difference within the nature of the soul.’ Vernon J. 
Bourke, Ed., The Essential Augustine, 2nd edn (Indiana: Hackett, 1974), p. 68. 
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could be referred to as belonging to what is called the ‘Eclectic Tradition’,13 while 
others can be sourced in the ‘Greek Patristic Tradition’. The former refers to texts 
from the early fourth to the late sixth century, which contain both pagan and 
Christian material and as pointed out ‘it is an over simplification to treat the 
philosophical basis of twelfth-century anthropology as if it were purely 
Neoplatonic’.14 A list of the most important authors of this period would include 
Porphyry (c. 232–305); Calcidius, who wrote a long commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus, and dates from the fourth century; Boethius (c. 480–524), regarded as 
second only to Augustine in his influence on twelfth century authors and also, as we 
will see, on Jean in his employment of Boethius’ formula to support his position 
against those who held that the soul was composed of matter, albeit a spiritual 
matter. Another important source which was to prove influential to twelfth century 
authors was Cassiodorus (c. 477–570) whose Book on the Soul is also mentioned by 
name in Jean’s Summa in his discussion on the immortality of the soul. 
 
With regard to the second major tradition mentioned above, that of the 
Patristic tradition, one author stands out as paving the way for what was to come in 
the writings of the Arabic medical texts of Avicenna. The treatise by Nemesius, 
Bishop of Emesa (c. 400), entitled The Nature of Man ‘whose fourth book is an 
extensive summary of ancient medical knowledge’15 heralded the beginnings of the 
combined theological, philosophical and physiological understanding of man. Jean 
appeals to Augustine as his main theological source; to Avicenna as his philosophical 
source while John Damascene’s work entitled The Orthodox Faith was employed by 
him for his understanding of Greek theology. These works will be considered at 
                                                
13 McGinn, p. 10. 
14  Ibid., p. 12. 
15 Ibid., p. 16. 
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greater length in the second part of our study, in particular, in the discussion of the 
classifications of the powers of the soul. While Augustine and Avicenna both convey 
anthropological positions that are inspired by Neoplatonism certain tensions will 
emerge as Jean endeavours to bring about a synthesis of both authors. While Jean 
remains faithful to his Augustinian heritage he also adopts many aspects of 
Avicenna’s anthropology, often reconciling both traditions by taking the middle 
ground between the traditions. 
 
The study contains five chapters. Chapter one introduces the person of Jean 
de La Rochelle (1190/ 1200–1245) who was teaching and writing at a time when the 
Latin West became acquainted with the philosophy of the soul of Aristotle and 
Avicenna. These works were to change and challenge the theologian’s whole 
approach to the established psychology of the soul. Jean is writing within the topos 
of the ‘philosophical anthropology’ of the thirteenth century which sees both the 
physical and spiritual nature of man as part of that century’s philosophia naturalis 
‘which was still of the competence of the theology masters’.16 Jean de La Rochelle 
can be placed at the very beginnings of this new wave of interest in Greek–Arabic 
sources before ‘there took place an ideal handing over of medical, naturalistic themes 
from the theologians to the new scientific intellectual of the mediaeval universities, 
the “Scholastic Physician”.’17 Born at the end of the twelfth century, he was regent 
master at the University of Paris from the year 1238 at the latest. He was the only 
Franciscan among the university masters other than his master and colleague 
Alexander of Hales (1185–1245). This chapter also gives an account of how the 
                                                
16 Vico, p. 309. 
17 Ibid. 
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editor J.G. Bougerol was introduced to the works of Jean de La Rochelle and how he 
set about the work of transcribing and editing the Summa. 
 
In chapter 1, I will also give an overview of the contents of the Summa 
concentrating on the sources that were well known to Jean at this time. The Summa 
(written about 1235–36) is divided into two main parts, called a ‘Consideratio’, each 
of these in turn is divided into a number of chapters; 58 for the first; 60 for the 
second. Jean proceeds along the lines of the university ‘disputed question’, although 
it is not strictly arranged in that style. It is a work of its time with a Prologue based 
on the writings of scripture and again the transition between the two parts calling on 
Divine intervention. The first part of the work, on the substance of the soul, ‘is a 
fully-fledged theological treatise on the soul’,18 but, as our study will show, Jean 
incorporates much philosophical speculation to his psychology of the soul. The 
second part, on the powers of the soul, is above all a treatise on the most abstract of 
all philosophical topics, the human soul, what makes us humans what we are. 
 
Chapter 2 examines philosophical doctrines relating to the soul; the existence 
of the soul, the essence of the soul, the unity of the soul, the origin of the soul, the 
soul’s relation to the body, the immortality of the soul. Taking, for example, the 
question of the existence of the soul, it will be shown that Jean was one of the few 
writers on the soul who employed Avicenna’s thought experiment of the ‘Flying 
Man’ to prove the existence of the soul and, as Hasse notes, Jean is one of only two 
authors who come closest to Avicenna’s original intention in the theory. The ‘Flying 
Man’, according to Hasse, ‘is an example of a theory of considerable philosophical 
                                                
18 Hasse, p. 49. 
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interest whose reception depends very much upon the understanding of nuances in 
the meaning of key terms’.19  Of philosophical interest also is Jean’s formulation of 
the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘essence’, where he employs the concepts of 
‘quod est’ and ‘quo est’ (a formula which he borrows from Boethius 480–524) to 
explain how the ‘being’ of the soul is distinct from the ‘essence’ of the soul. 
 
Chapter 3 highlights the significance of the Psuedo-Augustine writings on the 
powers of the soul in Jean’s psychology of the soul. Although there is a question 
mark over the authorship of this work, it was one of the most influential works of the 
early thirteenth century. It originated in the twelfth century Cistercian milieu and it 
played an even more important role than the work of Isaac of Stella.20  
 
Chapter 4 presents a philosophical commentary on the powers of the soul 
according to John Damascene who was the author of the ‘first great Summa of 
theology to appear in either the East or the West’, entitled The Fount of Knowledge 
and was written in Greek in 743.21 A complex account of human behaviour emerges 
from this study as ‘Damascene believes that to understand human actions we have to 
see that they involve an exercise of the will’.22 This chapter will focus on the 
doctrine of the will in Damascene in light of Jean’s exposition of the powers of the 
soul in Damascene and, in particular, the appetitive powers.   
 
                                                
19 Ibid., p. 79. 
20 Janet Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 220. 
21 Saint John of Damascus, Writings, trans. by Frederic H. Chase (Washington: Catholic University 
Press, 1958), p. v. 
22 Michael Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom’, in Byzantine 
Philosophy and its Ancient Sources ed. by Katerina Ierodiakonou(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 
63-95 (p. 63). 
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Chapter 5 will discuss the powers of the soul according to Avicenna and, in 
particular, the latter’s doctrine of the external and internal senses. Our study will 
examine one major philosophical issue that confronted Jean de La Rochelle and his 
contemporaries at the time, namely, that of the passive and active intellect in both 
Aristotle and Avicenna. In spite of the fact that Jean de La Rochelle retains 
Aristotle’s teaching on the active and passive intellect, he also accepts Avicenna’s 
separate agent intellect. The powers of the soul according to Avicenna contain much 
philosophical material and it seems that Jean had first-hand knowledge of the latter’s 
De Anima. Jean, for instance, quotes passages from Avicenna never referred to 
before in the West. He repeats, almost verbatim, the long discussion of the estimative 
power, one of the five internal senses, which was not only one of the most interesting 
of Avicenna’s doctrines but also one of the most controversial.  
 
This study will highlight the thought of one author who belongs to the first 
group of theologians who were influenced by the Arab philosopher, Avicenna. Jean’s 
Summa gives a clear picture of the moment immediately prior to the huge growth of 
interest in the psychological works of Aristotle and the commentaries on them, in 
particular, that of Averroes. Jean was not seeking to explain the unity of body and 
soul as a result of the new thinking. This, as we have seen, was already present in 
Augustine as he attempted to determine the relation between body and soul. Jean, 
however, is writing at a time which witnessed the very beginnings of a philosophy 
which undertook an extensive examination of the powers of the soul. We turn now to 
an examination of the background to the Summa of Jean de La Rochelle. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE  
SUMMA OF JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE 
 
 
This first chapter of our study begins with a sketch of the background to Jean de La 
Rochelle’s writing on the soul, in light of the new Greek-Arab sources and the 
impact they had on Jean’s Summa de anima in the first Consideratio. Jean’s sources 
will then be examined, after which a general overview of the contents of the Summa 
de anima will be presented. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the 
influence of Jean’s Summa de anima on some of the better-known writers of the 
thirteenth century. 
 
 
SECTION ONE 
JEAN’S EARLY EDUCATION, CAREER AND WRITINGS 
 
Jean de La Rochelle [Joannes De Rupella] of the Franciscan Order, author of the 
Summa de Anima was born at the end of the twelfth century in La Rochelle and 
belonged to the Franciscan province of the Aquitane.1 Though little is known about 
the early life of Jean, it may be surmised that he probably entered the Franciscan 
Order at an early age because his writings are considerable and given that he died in 
1245, perhaps before he had reached the age of fifty. Jean was a student of William 
of Auxerre (c. 1140–1231) who no doubt influenced him in his writing. William, it is 
stated, was ‘a master of theology at Paris who developed the first great synthesis of 
                                                
1 Bougerol, ‘Introduction’, in Jean de La Rochelle, Summa de anima, p. 9. 
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Christian theology and the philosophy of Aristotle’.2 Jean was also a student of 
Alexander of Hales (1185–1245) and we learn that, as a secular master of theology 
Alexander had held a ‘public chair’ in theology at the University of Paris but when 
he joined the Franciscan Order in 1236 he brought this chair with him though ‘not 
without opposition on the part of the secular masters’.3 Alexander and Jean taught 
from that chair and while legally one master could not hold more than one chair 
nothing prevented two masters from sharing the same chair. Bougerol states that the 
university assigned bachelors of theology to both masters and that Jean’s name is 
included in a document borrowed by the record keeper of the University of Paris 
(Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis) which lists the names of the masters of 
theology who took part in a public disputation alongside the Bishop of Paris 
(William of Auvergne 1180/90–1249). This document confirms that Jean was a 
‘regent master’ at Paris since he was able to ‘determine’, that is to say, to publicly 
give his conclusions at the time of disputed questions.4 It is also recorded in a 
chronicle that Jean collaborated with Alexander of Hales in a petition to depose the 
general of the Order, Brother Elias.5  In addition, Alexander, together with ‘Jean de 
la Rochelle, Eudes Rigaud, and Robert de la Bassée, under the leadership of 
Godefroid de Brie’6 wrote an Exposition of the Rule of the Friars Minor in the years 
1241–1242. While the date of Jean’s birth cannot be determined it is recorded that 
                                                
2 Jack Zupko, ‘William of Auxerre’, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages,  ed. by Jorge 
J. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 688. 
3 Edward A. Synan, Review of Jean de La Rochelle’s Summa de anima in Speculum; 1997 Vol. 72, 
No. 4, 1188–9. 
4 Bougerol, Summa, Introduction, p. 11. ‘Un autre document emprunté par le Chartularium 
Univesitatis Parisiensis à Thomas de Cantimpré, nous apprend que l’évêque de Paris (Guillaume 
d’Auvergne) “détermina” dans une disputation publique et avec lui, Hugues de l’ordre des Prêcheurs 
et plus tard Cardinal de L’Eglise romaine, frère Guerric et frère Gaudefroid, du même Ordre, frère 
Jean de La Rochelle, de L’Ordre des frères mineurs et beaucoup d’autres maîtres en théologie 
déterminèrent dans leur propres écoles sur la pluralité des bénéfices.’ 
5 Bougerol, Summa, ibid, p. 11, n. 6. Chronica fratris Jordani, ed. by H. Boehmer (Paris, 1908), n. 61: 
‘Habito ergo consilio fraters decreuerunt communiter ordini prouidere. Quibus in consilio precipui 
frater Alexander de Ales et frater Johannes de Rupella, magistri Parisienses, tunc temporis, affuerunt.’ 
6 J. Guy Bougerol, Introduction to the works of Bonaventure (New Jersey: St Anthony Guild Press, 
1963), p. 14. 
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his death occurred just a few months before his friend and master, Alexander. It 
states that he died on the 3rd February 1245 and Alexander died on August 21st of the 
same year. This is known from a letter sent by Robert Grosseteste to the minister of 
the English Brothers, William of Nottingham. Grosseteste was expressing his fear 
that the loss of both masters would ‘put the Franciscan claim to their chair in 
jeopardy’.7 The letter requested that Adam Marsh would remain in Paris and it 
specified the names and dates of the deaths of Jean de La Rochelle and that of 
Alexander of Hales.  
 
In the history of medieval philosophy the thirteenth century ‘marks the 
privileged moment when the Greek–Arabic philosophical tradition became 
thoroughly known and used in the Latin West’.8 Jean can be placed at the very 
beginnings of the new ‘anthropological’ outlook and was one of the first theologians 
to describe the physical and spiritual nature of man ‘within the theological 
perspective of the natura lapsa’,9 that is, within the view of man as forever 
struggling against the corruption brought about by original sin. Jean devotes two 
works to the soul and its powers, the Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum 
animae written between 1233–123510 and his Summa de anima follows in the years 
1235–1236, the latter work being the topic of my thesis. In the first Consideratio of 
the Summa de anima Jean presents his own views on the subject of the soul. This is 
described as a more personal work than the Tractatus de divisione potentiarum 
animae, and represents the fruits of his labours and the results of his engagement 
                                                
7 Bougerol, p. 11.  
8 Vico, p. 308. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Francis Shaw, ‘Medieval Medico-Philosophical Treatises in the Irish Language’ in John Ryan, ed. 
Féil-scríbhinn Eóin Mhic Néill Essays and Studies presented to Professor Eóin Mhic Néill (Dublin: 
Four Courts, 1995), pp. 144–157.  
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with the new medical and philosophical sources that were coming on stream at this 
particular time. While it may be necessary to refer to the Tractatus regarding Jean’s 
sources on the powers of the soul our study will be confined to translating and 
commenting on his later work, the Summa de anima.    
 
Both the Summa de anima and the Tractatus de divisione multiplici 
potentiarum animae  (henceforth referred to respectively, in abbreviation, as the 
Summa and the Tractatus) belong to moral psychology of the thirteenth century but 
Jean was first and foremost a theologian. He was, nonetheless, inspired by a ‘very 
highly developed philosophical spirit’ and, we are told that he, in one of his sermons, 
was critical of ‘the hostility of those who were at that time making every effort to 
stifle theological studies’, he equated philosophical studies with ‘cultivated minds’.11 
The titles of his works, both his theological and philosophical works, are listed in the 
introduction to Bougerol’s critical edition,12 and in the French translation of the 
Summa.13 Jean, therefore, was an influential theologian, as well as an influential 
philosopher and was one of the first authors in the West to face the challenge of 
reconciling the new Greek-Arab sources with his own Christian beliefs. Jean’s moral 
psychology, when viewed in the context of the history of medieval moral 
psychology, mark him out as one of the first authors who undertook the task of 
presenting a systematic account of all the doctrines circulating on the theme of the 
                                                
11 Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York & London: Sheed 
& Ward, 1955), p. 329. Somewhat dated but very reliable source for medieval scholars. 
12 Bougerol, Summa, pp. 12–13. 
13 Vernier, Somme de Lâme, Introduction, p. 9. ‘Son oeuvre est abondante. Elle comporte plusieurs 
summae: la Summa de vitiis, la Summa de anima (vers 1235–1236), la Summa de articulis fidei, la 
Summa de praeceptis et la Summa de sacramentis; le Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum 
animae (san doute après 1233); un Introitus generalis in sacram doctrinam; des Postilles sur le livre 
de Daniel, Isaïe, Jérémie, Ezéchiel, et les douze petits prophètes; des Commentaires sur les Evangiles 
de saint Matthieu, saint Marc et saint Luc, et une Summa sur les Epîtres de saint Paul; enfin de 
nombreux Sermons. J.G. Bougerol ajoute: “La Glose sur les Sentences contenue dans le manuscrit 
Vat. lat. 691 pourrait, à mon avis, constituer le Commentaire de Jean de La Rochelle”.’ 
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soul. Commenting on the philosophical anthropology of the thirteenth century, 
Romana Martorelli Vico, for instance, makes the point, highlighting Jean’s Tractatus 
in particular, that:   
 
This new anthropological horizon is initially documented right in the works 
of some theologians of that century, among them the Franciscan John of 
Rochelle, master in theology at Paris in the first half of the 1200s. He is the 
author of the Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae, written 
between 1233 and 1239, where the different doctrinal traditions on the theme 
of the soul and of its faculties or forces are described for the first time in a 
systematic way, testifying to the growing interest in the new Greek-Arab 
sources. This work can be rightly considered the initial stage of the new 
cultural foundation that started to link the study of the soul to natural 
philosophy, distinguishing it formally from moral philosophy.14 
 
The theme of the powers of the soul is taken up again in the second part of 
the Summa where Jean discusses the faculties of the soul according to Pseudo-
Augustine, John Damascene, and Avicenna. As the Summa postdates the Tractatus15 
it would seem that Jean had reshaped his theory in the light of his earlier formulation 
of the powers of the soul and wanted to expand the Peripatetic psychology into a 
theological treatise on the soul. Hasse remarks that the two medical sources are 
omitted from the Summa: that of the Isagoge of Johannitius and the Canon of 
Avicenna.16 It is interesting to note that, apart from the medical writings of Galen 
and Hippocrates, the medical tradition really came into its own in the middle of the 
twelfth century. The main reason for this was due to the work of translation, which 
provided the medieval authors not only with the philosophical writings from the 
                                                
14 Vico, p. 311.  
15 Hasse, p. 47, n. 201. ‘That the Summa postdates the Tractatus was first demonstrated by Lottin, “A 
propos de Jean de La Rochelle”, pp. 185–92. The date of the Summa is Bougerol’s approximation; the 
terminus ante quem is the date of book two of the Summa fratris Alexandri (which borrows from the 
Summa) written before 1245.’  A further Bibliographical reference in Hasse, p. 330:‘A propos de Jean 
de la Rochelle’, in O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, VI, Gembloux, 1960, pp. 
181–223 (first published in two articles as: ‘Les Traités sur l’âme et sur les vertus de Jean de la 
Rochelle’, Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie, 31, 1930, pp. 5–32; and: ‘Alexandre de Halès et la 
“Summa de vitiis” de Jean de la Rochelle’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 1, 1929, 
pp. 240–43). 
16 Hasse, p. 49. 
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Arab world but also with the medical works of the classical Greek originals together 
with the Arabic Aristotelianism of Avicenna’s mammoth work the Canon. While 
Jean refers briefly to the latter, he integrates much of the new medical tradition into 
the Summa without attributing it to its source. He introduces the theories of the four 
elements, the humours and the three spirits (naturalis, spiritualis, animalis) into the 
first Consideratio on the soul, the latter explaining the main vital functions of a 
living organism. In the Summa he, also, ‘enlarges the already comprehensive 
Avicennian section of the Tractatus quite considerably by adding new quotations, 
often silently, in particular on the vegetative faculties and on the senses’.17 Hasse 
states, however, that this does not seem to have received much attention. He provides 
a useful list of the quotations that had been overlooked, unfortunately, in Bougerol’s 
critical edition.18 He also raises the issue as to why Jean seems to rely more on 
Avicenna rather than Aristotle: was it that he preferred Avicenna because he offered 
more in his highly developed Peripatetic philosophy? Or was it because Avicenna’s 
philosophical psychology seemed more compatible with his Augustinian 
background? The answers to these questions will emerge, as our study progresses. In 
addition, we will see that Jean is included among those who satisfy the criterion for 
the application of the phrase ‘Avicennised Augustianism’ a modern term which is 
applied to Jean and which will be the subject for discussion in the chapter on the 
cognitive powers of the soul.19 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Hasse, p. 49. 
18 Hasse, p. 49 n. 217. 
19 See Chapter Five on the cognitive powers in Avicenna. 
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SECTION TWO 
ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND  
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
Christian philosophy up to the twelfth century was a mixture of Platonism and 
Christianity as evidenced in the works of Plotinus,20 Dionysius the Areopagite, and 
above all in Augustine, even if, as Brown states, ‘the influence of Platonism on the 
Latin Middle Ages, however, was certainly much more vast than the influence of the 
texts of Plato himself’.21 Earlier writers, such as John Scottus Eriugena, Peter 
Lombard, Aelred of Rievaux were already questioning the nature of man but they 
mostly found their answers, according to Hasse, in Augustinian and Cassidorian 
material. St Augustine (354–430) was certainly the ‘authority’ for the majority of 
Christian thinkers in the Latin West. Augustine’s main interest was in his journey to 
God and the search for wisdom and truth. We know from his writings that he gained 
a love of philosophy after he read the Hortensius of Cicero (106–42 BCE). It is not 
until he was in his forties, however, that he describes the great impact Neoplatonism 
had on his life and how it gave an answer to the problem of evil as well as showing 
him how to conceive of a spiritual substance. It also convinced him that the ultimate 
truth must be something immaterial. Thus it is that through his reading of Plotinus’s 
Enneads, or, at least, parts of it in translation, his reading of Plato’s Timaeus and the 
Meno and his own thinking that Augustine ‘had found what he believed was a true 
presentation of reality’.22 It is through Augustine that Neoplatonism passed down 
through the generations of writers within the Christian tradition, in particular his 
                                                
20 The writings of Plotinus were not directly known at this time. Augustine, for example, read some of 
the Enneads in Marius Victorinus’s translation, the latter being a distinguished rhêtor in Rome in the 
mid-fourth century. 
21 Brown, Stephen, ‘Translation and Transmission of Greek Philosophy’ in The Pimlico History of 
Western Philosophy, ed. by Richard H. Popkin (UK: Pimlico, 1999), pp. 230–244 (p. 230). 
22 David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (London: Longman, 1962), p. 35. 
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theory of the soul, which is characterised by the definition of man as a soul that 
makes use of a body (anima utens corpore).23 Augustine dominates most of the 
Middle Ages until the rise of Aristotelianism in the twelfth century. It is at this time 
that Augustianism enjoys something of a revival by those who, like Jean de La 
Rochelle, want to incorporate his teaching into the Greek-Arab writings of Aristotle 
and Avicenna, in particular the theory of illumination of the intellect.   
 
Thus began the ‘age of the summae, magisterial and comprehensive synthesis 
ranging over a wide domain of theology and philosophy’.24 With the rise of the 
universities and also the flourishing of the Dominican and Franciscan Orders it is 
easy to see how theology held sway over philosophy. So why did the introduction of 
Greek and Arabic authors present a great challenge to the theologians writing in this 
century?  
 
SECTION THREE 
TRANSLATION OF THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE AND AVICENNA 
 IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 
 
The logical works of Aristotle presented little or no problems for the Latin scholars: 
but the natural philosophy of Aristotle did present the greater challenge to Christian 
writers. In fact, what is called the ‘old logic’ of Aristotle, that is to say, the 
Categories, On Interpretation and Porphyry’s Introduction to the Organon were 
available in the early twelfth century and by the middle of this century the ‘new 
logic’ arrived, the Analytica priora, the Analytica posteriora, the Topica and de 
                                                
23 On this point, Augustine follows Plotinus (Enneads, 1, 1, 3) who held that man was a “soul that 
uses a body”. Taken literally this would mean that we are essentially our souls but Augustine sees this 
as a forcible expression of the transcendent superiority of the soul over the body. Plotinus, Enneads, 
trans. by Stephen MacKenna (London: Penguin, 1991). 
24 Arthur Hyman and James, J. Walsh, eds, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, The Christian, Islamic, 
and Jewish Traditions, 2nd edn (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett, 1973), p. 451. 
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Sophisticis Elenchis completing the corpus on logic which was very well received in 
the new universities. Logic was to become the ‘necessary preparation for all higher 
studies in the nascent universities’25 and from a cursory reading of Jean’s Summa we 
can see his appreciation of Aristotelian propositions and syllogisms. His use of the 
style of the disputed question can be seen in the chapters which proceed according to 
what must at first be asserted, dicendum est, which is often followed by an appeal to 
an authority, then a contra and then the replies to objections. Knowles states 
regarding the new logic, ‘it was in fact, decisive in making dialectical logic, for more 
than fifty years, the be-all and end-all of the course in the liberal arts’.26  
 
Aristotle’s major philosophical works, however, gradually came on stream in 
the late twelfth century when Gerard of Cremona (died, 1187) translated the Physics, 
On Generation, On the Heavens and the first three books of On the Meteors from 
Arabic to Latin, making them available to the Latin thinkers of the early thirteenth 
century. Brown remarks that anonymous twelfth century translations of the Physics, 
On the soul, and of books 1 through to 4 of the Metaphysics translated from the 
Greek were also known at this time.27 Aristotle’s On the soul was also translated 
from the Greek by James of Venice c.1150 but did not make an impact at that time; 
However, it was soon to become ‘one of the focal points of controversy in the 
thirteenth century, but this was due principally to the appearance of the Arabic 
commentaries on the book, and to the doctrines of the Arabs on the human soul’.28 
Jean and his contemporaries, as we have alluded to above, are presented not only 
with the philosophical tradition based on Aristotle’s biological works but also with 
                                                
25 Knowles, p. 190. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Brown, ‘Translation and Transmission of Greek Philosophy’, p. 231. 
28 Knowles, p. 192. 
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the medical tradition derived from Hippocrates’ and Galen’s texts. These texts were 
known indirectly through the works of Avicenna but they also reached the medieval 
scholars through translations made from the Greek and Arabic by Constantine the 
African. The impact of the translations will be discussed below in relation to the 
powers of the soul according to Avicenna. We can begin to appreciate the impact 
that the medical and biological sources had on thirteenth century authors from the 
words of William of Thierry, when he describes his acquisition of the new texts as 
work drawn from ‘philosophers and natural scientists (physici) and partly from 
ecclesiastical writers’.29 The key word here is the physici,30 relating to the work of 
the physician and the biologist and, according to Hasse, this challenge was the most 
important event in the course of the early medieval history of psychology. 
 
Jean has ‘first hand knowledge’ of Avicenna’s De anima, citing passages 
never before referred to in the West.31 He presents Avicenna’s doctrine of the 
internal senses, ad verbum, with regard to the estimative power and the memorative 
power and it is clear that the authority of Avicenna eclipses that of the Pseudo-
Augustine and John Damascene, whose sections on the powers of the soul are, as we 
will see, much shorter. As a physician, Avicenna could forge agreement between 
philosophy and medicine and, as Romana Martorelli Vico remarks, ‘only a synthesis 
of the two models was really descriptive of all the complexity, physical and psychic, 
of human nature. Only in this way, as a matter of fact, could philosophical 
                                                
29 Hasse, pp. 10–11. 
30 Ibid., p. 11. 
31 Ibid., 49 – 50. Hasse explains further that Jean had first hand knowledge of Avicenna’s De anima 
which was translated from Arabic into Latin. See below p. 22 for details of the translators.  
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anthropology present a suitable and opportune completion of theological 
anthropology’.32 
Dominic Gundissalinus and Ibn Daud (Avendauth), two of the most prolific 
translators to emerge from the school of translation set up by the Archbishop of 
Toledo, Raymond (1126–52) translated Avicenna’s De anima in Toledo. The preface 
to this translation tells us that the work was ordered and paid for by John, 
Archbishop of Toledo, to whom it is dedicated. This fixes the date of the translation 
between 1152, the death of Archbishop Raymond, and 1166, the death of his 
successor Archbishop John of Toledo. As we shall see this is the text which Jean 
uses, although it seems he had two versions of the translations at different times, this 
is explained in the next section.  
 
SECTION FOUR 
SOURCES 
 
In his account of Jean’s sources, Bougerol states that Avicenna is the philosopher for 
Jean although the important qualification is made that it is an Avicenna inspired by 
Aristotle.33 Given that Aristotle was available to the Arab world from the ninth 
century onwards, it is held by many commentators that Avicenna’s De anima is a 
commentary or paraphrase of Aristotle’s Peri Psychés (De anima). This is not the 
case, however. Avicenna’s De anima is a comprehensive compendium of the theory 
of the soul. It is arranged, for the most part, according to the Peripatetic tradition and 
it presents Avicenna’s own philosophy. The translation of the text by Gundissalinus 
and Avendauth is extant in fifty manuscripts but the work of editing the text was 
                                                
32 Vico, p. 317. 
33 Bougerol, p. 31. ‘Parmi elles, il faut citer en premier le De anima d’Avicenne par lequel Aristote 
pénètre largement dans les développements de la Summa.’ 
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complicated by the fact that it is extant ‘in two recensions, called A and B by modern 
scholars’.34 The editor, Simone Van Riet, sheds new light with regard to the 
reception of the two versions;35 Dominicus Gundissalinus (c. 1170) and John Blund 
(c. 1200) quote version A while Albert the Great (1242–43) quotes version B. The 
quotations in Jean’s Tractatus (1233–35) are in the wording of version A, while 
those of the newly added passages in the Summa (1235–36) follow version B. It 
seems that version B is a re-working of version A. 
 
For Jean, Aristotle is an important philosopher but he is not the philosopher. 
Vernier states that it appears that Jean had only a limited knowledge of Aristotle, yet 
Jean refers to Aristotle by name in a number of places in the Summa and he quotes 
Aristotle’s definition of the soul, giving it a prominent place in his definitions of the 
soul. If Bougerol is correct in his dating of Jean’s Summa (written between the years 
1235–1236) we could place the reception of Aristotle’s De anima in the early to mid-
thirteenth century, given that Jean’s earlier work the Tractatus (written about 1233–
1235) uses the same quote in a list of definitions on the soul.36 It would probably be 
more correct to say that he had a good knowledge of Aristotle’s De anima and, as we 
will see, Aristotle’s presence is pervasive in the second treatise, in particular on the 
theme of the intellect.  
 
The Pseudo-Augustine’s De spiritu et anima is another major source for Jean. 
He wrongly attributes this work to the genuine Augustine (who of course is also a 
                                                
34 Hasse, p. 8. 
35 Avicenna, Avicenna Latinus, Liber De Anima seu Sextus De Naturalibus, Édition critique de la 
traduction latine médiévale par S. Van Riet (Louvain & Leiden: E. Peeters & E. J. Brill, 1972. 
36 Jean de La Rochelle. Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae, p. 64. Ad expositionem 
sexte diffinitionis que talis est: Aristoteles in libro De anima ‘Anima est actus primus corporis phisici 
organici potentia vitam habentis’, notandum quod diffinitio communis est anime vegetabili, sensibili 
et rationali, in quantum est anima, scilicet copori unibilis.  
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considerable influence on Jean) but when Jean quotes the manuscript in the Summa 
he reverses the order in the title, calling it De anima et spiritu. Albert the Great 
attributed it to Augustine but, according to Gilson, Thomas Aquinas did not make the 
same mistake.37 This should not devalue the Psuedo Augustinian manuscript which 
played a very important role in the history of philosophy. It was compiled c. 1170 
and was at one stage attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux. Recent studies claim that this 
work is a string of excerpts from various authors, e.g., Augustine, Cassiodorus, 
Isidore of Seville, Alcuin, Anselm, Bernard, Hugh of St Victor and Isaac of Stella. It 
was most influential in the years of the 1230’s and early 1240’s as it was connected 
with the beginnings of Franciscan theology and it provided ‘a centre for the 
continuation of a Neo-Platonic and Augustinian current in the teeth of a developing 
Aristotelianism’.38  
 
Augustine is ‘the’ theological authority and is cited repeatedly throughout the 
treatise (forty eight times according to Bougerol). For the most part the quotations 
are from De civitate Dei; De quaestionibus 83; De Genesi ad litteram; De 
quantitatae animae; De Trinitate; The Summa de Bono of Philip the Chancellor 
(1160/85–1236) is another main source for the first treatise. Philip was a 
contemporary of Jean’s and in the foreword to the French translation of the Summa 
Bataillon states that it is without doubt through Jean’s Summa that Philip’s influence 
continued to be exercised.39 This may be referring to the fact that Philip the 
Chancellor was an important source for both Jean and his master and colleague, 
Alexander de Hales. Jean quotes from Philip’s Summa de Bono, in particular in his 
                                                
37 Gilson, p. 169. 
38 Coleman, p. 227. 
39 ‘On sait que son influence directe ne durera guère et c’est sans doute en partie par l’intermédiaire 
du traité de Jean de La Rochelle qu’elle a continué à s’exercer.’ Vernier, Somme de Lâme, Avant-
propos de Louis-J. Bataillon, p. 8. 
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discussion on the Trinity and also on the question of intermediaries between body 
and soul. Philip’s work is also quoted in the Summa Fratris Alexandri.40 This 
suggests that Jean held him in high esteem. Hilaire of Poitiers in the De Trinitate and 
De Synodis is also appealed to at the theological level, particularly as an authority on 
the soul as an image and likeness to God.  
 
Also from the Greek tradition, John Damascene (c.675–c.750) is an important 
authority. Bougerol states that he is present in forty-five quotations from twenty-four 
chapters of De fide orthodoxa. In the second Consideratio of his Summa Jean 
discusses Damascene’s account of how we come to have intellectual knowledge and 
how the mind comes to a conclusion based on a relation of ideas. Other Greek 
sources cited are: Calcidius on Plato’s Timaeus, Didymus, Gregory Nazianzus, the 
Liber de causis by Proclus, Nemesius of Emesa, and Dionysius the Areopagite.  
 
The De potentiis animae et obiectis is cited at least twelve times in the 
Summa. The anonymous author is a theologian, ‘as is apparent from the changes and 
additions he makes to his source’ and like many other theologians he omits the 
discussion on the vegetative powers.41 It is one of the earliest examples of a ‘divisio 
potentiae animalis’, a forerunner to Jean’s Summa. The text has been edited by 
D.A.Callus.42 It is thought to have been written by an English theologian ‘without the 
influence of the Latin translations of Averroes, which entered circles at the 
                                                
40 Bougerol, p. 38. ‘Pour montrer que lâme est une en trois puissances, la Summa recourt à la même 
source que Jean de La Rochelle, c’est-à-dire à la Summa de bono de Philippe le Chancelier.’ 
41 Hasse, p. 35. 
42 D.A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul, An early unpublished text’, Extrait de Recherches de 
Tholéogie ancienne et médiévale, Tome XIX, January-June 1952, pp. 131–170. 
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University of Paris c. 1230’.43  Jean employs this source in his discussion with regard 
to distinguishing the powers of the soul and with regard to the intellect. 
 
SECTION FIVE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITICAL EDITION OF THE SUMMA 
 
In the introduction to the critical edition of the Summa J. G. Bougerol relates how he 
became interested in the work of this master of theology whose dates are recorded as 
between c.1190/1200–1245. These consisted of a series of registers containing 
notices, lists of manuscripts and transcriptions of the most well known works of 
Jean.  He provides what little biographical details we have of Jean. Bougerol states 
that work on Jean dates back at least to 1856, when Canon M. Cholet, working 
alongside another diocesan priest, Th. Grasilier, listed the manuscripts of Jean de La 
Rochelle and from one of them, MS Arras, Bibliothèque de La Ville 537 transcribed 
the present work. This project was carried forward by Henry Luguet in two studies 
based on Jean’s Summa de anima, both dated 1875, one of which is a thesis that 
Luguet submitted to the Sorbonne.44 In 1882 Teofilo Domenichelli published an 
edition of the Summa under the direction of P. Marcellino da Civezza. Domenichelli 
lists whatever manuscripts Luguet had consulted. Bougerol used Canon Cholet’s 
transcription of the Summa de anima as a basis for his updated version and provided 
a list of fifty manuscripts in which the text of the Summa appears and has included a 
stemma in the introduction to his edition.45 The late Pierre Michaud-Quantin edited 
Jean’s other work on the soul, the Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum 
                                                
43 Coleman, p. 382. 
44 Reference in Bougerol, p. 27. Henry Luguet, Essai d’analyse et de critique sur le texte inédit du 
Traité de l’âme de Jean de La Rochelle, Paris, A. Durand et Pedone Lauriel, 1875. ‘La même année, il 
publia en latin le texte d’une thèse en Sorbonne sur la psychologie de Jean de La Rocelle’: Fratris ac 
Magistri Johannis a Rupella ex eo libro hactenus inedito cui Summa de anima titulus inscribitur 
psychlologicam doctrinam exprompsit Henricus Luguet, Paris, 1875, 76pp. 
45 Bougerol, p. 26.  
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animae, which is a less finished version of the work we have here before us. Jean’s 
works have attracted the attention of scholars for a long time and while there are 
entries on his writings in many of the anthologies of medieval philosophy these are 
very brief accounts of his work. In 2001, however, the French translation of the 
Summa, referred to above, was produced under the aegis of the Bibliothèque Des 
Textes Philosophiques, translated by Jean-Marie Vernier. The introduction to the 
French text contains a comprehensive outline of the Summa which, no doubt, has 
contributed to a renewal of interest in Jean and his works, as will the present work. 
 
SECTION SIX 
OUTLINE OF THE FIRST CONSIDERATIO OF THE SUMMA 
 
The Summa is divided into two main parts, each called a Consideratio which are 
further divided, in turn, into chapters; fifty eight chapters are included in the first, 
sixty in the second. The first Consideratio is a theological treatise in which Jean tries 
to bring together the ‘seemingly boundless tradition of psychological doctrines’ 
flourishing at this time.46  In the second Consideratio, Jean presents the faculties of 
the soul as found in Pseudo-Augustine, John Damascene and Avicenna. Bougerol 
states that there is a problem with the titles and the numbers of the chapters because 
of the many differences between the manuscripts.47  
 
The following is an outline of the chapters that are contained in the Summa. 
Beginning with the Prologue I will follow the structure of the first Consideratio in 
                                                
46 Hasse, p. 48. 
47 Bougerol states there are many differences between the manuscripts and the only conclusion he 
could reach is that Jean did not write headings for his chapters since he found that the best 
manuscripts had no titles or badly matched titles. He therefore adopted the headings from one of the 
manuscripts, the Uppsala manuscript, and the numbering from the Cholet transcription. He also 
provides numbers, in brackets, which correspond to Domenichelli’s edition of 1882 (Domenichelli, 
Teofilo, La Summa de anima di Frate Giovanni della Rochelle, Prato, 1882).      
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order to show that, while this first division is described as a theological treatise it is 
evident that Jean incorporates the new philosophical and medical learning into his 
account of the soul. Some of the philosophical doctrines that emerge will be 
elaborated upon in the second chapter, while certain themes, for example, the Trinity, 
and topics relating to the place and movement of the soul, including those relating to 
the separation of the soul from the body after death, will be discussed only as part of 
this initial overview. Inasmuch as they are, in their own right, of philosophical and 
theological interest and deserving of broader analysis, they are themes that go 
beyond the scope of our study.       
 
1.6.1  Prologue 
 
 
The treatise on the soul begins with a prologue which is Jean’s interpretation of the 
Canticle of Canticles (1.7). In it he addresses the rational soul announcing the three 
things which must be considered, namely, its substance, power and activity.48 The 
first Consideratio examines: (I) the existence of the soul; (II) the quiddity or the 
definition of the soul; (III) the origin of the soul; (IV) the ‘being’ of the soul; (V) the 
soul as an image of God (VI); the soul in relation to the body; (VII) the immortality 
of the soul; (VIII) the suffering (or passibility) of the soul; (IX) the location of the 
soul; and (X) the movement of the separated soul.  
 
1.6.2  (I) Whether the Soul Exists 
 
 
The first section questions the existence of the soul and for this Jean employs 
Avicenna’s famous ‘Flying Man’ thought experiment to establish its existence. It is a 
                                                
48 Summa, Prologus. Tibi ergo, anima, de te ipsa consideranda sunt tria: substancia uidelicet tua, 
uirtus et operacio, in quibus consistit tua admirabilis pulchritudo.  
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thought-experiment in which man finds himself floating in the air or the void in such 
a way that he is not conscious of his physical body but yet he is aware of the 
existence of his own essence. The question as to what Avicenna intended to 
demonstrate by his thought-experiment will be discussed in a later chapter with 
regard to the reception of Avicenna and his influence on our author. Jean employs a 
further two arguments from the Psuedo Augustine’s De spiritu et anima in order to 
establish the self-awareness of the soul. It is significant that Jean places the thought-
experiment in the opening question of his De anima on the existence of the soul.49 In 
fact, he opens the study with a quotation from Avicenna. However, in contrast to the 
Flying Man thought-experiment he does not attribute the content of the passage to 
Avicenna.  
 
1.6.3  (II) What is the Soul? 
 
 
 Seven definitions of the rational soul follow: in the first, the soul is defined as spirit 
by Alfred of Sareshel; ‘the soul is an incorporeal substance, intellectual, receptive, 
through an ultimate relationship, of the illuminations which are from God’.50 It is 
defined as soul in a twofold way: it is compared and united to the body as ‘the mover 
of a mobile and the sailor of a ship’.51 Quoting Remigius52 Jean states that ‘the soul 
is an incorporeal substance which rules the body’ (in fact this quote should be 
attributed to Nemesius).53 Aristotle’s definition of the soul follows and is taken from 
                                                
49 ‘The significance of the Flying Man for Western psychology lies in the fact that three early writers 
quote the thought-experiment at prominent places in the opening questions of their books: 
Gundissalinus, Anonymous (Vat. Lat. 175) and Jean de La Rochelle.’ Hasse, p. 91. 
50 Summa, C. 2, 15-16. ‘Anima est substancia incorporea, intellectualis, illuminacionum que sunt a 
primo ultima relacione perceptiua’. Alfredus Anglicus, De motu cordis, 1 (ed., 1923, 2 7). 
51 Summa, C. 2, 17-18. ‘Ut anima, diffinitur dupliciter quia dupliciter comparatur et unitur corpori, ut 
motor mobili et nauta naui’. 
52Summa, C. 2, 19. ‘Anima est substancia incorporea, regens corpus’.  
53 Bougerol, p. 53. Cf. Nemesius, De Natura hominis, c.2. (ed., 23-50); cf. I.Brady, Remigius-
Nemesius, in FS 8 (1948) 275-284. 
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his De anima. It is defined as follows; ‘the soul is the first act of a natural organised 
body, having life in potency’.54 The next four definitions refer to both spirit and soul: 
the first is taken from Augustine (actually the Pseudo-Augustine) where it is stated 
that the soul bears within itself all things generally, ‘the soul is the likeness of all 
things’55 and the second ‘the soul is a certain substance partaking of reason, fitted to 
ruling the body’.56 Jean’s next definition relies on Scripture; the soul is the ‘Divine 
breath of life’, in so far as it refers to the breath of life the definition from Genesis 2. 
7 is also quoted by Jean as he states: God made man from the mire of the earth and 
infused the breath of life into his countenance. In so far as the soul has a likeness to 
the divine, Jean quotes from Genesis 1. 26: Let us make man to our image and 
likeness. The seventh and final definition is from Seneca’s Epistles: ‘the soul is an 
intellectual spirit determined in itself and in the body towards happiness’.57 Although 
Jean separates the theological from the philosophical his intention would seem to be 
to give a precise account of all the sources which were then at his disposal.  
 
Definitions on the soul abounded at this time; sometimes the soul was defined 
as soul alone, sometimes as spirit and sometimes as soul and spirit.58 The influence 
of the Cistercian text, the Pseudo-Augustine’s Treatise on the Spirit and the Soul is 
clear. The distinction between spirit and soul ‘was important to that wing of twelfth-
century psychology which identified the term spiritus with the highest dimension of 
                                                
54 Summa, C. 2, 20-22. Et secundum hoc diffinitur ab Aristotele, in libro De anima: ‘Anima est actus 
primus corporis phisici, organici, potencia uitam habentis.’ Aristotle, De Anima, 11 (412a 19-22, 27-
28, 412b 5-6). 
55 Summa, C. 2, 24-25. ‘Anima est omnium similitudo.’ 
56Summa, C. 2, 26-27. Ps. Augustine, De spiritu et anima, c. 1 (PL 40,783). ‘Anima est substancia 
quedam racionis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata.’ 
57 Summa, C. 2, 35-36. Seneca, Epistles 92, 1-2. ‘Anima est spiritus intellectualis in se et in corpore ad 
beatitudinem ordinatus.’ 
58 Summa, C. 2, 12-13. Diffinitur autem anima racionalis aliquando ut spiritus, aliquando ut anima, 
aliquando ut spiritus et anima. 
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the soul’.59 It is the soul which animates or enlivens the body, while ‘spirit is the soul 
considered in its spiritual nature, or derives its name from the fact that it may be 
regarded as the body’s breath’.60 From the medical tradition, however, we will see 
that a physical theory of spiritus was more suited to explaining the physiological 
systems involved in the functions of the living organism. This will become clearer 
when we examine the powers of the soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine in 
which Jean discusses the natural, the vital and the animal spirits according to the De 
spiritu et anima. Jean’s inclusion of Aristotle’s actus sees him going towards the 
‘idea of a mover that presides over a series of specific operations of an animated 
human body’, as ‘actus is the substance of a thing relative to its operations’.61 The 
second Consideratio will illustrate this with regard to the vegetative, the sensitive 
and the intellectual powers of the soul. 
 
1.6.4  (III) The Origin of the Soul 
 
A discussion on the essence of the soul follows with a reference to its becoming and 
to its being. The origin of the soul is considered from the point of view of causality 
and the moment of creation. Jean discusses the soul under the aspect of Aristotle’s 
four causes. Regarding, (1) the material cause, Jean argues that the soul is 
immaterial, yet it cannot be made from a divine substance since it is subject to 
‘falsehood’;62 the divine substance is simple in that it is a whole, but souls are 
substantially different; and, following Augustine, Jean states that the soul is not made 
from spiritual matter either. Since the operation of the soul is through abstraction 
                                                
59 McGinn, p. 73. 
60 Ibid., p. 190. 
61 Vico, p. 312. 
62 Summa, C. 14, 4-5. Anima falsitatem habet: ergo non est ueritas, nec de ueritate: ueritas autem 
divina substancia est. 
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from matter, the substance of the soul must be immaterial. Further proof for its 
immateriality can be seen in the ability of the intellect to receive the ‘species’ of 
things, a term used in the thirteenth century to explain how the soul knows objects in 
the world with the senses and with the soul’s intellect.  
 
The soul’s intellect is immaterial; for if it was material like a sense, it would 
not receive any sort of species whatsoever of a sensitive thing beyond itself, 
but only that species which has a likeness with an organ, such as sight to 
colour, hearing to sound and not the opposite. Similarly the intellect would 
not receive every intelligible species, but some yes and some no. That is why, 
since it is certain that it receives every species whatsoever, it will be 
immaterial.63  
 
 
Regarding (2) the formal cause, in order to avoid either ascribing corporeal or 
spiritual matter to the soul, Jean uses a formula, taken from the ‘forgotten formulae 
of Boethius’. The formulae, based on the terms quo est and quod est describe the 
composition of the soul and are employed by Jean to distinguish the being of the soul 
from the essence of the soul. The formal cause of the soul, therefore, distinguishes 
between an incorporeal essence which has its being through participation, such as the 
soul and an angel, and a being who is uncreated and the First cause of all that exists;  
 
This is shown as follows: because everything that is below the First is a being 
through participation. Therefore, in every creature ‘that which exists’, namely 
being itself, is different from ‘that through which it exists’, namely, its 
essence; because since it is a being through participation, it is not its essence. 
This is shown as follows: for just as the good that is God is good through 
essence, since by his very nature he is good and to be and to be good are the 
same for him; therefore in him the good and goodness are entirely without 
distinction.64 
                                                
63 Summa, C. 16, 43-49. Intellectus anime est immaterialis; si enim esset materialis sicut sensus, non 
reciperet quamlibet speciem rei sensibilis supra se, sed illam speciem tantum que habet similitudinem 
cum organo sicut uisus colorem, auditus sonum et non e conuerso. Similiter intellectus non reciperet 
quamlibet speciem intelligibilem, sed aliquam sic, et aliquam non. Quare cum certum sit quod recipit 
quamlibet, erit immaterialis. 
64 Summa, C. 17, 30-36. Quod manifestatur sic: quia omne illud quod est citra Primum est ens per 
participacionem. Est ergo in qualibet creatura ens differens quod est, scilicet ipsum ens, ab eo quo est, 
scilicet sua essencia; quia cum sit ens per participacionem, non est sua essencia. Quod manifestatur 
sic: sicut enim bonum quod est Deus, est bonum per essenciam, quia est se ipso bonum, nec est ei 
aliud esse et bonum esse: ideo in eo indifferens omnino bonum et bonitas. 
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In relation to (3) the efficient cause, Jean remarks that God alone is the efficient 
cause of the rational soul since no created being can create, or make something from 
nothing; one of the arguments put forward is the fact of man’s free will and how we 
understand that we are not born to be subject to another created being. 
 
Likewise, every power of a thing which has been made is subject to its 
efficient cause; however the power of the rational soul, in accordance with 
free will is not subject to any creature since it cannot be forced by anything.65 
 
In relation to his discussion on (4) the final cause, Jean quotes from the Pseudo-
Augustine who considers man from both the spiritual and the physical side and he 
states that man can find happiness in God who is the principal end of the soul and in 
a secondary way man participates in the highest good as the rational soul is made to 
know, love, possess and enjoy the highest good. With regard to the moment of 
creation of the soul, Jean states it is known to the Creator alone but in general he 
states that as soon as the body is made and formed in the womb the soul is created 
and infused and a human being has life in the womb. 
 
But we say that the body alone is produced through the union of marriage; 
and that the Creator alone knows the creation of the soul, and by his 
judgment the body comes together in the womb, and is made and formed; and 
as soon as the body is formed, the soul is created and infused, and a human 
being has life in the womb.66 
 
 
1.6.5  (IV) The Soul with Regard to Being  
 
                                                
65 Summa. C. 18, 69-74. Item, omnis potencia rei effecte subiecta est sue cause efficienti; potencia 
autem racionalis anime, secundum libertatem arbitrii, nulli creature est subiecta cum a nulla cogi 
possit.  
66 Summa, C. 20, 26-30. Sed dicimus corpus tantum per coniugii copulam seminari; creacionem uero 
anime solum creatorem nosse, eiusque iudicio corpus coagulari in uulva, et compingi atque formari; 
ac formato iam corpore, animam creari et infundi, ut uivat in utero homo. 
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Having discussed the origin of the soul Jean wants to show that the soul is a 
substance, that it is incorporeal, that it is simple and that it is one in three powers. 
The soul is a ‘hoc aliquid’, it is a substance following Aristotle’s account of 
substance and while its essence remains unchanged it is capable of receiving 
opposites, as in the case of moving from ignorance to knowledge.67 One argument 
for the soul’s incorporeality is that anything whose qualities are not perceived by a 
corporeal sense is itself incorporeal.68 Further the soul does not have spatial 
dimension which is clear with reference to the imaginative, the memorative and the 
intellectual powers. The species or likenesses of things, whether imagined or 
understood enter the soul in a simple mode, not a dimensional mode.  
 
Likewise, all that is received is present in that which receives it, according to 
the nature of the receiver, not according to the nature of that received; 
therefore, since the soul is receptive of all likenesses and species, they will be 
in the soul according to its nature; therefore since the species of things are in 
the soul, whether as imagined or understood, they are in a simple mode and 
not a spatial mode, since they do not fill the soul up; therefore the nature of 
the soul is simple and without quantity.69  
 
Jean distinguishes between the absolute simplicity of God and the simplicity of 
spiritual substances, such as the soul and an angel. He employs the concept of quod 
est and quo est (which, as stated above, Jean also employs to describe the formal 
cause of the soul) to distinguish the simplicity of God from the simplicity of the 
human soul. 
But properly and absolutely something is simple in which there is not a 
composition of matter and form nor the difference between ‘that which 
                                                
67 Summa, C. 22, 12-14. Sed anima secundum se recipit opposita intransmutata secundum essenciam, 
ut sciencie et ignorancie, ergo est substancia. 
68 Summa, C. 23, 4-6. Item, omne illud cuius qualitates non percipiuntur sensu corporeo est 
incorporeum 
69 Summa, C.24, 7-11. Item, omne quod recipitur est in recipiente secundum naturam recipientis, non 
secundum naturam recepti; cum ergo anima sit receptiua omnium similitudinum et specierum, erunt in 
anima secundum naturam ipsius; cum ergo sint in anima species rerum siue imaginatiue siue 
intellectiue, modo simplicitatis et non dimensionis, quia non replent eam; ergo natura anime simplex 
est et sine quantitate.   
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exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’, as in the case of God: for God and 
divinity do not differ in the same way as man and humanity differ; since 
when I say ‘a man’ I indicate ‘that he exists’ and when I say ‘humanity’ I 
refer to ‘that through which he exists’. However, when I say body, I am 
referring to matter; when I say soul, I am referring to form.70 
 
Following Avicenna the soul is one in three powers; they are the vegetative, the 
sensitive and the rational powers. Jean explains that just as a triangle is in a square so 
the vegetative is in the sensitive, the sensitive in the rational with the soul 
encompassing all three.  The soul is one from the point of view of substance, but it is 
different with regard to powers of the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational soul. 
 
Let us say therefore, following Augustine, in his book On the soul and spirit: 
‘the substance of the soul is one and the same’, the vegetative, the sensitive, 
the rational; but ‘according to the different powers it is assigned different 
names’.71 
 
 
1.6.6  (V) On the Soul with Regard to the Image 
 
 
Jean raises many questions with regard to the soul as the image of God. He devotes 
nine chapters to the topic, although two of the issues raised in his opening chapter are 
omitted altogether. He begins by asking what is the image in the divine persons 
essentially? The image to which the human soul is made is the essence of God as 
present in the Three Persons of the Trinity.  
 
And this is what Augustine said in the Sermon on the Image: There is a 
likeness of the Trinity in the soul which is as an image of its creator, perfectly 
formed in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit; and although it is of one 
nature, it has however, three dignities, intellect, will and memory; and just as 
there is God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, there are not 
                                                
70 Summa, C. 25, 11-16. Proprie uero et absolute simplex est in quo non est composicio materie et 
forme, nec differencia eius quod est et quo est, ut Deus: non enim differt Deus et deitas, sicut homo et 
humanitas; quia cum dico hominem significo quod est, cum dico humanitatem dico quo est. Cum 
autem dico corpus, dico materiam; cum uero dico animam, dico formam. 
71 Summa, C. 26, 89-92. Dicamus ergo, secundum Augustinum, in libro De anima et spiritu: ‘Una et 
eadem est anime substancia’ uegetabilis, sensitiua, racionalis; sed ‘secundum diversas potencias 
diversa sortitur uocabula.’   
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however three gods, so also the soul is intellect, will and memory, but there 
are not three souls.72 
 
The image of God in man is seen in man’s knowledge of first truth and in his love of 
the highest good; the soul remembers, understands and loves according to its own 
way and in an analogous way it is an image of God.73 The relationship between the 
three Persons is that the Son of God is an image of the Father in his characteristics 
and it is said of the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from the Father through spiration 
and also from the Son through spiration. 
 
So also the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son through one and the same 
spiration, and on account of this the Holy Spirit will not be an image of the 
Son, as the Son is the image of the Father.74  
 
The human soul alone carries within itself the likenesses of all things, spiritual and 
corporeal and for this reason it is capable of unity with God. Also in union with God 
the human soul has the power over its own body, which is analogous to the power of 
God to govern the world.75  Man also has the power to produce another person, as the 
first two Persons of the Trinity produced a third but an angel does not share this 
                                                
72 Summa, C. 28, 18-23. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, in Sermone de ymagine: Est similitudo 
Trinitatis in anima que est ad ymaginem sui conditoris perfecte in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto 
condita; et licet illa unius nature sit, habet tamen tres dignitates, intellectum, uoluntatem et 
memoriam; et sicut Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus, non tamen tres dii, ita anima est 
intellectus, uoluntas et memoria, non tamen tres anime.  
73 Summa, C. 30, 19-26. Ad ultimum dicendum quod quamuis non sit conueniencia in aliqua forma 
substanciali uel accidentali, est tamen conueniencia in ordine, quia rationalis creatura ordinatur ad 
Deum secundum immediacionem in cognicione prime ueritatis et amore summe bonitatis. Est eciam 
conueniencia proporcionaliter in effectu, ut sicut Deus memoratur, intelligit, diligit que tribus personis 
appropriantur, sic anima secundum suum modum.  
74 Summa, C.29, 30-32. Ut sicut a Patre spiritus sanctus per spiracionem, ita et a Filio per spiracionem 
unam et eamdem, et propter hoc non erit Spiritus sanctus ymago Filii, sicut Filius ymago Patris. 
75 Summa, C. 30, 79-85. Secundum quod accipitur essencialiter: sicut Deus habet uirtutem ad regimen, 
et continenciam, et mocionem sui mundi, sic anima ad regimen sui corporis, quasi sui mundi; unde 
Augustinus, in Sermone de ymagine: sicut Deus semper et ubique totus est omnia uiuificans, mouens 
et gubernans, sic anima ubique in suo corpore tota ubique uiget, illud mouens, uiuificans et gubernans; 
et hec est ymago Trinitatis omnipotentis Dei, quam habet anima in se.   
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power with the Trinity.76 What is meant by the quotation from Scripture, Let us make 
man to the image; Faciamus hominem ad ymaginem nostram; man is made according 
to the image, the preposition ad has the sense of completion or an efficient cause, 
that man is made as the nearest thing to perfection as is possible.77 The human soul is 
an image of the Trinity because of its most elevated part, the mind, and as an analogy 
of the Trinity it has three powers, memory, understanding and will. 
 
Inasmuch as man is called an image, according to the purpose of its nature, 
namely an expression  of conformity, not of totality, in the same way that the 
soul and man are an expression of conformity, according to their most pure 
and highest part of man, which is formed immediately by the first truth, 
which is called mind or intelligencia or superior reason, are said to be made 
in the image of the Trinity according to a threefold account of its power, 
namely memory, intellect, will, through which it is said to be immediately 
turned towards God; according to memory towards perfect eternity, according 
to intellect, towards first truth, according to the will, towards the highest 
good: eternity is attributed to the Father, truth to the Son and goodness to the 
Holy Spirit.78 
 
The section on image concludes with a long discussion on the soul as a 
representative of the Trinity. The unity that exists between memory, understanding 
and will in the human soul is analogous to the relationship between the persons of 
the Trinity in that both relationships are substantially inseparable. Jean, quoting from 
Augustine,79 states:  
 
                                                
76 Summa, C.30, 86-89. Preterea, est in ymitacione diuine uirtutis secundum quod accipitur 
personaliter, ut sicut est uirtus in personis qua possunt producere ex se personam, et uirtus in personis 
qua possunt produci, sic in humana natura: in hiis autem deficit angelus. 
77 Summa, C. 31, 15-19. – Vel per ymaginem potest accipi forma exemplaris, id est hominis; et tunc 
ymago supponit creatam ymaginem et hec dictio ad nota est termini siue complementi, id est cause 
efficientis, et est sensus: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem, id est ad talem perfectionem que sit nostra 
ymago et similitudo. 
78 Summa, C.33, 51-60. Secundum autem quod ymago dicitur, secundum intencionem qualitatis, 
expressio uidelicet conformitatis, non totalitatis, sic anima et homo secundum partem suam 
purissimam et summam, que immediate a prima ueritate formatur, que dicitur mens uel intellingencia 
uel superior racio, dicitur ad ymaginem Trinitatis secundum triplicem racionem potencie, scilicet 
memorie, intelligencie, uoluntatis, quibus immediate conuertitur ad Deum, secundum memoriam in 
summam eternitatem, secundum intelligenciam in primam ueritatem, secundum uoluntatem in 
summam bonitatem; eternitas Patri, ueritas Filio, bonitas Spiritui sancto. 
79 Augustine, De Trinitate, IX, c. 5, n. 8 (PL 42, 965). 
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Therefore in a wonderful way these three are inseparable from each other; 
and yet each singly is a substance or an essence, although they are said to be 
together in a relative sense.80  
 
 
 
1.6.7  (VI) On the Soul in Relation to the Body 
 
 
The question of the unity of soul and body goes back ultimately to Plato. Augustine, 
however, rejects the strong dualistic account of soul in Plato, and as we have seen 
above, stresses the unity of body and soul, particularly in his portrayal of the Trinity 
as an analogy of the human mind. The soul is united to the body essentially, in this 
way the rational soul is different from an angel. The instrumental quo differentiates, 
as before, between the nature of the human soul and its ability to be united to the 
body and how it does not belong to the essence of an angel to have a body.81 The 
soul is united to the body through its essence, as its form and its perfection. In this 
way it is united without an intermediary but in another way the powers of the soul 
are the intermediary between the substance of the soul and the activity of the soul. 
The soul is compared to the work of a craftsman who produces his works through an 
instrument. In the same way the soul acts through the medium of the vegetative and 
the sensitive powers, as, for example, in seeing and hearing: 
 
Since the activity of the soul is by means of an organ, inasmuch as the soul 
acts through the animated body, namely in seeing and hearing and other acts 
of this kind; the union of the soul itself to the body, as to its organ, occurs 
through its potency and its power, for example, by means of the vegetative 
and sensitive power.82  
 
                                                
80 Summa, C. 35, 92 – 94. ‘Miro itaque modo tria ista sunt inseparabilia a se ipsis; et tamen singulum 
eorum quodque est substancia uel essencia, licet ad inuicem relatiue dicantur.’  
81 Summa, C. 37, 1-4. Primo ergo queritur an anima corpori uniatur per medium, an sine medio; et 
cum unibilitas non sit accidentalis anime sed essencialis et sit illud quo essentialiter differt anima 
racionalis ab angelo, sicut dictum est prius. 
82 Summa, C. 37, 60-62. Quia ergo operacio anime fit organo, secundum quod anima per corpus 
animatum operatur, uidendo scilicet et audiendo et huiusmodi; unio ipsius anime ad corpus ut 
organum erit mediante potencia et ui eius; uerbi gracia, ut mediante uirtute uegetatiua et sensitiua. 
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In his discussion of the unity of the body, which is a composite, and the soul, which 
is a simple nature, Jean states that the body is composed of the four elements in 
collaboration with the fifth essence and is therefore the most perfect among all 
bodies constituted from the elements. It is because the body is so organised that it is 
impossible for it to be simple and of one nature. 
 
The body, therefore, not only the human or the animal but also the vegetative, 
is from elements, together with the fifth essence, for the purpose of 
establishing a harmony between them.83  
 
Two intermediaries pertain to the soul and two to the body.84 On the part of the soul, 
as we have seen above, are the sensitive nature and the vegetative nature.  
 
On the side of the body it is the fifth essence, called spirit. On the part of the 
body two intermediaries must be posited: one pertaining to the celestial 
nature, which is the fifth essence, which is called spirit: the naturalists call it 
the vehicle of the powers of the soul; and it is a delicate body, spiritual, and is 
diffused into the cavities of the limbs from the nature of the fifth essence; 
consequently its movement comes from its sources, as the movement from 
irradiation and illumination comes from luminous bodies: the principal and 
essential limbs are called the heart, the brain and the liver. Inasmuch as they 
are distinguished the threefold differences in spirit, are, natural in the liver, 
vital in the heart and animal spirit in the brain.85  
 
The union of body and soul is explained further in terms of ‘light’. Three forms of 
light, the light in carbon, the light in flame and the light in air are applied to the 
powers of the soul. The vegetative power is considered according to the mode of the 
                                                
83 Summa, C. 38, 65-68. Corpus ergo, non solum humanum uel animale, sed eciam cuiuscumque 
uegetabilis, erit ex quattuor elementis et quinta essencia concurrente, ad unam armoniam 
conciliandam in eis. 
84 The second intermediary on the part of the body is referred to in Chapter II, Section Four. 
85 Summa, C. 39, 53-61. Ex parte uero corporis ponenda sunt duo media: unum pertinens ad naturam 
celestem, que est quinta essencia, quod dicitur spiritus: dicitur a phisicis uehiculum uirium anime; et 
est corpus subtile, spirituale, diffusum in concauitatibus membrorum a natura quinte essencie; unde 
motus ipsius a fontibus est, sicut motus irradiacionis et illuminacionis a corporibus luminosis: fontes 
autem dicuntur principalia et radicalia membra, cor scilicet, cerebrum et epar. Secundum quod 
distinguitur triplex differencia spiritus, naturalis in epate, uitalis in corde, animalis in cerebro. 
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light in carbon, the sensitive to the light in flame and because both are dependent on 
bodies they perish with the body.  
 
Inasmuch as it is possible to think according to such a mode, one must 
understand a triple difference of the corporeal light, which is in the soul; just 
as there is a triple difference in corporeal light that is capable of unity, as the 
light in charcoal, the light in a flame, the light in air, in relation to the 
incorruptible celestial nature; in the same way there is a triple difference in 
the soul, which is understood as an incorporeal light that is capable of unity, 
also the vegetative soul in plants is considered according to the light in 
charcoal because it is united to the dense and terrestrial bodies of plants not 
suited to local movement, nor is it radiant through knowledge, in such a way 
that a light of cognition shines; on the other hand, the sensitive soul is 
considered as the light present in a flame which is united to bodies that are 
more fine and more suited to movement and it is radiant since the light of 
cognition pours out from it; and these two according to nature are dependent 
on the body and therefore die with the body.86  
 
The rational power is thought of as the light of the celestial nature, incorruptible, 
radiating in the air and in this way the soul is present in the human body, leading the 
intellect to the comprehension of truth.87 This light is called the empyrean light (lux 
celi empirei) disposes the human body to receive the noblest life, that is, the rational 
life.  
 
The explanation for the unity of body and soul in terms of the fifth element 
points to an explanation that is later used by Thomas Aquinas where he denies that 
the four elements alone are responsible for cognition. For Jean and Thomas Aquinas 
                                                
86 Summa, C. 40, 122-135. Secundum talem modum secundum quod possibile est cogitare, est 
accipere triplicem differenciam lucis incorporee, que est in anima: ut sicut triplex est differencia lucis 
corporee unibilis, ut lux in carbone, lux in flamma, lux in aere, a natura celesti incorruptibili; sic est 
triplex differencia anime, que intelligitur ut lux incorporea unibilis, et cogitetur uegetabilis anima in 
plantis secundum modum lucis in carbone, eo quod ipsa uniatur corporibus grossis et terrestribus 
plantarum ineptis ad motum localem, nec est radiosa per cognicionem, ut ex ea lumen cognicionis 
fulgeat; anima uero sensibilis cogitetur ut lux in flamma que unitur corporibus subtilioribus et 
aptioribus ad motum, et est radiosa quia lumen cognicionis effundit de se; et hec due secundum 
naturam sunt dependentes a corporibus, et ideo deficiunt cum eis. Anima uero racionalis cogitetur ut 
lux nature celestis, incorruptibilis, radians in aere, sic et ipsa anima in humano corpore.     
87 Summa, C. 40, 142-144. Sic ergo sane intelligatur exemplum positum, in quantum scilicet dirigit 
intellectum ad comprehensionem veri. 
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the account of sensation must go beyond the four elements, that of earth, air, fire and 
water. The unity of body and soul is influenced by the heavenly bodies which are 
composed of quintessence or fifth essence. Aristotle posited the theory that ether was 
the cause of the circular movements of the celestial bodies and in his psychology he 
held the doctrine of the pneuma ‘and it is usual to assume that pneuma means only 
something like a peculiar kind of body (analogous to ether) in which the soul 
permanently resides or which is its organ’.88 Avicenna’s theory of emanation is also 
behind the explanation as will become apparent in our discussion on the active 
intellect in Avicenna. While Aquinas seems to hold to a quasi-materialist explanation 
of sensation he also wants to maintain that there is something above and beyond the 
material explanation of sensation. Avicenna’s explanation of the sublunar world 
relies on his theory of emanation where ‘he knits intelligences and spheres together 
through a series of emanations.’89 The last in the series of Avicenna’s incorporeal 
intelligences is the active intellect which along with the aid of the movement of the 
heavens ‘there emanates […], something containing the imprint of the forms of the 
lower world’.90  The question is asked as to why the heavenly bodies were believed 
to have souls in the first place. One possible answer is stated as follows: 
 
One rationale for supposing that the heavenly bodies are living rather than 
just bodily but not living is the assumption that reality is hierarchical: to be 
alive is supposed to be better than not to be alive, and the heavenly bodies are 
assumed to be beings of a higher kind than we are. […] If there is life already 
in sublunary nature, there must be life in the heavens as well, which is a 
higher sphere of being than nature.91  
 
                                                
88 A.H. Armstrong, ed. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 40 n. 9. 
89 Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes, on Intellect (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 74.  
90 Ibid.,  p. 77. 
91 Miira Tuominen, The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle (UK: Acumen, 2009), p. 151. 
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This hierarchy is also present in Jean’s identification of different types of light to 
explain the reciprocal nature of body and soul. The rational soul receives the most 
noble light, that of the empyrean light. The reference to light highlights the 
reciprocity of matter and form and but also the separability of both. A contemporary 
of Jean’s at Oxford, Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168–1253) developed an original theory 
with regard to light. His thesis was that the ‘first form of corporeity is to be identified 
with light’.92 This conclusion is supported by the fact that light has ‘excellences 
which place it beyond all corporeal and material things and liken its nature to that of 
the separate forms of intelligences, in view of all sapientes’.93 Jean and Grosseteste 
share a common source, that of Avicenna and his theory of vision. In fact, in the 
thirteenth century ‘there is hardly any Western reader who does not give an 
Aristotelian or Grossetestian bent to Avicenna’s concept of acquired light (lumen)’.94 
This will be referred to in our discussion of the five senses and how Avicenna’s 
theory of vision impacted on the authors on the soul in the early thirteenth century. 
 
1.6.8  (VII) On the Immortality of the Soul 
 
 
Jean begins his discussion on the immortality of the soul by stating that if there is 
divine justice bad deeds will be punished and good deeds rewarded, but not in this 
life: 
 
The immortality of the soul is shown in relation to the justice of God by way 
of two arguments, the first of which is: if there is divine justice, God will 
repay the good as much as the bad according to merit; that is, to the good 
there will be rewards, to the bad, punishments. But it will not happen in this 
life: if there is divine justice, the good and bad will be repaid after this life. 
                                                
92 James McEvoy, ‘Medieval Cosmology and Modern Science’ in Philosophy and Totality, ed. by 
James McEvoy (Belfast: Mayne, Boyd & Son, 1977), pp. 91–110 (p. 92). 
93 Ibid. 
94 Hasse, p. 115.  
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Therefore the souls of the good as much as the bad remain after this life since 
there is divine justice.95 
 
He puts forward many arguments for the immortality of the soul; that man shares 
immortality with an angel and mortality with the beast. 
 
Likewise, Gregory, in the fourth book of the Diaologes states: ‘Man is 
created as an intermediary, so that he is inferior to an angel, superior to an 
animal; thus he possesses something which necessarily agrees with that 
which is superior and something which agrees with the inferior, namely 
immortality of the spirit with an angel, mortality of the body with an 
animal’.96 
 
Further if in material being prime matter is incorruptible, similarly in formal being 
ultimate form is incorruptible, that is, the rational soul, which is the noblest 
perfection.97 Since the being of the soul does not depend on the being of the body the 
soul is, therefore, separable from the body.  
 
Likewise, the immortality of the soul in comparison to the body is shown in 
many ways, as follows. Every substance, whose activity does not depend on 
the body, is itself not dependent on the body; but the activity of the rational 
soul itself inasmuch as it is of this kind, does not depend on the body, namely 
understanding. Therefore it is a substance that does not depend on the body; it 
is therefore separable from the body and lives without the body.98  
 
                                                
95 Summa, C. 44, 1-6. Ostenditur ergo immortalitas anime per comparacionem ad Dei iusticiam 
duabus racionibus, quarum prima est: si divina iusticia est, retribuet tam bonis quam malis secundum 
merita; bonis scilict premia, malis penas. Sed hoc non fit in hac uita: si ergo divina iusticia est, bonis 
et malis fiet retribucio post hanc uitam. Manent ergo anime tam bonorum quam malorum post hanc 
uitam cum divina iusticia sit. 
96 Summa, C. 44, 35-39. Gregorius, Dialogorum, IV, c. 3 (PL 77, 321 B). Item, Gregorius, in quarto 
libro Dialogorum: ‘Homo sicut in medio creatus est, ut esset inferior angelo, superior iumento; ita 
habet aliquid quod necesse est conuenire cum summo, aliquid cum infimo, scilicet immortalitatem 
spiritus cum angelo, mortalitatem uero corporis cum iumento’.  
97 Summa, C. 44, 44-46. Si igitur in esse materie incorruptibilis est materia prima, scilicet yle; similiter 
in esse forme incorruptibilis erit forma ultima, scilicet anima racionalis que est perfectio dignissima.      
98 Summa, C. 44, 145-150. Item, ostenditur immortalitas anime per comparacionem ad corpus 
multiplicitur, sic. Omnis substancia cuius operacio non dependet a corpore, nec ipsa dependet ex 
corpore; sed ipsa operacio anime intellectiue in quantum huiusmodi non dependet ex corpore, scilicet 
intelligere. Ergo nec substancia dependet ex corpore: igitur est separabilis a corpore et uiuens sine 
corpore. 
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The rational soul is moved naturally by desire for happiness and beatitude as for an 
end, desiring immortality it seeks and strives naturally for it.99 The more the 
intellective power is immersed into the body the more passive and slow it is but 
when distanced from the body it understands more clearly.100  
 
 
1.6.9  (VIII) On the Passibility of the Soul 
 
 
The passibility of the soul is described in two ways. Firstly, the question of the 
passibility of the soul is considered before the Fall and, in this mode, the soul is not 
at fault; but, in the second mode, it refers to after the Fall and, therefore, the soul is 
said to suffer.101 The question is asked as to whether the soul suffers as a result of 
being in the body and if it does not have ‘dimensional quantity’ how can there be 
contact between the body and soul.102 The soul does, however, suffer in many ways 
along with the body, for example, the master suffers in punishment of his slave, a 
mother in the punishment of her son.  
 
It should be said in reply to the objections: to the first that suffering is 
twofold, that is, of subjection and of compassion. The suffering of subjection 
is, by nature, weaker, in the way that weaker bodies suffer from stronger 
bodies, as wood from fire; the suffering of compassion is of a stronger nature, 
in the way that a master suffers in the punishment of his slave, and a mother 
in the punishment of her son; in this way the soul suffers in the suffering of 
the body in the feeling of compassion.103 
                                                
99 Summa, C. 44, 130-131. Sed anima racionalis naturaliter mouetur per apppetitum ad felicitatem et 
beatitudinem.                
100 Summa, C. 44, 150-153. Item, omnis uirtus cuius operacio impeditur a corpore, eius esse non 
dependet a corpore; sed uirtus intellectiua est huiusmodi, quia quanto plus corpori se immerserit, tanto 
intelliget obtusius et tardius; quanto autem se elongauerit, tanto clarius et facilius.                               
101 Summa, C. 46, 67-69. Causa ergo passibilitatis miserie que pena est, est ex culpa. Primo modo 
passibilitas antecedit culpam; secundo est post culpam. 
102 Summa, C. 48, 4-6. Item, omnis actio naturalis est per contactum, sed non est contactus nisi eorum 
que habent quantitatem dimensiuam.                    
103 Summa, C. 48, 16 -21. Dicendum ergo ad obiecta: ad primum quod passio est duplex, subiectionis 
scilicet et compassionis. Passio subiectionis est nature infirmioris, quemadmodum paciuntur corpora 
infirmiora a forcioribus corporibus, ut ligna ab igne; passio compassionis est nature forcioris, 
quemadmodum dominus patitur in pena serui, et mater in pena filii; sic anima patitur in passione 
corporis compaciendo. 
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The above at least points to one way in which the body and soul interact with each 
other. The problem for the medieval thinkers of the thirteenth century was not only 
to explain how body and soul can interact but it also raises the problem as to how can 
the soul be understood as self-subsisting as Plato and Augustine argued and as the 
form or principle of a body as defined by Aristotle. This will be among the topics for 
discussion in the following chapter where we will see that Jean sees no contradiction 
in holding that the soul can be conceived in both ways. 
 
1.6.10  (IX) On the Place of the Soul 
 
To say that the soul is determined to a place is appropriate by the fact that it is a 
substance which is limited and finite since it must be distinguished from God who is 
unlimited and infinite and, therefore, everywhere. 
 
Note therefore that being in a place through limitation is suited to the soul by 
reason of substance which is limited and finite. Hence, being in one place and 
not in another is fitting in relation to the difference from the divine substance 
which is unlimited and infinite, and for this reason it is everywhere. This 
mode of being is suited to the separated soul. For being in a place through a 
presence is suited to it on account of its activity. Also John Damascene states, 
in relation to an angel, that it is present where it acts. On the other hand, 
being in a place because it is circumscribed is fitting by accident, that is, 
through union with the body. There ought to be a place through limitation, by 
reason of substance; by reason of its activity; by reason of being 
circumscribed, but it is by accident, because of the body.104  
 
                                                
104 Summa, C. 51, 48-58. Nota ergo quod esse in loco per diffinicionem conuenit anime racione 
substancie que est terminata et finita. Vnde ei conuenit ita esse alicubi quod non alibi, ad differenciam 
divine substancie que interminata est et infinita et ideo ubique est. Et hic modus essendi in loco 
conuenit anime separate. Esse uero per presenciam in loco ei convenit propter operacionem. Vnde et 
Ioannes Damascenus de angelo dicit quod ibi est ubi operatur. Esse uero in loco per 
circumscriptionem ei conuenit per accidens, scilicet per eam unionem que est ad corpus. Debetur ergo 
ei esse in loco per diffinicionem racione substancie; esse uero per presenciam eidem racione 
operacionis; esse vero per circumscriptionem, sed per accidens, racione corporis. 
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Also, following the Pseudo-Augustine, Jean states that it cannot be said that it 
occupies a space such that a greater part of it occupies a greater place. On the 
contrary, the soul in total is every part of the body. 
 
Hence Augustine in the book On the soul and the spirit states that in respect 
to the incorporeal nature of he who is everywhere supremely unchanging, 
namely through his presence, the soul itself is said to be corporeal or 
localised, since it is in one place, and therefore not in another; but it is in a 
place through limitation, not however that it is situated in the space of a 
place, so that a greater part occupies a greater part, that it is in a place through 
circumscription, on the contrary, it is whole in every part and completely 
present in each part.105 
 
Jean posits a number of states of being for the soul after its separation from the body, 
for example, following Augustine, he states that the soul will be where it was always, 
acting in the body and in that way it will be punished or rewarded.106 He also follows 
Augustine where he states that just as it can be said that God was in some place 
before the World began and would be in if the World ceased to be, in the same way 
if the soul had being before the constitution of the body it will have it after the 
dissolution of the body.107 
 
1.6.11  (X) Movement of the Separated Soul 
 
 
It is asked if the soul is moved from place to place, if it is moved suddenly or if it is 
moved in succession. The soul is not moved to a place but it is moved by time 
according to the Pseudo-Augustine. The soul is understood as passing through in 
                                                
105 Summa, C. 51, 78-84. Vnde Augustinus in libro De anima et spiritu, dicit quod respectu incorporee 
nature que summe incommutabilis est et ubique est, scilicet per presenciam, ipsa anima dicitur 
corporea siue localis, quia alicubi est, ita quod non alibi; hoc est esse per diffinicionem, non tamen 
loci spacio ita sistitur, ut maiore sui parte maiorem locum occupet, quod est esse in loco per 
circumscriptionem, immo in omnibus partibus corporis est tota et in singulis tota.      
106 Summa, C. 55, 11-12. Augustinus, in libro De anima et spiritu: ‘Ibi est anima, post corporis 
separacionem, ubi erat agens in corpore’.  
107 Summa, C. 55, 26-28. Ita intelligendum est de anima, secundum Augustinum: si haberet esse ante 
constitucionem corporis, sicut habet post resolucionem.      
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time, as a succession is found according to a before and an after or according to a 
past and future, since it knows that which it did not know previously and desires that 
which it did not desire previously. 
 
Hence Augustine, in the book, On the soul and the spirit: placed between 
God and the body, it moves through time, either remembering what has been 
forgotten, or learning what one does not know, or by willing what has been 
denied.108 
 
Jean’s source is clearly the Pseudo-Augustine’s De spiritu et anima where it is said 
that the soul does not move through space since it is not ‘extended over the space of 
places’.109  
 
The movement of the soul is the last topic of the series of questions on the 
soul. The first Consideratio is, as was stated earlier, a fully fledged theological 
treatise yet some points regarding its structure and content deserve mention. The 
order of the topics follow a certain logical order; the soul as part of the body; the soul 
as it leaves the body; the soul after separation from the body. Jean places Avicenna’s 
thought-experiment in the opening chapter thereby giving prominent place to the 
Arabic philosopher in his discussion on the existence of the soul. With regard to the 
personal nature of the first Consideratio it can be said that Jean incorporates the new 
material in order to clarify his theological beliefs. At the theological level, Augustine 
is the authority, but Jean shows himself to be very much open to the challenge of 
integrating Avicenna’s works into his Augustinian account of the psychology of the 
soul. It is true to say that he held philosophy in high regard. The overview shows that 
Jean was aware of philosophical questions that are with us to this day; that of the 
                                                
108 Summa, C. 56, 44-47. Vnde Augustinus, in libro De anima et spiritu: anima inter Deum et corpus 
posita, per tempus mouetur, uel reminiscendo quod oblita fuerat, uel discendo quod ignorabat, uel 
uolendo quod nolebat.                  
109 McGinn, p. 206. 
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mind/body problem, the immateriality of the soul, the immortality of the soul. He 
realised the great divide that still existed between body and soul and it is Jean’s 
engagement with philosophy, above all with Avicenna, which helped to narrow the 
gap between philosophy and theology.        
 
 
SECTION SEVEN 
OUTLINE OF THE SECOND CONSIDERATIO OF THE SUMMA 
 
The second main topic of my thesis is a discussion of the powers of the soul 
according to the Pseudo-Augustine, John Damascene, and Avicenna, the authorities 
on the psychology of the soul at this time. The translation of appropriate passages 
will be withheld for inclusion in their respective chapters.  
 
1.7.1 Powers of the Soul According to Pseudo-Augustine 
 
 
Recent scholarship dates the Pseudo-Augustine’s work in Cistercian circles around 
1170; The Fount of Knowledge, Damascene’s major work, written in Greek in 743 
was translated into Latin in the middle of the twelfth century; Avicenna’s De anima 
was also translated into Latin in the twelfth century, sometime between 1152 and 
1166; the reception of the texts will be examined in more detail later. The following 
may serve as a brief introduction to the second Consideratio.  
 
Although the Pseudo-Augustine’s De spiritu et anima was written in a 
predominantly theological framework it was, nevertheless, the most influential 
Augustinian discussion of the psychology of soul in the early thirteenth century. It is 
a compilation by different authors (originally it was ascribed to Alcher of Clairvaux) 
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and, as it was stated above, Jean also wrongly attributes the work to the genuine 
Augustine. Augustine’s psychology was not, as we have already mentioned, a faculty 
psychology, so how was his name associated with the text of De spiritu et anima? 
The treatise although ‘ascribed to, among others, Bernard, Hugh of St Victor, Isaac 
of Stella, and William of Thierry, at different times, its connection with the name of 
Augustine was the one that stuck’.110 The error was also made possible by the 
amount of genuine Augustinian material contained in it and also because there were 
those who were anxious to incorporate Augustine into the new Greek and Arabic 
sources but wished to do so while remaining ‘in harmony with the best aspects of 
tradition’111  
 
The first question asks whether the soul is its powers or potencies. Jean gives 
several positions for and against the statement that the soul is identical with its 
powers. Some argue, according to Jean, that the being of the soul and its activities 
are not the same and that, therefore, its essence and its powers are not the same. 
Others, he states, and he includes Augustine among them, are those who say that the 
soul is the same as its powers but differ only according to reason (secundum 
racionem).  The assertion or non assertion of the identity was of interest to 
philosopher and theologian and according to McGinn it was because of the ascription 
to Augustine that the De spiritu et anima played ‘an important role in the evolution 
of one of the major themes of thirteenth century Augustinianism’.112 The anonymous 
author or authors of the De spiritu et anima defended the Augustinian view, as we 
will see, in Jean’s treatment of the question. Jean’s presentation of the powers of the 
soul according to the Pseudo-Augustine is considerably shorter than that of John 
                                                
110 Ibid., p.68. 
111 Ibid., p.69. 
112 Ibid. 
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Damascene or Avicenna, but the particular passages in the Summa introduce the 
‘new’ medical theories of the four elements and the four humours and their 
respective organs (liver, heart and brain). The author (or more correctly, the 
compiler) of the De spiritu et anima distinguishes between the rational, the 
concupiscible and the irascible powers. In addition there are five cognitive powers, 
they are sensation, imagination, reason, intellect and understanding. The importance 
of the text lies in the fact that it was connected with the commencement of 
Franciscan theology and for our purposes it has much to tell us about the early 
studies on the soul.113 
 
1.7.2 Powers of the Soul According to Damascene 
 
 
John of Damascus (c. 650/ 660–750) a monk in the monastery of Mar-Saba,114 near 
Jerusalem ‘was the son of a local Christian notable who served in the financial 
administration of the Caliphate of Damascus’.115 Little is known of the life of 
Damascene, but his psychology was known to the medieval scholars through his 
work entitled De fide orthodoxa.116 Jean quotes extensively from this work, and here 
I give a brief summary of the cognitive powers as outlined by Jean. 
 
                                                
113 ‘In the late 1230’s and early 1240’s the influence of The Spirit and the Soul is connected with the 
beginnings of Franciscan theology, the current which was to provide the center for Augustinianism in 
the thirteenth century.’ McGinn, p. 71. 
114 ‘The tradition that his monastery was the famous Great Laura, the monastery of St Sabas (or Mar 
Saba), founded in 478 by St Sabas on the steep slopes of the Wadi Kidron in the Judaean desert, is a 
late tradition: there is no mention of this monastery in the account of John in the tenth-century 
Synaxarion of Constantinople; its earliest mention seems to be in the probably tenth-century Greek 
vita, composed by John, patriarch of Jersusalem. There is little doubt, however, that it was in the 
environs of Jerusalem that he became a monk, for one of the rare personal references in his works 
mentions his closeness to the patriarch (presumably John V, 706-35: Trisag. 26. 13-14).’ Andrew 
Louth, St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 6. 
115 Coleman, p. 389. 
116 See Chapter IV below (pp. 136-137) for details of the translation of De fide Orthodox (On the 
Orthodox Faith).  
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The first division is that of the exterior irrational powers of knowing, these 
are the five external senses, an explanation of the functions of each is given. The 
interior irrational powers are the imaginative, the excogitative (also called opinion) 
and the memorial powers. The imaginative is the source and origin of the external 
sensibles; opinion pertains to the sensitive power of judgement and is the power to 
conceptualise, to make judgements as regards carrying out an action or avoiding it. 
The power of memory stores the representations left by the senses; it also stores the 
types of objects on which an opinion is formed and things which it understands. 
 
The rational powers of knowing, known as intellect or mind, follow a triple 
path, the way of experience, the way of conceptualising and the way of teaching; the 
first way passes through the senses, to the ‘imaginacio’, from which one forms an 
opinion, the mind then judging the opinion decides whether it is true or false. The 
second is conceptualising something that is permanently known by the soul and it 
refers to syllogistic reasoning, such as; the whole is greater than its parts; every 
continuum is a whole; therefore every continuum is greater than its parts. This way is 
called prudence and is an example of how Damascene’s connects the virtues with the 
powers of the soul. The third way is the way of teaching and it refers to the transfer 
of insight to another. Jean then provides an exposition of the irrational appetite and 
the emotions that follow from it, pleasure, sadness, fear, and anger. This is followed 
by a discussion on the rational movement of the soul with regard to the will and 
reason, and he finishes with a long discussion on the question of free will. He poses 
two questions, the first is whether we do have free will (or not) and the second 
concerns the things over which we do have power. 
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1.7.3 The Powers of the Soul According to Avicenna 
 
 
The treatment of the powers of the soul according to Avicenna occupies thirty-eight 
chapters. It follows the psychology of Avicenna for the most part but it brings in 
some elements from outside sources, such as in Chapter 100 where Jean discusses 
which cognitive faculties are at work when we are dreaming.  
 
Briefly Jean posits three powers of the soul, the vis vegetabilis, the vis 
sensibilius and the vis racionalis. The vis vegetabilis is further divided into the 
generative, nutritive and augmentative powers; the vis sensibilis into the 
apprehensive power and the motive power. The apprehensive power is further 
divided into an animal mode and a natural mode, the animal mode being the 
cognitive power subject to reason, as in the power of sight and hearing; and the 
natural mode is the imagination which is not subject to reason. The motive power is 
likewise subdivided into a natural mode and an animal mode, the former is called the 
virtus vitalis or the pulsativa; the latter is the appetitive power, that is, the irascible 
and concupiscible powers. The third power. specific to man, is the rational soul 
which acts only as guided by reason.  
 
Jean follows Avicenna’s De anima very closely in his treatment of the 
external and the internal senses. The five internal senses are fantasia (also called the 
common sense by Avicenna); imagination; imaginative (also called sensitive 
imagination and cogitative imagination); estimative; memory; Avicenna assigns a 
place for each within the ventricles of the brain. The estimative power is innovative 
in Avicenna’s account of the internal senses and, as we will see, Jean provides a 
comprehensive account of the estimative power and also of Avicenna’s theory of 
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abstraction. He is one of a few authors who successively integrates an Augustinian 
psychology of the soul with Avicenna’s theory of the agent intellect.   
 
 
 
 
SECTION EIGHT 
INFLUENCES OF THE SUMMA 
 
Jean’s Summa is one of the principal sources of the Summa Fratris Alexandri, also 
called the Summa Halesiana, after Alexander of Hales (1180/1186–1245). Alexander 
is considered a very notable figure in the history of medieval philosophy and 
according to Gilson one of the first masters to teach a commentary on the Sentences 
of Peter Lombard, the standard theological text of the period.117 It is from the studies 
of Victorin Doucet, published almost sixty years ago, that we now know that it was 
Jean who produced the first and third books of the Summa Fratris Alexandri.118  In 
fact, Bougerol’s edition of the Summa is a twentieth century contribution to a process 
which began in the thirteenth century when it was remarked by Roger Bacon that it 
was not Alexander who produced it but others (quam ipse non fecit, sed alii).119 
Although Alexander of Hales (d.1245) was the initiator of the work scholars today 
recognise the important contribution of Jean and others to the Summa Halesiana.120 
The fact that it was compiled by members of the same doctrinal school gives it ‘a 
distinct signification’ and Gilson continues it ‘remarkably illustrates what may be 
                                                
117 Gilson, p. 327. 
118 Hasse, p. 51, n. 227. Doucet, Prolegomena (1948). (Victorin Doucet, Alexandri Hales O.M. 
Summa theologica, t. 4, Prolegomena, Quaracchi, 1948). 
119 Roger Bacon, Opera hactenus inedita, p. 326. Quoted in Hasse, p. 51, n. 226 
120 Bougerol, pp. 38-39.  
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called “the spirit of the thirteenth-century Franciscan school of theology at the 
University of Paris”’.121  
 
 In his introduction to Jean’s Summa de anima Bougerol highlights a number 
of passages in the Summa Fratris Alexandri corresponding to chapters in Jean’s 
Summa. The following is taken from Bougerol’s account; from a cursory reading of 
the content and chapter headings in the Summa Fratris Alexandri it seems that the 
list is not exhaustive. For example, Bougerol does not refer to Alexander de Hales’s 
employment of the terms quod est and quo est in the latter’s discussion on the 
simplicity of the soul. The following examples are borrowed from Bougerol to 
illustrate the important contribution made by Jean to the work of his master and 
colleague, Alexander who, ‘may truly be seen as the founder of the Franciscan 
School, for he gave that school both its body of teachings and its characteristic 
spirit’.122 The Summa Fratris Alexandri is referred to as the ‘Summa’ by Bougerol, 
the numbers refer to the ‘questions’ in Alexander’s Summa. The chapter numbers 
refer to Jean’s text.  
 
 From Book I of Alexander’s Summa on the study of the image, question n. 
413 is reproduced from Chapter 28 of Jean. It is reproduced to the letter, including 
the citations from Sermon 52 of the Pseudo-Augustine. In Book II-I of the Summa 
concerning the existence of the soul certain arguments from Chapter 1 of Jean’s 
Summa appear. Also, among the definitions of the soul, the first, second and the 
fourth are from Jean. The treatment of the final cause of the soul in question 330 of 
Alexander’s Summa is to be found in Chapter 19 of Jean’s text. Likewise, the 
                                                
121 Gilson, p. 327. 
122 J. Guy Bourgerol, Introduction to the works of Bonaventure, trans. by José Vinck (New Jersey: St 
Anthony Guild Press), p. 15. 
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simplicity of the soul in question in 331 is found in Chapter 24 of Jean. The question 
of the place of the soul in Alexander’s Summa, 334 and 335 are copied ad verbum 
from Jean’s chapters, 51 and 53. Jean’s chapters on image and the Trinity are also 
the source of much of the content of questions 336-342 of Alexander’s work. There 
are parallels also between both works in the treatment of the powers of the soul. It is 
interesting to note that Jean’s Tractatus, which was his first treatise on the powers of 
the soul, does not appear to be a source for Alexander’s Summa. Jean’s contribution 
to Alexander’s Theological Summa deserves to be highlighted if we consider that the 
latter is described as a ‘remarkable, indeed a unique, witness to the intellectual state 
of the first half of the thirteenth century’.123 
 
Jean’s Summa is also one of the principal sources of Vincent Beauvais’s 
Speculum Naturale where his Summa is also quoted extensively in Beauvais’s work. 
The latter is described by Hasse as ‘the most influential encyclopaedist of the Middle 
Ages’124 and from Vernier we learn that he was a Dominican of the thirteenth 
century, lector of the Cistercian abbey of Royaumont125 and an acquaintance of Saint 
Louis the King.126 Vernier states that after the study of God as creator of all beings, 
of the Trinity, of angels and devils it presents an immense glossary of the Genesis 
story of Creation.127 It is in Book XIII that Vincent includes a section on the soul 
                                                
123 Bourgerol, The Works of Bonaventure, p. 15. 
124 Hasse, p.74. 
125 Vernier. Somme de L’âme, p. 22 n. 2. Vincent écrit lui-même que sur l’ordre du roi, il exerçait cet 
office à Royaumont (cf. Epistola consolatoria, De eruditione filiorum regalium, Tractatus de morali 
principis institutione, voir Quétif et Echard, Scriptores  O.P., t. 1, p. 239). 
126 Ibid., p. 22 n. 3. Cf. Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, Letouzé et Ané, Paris, 1950, t. XV, 2nd 
partie, col. 3027-3028, art. Vincent de Beauvais par H. Peltier.  
127 Ibid., pp. 21-27. Vernier provides a comprehensive survey of the sections from Jean’s Summa and 
gives a detailed list of the paragraphs that are incorporated into Beauvais’ work.  
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which according to Hasse depends heavily on Albert the Great’s De Homine and 
Jean’s Summa.128   
 
It is held also that Thomas Aquinas followed Jean’s structure of the Summa 
in his work entitled Disputed Questions on the Soul which is highlighted by Bazan in 
the preface to his edition of this work.129 He states that without doubt it was Jean’s 
Summa which influenced Thomas Aquinas in his structuring of his questions on the 
soul. Bazan points to chapter thirty six of the Summa in which Jean discusses how he 
will proceed to discuss the relationship between the body and soul which 
corresponds to that used by Thomas Aquinas. There is further evidence which 
connects the two authors, for example the distinction between being and essence is 
already present in chapter 17 of the Summa, this distinction was employed by 
Thomas Aquinas in his work entitled the De Ente et Essentia and it points to the fact 
that Jean’s work was well known to him and influenced him in his writing on the 
soul.  It is more than likely the case that certain other doctrines which Jean exposes 
may help to find possible sources of theories that at times can be difficult to pinpoint.  
 
1.8.1 Conclusion 
 
 
The tradition that we are examining here stems from what has come to be known 
since the twentieth century as ‘philosophical anthropology’ a term that could be said 
to have had its origin in the medieval reflection on the subject of Man. One author 
writing on the philosophical and theological traditions of the thirteenth century 
states: 
                                                
128 Hasse, p. 51. 
129 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed questions on the soul, ed. B. Carlos Bazan, Opera Omnia, t. XXIV, 1, 
(Rome-Paris, Commissio Leonina-Ed. Du Cerf. 1966), p. 102*.  
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It is well known that the term ‘philosophical anthropology’ has its cultural 
matrix in twentieth-century currents of thought. The use of such a definition 
in a different and definite chronological context, such as that of the thirteenth 
century, therefore derives the idea from contemporary philosophical studies, 
such as phenomenological thought, but it perfectly suits the hypothesis of 
research here developed, related to the outline of a doctrine of man, of 
medical, biological origins complementary to the traditional theological 
anthropology of Augustinian school.130 
 
This was a very specific moment in time when the philosophical works of Aristotle 
and Avicenna overwhelmed the intellectual scene, presenting a great challenge to the 
theologian writing in the early years of the thirteenth century. Jean’s Summa is 
testament to the great efforts of the scholastic writers who were writing at the very 
beginning of a new genre of writing on that ‘philosophical-theological enigma, the 
soul, which makes us humans what we are,’131 not only as it is presented in the works 
of Aristotle and Avicenna but also taking into account the efforts to integrate them 
with Augustine’s Neoplatonism on the philosophical level and with Christian dogma 
and principles on the theological level. It is testament to Jean that his works were 
known widely but more importantly, Jean knew the potential value of this new 
knowledge and the need to understand it and not only to provide an exposition of the 
many doctrines but to show that it is his own search for truth that is uppermost in his 
mind and this is what gives the Summa its distinctive shape.  
 
 
                                                
130 Vico, p. 317.  
131 Edward A., Synan, : Speculum: 1997 Vol. 72, No. 4, pp.1188-1189 (1889). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
EXPOSITION AND ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS 
RELATING TO SPECIFIC DOCTRINES ON THE SOUL 
 
For the purposes of our inquiry into and analysis of themes relating to Jean’s 
doctrines on the soul, references in this exposition of Jean’s arguments regarding his 
specific doctrines on the soul will be made to the Greek, Arabic and Christian 
influences on our author where they apply to passages in Jean’s text or are most 
relevant to their evaluation. While it may be difficult to trace conclusively the origin 
of some of Jean’s arguments, it will be useful to refer to the views of those who, 
directly or indirectly, influenced his position on such topics as, for instance, the 
existence of the soul; the incorporeality of the soul; the soul in relation to the body 
and the question of the immortality of the soul. 
 
SECTION ONE 
ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL 
 
The first topic for discussion is the existence of the soul. In order to prove the 
existence of the soul Jean quotes Avicenna’s famous thought-experiment in support 
of his argument. It appears in many of Avicenna’s psychological writings but we can 
see that Jean quotes the passage almost verbatim from Avicenna’s De anima.1  The 
De anima is part six of a work entitled aš-Šifā, it is Avicenna’s most comprehensive 
work on the soul, and also known by another Latin name, the Liber sextus de 
naturalibus. The translation of the De anima was carried out in the middle of the 
twelfth century by Avendauth (also known as Abraham Ibn Daud) in collaboration 
                                                
1 Van Riet, pp. 36 49-37 68 (Book 1, c. 1).  
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with Dominicus Gundissalinus, archdeacon of the district of Cuéllar in the diocese of 
Segovia between 1162 and 1181.2 It is around this time too, the middle of the twelfth 
century, that James of Venice translated Aristotle’s treatise on the soul, the Peri 
psychēs from the Greek. This is known as the translatio vetus and is to be 
distinguished from the revision produced by William of Moerbeke between 1260 and 
1269. The following is Avicenna’s argument as we have it in Jean’s treatise: 
 
For this purpose the argument of Avicenna is as follows: given that a man 
was created immediately and, his vision has been veiled, he would not see 
exterior objects, and that he was made in such a way that the breadth of the 
air which he himself could feel would not touch him, and the limbs were 
separated in such a way that they do not meet nor touch each other; it is clear 
that man made in this way, thinking about himself, would not hesitate to 
affirm that he exists: however he would not affirm the outer parts of his 
organs nor the hidden parts of his interior organs, such as the brain or other 
inner organs; indeed if it were possible for him to imagine a hand, or another 
limb, he would not imagine that limb as his own, nor as necessary to his 
essence. Since therefore everything that is affirmed is different from that 
which is not affirmed, and that which is conceded is different from that which 
is not conceded, the essence however, which he affirms, is his own, because 
it is his very self: however this essence is apart from his body, since he does 
not affirm his body. Once awakened therefore from a state of this kind he has 
a way to realise and know that the being of the soul is different from the 
being of the body.3   
 
It is employed here by Jean specifically to prove the existence of the soul, but it has 
been pointed out that both Jean and a number of his contemporaries misinterpreted 
the text to varying degrees. Jean, however, is one of three authors who placed the 
                                                
2 Hasse, p. 5. ‘The preface to this translation tells us that the work was ordered and paid for by John, 
Archbishop of Toledo, to whom it is dedicated […]. This fixes the date of the translation between 
1152, the death of Archbishop Raimundus, and 1166, the death of his successor Archbishop John of 
Toledo’. 
3 Summa, C. 1, 27–41. Ad hoc est racio Avicenne talis: posito quod subito esset homo creatus 
perfectus et, uelato uisu suo, non uideret exteriora, et taliter creatus esset quod non tangeret eum 
spissitudo aeris quam ipse sentire posset, et membra sic essent disiuncta ut non concurrerent sibi, 
neque contingerent; constans est, quod sic conditus homo, cogitans de se, non dubitaret affirmare se 
esse; non tamen affirmaret exteriora suorum membrorum, uel occulta suorum interiorum, sicut 
cerebrum uel alia; immo si possible esset ei ymaginari manum, uel aliud membrum, non ymaginaretur 
illud membrum sui, nec necessarium sue essencie. Cum ergo omne quod affirmatur aliud est ab eo 
quod non affirmatur, et concessum aliud est ab eo quod non conceditur, essencia autem quam affirmat 
est propria illi, eo quod illa est ipsemet; tamen est preter corpus eius, quod non affirmat. 
Expergefactus igitur ab huiusmodi statu, habet uiam euigilandi et cognoscendi quod esse anime aliud 
est quam esse corporis. 
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thought-experiment at a prominent place in the opening question of his work.4  In 
fact, it is employed by Jean in his first question, an sit anima. Regarding the purpose 
of the Flying Man, it is said that the primary objective is to point to the independence 
of the soul from the body. However, from a recent study of the Latin reception of the 
Flying Man it is clear that it was interpreted in different ways. Jean, as we see, 
employs the thought-experiment to prove the existence of the soul and, according to 
Hasse he is also one of only a few authors to come close to Avicenna’s original 
intention in the latter’s Liber de anima. The very first line of Jean’s treatise states 
that it is necessary to show that the soul exists in such a way that no doubt arises as 
to its existence and this is followed almost immediately by Avicenna’s doctrine. 
Although Avicenna’s main purpose was to point to the incorporeal nature of the soul 
it will be shown that Jean follows him closely with regard to the following: that the 
soul is the form and perfection of the body; that it is a substance; that as a substance 
it can exist independently from the body. For Jean, the Flying Man thought-
experiment establishes that there is a core entity that is inherent in the human being 
and that whatever we understand it to be, it is other than body. In other words, it 
points to the existence of an essence apart altogether from the physical body. Jean 
develops this thesis further in his use of quotes from the Pseudo-Augustine’s De 
spiritu et anima (which he quotes immediately after that of Avicenna). This, as we 
have already seen, played a major role in medieval moral psychology. It is employed 
by Jean as a major source in the second Consideratio on the powers of the soul, that 
of John Damascene and Avicenna also being the authorities with regard to the 
psychology of the soul. The following is taken from the Peudo-Augustinian text 
                                                
4 Hasse, p. 90. 
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which Jean presents to further his argument for the self-awareness that is implied in 
Avicenna’s thought-experiment:    
 
Likewise, <Pseudo > Augustine in the book On the soul and spirit: <states> 
‘The mind or soul knows nothing except that which is present to itself; 
nothing whatsoever is more present to either the mind or the soul than itself. 
Therefore it knows nothing as much as it knows itself: for it understands that 
it lives, that it remembers, desires, understands, knows, judges; and it most 
certainly knows all of these things about itself.’ Therefore, it is impossible 
that it does not know that it exists.  
Likewise ‘when the mind or soul asks what is the mind or soul, it 
certainly knows that it is asking itself; and it knows that it itself is the mind or 
soul which is questioning itself; nor does it ask something else about itself, 
but itself. Since therefore it knows that it is itself questioning, it certainly 
knows that it exists’.5 
 
Jean’s placement of this text alongside that of Avicenna is significant in light of a 
later reference to the Flying Man, highlighted by Sorabji, which only became 
available to Latin readers in the sixteenth century and which provides a more 
advanced account of Avicenna’s reasoning as to why the Flying Man must grasp his 
essence. The reference is to Avicenna’s work entitled the Almahad which was 
translated by Alpago, (who died in 1522), which Sorabji states became available to 
Latin readers a hundred years before Descartes in the Venice edition of 1546 (repr. 
Farnborough 1969). Avicenna gives a further explanation in another work, the Reply 
to Bahmanyâr and al Kirmânî 6 which has since been translated into French. 
 
Avicenna gives his reason why the Flying Man must grasp his essence only 
in this recently translated text (Reply to Bahmanyâr, paras. 58-59, Michot). It 
is that nothing grasps a thing without grasping its own essence as grasping. 
                                                
5 Summa, C. 1, 42-51. Item, Augustinus, in libro De anima et spiritu: ‘Nichil tam novit vel anima 
quam id quod sibi presto est; nec menti nec anime quicquam magis presto est quam ipsa sibi. Ergo 
nichil tam novit quam se: cognoscit enim uiuere se, meminisse se, uelle, cognoscere, scire, iudicare; et 
hec omnia certissime novit de se’. Impossibile est igitur quod ignoret se esse. 
Item ‘cum querit mens uel anima quid sit mens uel anima, profecto novit quod seipsam querit; et novit 
quod ipsa sit mens que se ipsam querit uel anima; nec aliud querit de se, sed ipsam. Cum ergo 
querentem se novit, se utique novit esse.’ 
6 Richard Sorabji, Self, Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 222. 
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Augustine argues, admittedly differently (On the Trinity 10.10.16), that 
nothing knows a thing without knowing that thing’s essence.7  
 
Jean had the foresight to make this connection with the Pseudo-Augustine’s text and 
although he may not have been aware of the many ambiguities and 
misunderstandings associated with the Arabic-Latin translation he does, nevertheless, 
give us some insight into how Avicenna’s influence was beginning to take hold in 
those early years of the thirteenth century.  
 
Another argument taken directly from Avicenna’s De anima by Jean 
introduces the distinction between the three principles of soul: the vegetative, the 
sensitive and the rational soul.  
 
Since we see certain bodies which are neither nourished, nor increased nor 
generated, nor moved by voluntary movement, such as stones: and we see 
other bodies which are nourished, both increased and generating like 
ourselves, such as plants; and we see others which sense and are moved 
voluntarily; it remains that the principle of their actions is in their essence, 
besides corporeality. Because if the principle of their actions were corporeal, 
then it would be found in all bodies. Therefore since that from which those 
actions emanate is called soul by everyone: therefore it is soul. Besides, we 
see actions in which plants, animals and human beings only share such as 
nourishing and begetting; and actions in which only animals share, or many 
of them, and human beings share in and which plants do not, such as sensing, 
imagining and being moved voluntarily; and there are actions which are 
proper to human beings such as reasoning, understanding, discerning between 
both truth and falsity and good and evil, discovering the arts, and both 
deliberating and choosing freely. Therefore there is a principle of nutrition 
and generation in plants, indeed a principle we call the vegetative soul; in 
animals a principle of sensing, and in man the principle of reasoning, and of 
understanding etc., which is called the rational soul. Therefore there is the 
vegetative soul, the sensitive and the rational.8 
                                                
7 Sorabji,  p. 222, n. 18. “French trans. Jean (=Yahya) Michot in Le Muséon, 2000”. 
8 Summa, C. 1, 5-26. Cum videamus quedam corpora que non nutriuntur, nec augmentantur, nec 
generant, nec mouentur motu uoluntario, ut lapides; et uideamus alia corpora que nutriuntur, et 
augmentantur, et generant sibi similia, ut plantas; et uideamus alia que sentiunt et mouentur 
uoluntarie; relinquitur ut in essencia eorum sit principium harum actionum, preter corporeitatem. Quia 
si principium harum esset corporeitas, inueniretur tunc in omnibus corporibus. Cum ergo illud, a quo 
emanant iste actiones, ab omnibus dicatur anima: anima igitur est. Preterea, nos uidemus actiones in 
quibus conueniunt uegetabilia et animalia et homines tantum, sicut nutrire et generare; et actiones in 
quibus conueniunt animalia tantum, aut plura ex eis, et homines in quibus non conueniunt uegetabilia, 
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The soul, for Avicenna, comprises three species; the vegetative soul, the animal soul 
and the human soul. Plants, although they are truly living bodies, do not have 
sensation as do animals and humans but they have the three faculties of nourishment, 
growth and reproduction. Besides the faculties ascribed to plants, animals have, in 
addition, the power of sensing, perception and movement. In addition to the 
vegetative and sensitive faculties, human beings, have the intellectual powers of 
reasoning, understanding and discernment and the faculty of free will. The question 
as to whether this implied that there were three souls in man or whether they could 
be understood as faculties of one soul was the cause of much debate in the early part 
of the thirteenth century and it is treated below under the topic of the simplicity of 
the soul. The soul is described here as a principle and as ‘that from which those 
actions emanate’ a quo emanant iste actiones, ab omnibus dicatur anima: anima 
igitur est. Principle, in this sense, is something that is over and above the body, the 
material body, so to speak. This introduces Jean’s use of quo, as highlighted by 
Spruit,9 to explain the instrumental cause of something and which, as we will see 
later, Jean also employs in various ways to make distinctions, particularly that 
between being and existence in his discussion on the simplicity of the soul.  
 
Avicenna shares much with Aristotle with regard to the soul and its three 
faculties. The basic structure of both theories are the same but we will see how they 
differ with regard to how each accounts for the division of the powers of the soul:  
                                                                                                                                     
ut sentire, ymaginari et moueri uoluntarie; et actiones que sunt proprie hominum, sicut racionari, 
intelligere, discernere inter uerum et falsum et bonum et malum, adinuenire artes, et consiliari et libere 
eligere. Erit ergo in uegetabilibus principium nutrimenti et generacionis, quod quidem principium 
dicimus animam uegetabilem; in animalibus principium senciendi, ymaginandi et mouendi secundum 
appetitum, quod dicitur anima sensibilis; in hominibus uero principium raciocinandi et intelligendi 
etc., quod dicitur anima racionalis. Ergo anima uegetabilis est et sensibilis et racionalis. 
9 Leen, Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge; Volume 1. Classical Roots and 
Medieval Discussions (Brill Studies in Intellectual History 48, 1994), p. 126.  
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A division of the faculties according to Aristotle would have looked different 
from Avicenna’s, after all; to quote Aristotle’s most straightforward account: 
‘potentias autem dicimus vegetativum, appetitivum, appetitivum, sensitivum, 
motivum secundum locum, intellectivum. 10 
 
The question is asked as to why Jean does not include an Aristotelian division of the 
powers of the soul in either of his two philosophical treatises. Is it simply that 
Avicenna is the preferred philosopher for Jean? Avicenna clearly went beyond 
Aristotle and already we see that, in contrast to Avicenna, Aristotle ‘had not 
conceived the notion of the self as a pure spiritual being to which its body is as much 
a part of the outside world as other physical things’.11   
 
SECTION TWO 
CAUSALITY WITH REGARD TO THE SOUL 
 
The next topic for discussion clearly shows that Jean is indebted to Aristotle, whether 
directly or indirectly (via Avicenna) we cannot know, for the doctrine of the four 
causes is obviously well known to him. He employs the Aristotelian doctrine to 
explain the immaterial nature of the soul, its origin and its final cause. Jean also 
borrows a formula from Boethius (c. 480–524) as we have referred to above, to 
explain the formal cause of the soul. It was Philip the Chancellor (c.1165/85–1236) 
who was responsible for the re-introduction of the Boethian formula which he 
employed to distinguish between the simplicity of God and the hylomorphic nature 
of the soul, that is, that because the soul is composed of an active and a passive 
intellect Philip held that it, therefore, had matter and form. Rather than attribute a 
                                                
10 Hasse, p. 51. 
11 David Ross,  Aristotle; with a new introduction by John L. Ackrill, 6th edn (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 138. 
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composite nature to the soul Jean employed the formula to distinguish between the 
‘being’ of the soul and its ‘essence’. 
 
 
The distinction between ‘being’ and ‘essence’, therefore, arose in the 
elaboration of the theory of universal hylomorphism, defended by the Franciscans, 
which maintained that there is a composition of matter and form in all beings other 
than the First cause.12 Jean situates the distinction within the context of a discussion 
of the formal cause of the human soul in its difference from other souls, in particular 
from angels. It raises the question as to whether Jean’s formulation of the distinction 
anticipates that of St Thomas Aquinas’s (1224–1274) in his early writings on De 
Ente et Essentia.  
 
2.2.1 THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE SOUL 
 
 
Jean begins by addressing the question of the material origin of the human soul. That 
is to say, he raises the question, what is that out of which the soul is made?  Before 
directly answering this question, he first endeavours to tell us what the soul is not 
made out of. It is not made out of divine substance, for instance. 
 
2.2.1.1 That the Soul is Not Made from a Divine Substance  
 
 
Jean quotes Augustine in support of the argument that the soul is not made from a 
divine substance because we know that it can be mistaken in many ways, it can be 
                                                
12 Universal hylomorphism refers to the doctrine that states that everything below the first cause is a 
composition of matter and form. This marks everything off from God as in God there is no such 
composition. Jean de La Rochelle explains the composition of everything below the first cause in 
terms of quod est and quo est. This is discussed in Section 2.2.2. below on the formal cause of the 
soul. 
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deceived, and it can be changed for better or for worse.13 Augustine states that 
divinity does not possess falsehood, but a soul does have falsehood, therefore, it is 
not truth, nor is made from truth (ergo non est veritas, nec de veritate). Jean 
continues, 
 
Likewise from something that is substantially simple, since it does not have 
parts, it cannot exist as substantially different. The divine substance, 
however, is simple; souls, however, are substantially different: therefore, 
souls are not made from the divine substance.14 
 
Jean is following Augustine here in that he holds that the soul is mutable in 
comparison to God’s unchangeable nature. Under the influence of the Platonists, 
Augustine, in his early writings, believed that the human soul is part of the divine but 
later came to realise that the soul ‘is not what God is, it is a creature made by God, 
not made out of God, but out of nothing.’15 
 
2.2.1.2 That the Soul is Not Made from Matter 
 
 
As a theologian, the fact that the soul is not made from matter is not in question. The 
question, rather, is whether the soul arises from a spiritual matter, or not; but what, 
Jean asks, is meant by spiritual matter? Jean uses a number of arguments throughout 
the Summa to show that the soul is free from any sort of matter whatsoever. The soul 
is incorporeal because its operation is through abstraction from matter, and since the 
activity follows from the nature of the power and substance, both the power and the 
                                                
13 Summa, C. 14, 1-4. Quod autem non sit de diuina substancia, ostendit Augustinus, Super Genesim: 
quia si esset de Dei substancia, nec a se, nec ab alio decipi posset, nec ad faciendum, nec ad 
paciendum compelli, nec in melius, nec in deterius mutari. 
14 Summa, C. 14, 8-11. Item, ex simplici secundum substanciam, cum non habeat partes, non potest 
esse differens secundum substanciam. Diuina autem substancia simplex est; differentes autem 
secundum substanciam anime sunt: non ergo de diuina substancia sunt anime. 
15 Teske, ‘Augustine’s Theory of Soul’, p. 118.  
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substance of the soul itself will be immaterial.16 Jean does not develop the theory of 
abstraction here, but later, when he discusses the powers of the soul, he puts forward 
a number of arguments, taken from Avicenna, to prove that the intellective power is 
incorporeal. The question as to whether Jean maintains the doctrine known as 
Avicennised Augustinianism,17 based as it is, on the authorities whose names are 
understood by it, will be addressed in the chapter on the powers of the soul according 
to Avicenna. It will examine Jean’s attempt to reconcile Avicenna and Augustine in 
the area of intellective cognition. In brief, an exponent of the doctrine is a medieval 
thinker who ‘(1) teaches that God is the active intellect, and (2) affirms that this can 
be proved by establishing the concordance of Augustine with Aristotle as interpreted 
by Avicenna.’18  
 
The dualistic nature of Avicenna’s ‘flying man’ thought-experiment appears 
to be similar to Descartes’ Cogito, but the similarity turns out to be superficial 
because both the context and the purpose of the ‘flying man’ thought-experiment are 
very different to those of the cogito, as Wisnovsky notes.19 Avicenna does not arrive 
at his thought-experiment of ‘the flying man’ at the termination of the process of 
methodic doubt; rather, Avicenna’s argument is a claim about essence, or more 
exactly stated, about the fact that nothing grasps a thing without grasping its own 
                                                
16 Summa, C. 15, 13-16. Preterea intellectus ipsius anime est immaterialis, quia eius operacio est per 
abstractionem a materia: ergo et uirtus et substancia ipsius anime erit immaterialis: operacio enim 
consequitur naturam uirtutis et substancie.  
17 ‘The term is first introduced in Gilson, “Pourquoi saint Thomas”, p.102, n. 3. Gilson studied the 
phenomenon in three articles between 1926 and 1933: “Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint 
Augustin” (1926/27), pp. 5-127; Les Sources gréco-arabes de l’Augustinisme avicennisant” (1929), 
pp. 5-149; “Roger Marston: un cas d’Augustinisme avicennisant” (1933), pp. 37-42. The most 
important article of the three is the first (although the term ‘augustinisme avicennisant’ does not 
appear in the title) because it discusses the traces of the doctrine in many thinkers of the 13th century. 
Gilson’s article on Duns Scotus from 1928 does not concern Avicennized Augustinianism proper.’ 
Hasse, p. 205, n. 704. 
18 Ibid, p. 205. 
19 Robert Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Arabic Philosophy, ed. by Peter Adamson and Richard Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005; repr. 2006), p. 103. 
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essence as grasping. Sorabji maintains that there are certain links between Augustine 
and Avicenna which point to the fact that self-awareness involves turning into the 
interior part of ourselves. The ‘flying man’ thought-experiment is one of many 
‘coincidences’ between Avicenna and Augustine which come close to Augustine’s 
argument for the immateriality of the soul. Sorabji argues that there must be a 
common Greek source for some of their ideas, given that Avicenna could not have 
known Augustine’s works which were written in Latin. The common source, he 
thinks, may be Porphyry’s Sentences 40. Sorabji attributes this finding to Courcelle20 
who, he states, ‘has compared with Augustine’s phrase “present to itself” Porphyry’s 
Sentences 40 where Porphyry says that you are by nature present to a self that is 
present to you […] although you can absent yourself, rather as Augustine thinks that 
the soul ignores its presence to itself when it searches for itself through images’.21  
 
There is a connection to be made with Descartes’s cogito which was written 
in the context of his search for first principles. Descartes’s doctrine of innate ideas 
has much in common with Augustine with regard to knowing the self as non-bodily. 
According to Descartes, we receive the ‘ideas’ of things through our capacity to 
think, imagine, feel, or experience, but our ‘ideas’ with regard to God, the self and 
self-evident truths, these are already present in the baby in the womb. The fact that 
Avicenna’s objective in the ‘Flying Man’ is to point to the independence of the soul 
(and that the other theses pertaining to the existence of the soul, the self-awareness of 
the soul and the substantiality of the soul, are only implied)22 does not devalue what 
is a powerful argument for the existence of the soul and its incorporeality.  
 
                                                
20 P. Courcelle, Connais-toi toi-même, Paris, 1974, vol. 1; quoted in Sorabji, p. 226, n. 27. 
21 Ibid, p. 226. 
22 Hasse, p. 51. 
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2.2.1.3 That the Soul Is Not Made from a Soul 
 
Jean argues that if all souls were from one soul, the soul would be both communal 
and divisible, and, therefore, not simple.23 The background to Jean’s position may be 
that of Plato’s Timaeus24 and the question of the universal soul. In the Timaeus Plato 
states that the World is a living entity and that it has, in common with us, a body and 
soul, it is, as it were, a living organism, as if the soul were one. The notion that souls 
are multiplied in seeds, or in matter must be also rejected (cum anima racionalis non 
dependeat a materia, nullo modo potest poni multiplicabilis in materia) as the soul is 
not generated, nor procreated through the generation of the body, a theme which I 
will return to briefly in discussing the efficient cause of the soul.  
 
Jean’s main theological source is Augustine who clearly rejects the theory 
that the soul is one because, if, as he remarks, a soul is happy in one person and 
unhappy in another, how can a soul be said to be from a soul? Jean’s goal is to prove 
the immateriality of the soul and here he introduces the concept of ‘the intelligible 
species’ to further his argument. He states that if the soul’s intellect is material like a 
sense, it would not receive any sort of species that goes beyond the sense, it would 
receive only that species which has a likeness with a particular organ, such as sight to 
colour, hearing to sound and not the opposite.25 Notions like quantity, contrariety and 
                                                
23 Summa, C. 16, 1-4. Quod non sit anima de anima uidetur. Si enim essent omnes anime de una 
anima, esset anima partibilis et diuisibilis et non simplex; cum ergo sit simplex et immaterialis, non 
erit possibile animam de anima esse.  
24 Timaeus, 41e 
25 Summa, C.16, 43-49. Intellectus anime est immaterialis; si enim esset materialis sicut sensus, non 
reciperet quamlibet speciem rei sensibilis supra se, sed illam speciem tantum que habet similitudinem 
cum organo sicut uisus colorem, auditus sonum et non e conuerso. Similiter intellectus non reciperet 
quamlibet speciem intelligibilem, sed aliquam sic, et aliquam non. Quare cum certum sit quod recipit 
quamlibet, erit immaterialis. 
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opposition apply to matter but when we talk about form we go beyond matter: form, 
he states, is transcendent.26  
This is of importance from the point of view of later accounts of ‘intelligible 
species’, as for example in Thomas Aquinas, and may be seen as an anticipation of 
the theory. It was present in Augustine as ideae, rationes, formae, or species which 
‘were what the mind objectively confronted, not subjective mental features,’27 but it 
was not pursued in his account of cognition. Although the senses had a role to play in 
Augustine’s epistemology his theory of illumination explained how things entered 
the mind in order to be known, his definition of ‘soul as a likeness of all things’ 
supports his theory of the mind. It is likely that Jean was influenced by his teacher 
William of Auxerre (c. 1140–1231) in the latter’s early synthesis of Christian 
philosophy and the philosophy of Aristotle. While William retained Augustine’s 
doctrine of divine illumination he also accepted the Aristotelian notion of abstraction 
of forms by the intellect. He held that the ‘material intellect’, Aristotle’s potential 
intellect, had to receive its species from species of corporeal things. Jean’s reference 
to the ‘intelligible species’ emphasises the fact that we cannot describe the intellect 
in terms of matter and form in the way that we can describe things that are capable of 
generation and corruption. His explanation is that the soul is ‘perfectible according to 
knowledge and virtue’ and that it is not ‘constituted by means of form’ a point he 
will develop in the next chapter on the formal cause of the soul. 
 
                                                
26 Summa, C. 16, 63-70. Dicendum est enim quod materia non habet determinari nisi secundum id 
quod est eius nocio: uerbi gracia, quantitas habet determinare materia, et est eius nocio; similiter et 
motus contrarietatis. Quandoque ergo per quantitatem determinatur materia, et non per contrarietatem, 
ut in celestibus. Nunquam autem per substancialem formam determinatur cum qua ueniat in 
composicionem. Forma igitur non determinat materiam quoniam ipsa est transcendens, sed quantitas 
non inuenitur nisi in materia. 
27 Joseph Owens, ‘Faith, Ideas, Illumination and Experience’, in The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy, ed. by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 442.  
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The doctrine of ‘intelligible species’ reaches a high point in Thomas Aquinas 
who returns to a theme that goes back to Aristotle, that of phantasms; phantasms are 
the objects towards which the intellect must constantly turn ‘not only in order to 
acquire intelligible species, but also somehow to inspect those species in 
phantasms’.28 Imagination is what produces the phantasms on the level of the senses, 
but on the level of cognition the agent intellect produces the intelligible species.  
 
2.2.2 THE FORMAL CAUSE OF THE SOUL 
 
 
When referring to the formal cause of the soul Jean employs the concepts of ‘quod 
est’ and ‘quo est’. These, as we have referred to them above, have been called the 
‘forgotten formulae of Boethius’, which, as Crowley notes, were re-introduced by 
Philip the Chancellor (d.1236).29 Philip’s work, entitled the Summa de Bono, is 
frequently the theological reference point for Jean in the Summa. The quod est, as 
interpreted by Jean, refers to the ‘being’ of the soul, the quo est refers to the essence 
of the soul.  
 
Therefore, in every creature ‘that which exists’ namely, being itself, is 
different from ‘that through which it exists’, namely its essence; because 
since it is a being through participation, it is not its essence.30 
 
The distinction between quod est and quo est has been variously interpreted by 
philosophers throughout the Middle Ages. Boethius (c.480–c.525) introduced the 
distinction in his treatise De Trinitate where he argues that the Divine Substance is 
form without matter and is its own substance. Jean quotes from the De Trinitate (the 
                                                
28 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 289. 
29 Theodore Crowley, Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in Philosophical Commentaries 
(Louvain & Dublin: Duffy & Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 81. 
30 Summa, C. 17, 31-34. Est ergo in qualibet creatura ens differens quod est, scilicet ipsum ens, ab eo 
quo est, scilicet sua essencia; quia cum sit ens per participacionem, non est sua essencia. 
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first of Boethius’s five treatises known as the Opuscula Sacra which survived into 
the Middle Ages) in support of the view that created being is of a composite nature 
whereas divine being is of a simple nature.31 In the third treatise Boethius deals with 
being and goodness. He poses the following problem: if everything is good in that ‘it 
is’, and if everything receives its goodness from God, is everything, therefore, 
identical with God? Boethius’s solution is contained in the distinction between id 
quod est et esse: ‘Being and the thing that is are different. For simple being awaits 
manifestation, but the thing that is “is” and exists as soon as it has received the form 
which gives it being.’32 
 
Jean states that the constitutive principles quod est and quo est are to be 
found in everything below the First cause since everything below the First is a being 
through participation. Therefore, the ‘being’ or the ‘subject’ (quod est) of an essence 
is different from its ‘nature’, the latter being that through which it is an essence (quo 
est). If we say that God is good through his essence, since by our understanding he is 
good, ‘to be’ and ‘to be good’ are the same for him. With regard to anything below 
the First cause, however, a creature is good because it is ordered toward the highest 
good. With regard to the soul it is a created ‘being’ (quod est) created by God out of 
nothing, the nature of the soul (quo est) is understood as an ‘essence’ received from 
God. In addition to their composition of matter and form which ‘is a receptive and 
                                                
31 Summa, C 17, 5-6. Hoc videtur per Boecium, in libro De Trinitate; ‘In omni eo quod est citra 
Primum, est hoc et hoc.’ 
32 Boethius, De Trinitate, ed. Steward-Rand, Loeb classics, vol. 74, ch. 2, p. 41: ‘Diversum est esse et 
id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consistit.’  
This distinction would appear to be echoed in Heidegger’s meditation on the ‘ontological difference’ 
and the latter’s famous attempt to raise anew the question of ‘the meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein)’ in 
its difference from ‘that-which-is (das Seiende)’. 
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passive potential in a creature’,33 human beings, therefore, have this second 
composition, that of ‘being and essence’.  
 
Jean asks whether there are specific differences between the soul and an 
angel even if it can be said that they share the same formal cause of their being. In so 
far as it can be a part of an angel’s composition, ‘that through which’ an angel exists 
is ‘intellectuality’ and ‘that which it is’ is an intellectual substance; in the case of 
human being ‘that through which’ it is a human being is rationality and ‘that which it 
is’ is a rational substance. Jean accounts for a number of differences according to 
species and according to essence, e.g., the angelic intellect is not directed towards 
sensation whereas the human intellect begins at this level and it is so directed. An 
angel has being as a person, a soul has being as a form and as a perfection. An angel 
is like God in its intellect and according to act because from the beginning of its 
condition it has the forms imprinted on it for the purpose of knowing the nature of 
things. In contrast Jean holds that the human soul is like a clean writing tablet which 
contains possibilities for the forms. Jean wants to present an argument for the formal 
cause of the soul in a manner which is acceptable to Christians but in admitting 
composition of quod est and quo est Jean seems to deny the simplicity of the soul. 
 
According to Burrell it was philosophers in the Arabic tradition who were the 
first to distinguish ‘what constitutes the individual, namely its existing, from what 
makes it the kind of thing it is’,34 but as we have seen these speculations were 
already familiar to medieval thinkers, ‘especially from the ninth century when they 
                                                
33 Summa, C.17, 60-61. Secundum primum modum, est in creatura potencia receptiua et passiua; iuxta 
secundum modum, potencia actiua. 
34 David B. Burrell, ‘Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish thinkers’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Aquinas, ed. by Norman Kretzmann & Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 60–84 (pp. 64–65). 
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first aroused interest.’35 According to Parviz Morewedge, however, it is a matter of 
contention regarding whether Aristotle made a distinction between essence and 
existence, or not.36  He acknowledges the monumental work of A.N. Goichon37 and 
N. Resher38 who refer to a passage in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics:   
 
But if you are to prove what it is and that it is, how will you prove them by 
the same argument? For both the definition and the demonstration make one 
thing clear; but what a man is and that a man is are different.39 
 
Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) in De Ente et Essentia is especially indebted 
to Avicenna’s remarks made on essence and existence, for, Thomas too argues that 
in God alone there is no distinction between essence and existence, ‘no becoming, no 
potency, because he is pure existence without contingency or finiteness.’40 He rejects 
the form–matter composition in non-bodily substances and, instead, ascribes the 
essence–existence composition to them. Thomas restricted hylomorphic composition 
to corporeal bodies while Bonaventure (1217-1274) held the opposite view, that 
angels must be hylomorphically composed, ‘otherwise they would be pure act and 
God alone is pure act’.41 Bonaventure appealed to the doctrine of seminal reasons in 
order to explain how forms are imparted to matter in two modes; in one mode the 
primary cause is God but in a secondary manner we see that parents produce new life 
through their activity. There is something in matter, a seed, like an acorn which 
becomes an oak tree: the agent gives to the essence, already present in matter, a new 
                                                
35 David Luscombe, Medieval Thought (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 21. 
36 Parviz Morewedge, The ‘Metaphysica’ of Avicenna (Ibn Sināā) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1973), p. 182. 
37 A.-M. Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ibn Sinā (Avicenna) (Paris:  
1937), p. 132, cited in Morewedge, p.183, n. 56. 
38 Nicholas Resher, Studies in Arabic Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1967), p. 
73; cited in Morewedge, p.185, n. 62. 
39 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics Book II Chapter 7, 92 b 8. The Complete Works of Aristotle, The 
Revised Oxford Translation, ed. by Jonathan Barnes Volume One (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1984). 
40 Luscombe, Medieval Thought, p. 101. 
41 Frederick Copleson, A History of Philosophy, vol. 2 (New York: Image Books, 1962), p. 49. 
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form of existence, transforming an essence really existing in matter from a potential 
to an actual form. While the souls of animals and plants arise entirely from seminal 
reasons, the human soul enters the body after it has gone through a process which is 
explained in terms of the celestial bodies and the four elements. Thus the human 
body is a composite of many forms. Thomas, however, argued against this position 
in the debate on the plurality of forms which provoked lively discussion in the 
thirteenth century. For Thomas, form is ultimate, there is only one form of the living 
human being, its soul, and as Gilson remarks there is no form of the form.42  
 
Arguing for his position regarding angels Thomas appealed to the distinction 
between potency and act as something which runs through the whole of creation and 
as such he can claim that angels display potentiality in their performance of acts of 
will and intellect.  
Now whatever acquires something from another has a potentiality for what it 
acquires, a potentiality that what is acquired actualizes; so the very whatness 
or form which an intelligence is has the potentiality for the existence it 
acquires from God and the acquired existence actualizes it.43  
 
Therefore, there is composition in an angel, namely, composition of form and 
existence. In substances composed of matter and form, however, there is a double 
composition of act and potentiality, the first is a composition of matter and form, the 
second a composition of the latter with existence. This second composition is called 
by Thomas the quod est and esse or the quod est and the quo est. In a chapter of the 
De Ente et Essentia entitled ‘The Compositeness of Intelligences’, Thomas makes 
                                                
42 Gilson, p. 376. 
43 ‘Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio, est in potentia respectu illius; et hoc quod receptum est in 
eo, est actus eius. Oportet ergo quod ipsa quiditas vel forma quae est intelligentia, sit in potentia 
respectu esse quod a Deo recipit; et illud esse receptum per modum actus.’ ‘De Ente et essentia’ 
(Caput V) in Opuscula Et Textus: Historiam Ecclesiae Eiusque Vitam Atque Doctrinam Et Mystica 
(Aschendorff: Monasterii, 1926), p. 44. 
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use of the formula quo est et quod est as he states, ‘so some people say such things 
are composed of that which and that by which, or from that which exists and 
existence as Boethius says’.44 The editors of the Leonine edition of the De Ente et 
Essentia point to a variant reading of the line in question and to its authenticity.45 
According to Etienne Gilson, there is great confusion regarding the use of Boethius’s 
terminology in its Thomistic meaning.46 He maintains, ‘the very precision of his 
[Boethius’s] formulas was to make it more difficult for his successors to go beyond 
the level of substance up the level of existence, but they helped those who succeeded 
in doing to formulate their own thought in strictly accurate terms.’47 In fact, this 
formula is used by Thomas in thirty-six cases throughout his many works.48  
 
In some instances, Thomas acknowledges two sources and two formulations, 
they are: id quod est et esse, attributed to Boethius; and that of quod est et quo est, 
the source of which is attributed to ‘quidam’ or in another case to ‘alii’ (the Latin 
translated respectively as ‘certain persons’ and ‘others’). Considering the dates of 
two of the works in which Thomas employs the formulae indicates he maintained the 
distinction throughout most of his works, one example, which I have already referred 
to, is the De Ente et Essentia, written between 1252–1256; the second work, the 
                                                
44 Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, in Aquinas Selected Philosophical Writings, ed. by Timothy 
McDermott (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1993), p. 105. Latin Text: Et propter hoc a quibusdam 
dicuntur huiusmodi substantie componi ex quo est et quod est, vel ex quod est et esse, ut Boethius 
dicit. See http:www.corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age> De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3 (Case 33. Place 
39) 
45 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Opera Omnia, De Ente et Essentia, Tomus XL111. Editori di San 
Tommaso, Roma, 1976. p. 351 ch. 4. line. 165: ‘[componi ex quo est et quod est, vel ex quod est et 
esse ut Boethius dicit] Au lieu de quod, les anciens – sauf  b g - ont quo: cette leçon de l’archétype ne 
peut se recommander ni de Boèce, qui écrit: “diversum est esse et quod est” (PL 64, 1311 B); ni de 
saint Thomas, dont l’autographe du Contra Gentiles 11, 54, lieu parralèle de celui-ci, porte 
exactement: “quibusdam dicitur ex quod est et esse, vel ex quod est et quo est”.’ (ms. Vat. lat. 9850, 
fol. 42 vb).  
46 Gilson,  p. 421. 
47 Ibid., p. 105. 
48 A search in the Index Thomisticus revealed this result: <http:www.corpusthomisticum. 
org/it/index.age>. 
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Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima was written in the year 1269.49 If we examine 
some quotes from Jean’s Summa, however, we see clearly that he had already made 
this distinction with regard to immaterial substances. As we have seen in his 
discussion of the formal cause of the soul Jean writes: ‘that which exists’ and ‘that 
through which it exists’ is different in created being,’50 again, ‘therefore it is clear 
that “that which exists” and “that through which it exists” namely the essence differ 
in the soul’,51 and further, ‘therefore one should say that spiritual beings and the 
rational soul have a composition made from the essential parts, which are the parts 
“that which exists” and “that through which it exists”.’52 Thus Jean’ Summa, written 
between 1235–1236 may have been the source for Thomas’s position in De Ente et 
Essentia. Further evidence which connects the two authors can be found in the 
preface to Thomas’s Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima. The editor, B.C. Bazan, 
states that, without doubt, it was Jean’s Summa which influenced Thomas’s structure 
of the disputed questions on the soul. He points to Chapter Thirty Six of the Summa 
where Jean explains the structure of his work in terms which anticipates the structure 
of Thomas’s questions.53 Jean’s work was, therefore, well known to Thomas and it is 
testament to the quality of his work that it influenced Thomas in his writing on the 
soul, the question is to what extent; this will become clearer as our study progresses. 
 
                                                
49 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima, p. 51: ‘Et hinc est quod Boethius dicit in libro 
ebdomadibus, quod in aliis que sunt post Deum differt esse et quod est, vel, sicut quidam dicunt, quod 
est et quo est, nam ipsum esse est quo aliquid est, sicut cursus est quo aliquis currit.’ 
50 Summa, C.17, 44-45. Et ideo erit differens in ente creato quod est et quo est. 
51 Ibid, 54-55. Patet ergo quod differt in anima quo est, scilicet essencia et quod est. 
52 Ibid, 67-69. Dicendum est ergo quod spiritualia et anima racionalis composicionem habent ex 
partibus essencialibus que partes sunt quod est et quo est, quia sunt a Deo et de nichilo. 
53 B.C. Bazan, ‘Preface’, in Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputante De anima, ed by Bazan, p. 102: ‘Saint 
Thomas a structuré soigneusement la série de questions disputes sur l’âme unie au corps: sept 
questions consacrées à l’essence de l’âme; sept questions consacrées à l’âme unie au corps; sept 
consacrées à l’âme séparée du corps. Cette structure lui a été suggéréé, sans doute, par la Summa de 
Summa de anima de Jean de La Rochelle. En effet, dans le chapitre 36 (XXX1V) de la première partie 
de cette somme, Jean de La Rochelle explique la structure de son oeuvre dans des termes qui 
rappellent la structure des questions de saint Thomas: “Dicto de anima secundum esse absolutum [...] 
secunda de modo essendi in corpore; tercia de esse post separacionem a corpore” [Bougerol, p.114].’  
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2.2.3 THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF THE SOUL 
 
 
For Jean, as a theologian, God alone is the efficient cause of the soul; no creature can 
be its efficient cause (cum ergo anima racionalis sit de nichilo, nulla potencia creata 
potest educere eam in esse). While Jean does not refer directly to Avicenna, Gilson 
states that no one could have read Avicenna and ignored his notions of a moving 
cause and of an efficient cause. Avicenna was one of the first philosophers to 
recognize that the notion of creation required more than Aristotle’s ‘moving cause’. 
Aristotle’s universe consisted of substances, material substances defined in terms of 
matter and form and eternal substances which required no explanation as their whole 
nature is being qua being. In his Metaphysics Avicenna introduced two notions of 
productive causality: first, that of Aristotle’s moving cause, which connects the 
moving power with causal power, but in order to introduce existence to the created 
world Avicenna introduced a second notion, that of a creating cause. God was the 
Prime Mover, as Aristotle held, but for Avicenna the prime mover ‘is only the first 
principle in the series of causes and is not the cause of the perfection of every 
entity.’54 Quoting from Aristotle, Jean states, ‘the intellect alone originates in a 
divine way from an exterior principle’.55 This chapter deals with the distinction 
between spontaneous life and life that is created ex nihilo. Jean refers to the doctrine 
known as traducianism (ex traduce per generacionem) which holds that souls are 
propagated along with bodies. This would bring the immateriality of the soul into 
question, but Jean argues that no created power can create, or bring forth something 
from nothing and he states that every power is subject to its efficient cause; however, 
                                                
54 Morewedge, p. 209. 
55 Summa, C. 18, 22-25. Item, dicit Aristoteles, in libro De animalibus, quod solus intellectus diuinitus 
ab extrinseco prouenit: ergo solum anima racionalis est ab extrinseco; anima ergo sensibilis et 
uegetabilis seminatur. Compare: Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Guillelmus de Morbecka, De 
generatione animalium, liber 2, cap.: 3 (Bekker: 736b): Relinquitur autem intellectum solum deforis 
advenire et divinum esse solum: nichil enim ipsius operationi communicat corporalis operatio. 
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the power of the rational soul, in accordance with free will, is not subject to any 
creature since it cannot be forced by anything. Therefore, no creature is its efficient 
cause and he concludes that, therefore, God alone is its efficient cause and creator.  
 
The influence of Avicenna’s theory of emanation is apparent in Jean’s 
positing of the power of an intelligence, or of an angelic substance as the source of 
the sensitive soul.56 Avicenna’s theory of emanation comprises a ‘translunar region 
comprising nine primary spheres that contain the planets, the sun and the moon’57 
where each sphere is accompanied by an incorporeal intelligence, at the summit of 
which is the First Cause and at the lowest point in the chain of incorporeal 
intelligences is the active intellect. It is the active intellect which figures large in 
Jean’s theory of cognition in the second part of the Summa. Although the agent 
intellect for Avicenna is separate and one for all men this does not put Jean’s theory 
into doubt since, as Gilson notes, he still holds the view that we each possess an 
active intellect and that God and the angels can be considered as so many separate 
agent intellects.58 
 
2.2.4 THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE SOUL 
 
 
The final cause of the rational soul is beatitude or love of God.59 In this life as human 
beings we can participate in the goodness of God by knowing, loving and possessing 
the highest good. All of these come together in a fourth way, which is enjoyment in 
loving God. In this life too, knowing, loving and possessing are related to the three 
                                                
56 Summa, C. 18, 30-34. Exitus anime sensibilis non a uirtute celi corporei, sed a uirtute celi mouente 
celum, que est uirtus intelligencie siue substancia angelica; que intelligencia, cum sit incorporea, bene 
potest esse principium substancie incorporee.  
57 Davidson, p. 74. 
58 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 331 
59 Summa, C. 19, 12-15. Facta est racionalis creatura primo modo ut intelligeret summam bonitatem, 
et intelligendo amaret, amando possideret, possidendo frueretur.  
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theological virtues: understanding to faith, loving to charity and possessing to hope. 
It is said that in a second way the soul is made for the goodness of God, that is, that 
we are made to serve God by acts of praising, serving and enjoying the highest good 
(facta est ut laudaret, serviret et frueretur ipsa summa bonitate). These issues 
originated in Peter Lombard’s Sentences, the basic book for the study of theology at 
this time, but it is interesting to note that this work was not used at the University of 
Paris until the time of Alexander of Hales (between 1223 and 1227) who was a 
master and colleague of our author. The purpose of the rational soul is also posited as 
the healing of a fallen angel (dico quod reparacio est quantum ad angelos bonos et 
hoc secundum quid, non simplicter) this is very similar to what we find in the 
Sentences.60 Jean states that this is a purpose by accident (per accidens) which may 
mean that it is just one purpose among many, but to understand what it means to say 
that an angel or a soul are created on account of goodness we should return to the 
text of the Sentences where it is stated that the rational soul and an angel share in the 
beatitude of God through intelligence.  
 
And in this manner He [God] distinguished it, so that part would remain in its 
purity and not be united with a body, namely the Angels, part would be 
joined to a body, namely souls. And so the rational creature is distinguished 
into the incorporeal and the corporeal; and indeed the incorporeal [is called] 
an ‘Angel’, but the corporeal is called a ‘man’, subsisting out of a rational 
soul and the flesh.61 
 
                                                
60 Peter Lombard, The Four Books of Sentences, Book II, d. 1, Part 1, c. V. De homine quoque in 
scriptura interdum reperitur, quod factus sit propter reparationem angelicae ruinae. 
<http://www.franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/opera/1s2-01.html> [accessed 16/10/2009]. 
61 Ibid, Book II, d. 1, Part II, c. 1V. Eamque hoc modo distinxit, ut pars in sui puritate permaneret nec 
corpori uniretur, scilicet Angeli, pars corpori iungeretur, scilicet animae. Distincta est itaque rationalis 
creatura in incorpoream et corpoream; et incorporea quidem Angelus, corporea vero homo vocatur, ex 
anima rationali et carne subsistens. 
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This is also brought out in Jean’s text where he states that beatitude in the rational 
creature must refer to both the body and the soul whereas that of an angel is in one 
nature alone.62  
 
SECTION THREE 
THE BEING OF THE SOUL 
 
The next topic for discussion is the being of the soul which, Jean states, must be 
examined with regard to two modes; that of absolute being and that of being in 
relation to the body. First absolute being refers to that which can exist by itself, it has 
esse absolutum. Applying the Aristotelian language of substance and accident to the 
being of the soul Jean holds that the soul is a substance, a hoc aliquid.  
 
2.3.1 Soul as a Substance 
 
 
Jean’s first argument for stating that the soul is a substance is:  
The first reason is: everything that moves and governs a substance is a 
substance; for a mover of this kind does not depend on that which it moves, 
and in this way the soul does not have dependent existence; therefore it is not 
an accident, therefore it is a substance, which must be conceded. Besides, no 
accident at all is more noble than a substance; but everything that moves a 
substance is more noble and more powerful and more actual than a moved 
substance; therefore etc., Further, everything that moves a substance is more 
noble and more actual than a moved substance; therefore etc.63  
 
 
                                                
62 Summa, C. 19, 44-50. Cum ergo finis racionalis anime sit beatitudo, tota anima racionalis erit 
beatificabilis; sed non est beatitudo nisi in Deo, ergo tota anima beatificabitur in Deo: ergo et quantum 
ad sensum et quantum ad intellectum; sed quantum ad sensum non potest beatificari in Deo secundum 
naturam diuinam, sed solum quantum ad intellectum; finis ergo ipsius anime racionalis erit 
beatificacio in utraque natura. 
63 Summa, C. 22, 2-8. Primo racio est: omne quod mouet substanciam et regit, est substancia; mouens 
enim in quantum huiusmodi non dependet ab eo quod mouet, et sic anima non habet esse dependens: 
ergo non est accidens, ergo substancia, quod concedendum est. Preterea, nullum accidens omnino est 
nobilius substancia; sed omne mouens substanciam nobilius est et uirtuosius et actualius substancia 
mota; ergo etc. 
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A substance is distinguished from an accident in that it is the substance that sustains 
it and as a substance it can exist independently, whereas an accident needs a 
substance for its existence. Aristotle states, primary substances are neither ‘said of’ a 
subject nor ‘in’ a subject, whereas other things are either said of them as subjects or 
in them as subjects.64 The question arises as to whether Aristotle held that the soul is 
a substance. One position is that while according to Aristotle the soul (psychê) is not 
a substance, God is a substance, a view which clearly contrasts with Avicenna for 
whom the soul is a substance whereas the Necessary Existent is not.65 The question 
at the centre of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics is whether the three aspects of 
reality, that is, form, matter and the composite are really substances. In the 
introduction to his translation of Aristotle’s De anima, Hugh Lawson Tancred writes 
with regard to the candidates for substance: 
 
For something to be substance in the fullest sense, it must be the possible 
subject of a definition and thus of fundamental knowledge, and it must thus 
constitute the logos of a particular thing. It is further required that it should be 
connected with a thing’s persisting through change and indeed be the cause of 
its so doing. Finally it must represent the fulfillment or realization of the 
particular thing. None of these requirements is wholly clear in itself, but it 
does seem that Aristotle’s mind is made up that these, vague as they are, will 
be the features of that which he will be most ready to recognize as deserving 
to be called substance, and on these grounds it is clear enough that the most 
successful candidates will be essence and closely related notion of form.66   
 
                                                
64 Aristotoles Latinus: Translator: Guillelmus de Morbeka: Categoriae [vel Praedicamenta] cap.: 5  
(Bekker: 2a11). Substantia autem est que propriissime et primo et maxime dicitur, que neque de 
subiecto aliquo dicitur neque in subiecto aliquo est, veluti quidam homo et quidam equus. Secunde 
autem substantie dicuntur species, in quibus speciebus que dicuntur prime substantie existunt, eadem 
que et genera specierum harum, puta aliquis homo in specie quidem existit homine, genus autem 
speciei est animal; secunde igitur hee dicuntur substantie, puta homo et animal. 
65 Morewedge, p. 195. ‘From the extensional point of view (i.e. on what kinds of substances there 
are), ibn Sīnā and Aristotle hold different views. Regardless of how we interpret Aristotle’s remarks 
on nous (the active intelligence) we can claim that according to Aristotle the soul (psychḗ ) is not a 
substance while God (theós) is a substance. For ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, a soul (nafs) is a 
substance, whereas the Necessary Existent […] is definitely not a substance.’ 
66 Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), Translated, with an introduction and notes, by Hugh Lawson-
Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 63.  
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Additionally, Ross states, when viewed abstractly substance can be described in 
terms of the essence but when viewed concretely we can look to its efficient or final 
cause, as he states, ‘the reason why this flesh and these bones make a man is that 
they are informed by the form of form, the human soul.67 
 
Aristotle’s understanding of substance is that which is composed of matter 
and form but as we have seen Jean rejects hylomorphism of the soul and instead 
employs the distinction between stating ‘that a thing is’ and ‘that through which a 
thing is’. This distinction underpins Jean’s position on the soul and while it was 
referred to by Aristotle and others it is Avicenna who thus ‘transforms a logical 
distinction between essence and existence into an ontological distinction of great 
import’.68 Avicenna also accepted the substance and accident division according to 
Aristotle. He posits a hierarchy of substances; immaterial substances are the highest, 
next is form, next is that which is composed of matter and form and finally matter 
itself.69  
 
In his discussion on the soul’s relationship to the body Jean states clearly that 
the soul is united to the body as its form and perfection. Avicenna refers to the soul 
as an ‘entelechy’ as in Aristotle’s definition of the soul and as Rahman states in 
Avicenna an ‘entelechy’ is a term ‘which describes the soul’s relationship with the 
body, just as if we describe a man as a builder the building will be included in the 
definition, but this does not describe the nature of the man taken in himself as man, 
                                                
67 Ross, David, Aristotle (London & New York, 1995), p.178. 
68 Soheil, M. Afnan, Avicenna – His Life and Works (Connecticut: Greenword Publishers, 1980), 
p.117. 
69 Afnan, p.110. “Substance could be in different states. Where it is part of a body it could be its form, 
or it could be its matter; and if it is entirely apart and separate, it could have a relation of authority 
over the body through movement and it is then called ‘the soul’; and it could be entirely free of matter 
in every way and it is then called ‘an intellect.” 
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i.e. whether he is a substance or not.70 Avicenna uses the concept of entelechy but he 
uses it in a wider sense than form and it is in this sense that Jean states that the soul is 
the perfection of the body. This guarantees that it is a separable substance and 
provides the basis for his argument for the immortality of the soul. It is important, 
however, to state that Avicenna stressed that the soul is not an ordinary form, just as 
Jean states that it is a complete thing in itself, an unum quid, as he states. It is, in 
Aristotelian terms, an entelechy and a substance in itself. Avicenna was also arguing 
against a tradition, that in the conception of the soul as a substance some held that 
the soul was a physical or corporeal thing: 
 
Accordingly, Ibn Sīnā follows Aristotle in emphasizing that some entelechies 
are mere forms, while others are substances: The soul that simply animates an 
organic body is its form. Here soul is to body as seaworthiness is to ship. But 
the rational soul, the human mind or consciousness, does more and is more. It 
is a substance and in principle separable from the body.71 
 
A second argument for the substance of the soul refers to its potential to receive an 
opposite. Everything that receives an opposite as such, while remaining unchanged 
as regards its essence, is a substance. This can be applied in a simple case of an 
apple, which although it changes its outward appearance, in its essence it remains the 
same. On a higher level, but following the same principle, the soul receives 
opposites, as for example, when it moves from ignorance to knowledge, yet in 
essence, it is the same substance. Although the soul is a substance, Jean states, it is 
                                                
70 Rahman, F, Avicenna’s Psychology; An English Translation of Kitāb Al-Najāt Book II, Chapter VI 
with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on The Cairo Edition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1952), p. 9. ‘Now, Avicenna continues, to say that the soul is ‘form’ is to say that 
the soul is an entelechy, for it is the soul which perfects the several species of living beings, i.e. makes 
a particular living being a member of a particular species.’  
71 Goodman, L.E. Avicenna, (London & New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 155. 
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not a substance like matter, nor is it substantial form only, it is a complete thing in 
itself, fixed in its nature.72 
 
2.3.2 Simplicity of the Soul 
 
 
In his discussion on the simplicity of the soul Jean describes a hierarchy of 
substances very similar to the Avicennian distinctions above; there exists improper, 
common and proper substances; when something is composed of matter and form it 
is an improper substance; a common substance refers to spiritual or immaterial 
substance; a proper substance refers to God. 
 
But it should be noted that substance is called simple in three ways: 
improperly, commonly and properly. For instance, improperly, it is called 
simple in a certain respect and in comparison, just as the elements with 
respect to the elements of the body are called simple, but which are composed 
of matter and form. Commonly something is called simple which by 
comparison and according to itself, in a certain way is called simple, such as 
spiritual substances which in comparison to the elements are called simple, 
and also in a certain way: but they do not have a composition which is of 
matter and form; however they have the composition of ‘that which is’ and 
‘that through which it is’. But properly and absolutely something is simple in 
which there is not a composition of matter and form nor the difference 
between ‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which it exists’, as in the case 
of God: for God and divinity do not differ, in the same way as man and 
humanity differ; since when I say man I indicate ‘that he exists’ and when I 
say humanity I state ‘that through which he exists’. However when I say 
body, I am referring to matter; when I say soul, I am referring to form.73 
                                                
72 Summa, C. 22, 8-16. Item, omne quod recipit secundum se opposita, manens secundum essenciam 
intransmutatum, est substancia; nec est instancia in quantitate et superficie, quae non transmutata 
recipit contrarios colores, quia non recipit colores secundum se, immo secundum uirtutem 
subsistentem corporee substancie. Sed anima secundum se recipit opposita intransmutata secundum 
essenciam, ut sciencie et ignorancie, ergo est substancia. Eisdem racionibus ostenditur quod anima 
non est substancia ut materia, nec est ut substancialis forma tantum, sed ut unum quid, fixum in sua 
natura. 
73 Summa, C. 25, 3-16. Sed notandum quod substancia simplex dicitur tripliciter: improprie, 
communiter et proprie. Improprie quidem, secundum quid et in comparacione, simplex dicitur, sicut 
elementa respectu elementorum corporum dicuntur simplicia, que tamen composita sunt ex materia et 
forma. Communiter dicitur simplex quod in comparacione et secundum se, quodam modo simplex 
dicitur, ut spirituales substancie que comparacione elementorum simplicia dicuntur, et eciam in se 
quodam modo: non enim habent composicionem que est ex materia et forma; habent tamen 
composicionem eius quod est et quo est. Proprie uero et absolute simplex est in quo non est 
composicio materie et forme, nec differencia eius quod est et quo est, ut Deus: non enim differt Deus 
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Jean makes further use of the distinction between something existing and that by 
which it exists, being is analysed into essence and existence to distinguish all of 
creation from the Creator. In this instance, however, he refers to a universal term, 
‘humanity’ which belongs to the definition of man but it has nothing to do with 
existence. Universals, for Aristotle, are things which are said of primary substances, 
they are distinguished from particulars in that they are to be found in many places at 
once, whereas particulars can only be in one place at any one time. Aristotle agreed 
with Plato in admitting the reality of universals but he argued against Plato treating 
them as other worldly and independent of the particulars to which they referred. 
Aristotle refers to universals as characteristics common to many different individual 
objects or persons and for him these are as real as the individual objects or persons 
themselves. He was not, however, interested in the ‘existential’ sense of being, 
substance is what exists and can be explained as what something is and in the final 
analysis its being it is reduced to its essence.   
 
For Avicenna, ‘(A)ll true being is true according to its essential reality’74, in 
the case of man he possesses a ‘unique reality’ something that the senses cannot 
perceive but that is ‘pure intelligible’.75 Universals, according to Avicenna, have a 
‘triple existence’. They are before things, ante res; they are in things, in rebus; and 
they are after things, post res, at one and the same time’.76 The first of these refers to 
the ideas in the understanding of God as God must have an idea of what a man or 
animal is; the second refers to the ‘sensible existence’ as it is attached to matter; the 
                                                                                                                                     
et deitas, sicut homo et humanitas; quia cum dico hominem significo quod est, cum dico humanitatem 
dico quo est. Cum autem dico corpus, dico materiam; cum uero dico animam, dico formam. 
74 Afnan, p. 120.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Afnan, p. 267. 
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third refers to when the mind abstracts the universal from the particular sense 
experience and forms a ‘conceptual notion’ of the universal. Clearly Jean accepts 
Avicenna’s account of universals as real substances. According to Afnan, however, 
Avicenna also tended towards nominalism in his logic (the latter being the theory 
that universals are just names attached to classes) and therefore he contends that it is 
more correct to call him a ‘conceptualist’.77 If we, however, consider universals in a 
causal sense when Jean refers to ‘humanity’ as ‘that through which’ man has 
existence, we can, with Avicenna, see that although universals exist only as concepts 
this does not ‘prevent them from being real common natures of things’.78 In this 
understanding of universality Marenbon explains that what Avicenna means is that 
although a general term can be used in the particular or universal sense that when it 
comes to considering ‘common natures’ they are neither universal nor individual. 
Avicenna has, as Marenbon states, ‘explained a certain veridical way in which things 
can be regarded’.79 
 
The definition of, for instance, ‘horseness, is not the same as and does not 
include universality in it, although the concept of horse can indeed be 
predicated of many. If we ask about this common nature, horseness, we 
should deny that it is either one or many, and that it either exists only in the 
mind or as a concrete thing’.80 
 
2.3.3 The Incorporeality of the Soul 
 
 
The argument for saying that the soul is incorporeal states that while the body is 
subject to all the senses the same cannot apply to the soul. The qualities of the soul 
cannot be perceived by a corporeal sense, therefore the soul is incorporeal.  
                                                
77 Afnan, p. 269. 
78 Marenbon, p. 107. 
79 Ibid, p. 108. 
80 Ibid. 
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Consequently it should be shown regarding the soul that it is incorporeal. In 
this respect we proceed as follows: each body is subject to all the bodily 
senses or to some of them; but the soul is not subject to all or to some of the 
senses: therefore the soul is not a body. Likewise anything whose qualities 
are not perceived by a corporeal sense is incorporeal; such is the soul; 
therefore the soul is incorporeal. 81 
 
Anticipating Descartes ‘res extensa’ Jean states that everything corporeal has spatial 
extension but the powers of the soul, such as the imaginative, the memorative and the 
intellectual powers are not present in the soul spatially but in a simple mode. If they 
were present in the soul spatially the soul would be infinite spatially. From a 
philosophical point of view extensionality is important as it raises issues such as 
space and the movement of bodies, but here Jean is referring to extensionality to 
further his argument for saying that the soul is of a simple and indivisible nature. 
 
Again everything corporeal has spatial extension; the rational soul does not 
have spatial extension: therefore it is incorporeal. The proof of the minor 
premise is clear with reference to the imaginative, the memorative and the 
intellective power; from which it is clear that the likenesses received in the 
soul are not there spatially, but in a simple mode. For if they were present 
spatially, because it is possible to imagine infinite things, the soul would be 
infinite spatially. Likewise, nothing corporeal can comprehend that which is 
incorporeal and spiritual; the rational soul can comprehend the incorporeal 
and spiritual: therefore it is not corporeal.82 
 
Jean addresses the simplicity of the soul relying on Augustine’s explanation of 
quantity: quantity can be explained in two ways; one is when we refer to the actual 
size of something or someone, as in the example given by Jean, that of Hercules. The 
                                                
81 Summa, C. 23, 1-6. Consequenter ostendendum est de anima quod sit incorporea. Ad quod 
proceditur sic: omne corpus subiacet omnibus sensibus corporalibus aut quibusdam; anima uero nec 
subiacet omnibus, nec quibusdam: ergo anima non est corpus. Item, omne illud cuius qualitates non 
percipiuntur sensu corporeo est incorporeum; talis est anima: ergo est anima incorporea. 
82 Summa, C. 23, 6-15. Item, omne corporeum habet extensionem dimensiuam: anima rationalis non 
habet dimensiuam extensionem; ergo est incorporea. Probacio minoris patet ex comparacione uirtutis 
imaginatiue et memoratiue et intellectiue; unde manifestum est quod similitudines recepte in anima 
non sunt ibi dimensiue, sed modo simplici. Si enim essent dimensiue, cum infinita possint ymaginari, 
anima esset infinite dimensionis. Item, nullum corporeum comprehensiuum est incorporei et 
spiritualis; anima racionalis comprehensiua est incorporei et spiritualis; ergo non est corporea. 
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latter is not only renowned for his physical attributes but there is the second sense in 
which he is renowned, that is, for his inherent powers which are not visible.  
 
Quantity is spoken of in two ways, in respect of powers and dimensions; 
consequently when one questions what size is Hercules, it is possible to ask 
about either the spatial quantity, namely, how tall is he or the inherent 
quantity, namely, how many powers? Therefore I say that the soul has 
inherent quantity, but not dimensional or material; and similarly there is 
inherent extension in the body since the activities of the body derive from 
powers.83 
 
The soul has inherent powers that are not quantifiable as they would be in something 
corporeal. As powers of the soul they are distinguished by their activity and their act, 
unlike parts in the body that are distinguished one from another, each assigned a 
distinct position in the physical body. Following the doctrine advanced in the Book of 
Causes, ‘that all that is received is present in that which receives it, according to the 
nature of the receiver, not according to the nature of that received’84 all likenesses 
and images will be in the soul in a simple mode, not in a spatial mode. If the soul had 
size or quantity, it would be larger in a larger body and lesser in a lesser body as Jean 
states: 
 
Likewise, if the soul was a quantity, therefore it would be larger in a larger 
body and lesser in a lesser body; and by increasing the body it would be 
increased and by diminishing it would be diminished, and consequently 
therefore, also its substance and all of its powers; therefore those whose 
bodies are larger would be more wise and old men would be more intelligent, 
and those small in body more foolish and uncultured, which, it is evident, is 
false.85 
                                                
83 Summa, C. 24, 30-35. Quantum dicitur duobus modis, uirtualiter et dimensiue; unde cum queritur 
quantus sit Hercules, potest queri uel quantitas dimensiua, scilicet quot pedum, aut quantitas uirtualis, 
scilicet quante uirtutis. Dico ergo quod anima habet quantitatem uirtualem, sed non dimensiuam siue 
materialem; et similiter uirtualem extensionem in corpore, quia uirtutibus insunt operaciones in 
corpore.  
84 Summa, C. 24, 6-7. Item, omne quod recipitur est in recipiente secundum naturam recipientis, non 
secundum naturam recepti. See also Bougerol p. 82 reference to Book of Causes, IX (ed. Pattin, 99 46-
49).  
85 Summa, C. 24, 15-20. Item, si anima esset quanta, ergo esset maior in maiori corpore et minor in 
minori; et augmentato corpore augmentaretur et diminuto diminueretur, per consequens ergo, et 
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The notion that ‘all that is received is present in that which receives it, according to 
the nature of the receiver, not according to the nature of that received’ had its source 
in the Liber de causis, as stated above. This treatise, dating from around 1180, is a 
translation of an Arabic text, probably dating back to the ninth century. It is itself a 
transcription of Proclus’s Elementatio theologica from the fifth century and wrongly 
attributed to Aristotle. Its actual author was Alfarabi but for most of the thirteenth 
century it was thought to have been the work of Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas was the 
first to recognise that it was based on a work of Proclus’s.86 What we must appreciate 
is that Jean and his contemporaries had no notion of the history of Greek philosophy 
as it is available to the modern scholar. It is all the more remarkable that they knew 
the value of information which came their way from compilations and commentaries, 
but seldom from original texts.  
 
2.3.4 The Soul as One in Three Powers 
 
 
The soul for Jean is one in three powers: the vegetative, the sensitive and the 
rational, however, they are not three separate substances. He states: 
 
Consequently it should be shown concerning the soul that it is one in three 
potencies: vegetative, sensitive and rational. With regard to this we must 
proceed as follows: in the same way that the perfectible is constituted in 
relation to the perfectible, so perfection is in relation to perfection; but the 
perfectible in man does not differ from the vegetative, the sensitve and the 
rational, since a man, according to his essence is vegetative, sensitive, 
rational. Therefore there is one perfection in relation to substance.87 
                                                                                                                                     
substancia et omnis uirtus ipsius; essent ergo sapienciores maiores corpore et ingeniosiores senes, et 
parui corpore insipienciores et rudiores; quod, patet, est falsum. 
86 ‘His [William of Moerbeke] translation of Proclus’s Elemetatio theologia brought to St Thomas the 
realisation that Liber de Causis was not the work of Aristotle, as it was previously supposed to be, but 
was based on the work of Proclus.’ Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume 2, 
Medieval Philosophy (London:New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 207. 
87 Summa, C. 26, 1-6. Consequenter ostendendum est de anima quod sit una in tribus potenciis: 
uegetabili, sensibili, racionali. Ad quod procedendum est sic: sicut se habet perfectibile ad 
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This can be understood in light of the argument whereby Jean employs the argument 
from geometrical shapes (also used by Bonaventure and others in the debate on the 
plurality of forms).88 The source of the argument from geometrical figures had its 
origin in Aristotle’s De anima as he states: 
 
The cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for the particulars subsumed 
under the common name in both cases, figures and living beings, constitute a 
series, each successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, e.g. 
the square the triangle, the sensory power, the self-nutritive.89  
 
Here Jean employs the argument to show how a complex form, the pentagon, 
contains the less complex, the square.  
 
Likewise, the proportion of the vegetative to the sensitive is the same as the 
sensitive to the rational, just as the proportion of a triangle is to a square, and 
a square to a pentagon; since just as a triangle is in a square, so the vegetative 
is in the sensitive and the sensitive in the rational. But although the triangle is 
in the square, so they do not differ according to substance, indeed they are the 
same in substance; therefore in the same way, the vegetative, since it is in the 
sensitive and both of these are present in the rational, they do not differ 
according to substance.90 
  
                                                                                                                                     
perfectibile, sic perfectio ad perfectionem; sed non differt in homine perfectibile a uegetabili, sensibili 
et racionali, quia unus homo secundum rem est uegetabilis, sensibilis, racionalis; ergo una est 
perfectio secundum substanciam. 
88 ‘But, in fact, so ardent a disciple of St Augustine as the Seraphic Doctor does not hesitate to find 
arguments in support of his thesis in Aristotle and in Averroes.’Crowley, p. 135; also in a footnote (p. 
135, n. 55) he refers to Bonaventure: In II Sent., d. XXXI, a.1, q.1; Op. Omn., II, p. 740. 
89 Aristotle, De anima, Book II c. 3 414b 1 28-32 in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. One (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). See 
also Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus Veneticus: De anima, liber: 2, cap.: 3 (Bekker: 414b). 
Similiter autem se habent ei que de figuris est, et que sunt secundum animam. Semper enim in eo 
quod est consequenter, est potentia quod prius est, et in figuris et in animatis, ut in tetragono quidem 
trigonum est, in sentitivo autem vegetativum.   
90 Summa, C. 26, 6-13. Item, similis est proportio uegetatiue ad sensitiuum, et sensitiui ad racionale, 
sicut est trianguli ad quadrangulum et quadranguli ad pentangulum; quia sicut triangulus in 
quadrangulo, sic uegetatiuum in sensitiuo et sensitiuum in racionali. Sed cum triangulus est in 
quadrangulo, sic non differt secundum substanciam, immo sunt idem in substancia; ergo similiter 
uegetatiuum, cum est in sensitiuo, et utrumque in racionali, non differunt secundum subtanciam. 
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If they were separate substances the actions of one would not be impeded by the 
actions of the other which contradicts our experience if we think how our physical 
selves are affected by how we think or imagine.  
 
The vegetative and sensitive powers are described as the ‘material qualities’ 
for the purposes of the soul and, as such, will play an important role in Jean’s 
discussion of the unity of body and soul through intermediaries. 
And although there are three substances, however, there are not three souls in 
man, since soul is the name of perfection. For this reason the vegetative 
substance is not a soul except in plants, of which it is the perfection, and the 
sensitive substance is a soul only in brute animals; but in man they are like 
the material qualities for the purpose of rationality, and rationality is the full 
actuality; and because of that reason alone is the soul in man, with the others 
existing as material dispositions for the purposes of the soul.91  
 
If the powers are one in substance how does Jean explain the connection between a 
corruptible and an incorruptible substance given that the vegetative and sensitive 
souls are material dispositions for the rational soul? Jean supports his position in 
saying that the soul is a single substance in three powers when he states that the 
sensitive soul is not corrupted in man ‘neither according to essence or according to 
potency, but according to act only, when the soul is separated from the body’.92 Jean 
states that a distinction must be made between the vegetative and sensitive souls in 
animals and those in man. In the case of animals they are not separable but because 
these powers belong to man as rational animal they are separable according as each 
                                                
91 Summa, C. 26, 38-44. Et quamuis sint tres substancie, non tamen tres anime in homine, quia anima 
nomen est perfectionis. Ideo substancia uegetabilis non est anima, nisi in plantis quarum est perfectio, 
sensibilis uero nisi in brutis; in homine autem sunt quasi materiales ad racionalem, et racionalis est 
complecio; et ideo ipsa sola est anima in homine, aliis existentibus ut disposicionibus materialibus ad 
ipsam. 
92 Summa, C. 26. 65-67. Responderi potest quoniam sensibilis non corrumpitur in homine nec 
secundum essenciam, nec secundum potenciam, sed secundum actum tantum, cum separatur anima a 
corpore. 
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is a power of the soul but they are not separable according to act. Powers are 
accorded different names but in substance they are one and the same. Jean concludes: 
 
I respond as before, that the sensitive power in man is different from that in 
brute animals; since in animals, although it is substantial incorporeal form, it 
is not separable from the body, neither according to power, nor according to 
act; however, in man since it is a power present in the rational soul, it is 
separable according to power, not according to act. Let us say following 
Augustine,93 in his book On the Soul and Spirit: ‘the substance of the soul is 
one and the same’ the vegetative, the sensitive, the rational; but ‘according to 
the different powers it is assigned different names’.94 
 
The question arises as to how to explain the powers of the soul of man that are 
separable and therefore capable of surviving our earthly existence but not according 
to act? This has implications for the immortality of the soul since the rational soul is 
separable but how then can it be said that man will be reunited to his body in the 
resurrection? In what way are the ‘acts’ of the soul understood if, as it is stated, they 
are not separable from the body? Does the soul reach a stage of full actuality and, as  
form of the body it no longer requires the ‘material’ attachments? For Jean the 
vegetative and sensitive souls that were necessary as long as the body endures in this 
life will be needed on the day of resurrection. Referring to a distinction between that 
of a two-fold vegetative power and a two-fold sensitive power in man, Jean argues 
that of necessity, the vegetative and sensitive souls must be reunited with the body. 
This will be discussed further with regard to the arguments for the immortaility of 
the soul which relies on the distinction between the nature of the form in brute 
animals and human beings.  
                                                
93 Pseudo-Augustine, On the Spirit and Soul, c. 15 (PL 40, 791). 
94 Summa, C. 26, 85-92. Respondeo ut supra, quia potencia sensibilis in homine aliter est quam in 
brutis; quia in brutis cum sit forma substancialis incorporea non est separabilis a corpore, nec 
secundum potenciam, nec secundum actum; in homine uero cum sit potencia in substancia anime 
racionalis, separabilis est secundum potenciam, non secundum actum. Dicamus ergo, secundum 
Augustinum in libro De anima et spiritu: ‘Una et eadem est anime substancia”, uegetabilis, sensitiua, 
racionalis; sed ‘secundum diversas potencias diuersa sortitur uocabula’. 
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A further problem arises in relation to the doctrine that the soul was one in 
substance but also one in three powers. If, as in the case of the embryro, the 
vegetative soul is present before the infusion of the rational soul would this not lead 
to the problem of difference in time, therefore a difference in substance? Jean 
distinguishes between the vegetative soul which prepares the body for the infusion of 
the rational soul and a separate form which is created with the rational soul and 
endures as long as the rational soul remains, or, as long as a person has life. The first 
disappears once the body receives the rational soul and from there it would seem that 
the vegetative soul (and the same holds for the sensitive soul) is one with the rational 
soul. The text from Jean reads as follows: 
 
In the second place they object: what exists before and what exists afterwards 
is not the same substance; but the vegetative soul comes first in time, which 
is clear in the seed and the embryo, because it is first brought to life since it is 
nourished and grows before the rational soul is infused: therefore as before. 
And it can be said that there is a vegetative soul that orders and a vegetative 
soul that completes; one is a form present in the becoming, the other is 
present in being: however the first is handed on and sown with the body, the 
second, however, is infused with the rational soul. Therefore the first passes 
away, once its becoming is completed, that is, the formed and organized 
body; the second, however, remains in the power of the rational soul; and 
similarly one must make a similar distinction with regard to the sensitive 
soul.95 
 
Jean’s solution may be said to anticipate Thomas Aquinas who held that the 
vegetative and the nutritive souls do not co-exist but that the one replaces the other 
                                                
95 Summa, C. 26, 73-82. Secundo obiciunt: non est eadem substancia prius ens tempore, et succedens 
tempore; sed uegetabilis est prior tempore, quod patet in semine et embrione, quod prius uegetatur 
quia nutritur et crescit, antequam anima racionalis infundatur; ergo primum. Et dici posset quod est 
uegetatiua disponens et uegetatiua perficiens; una est forma in fieri, alia est in esse: prima autem 
traducitur et seminatur cum corpore, secunda uero infunditur cum racionali anima. Prima ergo transit 
completo fieri, id est corpore formato et organizato; secunda autem manet in esse potencia racionalis 
anime; et similiter distinguendum est de sensibili. 
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and this is replaced by the rational soul.96 This did not, however, convince one of the 
most representative figures of this time, that of Roger Bacon, who taught in the 
Faculty of Arts at Paris from the period 1241 to 1245. He was, in contrast to Jean, a 
strong supporter of universal hylomorphism, which, as we have seen, is the doctrine 
which held that everything that exists is either matter or form or a composite of both, 
including the soul. One argument which Bacon relies on is taken from Boethius97 in 
the De Trinitate; that no pure form is subject to accidents but, he states, the separated 
intelligences are subject to accidents as, for example, to knowledge, virtue and even 
local movement. They cannot therefore be pure forms. Jean, however, has already 
made the distinction in terms of the essential and accidental nature of an angel and 
the soul.  
 
Likewise, the essence by which a creature is, is only said in respect of that 
which is essential to a creature. However, ‘that which is” refers to the 
essential and accidental, as is clear in an angel and in the soul; because it is 
said about it that it is a soul, and that it is rational, and this is essential to it; 
and that it is just, that this is accidental.98 
 
The soul is the form and perfection of the body but it is subject to error and to a 
badness of will (malicia voluntatis). The question as to whether the good are 
rewarded and the evil punished will be an issue for discussion on the immortality of 
the soul but we turn next to a discussion on the unity of body and soul. 
                                                
96 ‘Et sic primo inducatur anima vegetabilis; deinde ea abjecta, inducatur anima sensibilis et 
vegetabilis simul: qua abjecta, inducatur non per virtutem praedictam, sed a creante, anima quae simul 
est rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis. Et sic dicendum est secundum hanc opinionem quod embrio 
antequam habeat animam rationalem, vivit et habet animam, qua abjecta inducitur anima rationalis’ 
(De Pot., q. iii, a, ix, ad 9) quoted in Crowley, p. 126.  
97 Crowley, p. 84, n. 11. “Contra: Boethius in de Trinitate, nulla forma pura est accidentibus subjecta; 
set intelligentia est accidentibus subjecta, scilicet scientie sive virtuti et mutationi secundum locum, 
licet non motui, ergo non est forma pura…...Quod concedendum est” (O.H.I. XII, pp. 136-137). Cf. 
O.H.I., X, p. 282. (O.H.I., X, refers to one of Bacon’s Philosophical Commentaries: Questiones altere 
supra libros prime physicorum. pp. 1-336).  
98 Summa, C. 17, 49-54. Item, essencia que creatura est non dicitur nisi respectu eius quod est 
essenciale creature. Quod est uero respicit essenciale et accidentale, ut patet in angelo et anima; quod 
dicitur de eo quod est anima, et quod racionalis est, et hoc est essenciale ei; et quod est iusta, quod est 
accidentale. 
  96 
 
 
SECTION FOUR 
THE SOUL IN RELATION TO THE BODY  
 
Jean gives a number of reasons for saying that there are no intermediaries between 
the soul and the body. That the soul is united to the body is not accidental but 
essential to it. Unlike an angel it is united through necessity; therefore through its 
essence and therefore without an intermediary. If the soul is united to matter as its 
form and perfection, it is joined without an intermediary. It is stated that just as form, 
through itself, is joined to matter, so the soul, through itself, is joined to the body. 
Further it is stated: 
 
Therefore at first it is asked whether the soul is united to the body through an 
intermediary or without an intermediary; and since the capacity to be united 
is not accidental to the soul but essential to it and it is that through which the 
rational soul differs from an angel, as was stated previously. The soul is 
united to the body through its ability to be united: therefore it is united 
through its essence; therefore without an intermediary. Likewise, since an 
intermediary by nature ought to have a share in the extremes and the 
extremes are an incorporeal substance, that is, the rational soul and a 
corporeal substance, that is, the body; therefore if an intermediary were 
proposed it would be in part a corporeal substance and in part incorporeal, 
which is not possible; it remains therefore that it is without an intermediary.99 
 
On the other hand it is stated there is a great distance between the body and the soul  
The body is a composite while the rational soul is simple in that the soul is not a 
composition made from the essential parts of matter and form. The body arises from 
                                                
99 Summa, C, 37. 1-12. Primo ergo queritur an anima corpori uniatur per medium, an sine medio; et 
cum unibilitas non sit accidentalis anime sed essencialis et sit illud quo essentialiter differt anima 
racionalis ab angelo, sicut dictum est prius. Unitur anima corpori per suam unibilitatem: ergo unitur 
per suam essenciam; ergo sine medio. Item, cum anima uniatur corpori ut forma et perfectio ejus, 
forma autem unitur per se materie, ergo anima unitur per se corpori; ergo sine medio. Item, cum 
medium natura debeat habere conuenienciam cum extremis, extrema autem sunt substancia incorporea 
scilicet anima racionalis, et corporea scilicet corpus; ergo si poneretur medium, esset partim 
substancia corporea et partim incorporea, quod non est possibile; relinquitur ergo quod sine medio. 
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contrary elements, the soul is beyond contrariety in its substance. The body is weak, 
the soul is knowledgeable, the former is dependent, the latter absolute and fixed in its 
nature. The body is corruptible while the soul is incorruptible and immortal.100 Jean 
puts forward the theory that things that are united are united through similarity but 
soul and body exhibit such a distance between them there must be an intermediary 
which shares something of both natures. The Pseudo-Augustine allows for certain 
similarities between body and soul as it is stated:  
 
There are certain similarities between the body and soul, that is, supremacy of 
the body and humility of spirit, in which, without confusing their natures, 
they can be easily joined as belonging to a person. For similar things delight 
in similar things.101 
 
Jean responds in two ways. In the first way he states that because the soul is the form 
of the body and is its perfection (unitur enim ut forma sive materie sive ut perfectio 
suo perfectibili)102 it is therefore said that the union takes place without an 
intermediary. Using the example of how wood is predisposed to accept the form of 
fieriness, which is immediate, in the same way the body accepts the form of the soul. 
In a second way, however, he states the soul is united through intermediaries. The 
comparison is made between the works of a skilled craftsman who produces his 
works by means of an instrument (est comparacio anime sicut artificis operantis per 
instrumentum).103 In the case of the soul there must be something that is instrumenal 
in bringing about the unity between the essence of the soul and its powers of 
                                                
100 Summa, C. 37, 18-24. Cum substancia corporis sit substancia composita, substancia autem anime 
racionalis simplex; cum illa contraria uel ex contrariis, ista omnino preter contrarietatem in sui 
substancia; cum illa obtusa, ista cognoscitiua, cum illa dependens, ista absoluta et in se fixa, illa 
corruptibilis, ista incorruptibilis et immortalis; infinita distancia erit nature corporis et nature anime 
racionalis, sicut perpetui et temporali; non erit ergo possibilis unio sine medio. 
101 Summa, C. 37, 31-34. Item, Augustinus, in libro De anima et spiritu: ‘Sunt corporis et anime 
quedam similia, scilicet supremum corporis et spiritus infimum, in quibus sine naturali confusione, 
personali tamen cum unione facile coniugi possunt. Similia enim gaudent similibus’. 
102 Summa, C. 37, 45. 
103 Summa, C. 37, 56. 
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actualising. Jean states that the intermediary that brings about the unity is the power 
of the soul itself which is the intermediary between the essence of the soul and its 
activity. An intermediary exists between the essence of the soul and the activity of 
the power in, for example, the power of seeing and hearing. 
 
However, according to the second mode, the soul is united through an 
intermediary, and this intermediary is its potency or its power; for inasmuch 
as the soul is united to the body as its organ, through which it acts, the 
relation between the soul and the body is similar to that of a skilled craftsman 
working by means of an instrument, since in this way the soul is constituted 
for the body. In this way, three things must be considered, the substance of 
the soul, its power and its activity; the potency or power is the intermediate 
between the essence and the activity. The activity of the soul therefore occurs 
through an organ, inasmuch as the soul acts through the enlivened body 
through seeing and hearing and acts of this kind; the union of the soul itself to 
the body as its organ occurs through the intermediary of its potency or power, 
for example, by means of the vegetative power and sensitive power.104  
 
How can the body, a corporeal substance, be joined to the soul, an 
incorporeal substance? Jean discusses the composition of bodies generally to 
distinguish between the composition found in various bodies, beginning with the 
composition of minerals; next, the composition of the vegetative nature, which is a 
mixture of the elements and in addition it requires what in Latin is translated as a 
‘complexio’;105 next are brute animals whose bodies are composed of organs and 
limbs. The human body, however, is the most composite of all bodies in order for it 
to be an organ for the human soul.  
                                                
104 Summa, C.37, 53-64. Secundum uero secundum modum unitur anima per medium, et medium 
istud est potencia siue uis eius; secundum enim quod anima unitur corpori ut suo organo per quod 
operatur, est comparacio anime sicut artificis operantis per instrumentum, quia secundum hunc 
modum se habet anima ad corpus. In uia autem ista, est tria accipere substanciam anime et uirtutem 
ejus et operacionem; potencia uero medium est sive uirtus inter essenciam et operacionem. Quia ergo 
operacio anime fit organo, secundum quod anima per corpus animatum operatur, uidendo scilicet et 
audiendo et huiusmodi; unio ipsius anime ad corpus ut organum erit mediante potencia et ui eius; 
uerbi gracia, ut mediante uirtute uegetatiua et sensitiua. 
105 Vico, p. 318, n 15. ‘The Latin word ‘complexio” translates the complex idea of physiology and 
pathology that Galen defines in the prologue to the work De complexionibus. He states that each 
living being has his own peculiar combination of hot, cold, wet and dry qualities that is suitable to the 
nature of each and that establishes a right balance that can be identified with the state of health. 
Consequently, each deviation from or breaking of it causes pathological situations’. 
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The most perfect kind of perfection or form ought to be more perfect than 
what is capable of perfection; but among all bodies constituted from the 
elements, and also the elements themselves, the human body is the most 
perfect; and the rational soul is the most perfect perfection among all natural 
forms: therefore the human body alone is capable of unity to the rational soul. 
But that the human body is the most perfect is proved as follows. Everything 
that is the material of something is imperfect in relation to it, such as stones 
in relation to a house. Therefore with material elements in relation to bodies 
composed of elements, they are more imperfect than bodies composed of 
elements. Likewise, among bodies composed of elements, as mineral bodies; 
and certain in which not only a mixture is required but also a combination, as 
in the vegetative; from this it is correctly said concerning a tree or an herb 
that it is of such and such a combination, that in no way would it be said of 
any other body of mineral, as gold or silver; and there are certain bodies in 
which not only a mixture and a combination is required, indeed also a 
composition of organs or limbs, as the bodies of animals which have multiple 
composition, as in functional limbs. Therefore, since the mixture of the 
elements is material with respect to the combination and the combination 
with respect to the composition, and all these with respect to the human body 
are more imperfect, the mineral bodies are more imperfect than the 
vegetative, the vegetative more than the bodies of animals and all of those 
more than the human body.106 
 
 
All of these powers arise from the four elements and their qualities (hot and dry, hot 
and moist, cold and moist, and cold and dry). Anything, however, composed of the 
four elements is that of a nature that has contrariety. Accordingly, there is another 
nature, free from all contrariety, which establishes a harmony among the soul’s 
activities, whether of the vegetative, the sensitive or the rational souls. This is the 
celestial nature or, as it is also known, the fifth essence or quintessence. It is 
                                                
106 Summa, C. 38, 12-33. Perfectissime perfectionis siue forme debet esse perfectius perfectibile; sed 
inter omnia corpora constituta ex elementis, et eciam ipsis elementis, perfectius est corpus humanum; 
anima uero racionalis perfectissima perfectio est inter omnes naturales formas: ergo solum corpus 
humanum erit unibile anime racionali. Quod autem corpus humanum sit perfectissimum, probatur sic. 
Omne quod est materiale respectu alterius, est imperfectum respectu illius, sicut lapides in respectu ad 
domum. Ergo cum elementa materialia respectu corporum elementatorum, imperfectiora sunt 
corporibus elementatis. Item, inter corpora elementata quedam corpora sunt in quorum generacione 
exigitur tantummodo mixtio elementorum, ut corpora mineralia; quedam uero in quibus non solum 
requiritur mixtio, sed eciam complexio ut uegetabilia; unde recte dicitur de arbore uel de erba quod est 
talis complexionis uel talis, quod nullo modo diceretur de alio corpore minerali ut auro uel argento; 
quedam uero sunt in quibus non tantum requiritur mixtio et complexio, immo eciam composicio 
organorum siue membrorum, ut corpora animalium que composicionem habent multiplicem, ut in 
officialibus membris. Cum ergo mixtio elementorum materialis sit respectu complexionis, et 
complexio respectu composicionis, et hec omnia respectu corporis humani imperfectiora sunt, 
mineralia corpora uegetabilibus, uegetabilia autem corporibus animalium, et hec omnia corpore 
humano. 
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explained further in terms of the doctrine of light. Jean makes a three-fold distinction 
in order to explain how the human body receives the most noble light, which is the 
rational soul. He states that there is a triple difference in the nature of the celestial 
light; for there is a light of the heavenly sky; above that there is the aqueous or 
crystalline sky; above that again there is the light of the empyrean sky.  
 
For there is a light of the heavenly sky and above that there is the light of the 
aqueous or crystalline sky and again above both there is the light of the 
empyrean sky, and there is an order in them according to the nobility of the 
essence of the light; therefore since it is agreed that the influence of the light 
of the heavenly sky orders the vegetative bodies towards the reception of the 
vegetative life, and the influence of the more noble light, which is the light of 
the aqueous sky, orders the bodies of sensitive things to the reception of the 
sensitive light which, perhaps on account of a power which is there from the 
reception of the impressions of the images which is necessary in the sensitive 
apprehension, it is called the aqueous or crystalline light; and the influence of 
the most noble light, which is the light of the empyrean sky, also it especially 
approaches to the nature of the spirit, hence also the region of angels is the 
empyrean sky, and it disposes the human body to receive the most noble life, 
which is the rational life.107 
 
It is stated that the empyrean light approaches to what is called spirit which is 
described as a vehicle of the powers of the soul. Spirit in this sense relates to the 
corporeal in that the natural spirit relates to the liver, vital spirit to the heart and 
animal spirit to the brain. This is the tripartite scheme which refers to the functions of 
the living being. This will become apparent in the second Consideratio as we refer to 
the physiological systems which explain the vital functions present in man. This is to 
be distinguished from the biblical account of  spiritus which is the breath of life and 
refers to the soul of man. 
                                                
107 Summa, C. 40, 150-162. Est enim lux celi siderei et supra ipsum esse lux celi aquei siue cristallini, 
et iterum supra utrumque est lux celi empirei, et est ordo in eis secundum nobilitatem essencie lucis; 
cum ergo constet quod influencia lucis celi siderei disponat corpora uegetabilia ad susceptionem uite 
uegetabilis, et influencia lucis nobilioris que est lux celi aquei disponat corpora sensibilium ad 
susceptionem uite sensibilis que, forte propter uirtutem que est ex receptione impressionum 
ymaginum que necessaria est in apprehensione sensitiua, dicta est lux aquea uel cristillina; influencia 
uero lucis nobilissima que est lux celi empirei, que eciam maxime accidit ad naturam spiritus, unde et 
regio angelorum celum est empireum, et disponet corpus humanum ad susceptionem uite nobilissime, 
que est uita racionalis. 
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The nature of the spirit is therefore simple, non contrary, corporeal, passive, 
dependent. Simple since it is not a composite from the elements; corporeal in 
relation to the different natures, the vegetative, the sensitive, the rational; 
passive with regard to the difference between the sensitve and the rational; 
dependent with regard to the rational soul. 108 
 
The second intermediary on the part of the body is the elemental nature 
which is founded in the humours and especially in uniformity and moderation, which 
is in the blood. This is simple, contrary, corporeal, passive and dependent. Thus, 
between the extremes, that is, the rational soul on the one hand, and the body 
composed of the elements on the other, there are four intermediaries; two on the part 
of the soul and two on the part of the body. On the part of the soul there are the 
vegetative and the sensitive natures; on the part of the body there are the celestial and 
the elemental natures as we have briefly examined. In his discussion on the many 
modes of union Jean states that the mode of union of the vegetative and the sensitive 
souls to the body cannot be the same as the union of rational soul to the body. 
Similarly the mode of union, which comes from the celestial sky, must be 
distinguished according to that in which it is received. He distinguishes various 
relationships involved in the account of matter and form  as he states: 
 
To that which investigates the account of form, since it seems that no form is 
separable from matter, a distinction must be made among the forms, since 
there is a form which totally relies and rests on its matter and does not rule 
nor sustain it but is sustained by it; and a form of this kind is properly a 
corporeal form just as it is in all inanimate bodies; but the other is the form 
which relies more on its matter and it is sustained and ruled by the form itself. 
However the activity of this form only exists in and through its matter, the 
form of this mode is the vegetative soul; as regards plants the body of a plant 
is sustained and ruled and conserved; in this way also the animal body in 
brutes is ruled and moved by the sensitive soul. Therefore the vegetative and 
the sensitive soul is of the kind of form which relies more on its matter. 
Nevertheless since their activity is only present in a body and through a body, 
                                                
108 Summa, C. 39, 64-69. Est ergo natura spiritus simplex, non contraria, corporea, obtusa, dependens. 
Simplex quia non composita ex elementis; non contraria, quia nature celestis, non elementaris; 
corporea ad differenciam naturarum uegetabilis, sensibilis, racionalis; obtusa ad differenciam 
sensibilis et racionalis; dependens ad differenciam racionalis. 
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it is shown that their essence depends on the body: without it, it would be 
useless and empty to posit them separated from the body, since they have no 
activity separate from the body. There is yet another form on which its matter 
relies and is sustained and ruled by it, and its principle activity is not in 
matter, nor through it, and such is the rational soul, which according to the 
intellective activity is abstracted from matter; nor is this activity exercised 
through any organ of the body. Hence, from this it is most certain that its 
essence is not dependent on the body, and for that reason, although it is the 
form, it is however separable from the body.109 
 
The form on which matter relies is superior to matter itself and while the body 
cannot exist as a separate substance, since it only has the power to receive forms, the 
soul is a form that is capable of a separate existence. The soul can be seen, as it is in 
Avicenna, as an authority over the body, the powers of the soul being dependent to 
varying degrees on the body. Avicenna describes the soul as the ‘entelechy’ of the 
body. This is not saying anything about the soul itself but ‘it is merely a term which 
describes the soul’s relationship with the body’.110 The concept of ‘entelechy’ is 
wider than form for Avicenna and explains how some souls are ‘not forms subsisting 
in matter but are separable from it’.111 The rational soul, as the principle of 
intellective activity is capable of independent existence as we will now see when we 
turn to the question of the immortality of the soul. 
 
                                                
109 Summa. C. 40, 64-84. Ad illud quod queritur de racione forme, quia uidetur quod nulla forma sit 
separabilis a materia, distinguendum est in formis, quia est forma que totaliter innititur et incumbit 
materie sue et non regit nec sustinet eam, sed sustinetur ab ea; et huiusmodi forma est proprie forma 
corporalis sicut est in omnibus inanimatis corporibus; alia uero est forma cui pocius innititur sua 
materia, et sustinetur et regitur ab ipsa forma. Verumtamen non est operacio huius forme nisi in sua 
materia et per eam, cuiusmodi forma est anima uegetabilis; in plantis sustinetur et regitur et 
conseruatur corpus plante; sic eciam ab anima sensibili regitur et mouetur corpus animale in brutis. 
Anima ergo uegetabilis et sensibilis est talis forma cui pocius innititur sua materia. Verumtamen quia 
eorum operacio non est nisi in corpore et per corpus, manifestum est quod earum essencia dependet a 
corpore: sine eo cassum et uanum esset ponere eas separatas a corpore, cum nullam operacionem 
habeant separatam a corpore. Est iterum forma alia cui innititur sua materia et sustinetur et regitur ab 
ipsa, et eius principalis operacio non est in materia, nec per ipsam, et talis est anima racionalis, que 
secundum operacionem intellectiuam abstracta est a materia; nec illam operacionem exercet per 
aliquod organum corporis. Unde ex hoc certissimum est quod eius essencia non est dependens a 
corpore, et ideo quamuis sit forma, tamen separabilis est a corpore.  
110 Rahman, p. 9. 
111 Ibid. 
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SECTION FIVE 
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 
 
Jean’s first argument states that if there is divine justice the good are rewarded and 
the bad are punished. However, this will not happen in this life, therefore, it will 
happen in the next life; similarly divine justice will be meted out in the next life; 
through his goodness and wisdom God attends to those who love him but not in this 
life; therefore, in the next life. However, it is the soul of man that is incorruptible and 
as Jean states, quoting from Gregory:  
 
Likewise, Gregory, in the fourth book of Dialogues: states ‘As man is made 
as an intermediary, so that he is inferior to an angel, superior to an animal; 
thus he possesses something which necessarily agrees with the highest, 
something with the lowest, namely the immortality of spirit with an angel, 
and the mortality of the body with an animal.’112 
 
If prime matter, hyle, is incorruptible it follows that the ultimate form is also 
incorruptible, that is, the rational soul. If the corruption of bodies does not affect 
prime matter, even more forcibly, the corruption of the body will not affect that 
which is above it, namely the rational soul. Jean sets out to prove that the rational 
soul is not subject to corruption, death, or destruction. He puts forward a number of 
examples to explain the various modes of destruction, however, his main argument 
with regard to matter and form is that the rational soul is immaterial and, therefore, it 
is not a composite of matter and form. Even if some hold that it is from matter and 
form, he states that its form is not destructible since it does not have an opposite. 
Nothing is opposite to it, nor is it destructible through the destruction of integral 
parts since it is simple and indivisible, as we have already seen.  
                                                
112 Summa, C. 44,  35-39. Item, Gregorius, in quarto libro Dialogorum: ‘Homo sicut in medio creatus 
est, ut esset inferior angelo, superior iumento; ita habet aliquid quod necesse est conuenire cum 
summo, aliquid cum infimo, scilicet immortalitatem spiritus cum angelo, mortalitatem uero corporis 
cum iumento.’ Gregorius, Dialogorum, IV, c. 3 (PL 77, 321 B). 
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Compared to our bodies which weaken as we get older the intellective power 
gains in strength and understanding; the more it understands the stronger it becomes. 
It does not have a limit placed upon it as regards, activity, time or power. In contrast 
the sensitive soul can be damaged, for instance the sense of sight can be damaged by 
a powerfully bright object and the sense of hearing can be damaged by a powerfully 
sounding object but the intellect cannot be damaged in the same way by its object, 
the principal object of which is the truth, which is incorruptible.113  
 
The rational soul is moved naturally by the desire to reach its goal, which, as 
we have already seen is beatitude and which can only be attained after this life. As 
human beings we are subject to death but the natural inclination for the rational soul 
is to find perpetual rest and incorruption and since no movement in nature is in vain 
it is natural for the rational soul to be moved by the desire for happiness and 
beatitude. 
 
Likewise, every substance striving naturally and resting only where death or 
corruption do not reach, is incorruptible and immortal, since the natural 
dispositions towards a goal precede the natural inclination toward the end; 
therefore since everything that is desired naturally is desired by a natural 
movement, and immortality and perpetual rest and incorruption is desired 
naturally by the rational soul, therefore it seeks and strives naturally for it and 
it rests also; therefore it is incorruptible and immortal itself. 114 
 
                                                
113 Summa, C. 44, 116-124. Item, omnis potencia nata cognoscere incorruptibilia est incorruptibilis; 
proporcionabilia enim sunt cognoscitiuum et cognoscibile, quod scilicet naturaliter est cognoscibile, 
quia ex condicione obiectorum cognoscitur condicio potencie, et ex condicione potencie cognoscitur 
condicio substancie. Cum ergo obiectum precipuum uirtutis intellectiue sit ueritas, que quidem 
incorruptibilis est, uirtus autem intellectiua est incorruptibilis; ergo et ipsa substancia. 
114 Summa, C. 44, 138-145. Item, omnis substancia naturaliter tendens et ibi solum naturaliter 
quiescens quo non attingit mors uel corruptio, est incorruptibilis et immortalis, quia naturalem 
inclinacionem ad finem naturales disposiciones ad finem antecedunt; cum ergo omne quod appetitur 
naturaliter, naturali motu appetatur, immortalitas autem et quies perpetua et incorruptio a racionali 
anima naturaliter appetatur, ergo naturaliter petit et tendit in illam et eciam quiescit; ergo ipsa est 
incorruptibilis et immortalis. 
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Further arguments reiterate the independence of the intellective soul from the body, 
that the more it distances itself from the body the more it understands. It is impeded 
by the body when it is occupied by the love of temporal things but that does not 
mean it is dependent on the body. It can, in intellectual vision, know incorporeal 
things such as prudence and justice and the like where knowledge of such things 
occurs without a body but it is in separation from the body that it grows in 
understanding. 
 
Jean addresses a number of errors with regard to immortality; why is the 
intellective power not damaged in the same way that a corporeal sense is damaged? 
If the sensitive soul of animals is immaterial and simple, in that an animal can 
abstract and reach cognition can it not also be immortal? The latter is replied to with 
reference to the nature of form in brute animals. The activity of the form in brute 
animals exists only in and through its matter; a form of this kind weakens with the 
weakening of the matter. The vegetative soul and sensitive soul of a brute animal are 
material and therefore die with the body. 
 
Loss or perishing do not follow the vegetative or the animal soul for the 
reason that it is a soul, but in the way that it is totally ordered for the body. 
Hence, since in the case of brute animals and plants that are ordered for the 
body, it is necessary that they die with the body. But in man they are not 
ordered totally to the body, on the contrary, they are ordered to  reason which 
is immortal and therefore do not die with the body.115 
 
He argues for the second time that there is a two fold vegetative power and a two 
fold sensitive power in man. For Jean writing first and foremost as a theologian it 
was necessary that the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul would be united to the 
                                                
115 Summa, C. 45, 35-40. Deficere uel interire non consequitur animam uegetabilem uel sensibilem eo 
quod anima est, sed eo quod totaliter ordinatur ad corpus. Vnde cum in brutis et in plantis totaliter 
ordinentur ad corpus, necesse est eas interire cum corpore. In homine uero non totaliter ordinantur ad 
corpus, immo ad racionem que immortalis est et ideo non intereunt cum corpore. 
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body in the resurrection; they are necessary for man to have immortal being; because 
the souls of animals are not intellectual they do not survive their earthly existence. 
Jean, quoting from the Pseudo-Augustine states that the soul drags the vegetative, the 
sensitive, the irascible and the concupiscible powers with it into death.116  
 
The question is posed, how is man made in the image of God if he is 
imprisoned by an end, by death?  
 
It must be noted that God is Alpha and Omega, not having a beginning nor an 
end; a creature, however, in so far as he is a creature has a beginning. 
Therefore, the imitation of the creature in relation to the Creator is not 
possible since he does not have a beginning. If therefore a creature must be 
the image of the Creator, this will only be possible if he does not have an end. 
And since an image is an expressed likeness and an expressed likeness is 
considered more in the persistence of an essence than in the activity of a 
power; therefore a creature exists, which is an image of the Creator, in the 
imitation of a persistence without end.117 
 
Referring to Avicenna’s distinction between necessary and possible being to 
highlight the cause of permanency it is stated that everything that ‘is’ is either 
necessary or possible, but one thing alone is necessary because it has in itself the 
cause of its own necessity.118 In fact Avicenna divides ‘being’ into three classes: 
contingent, necessary and impossible. In the first case, that of contingent being, 
something may or may not exist; in the second whatever is necessary has existence 
and is applied to God alone; in the third what is impossible cannot exist but yet it has 
                                                
116 Summa, C. 45, 64-66. Unde Augustinus in libro De anima et spiritu, dicit quod anima in morte 
secum trahit uegetatiuam et sensitiuam, irascibilem et concupiscibilem. 
117 Summa, C. 45, 98-105. Notandum ergo quod cum Deus sit Alpha et Omega, non habens 
principium nec finem; creatura uero, in quantum creatura est, habens principium. Non est igitur 
possibilis ymitacio creature respectu Creatoris in hoc quod est non habere principium. Si ergo creatura 
debeat esse ymago Creatoris, non erit hoc possibile nisi in hoc quod est non habere finem. Et cum 
ymago sit expressa similitudo, similitudo autem expressa magis attenditur in duracione essencie quam 
in operacione potencie; erit ergo creatura, que est ymago Creatoris in ymitacione duracionis sine fine. 
118 Summa, C. 45, 79-83. Cum omne quod est sit necessarium aut possibile, solum autem illud est 
necessarium quod habet in se causam sue necessitatis. Sed solus Deus est talis: ergo solus Deus habet 
in se esse necessarium. Ergo omnia alia habent esse possibile ad non esse. 
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being. Morewedge explains that Avicenna assumed that the modalities of 
contingency, necessity, and impossibility could be legitmately be applied to 
being.’119 However, if God alone has necessary being and if all other beings fit into 
the other two categories, how can it be argued that contingent beings have 
immortality? To this Jean replies: 
 
To the last argument, it must be said that to have in itself the cause of its own 
necessity is spoken about in two ways: either it has the cause of its own 
permanency in being from another, and in this way the soul has in itself the 
cause of its own necessity, that is from God; or from itself and in this God 
alone has the cause of his own necessity.120 
 
The distinction between necessary, contingent and impossible existence ultimately 
derives from Aristotle. The latter devotes a chapter on ‘the necessary’ in his 
philosophical dictionary in Metaphysics V, where he discusses five different types of 
necessity.  Avicenna employed the various distinctions to respond to two unsolved 
problems in relation to God; that of ‘the conceptual reality entailed by God’s being 
both a final and efficient cause; the second problem he tried to solve was ‘how to 
distinguish between God and other eternal things’.121 Avicenna’s latter distinction 
was influential in post-classical Islamic teaching and had obvious appeal to medieval 
scholars with regard to the existence of the soul.122  
 
                                                
119 Morewedge, p. 204 
120 Summa, C. 45, 128-131. Ad ultimum, dicendum quod habere in se causam necessitatis sue dicitur 
dupliciter: uel habere causam sue permanencie in esse ex alio, et sic anima habet in se causam sue 
necessitatis, scilicet ex Deo; uel ex se et sic solus Deus. 
121 Robert Wisnovsky, ‘Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition’ in Peter Adamson & Richard C. 
Taylor, The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosphy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp. 92-136 (p. 120-121). 
122 ‘He [Avicenna] does not offer a criterion by means of which we can determine a decidable 
procedure for deducing whether or not a particular thing has existence. He does, however, make a 
helpful indication in that direction by avowing that although one may know a being and its essence 
(māhiyya), one cannot deduce that it does exist unless one knows the subject-matter of which the 
essence is predicated. Thus, knowing a being is possible without any empirical investigation of the 
actual world; however, such a knowledge is not factual (i.e. it is analytic in that it does not inform us 
about the world).’ Morewedge,  p. 169.  
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Jean’s employs the distinction to explain the difference between ‘that which, in itself, 
necessarily exists’ and ‘that which, through another (i.e., through its cause), 
necessarily exists’.123  The Necessary Existent is viewed ‘as a theological principle in 
the sense of being a philosophical explication of the religious notion of God’.124 The 
soul, Jean states above, is said to have in itself the cause of its own necessity, which 
is from God. This is similar to Avicenna’s identification of the ‘necessary existence 
in itself’ as the uncaused and his identification of the ‘necessary existence through 
another’ with the caused. However, this is just one of the many features of 
Avicenna’s ‘Necessary Existent’; the following highlights Avicenna’s statement that 
there is no distinction between the essence and existence of the Necessary Existent.  
 
The Necessary Existent can have no essence (māhiyya) other than mere 
existence (anniyya) for the following reason. The realization of an entity 
whose essence is other than existence is due to a cause other than itself; since 
the Necessary Existent has no cause, Its essence is no other than Its existence. 
The Necessary Existent obviously is not an accident (῾arad) because an 
accident subsists in something, whereas the Necessary Existent does not 
subsist in anything. But It is not a substance (jauhar), for a substance must 
have an essence which determines whether or not the substance in question 
exists. The Necessary Existent, on the other hand, exists necessarily.125 
 
  
With regard to the immortality of the soul how does Jean explain cases of mental 
illness, such as dementia? In the case of mental illness the intellective power is 
wounded or impeded, but once the power is restored to health, it reverts to its ‘proper 
activities’ as if it had not endured such injuries. As Rahman sees it, Avicenna’s 
theory that the intellective soul does not weaken as the body deteriorates but instead 
gets stronger, ‘by a strenuous exercise of its functions’,126 can be defended. 
Intellectual activity is suspended during illness but this is ‘not because the intellect is 
                                                
123 Wisnovsky, Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy p. 115. 
124 Morewedge, p. 229. 
125 Morewedge, p. 225. 
126 Rahman, p. 102. 
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dependent on the body but because the soul, during illness, is preoccupied with the 
body and is diverted from the intellectual activity’.127 With regard to the intellective 
power’s dependency on sense and imagination, which are the instruments of the 
body, Jean states that the intellective power must be distinguished in two ways; the 
inferior, which works through the senses and images and the superior which is 
illuminated to attain to first truths. The inferior and superior reason referred to by 
Jean had its origin in Augustine’s distinction between things that the soul can look 
upwards towards higher things, as in divine truths, or it can look downwards towards 
bodily things and events. For Augustine there is no possibility of error with regard to 
the highest level of reason: one knows that two plus two equals four. If not, this is 
due to ignorance, just as doing wrong is due to a lack of moral training.128 
 
Augustine places the human soul on a level between God and bodies, where it 
is able to look upward (ratio superior) to consult the divine truths, or 
downward (ratio inferior) to consider bodily things and events. The 
disposition, or habit, which enables the human mind to judge in accord with 
the divine truths is wisdom, while the habit that perfects the lower reason is 
knowledge. Both are useful, but knowledge depends on wisdom and not the 
reverse.129 
 
This was later developed in the writings of Algazel, Avicenna and Gundissalinus as 
the doctrine of the two faces of the soul. With Jean we see that the ‘higher reason is  
independent of bodily conditions and does not require the co-operation of the senses 
and of the imagination in order to exercise its functions’.130 The senses and the 
imagination, as instruments of the body, are required to reach the intellect but, once 
                                                
127 Ibid. 
128 ‘Yet Augustine admits that erroneous judgments are made by men. Error consists in taking one 
thing for another, by virtue of willing to do so; error becomes a volitional fault. “Bodies themselves 
are in no way present within the mind but only their images; and so, when we assent to the latter in 
place of the former, we err; thus error consists in assenting to one item in place of another” (The 
Trinity, IX, 11, 16).’ The Essential Augustine, p. 21. 
129 Ibid., pp. 20-21.  
130 Crowley,  p. 188. 
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reached, the imagination or the sense are no longer required in the process of 
knowing first truths. The superior face of the soul is sometimes illuminated by God 
or by intermediary luminaries, such as the angels.131 He also states that it can happen 
that the insane can make predictions and see the sublime although they may not be 
able to reason from sensible realities.  
With regard to the lower reason, it requires sensation and imagination, this is 
not in regard to the superior reason. Hence it is that in phrenetics and the 
insane that, although the intellective power is impeded with regard to the 
comprehension of sensitive things, which ought to be able to connect with the 
sensitive forms in the imagination, but due to the non performance and 
disorder of the imaginative power, the intellective power cannot be 
illuminated. However, the superior reason, is sometimes illuminated by 
irradiation, which comes to it from the first light, or by intermediate 
luminaries, that is, the angels. Hence it is that phrenetics can prophesy and 
can sometimes see many sublime realities.132  
 
Avicenna gives prophecy a very prominent place in his philosophy and while Jean 
does not elaborate on the theory he combines a passage from Avicenna with that of 
the Pseudo-Augustine and its explanation of five types of dreams that can be 
experienced during sleep. Visions are possible ‘if there is a connection between the 
divine realm, the soul and the imaginative faculty’.133 Jean refers to the illumination 
received from the good spirits as a way of gaining knowledge of the hidden but he 
also refers to the bad spirits whose main aim is to deceive souls, quoting the Pseudo-
Augustine Jean states: 
 
                                                
131 Rega Wood, “Imagination and Experience in the Sensory Soul and Beyond: Richard Rufus, Roger 
Bacon & Their Contemporaries” in Henrik Lagerlund, ed. Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal 
Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment (Netherlands: 
Springer, 2007) pp. 27-57 (p. 45).  
132 Summa, C. 45, 161-170.  Quantum ergo ad inferiorem, indiget sensu et ymagine, non quantum ad 
superiorem. Hinc est eciam in freneticis et alienatis quod, quamuis impediatur uirtus intellectiua 
quantum ad comprehensionem inferiorem, que uniri debet formis sensibilibus in ymagine, propter 
infectionem uirtutis ymaginatiue et confusionem, uirtus intellectiua non potest illuminari. Tamen 
secundum faciem superiorem illuminatur aliquando ab irradiacione, que est illi a luce prima, uel ab 
luminaribus mediis, scilicet angelis. Unde et frenetici prophetant et multa de sublimibus et interdum 
uident, quamuis prohibiti sint raciocinari de sensibus istis. 
133 Hasse, p. 155. 
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Sometimes a bad spirit, sometimes a good spirit, influences a human spirit, 
and it is not easy to discern by which spirit it is influenced, except that a good 
spirit teaches, an evil spirit deceives. 134 
 
Jean allows for the fact that knowledge can be attained through the senses and the 
imagination and as such a certain role is granted to the senses and the power of the 
mind to create images. His account of the unity of body and soul and his belief in the 
soul as one in substance but also as a combination of vegetative, sensitive and 
rational powers shows that he did not hold to a dualist account of the human being as 
Descartes did in the sixteenth century.  
 
One argument which Jean puts forward for the immortality of the soul, and one 
which we have already referred to, concerns the relationship between the body and 
soul; since the soul does not depend on the body for its existence it is therefore not 
destroyed with the body. A second argument is also taken from Avicenna, one which 
Jean relies on here, is that only composites are destructible and since, as has been 
proved, the soul is simple, it is therefore incorruptible. It is interesting that when he 
examines the passibility of the soul (the question as to whether the soul suffers in the 
body) Jean states that there exists a certain colligatio between the soul and the body. 
The meaning of the word is that of ‘a binding together’ but the binding that is 
involved is distinct from what is involved when a body acts on a body or when a 
spirit acts on a spirit; the former is through contact and the latter is through 
                                                
134 Summa, C. 100, 81-84. Nam sicut dicit Augustinus: ‘Humanum spiritum aliquando bonus, 
aliquando malus assumit spiritus, nec facile discerni potest a quo spiritu assumatur quantum nisi quia 
bonus instruit, malus fallit.’ 
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inclination; the action of a body on spirit, however, is through a colligatio as in the 
case of the body and the soul.135 
 
SECTION SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
Jean’s Summa is imbued with the new Greek and Arabic sources which came on the 
scene at this very specific moment in the history of philosophy, that of the early 
thirteenth century. Like many of his contemporaries he embraced the challenge of  
reconciling the philosophies of Aristotle and Avicenna (who had engaged in his own 
synthesis of Aristotle) to his Christian beliefs. Jean can be looked upon as belonging 
to the early phase of the reception of both Aristotle and Avicenna and it seems that 
Averroes was unknown at this time.136 It is clear that Jean had first-hand knowledge 
of Avicenna’s De Anima, in fact, as we have seen, he may have had two manuscripts 
to hand. His incorporation of Avicenna with regard to the issue of the existence of 
the soul, the soul as a substance, the immortality of the soul, all emphasising the 
importance of what today we might call ‘personal identity’, appealed, no doubt to 
Jean as much as it does to us today as we reflect on whether there is a part of us 
which remains after our earthly bodies die, as they inevitably will.  
 
There is no doubt that Jean was also aware that though Avicenna did hold to the 
doctrine of individual immortality he did not believe in the physical resurrection of 
the body. As we have seen, however, Avicenna’s Flying man thought-experiment 
was a unique demonstration of how each of us are conscious, reflective, autonomous 
                                                
135 Summa, C. 49, 136-138. Dico ergo quod anima colligatur corpori quod perficit duobus modis: uno 
modo ut agens in corpus uel per corpus, et alio modo ut recipiens in corpore et per corpus. Primum 
uirtutis est et perfectionis, scilicet agere; secundum imperfectionis et infirmitatis, scilicet recipere. 
136 Vernier, Somme de L’ậme, p. 8. 
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human beings. Jean also found in Avicenna a solution to the problem of how he 
could define the soul as a substantial form and at the same time hold to the definition 
that the soul is the form of the body. For Plato, the body was, in many respects, a 
hindrance to the soul. He was not interested in arguing for the unity of the human 
composite but he was the preferred philosopher for the Christian believers. The 
union of the soul and body was a natural union, but yet Augustine’s definition of the 
‘soul using the body’ still pointed to a view of the body which placed it on a lower 
level to the soul. The new Greek and Arab texts were therefore, a major challenge to 
to the schoolmen of the early thirteenth century. They tried to integrate the new 
psychology into their theological treatises on the soul while remaining faithful to 
their Christian beliefs. Augustine may not have provided a satisfactory account with 
regard to the soul and its relation to the body, nevertheless, we will see that Jean, 
remained constantly faithful both to Augustine with regard to his theory of 
illumination and to the theory of the superior and inferior powers of the mind. Jean 
was one of the first authors to attempt to reconcile Avicenna and Augustine in the 
area of medieval moral psychology. As we move into this area, the reasons as to why 
Avicenna really was the philosophical authority for Jean will become clearer. 
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CHAPTER III  
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JEAN’S ACCOUNT OF THE  
PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE’S DE SPIRITU ET ANIMA 
 
The second treatise or Consideratio by Jean contains a discussion on the powers of 
the soul. He examines the powers of the soul following three authors, namely: the 
Pseudo-Augustine (chapters 62–67) Damascene (chapters 68–81) and Avicenna 
(chapters 81–119). Jean wrongly attributes the Pseudo-Augustinian’s De Spiritu et 
anima to the genuine Augustine and, in fact, throughout the treatise he reverses the 
order in the title. Although this work is by an anonymous author it played a 
significant role in the history of medieval thought and especially in the years from 
the early 1230’s to the early 1240’s, encompassing the years in which Jean wrote his 
two philosophical works on the soul. It would seem that Jean was following his 
master, Alexander of Hales, who accepted the De Spiritu et anima to be by 
Augustine, but it was Philip the Chancellor (1165/ 85–1236) who recognized that it 
was not by the ‘genuine’ Augustine,1 and as later pointed out by Gilson, Thomas 
Aquinas did not make the same mistake. 2  
 
  While the De spiritu et anima lacks originality, it did appeal to the medieval 
scholars. Its appeal lay in the fact that it gathered together, ‘even in a totally 
unsystematic way, so much traditional wisdom on the soul, it served as an admirable 
textbook or vade mecum’.3 Anyone could find in it, therefore, definitions of the soul, 
classification of the powers of the soul, the definition of spiritus, the study of mind 
                                                
1 Coleman, p. 390, n. 3. 
2 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 169.   
3 McGinn, p. 67. 
  115 
and its functions, and so forth. That is, as long as one chose to neglect the sometimes 
conflicting views in the text. This chapter examines the significance of Jean’s 
account of the Pseudo-Augustine’s reflections for his understanding of the powers of 
the soul. 
 
SECTION ONE 
WHETHER THE SOUL IS ITS POWERS 
 
Jean asks whether the soul is identified with its powers and, secondly, if so, how are 
its powers distinguished one from the other. He addresses the question by examining 
the very meaning of the word ‘soul’. According to its activity, the soul is called by 
various names: 
 
It is called ‘soul’ when it enlivens; sensation when it feels; spirit when it 
contemplates; mind when it knows; reason when it distinguishes; memory 
when it recalls; will when it desires. These, however, do not differ in 
substance as they do in names, since all of these [aspects] are one soul, in fact 
the properties are diverse, but the essence one. From this it follows that the 
soul is its powers and potentialities and the opposite.4  
 
 
By discussing its many functions, we can come to understand in what way the 
powers of the soul are distinguished one from the other. Among the powers of the 
soul are the powers to nourish, to sense, to rationalise, to understand, to discern, to 
remember and to will. Though the functions of the soul are many, the soul is one and 
simple. How is the soul ‘one’, if its functions are many? According to the Pseudo-
Augustine, the powers of the soul are no more or no less than the soul itself. As it is 
stated: 
                                                
4 Summa, C. 60, 6–9. Dicitur namque anima dum uegetat; sensus dum sentit; animus dum sapit; mens 
dum intelligit; racio dum discernit; memoria dum recordatur; dum uult uoluntas. Ista tamen non 
differunt in substancia quemadmodum in nominibus, quoniam ista omnia una sunt anima, proprietates 
quidem diuerse, sed essencia una. Ex quo relinquitur quod anima est sue uires et potencie et 
econverso. 
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But we assign different names to one and the same substance according to its 
diverse powers. The soul has these powers even before it unites to the body. 
They are natural to it and are nothing other than the soul itself. The whole 
substance of the soul is perfect and complete when it has these three faculties: 
rationality, the positive appetite, and the negative appetite.5  
 
Anything that the soul has, then, it has it naturally. Jean, following the author of the 
De spiritu et anima, holds that the soul is the same as its powers but he remarks that 
qualities, such as prudence, temperance and justice are not natural powers but, in 
fact, are acquired accidents. Quoting from the Pseudo-Augustine Jean notes, 
 
The soul has certain things naturally and it is itself all these things; for the 
potencies and the powers of the soul are the same thing as the soul; it has 
accidents which are not the same as it; it is its powers and it is not its virtues; 
for it is not its own prudence, its temperance, its justice and fortitude.6  
 
In the first Consideratio Jean also has stated, in his discussion on what is essential 
and what is accidental to the soul, that rationality is essential but whether the soul is 
just or unjust is accidental to it. Jean also established there that the soul is not made 
from a divine substance and is, therefore, subject to error and to wrong doing.  
 
Jean puts forward a number of arguments, which appear to be his own as 
there is no attribution mentioned by him, or by the editor of the Summa. Arguing for 
his position he states: 
 
Likewise, just as prime matter has the power to receive all natural forms, so 
the soul has the power to receive all species. Therefore, since prime matter is 
itself a power to receive the forms, it follows more forcibly that the soul 
itself, which is more simple and is an image of God, is a power to receive all 
                                                
5 McGinn, p. 200.  
6 Summa, C. 60, 10–13. Habet anima naturalia et ipsa omnia illa est; potencia namque eius atque uires 
idem sunt quod ipsa; habet accidencia et illa non est; sue uires est et sue uirtutes non est; non enim est 
sua prudencia, sua temperancia, sua iusticia et fortitudo. 
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species. Therefore, the power to receive intelligible and sensitive species is 
the soul itself. Therefore, it is its powers.7 
 
Jean is clearly following Augustine and, as we have seen, the genuine Augustine did 
identify the soul with its powers throughout the whole of his career.  
 
In the twelfth century the contrary position which asserted a distinction 
between the soul and its powers was to be found in ‘William of Champeaux, Peter 
Abelard, and others’.8 This heralded the beginnings of an opposition to the 
Aristotelian psychology of the soul coming from those who wanted to defend the 
Augustinian identification of the powers of the soul with the soul itself. Opposition 
arose from the belief that a distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers 
would be counter to their belief in the soul as analogous to God. Jean and his 
contemporaries can be placed at the very early stages of the debate which lasted well 
into the thirteenth century with Thomas Aquinas advocating a contrary position to 
Jean and to those who invoked the authority of Augustine. For Aquinas, ‘these 
capacities, as he conceives them, are positioned midway between the soul’s essence 
and its operations. Only this mid-way status can explain why we sometimes make 
use of these capacities and sometimes leave them unactualised’.9 In other words, a 
human being is not always actualising the capacities of the soul. The argument ‘rests 
on a rather subtle distinction. Since the soul’s essence is always actualized, for as 
                                                
7 Summa, C. 60, 18-24. Item, sicut materia prima habet potenciam ad susceptionem omnium 
formarum naturalium, sic anima habet potenciam ad susceptionem omnium specierum. Cum ergo 
materia prima sit ipsa potencia ad susceptionem formarum, igitur et multo forcius ipsa anima, que 
simplicior est et ymago Dei est, erit potencia ad susceptionem specierum omnium. Ergo potencia 
susceptiua specierum intelligibilium et sensibilium est ipsa anima. Ergo est sue potencie. 
8 McGinn, p. 69. 
9 Pasnau, p. 156. Cf., Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis II sc 4 referred to by 
Pasnau. 
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long as the substance exists, the soul’s various powers will be part of its essence only 
if those powers are always actualized’.10 
 
Jean seems to be advocating a middle ground between those who followed 
Augustine and those who, like Thomas Aquinas, followed Aristotle in holding that 
the powers of the soul inhered in the soul as accidents. The powers of the soul differ 
according to their activity and in their relation to different acts but only conceptually 
as each belongs to the soul which is a single essence. In the passage below Jean 
refers to the power of heat in fire which, as a power, ‘naturally follows the thing. For 
being is prior to being able, that is, being able to act or be acted on’.11 He states that 
the power to receive the likeness of colour is accidental to the eye. How then is the 
soul identified with its powers?    
As he states: 
Others say that the soul is entirely identical to its powers, but differs with 
regard to reason, Augustine, himself, expressed this above. They say that 
there exists a power which is an accident in the thing of which it is the power 
and there is a power which follows essence as a property of it; and there is a 
power which is an essence, entering into a certain relation to act; for example: 
the power to receive the likeness of colour is accidental to the eye, for it 
weakens in old age; the power of heat in a fire follows essence, but it is 
inseparable and natural; the power of receiving the form in matter is the 
substance itself of matter. By how much more then is the power of the soul 
the soul itself. But it takes on a relation from one act to another act, in the 
different relations to the different acts there is a difference in the powers of 
the soul according to reason.12 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Robert Pasnau, ed. The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Voume Three, 
Mind and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 13 n. 12 ‘Summa Fratris 
Alexandri (vol. 2, p. 204b, n. 155, contra 1): “Power follows essence”’. 
12 Summa, C. 60, 54-66. Alii dicunt quod omnino idem est anima quod sue potencie, sed solum 
differre racione, unde ipse Augustinus in superioribus hoc expressit. Dicunt ergo quod est potencia 
que est accidens in re cuius est potencia, et est potencia que consequitur essenciam sicut proprietas 
eius; et est potencia que est ipsa essencia adiciens quandam relacionem ad actum; verbi gracia: 
potencia recipiendi similitudines colorum est accidens pupille, deficit enim in ea per senium; potencia 
calefaciendi in igne est consequens essenciam, sed inseparabilis est et naturalis; potencia recipiendi 
formam in materia est ipsa substancia materie. Quanto ergo magis potencia ipsius anime est ipsa 
anima. Sed adiicit relacionem ad alium actum et ad alium, penes quam differentem relacionem ad 
actus differentes est differencia potenciarum anime secundum racionem. 
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It was philosophers in the late thirteenth century, Henry of Ghent (c.1217–
1293), John Duns Scotus (1265–1308) and William of Ockham (1285–1347) who, 
following Jean, rejected the distinction between the soul and its powers. Ockham’s 
rejection and his argument for the identity of the soul’s powers and its essence rests 
on his famous principle of parsimony. In some respects Aquinas maintains a 
contradictory position; in one, the rational soul is the form of the body but in another 
‘the soul’s intellective capacity, is neither the form nor the actuality of any body’.13 
Is intellect therefore a capacity of the soul for Aquinas? The latter maintains that the 
powers of the soul are distinguished from its essence by arguing that ‘the principle of 
intellective cognition, whatever that may be, is the form of the human body’.14 This 
allows him to associate the intellect with the soul but without specifying the nature of 
that ‘relationship’. 
 
Jean also holds a distinction with regard to the intellective power of the soul 
but on his account the ‘instrumental’ quo distinguishes between a real and a 
conceptual understanding of the soul’s identity with its activities. The being of the 
soul is distinguished from its activities; this is understood as ‘that by which it is’, and 
‘that by which it acts’, or as the distinction between the essence of the soul and its 
powers respectively. This allows for a distinction between actions and objects but 
Jean can maintain his position with regard to the powers of the soul being identified 
with the soul itself.  
The being of the soul and its activity are not the same: therefore ‘that by 
which it is’ and ‘that by which it acts’ are not the same. But, ‘that by which it 
is’ is its essence and ‘that by which it acts’ is its potency. Therefore its 
essence is not the same as its potency. – Likewise in God, since his being 
does not differ from his activity, I call this the activity that by which he acts, 
                                                
13 Pasnau, p. 159. 
14 Ibid., p. 164. 
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his essence and potency are the same and not different.  Therefore since being 
and acting are not the same in the soul, the essence and its potency are not the 
same.15 
 
 
SECTION TWO 
DISTINCTION OF THE POWERS OF THE SOUL BY THEIR  
ACTIONS AND THEIR OBJECTs 
 
Jean draws upon an anonymous treatise as his source for a discussion on the question 
of the manner in which the powers are distinguished. It is one of two anonymous 
treatises on the soul, dating from 1225 and 1230 respectively, the De anima et de 
potentiis eius, edited by René Gauthier, and the De potentiis animae et obiectis, 
edited by Daniel Callus, the second of which is the source for our author. Both 
treatises are important for different reasons. The first is ‘one of the few witnesses to 
the psychological doctrine of masters of arts before 1240 (the only other example 
being John Blund)’,16 and the second treatise is one of the earliest examples of a 
‘divisio potentiae animalis (or animae)’ from which Jean quotes both in his earlier 
work, the Tractatus divisione potentis animae and in his Summa. It seems that Jean 
was ‘heavily indebted’ to this work. According to Hasse, the second treatise, De 
Potentiis animae et obiectis draws heavily on the first. Jean quotes from the latter at 
least fifteen times in the Summa but, unfortunately, he fails to acknowledge the 
source. At times he refers to this source as the anonymous alii. It is extant in three 
manuscripts but its anonymity remains to this day. As the editor of the treatise states: 
 
                                                
15 Summa, C. 60, 31-37. Non est idem esse anime et suum operari: ergo non est idem quo est et quo 
operatur. Sed quo est, sua est essencia, et quo operatur est sua potencia. Ergo non est idem sua 
essencia et sua potencia. Item, in Deo, quia non differt esse ab operacione, operacione dico qua 
operatur, idem est et non differens essencia et potencia; ergo cum in anima non sit idem esse et 
operari, non erit idem in anima essencia et sua potencia.  
16 Hasse, p. 34. 
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Yet whoever its author was, he assuredly wrote in the first decades of the 
thirteenth century and moved in the same intellectual circles as William of 
Auvergne. He must have been a theologian, not a Master in Arts, and could 
on occasion express his views forcibly and with a certain independence. His 
knowledge of Aristotle and of the ‘new learning’ was surprisingly wide in 
such an early stage of speculation.17    
 
According to Callus quotations from the text are more numerous in the Summa than 
in Jean’s earlier Tractatus and it is stated that he had a copy of the text before him 
due to the ‘extreme literalness’ of some passages in question. There is clear evidence 
of Jean’s employment of the text, however, unlike the author of the De Potentiis 
animae et obiectis Jean does not miss out on the vegetative powers of the soul. In 
fact Jean’s treatment of the vegetative soul is very extensive, in particular as he 
follows Avicenna. A major difference between the anonymours author and Jean lies 
in the fact that this treatise asserts that the active or agent intellect, ‘was not to be 
considered a substance separata a substancia anime but rather as an immanent 
faculty of the soul.18 We will see how Avicenna’s De anima impacted on Jean’s 
interpretation of the powers of the soul and in particular, how he accepts Avicenna’s 
theory of the separate intellect.   
 
With regard to the view that the powers of the soul can be distinguished 
according to actions Jean states this would lead to an almost infinite number of 
powers. 
 
Actions of the soul sometimes differ in rapidity and slowness, as opinion 
[differs] from certitude through lack of understanding. If therefore a 
difference of powers follows a difference of actions opinion and certitude 
would not come from the same power. […] Similarly, if an action of the soul 
is sometimes more perfect, sometimes less perfect, as happens with every 
action, such as seeing, understanding, etc.; if the decrease of action pertains 
                                                
17 D. A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul’, p. 140. 
18 Janet Coleman, p. 381. 
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to another power other than perfection, then it would be necessary that the 
number of powers be as great as the order of decrease and growth which are 
almost infinite.19 
 
 
A similar argument is applied to privation and possession, and to resting and moving. 
It would lead to a need for powers for both contrary and contradictory positions and 
therefore the positing of separate essences for each.  As he states: 
 
Likewise, actions of the soul differ in privation and possession as doubt 
differs from knowing; in the way that doubt is a privation of comprehension 
on one of two contradictiories; but knowing is a particular understanding of 
one of the contraries. And in this way resting and moving differ, as well as 
blindness and sight. But if these differences of actions produce differences of 
powers, then privation and possession are not meant to occur with regard to 
the same essence, which is false.20 
 
Jean maintains that if the distinction follows from the ‘object, either as that from 
which or that towards which the power is moved, just as color moves sight’ that 
similarly a distinct power would be required for each of contrary colours or tastes, 
such as sweet and sour. Considering the distinction in relation to the different organs 
of the body Jean states that there is one power which does not use an organ, that is, 
the intellective power. If the powers are distinguished according to their organs, 
however, this would mean that the intellective power could not be distinguished from 
powers which have no distinct organs assigned to them. Distinct powers exist in 
many organs, for example, the tongue is the organ of taste but also of speech. 
                                                
19 Summa, C. 61, 9-18. Actiones anime aliquando differunt uelocitate et tarditate, sicut est in 
comprehensione subtilis et hebetis; subtilis enim uelocius comprehendit, hebes tardius. Ab alio ergo 
inesset comprehensio in subtili et in hebete, si quecumque differencia actionum differenciam faceret 
potenciarum. Item, si actio aliqua anime aliquando est perfectior, aliquando est diminucior, sicut 
accidit circa omnem actionem, ut uidere, audire, etc.; si diminucio actionis pertineret ad aliam uim 
quam perfectio, tunc oporteret quod numerus uirium tantus esset quantus est numerus ordinum 
diminucionis et augmenti qui pene infiniti sunt. 
20 Summa, C. 61, 19-25. Item, differunt actiones anime in priuacione et habitu, sicut differt dubitacio a 
sciencia; eo quod dubitacio est priuacio comprehensionis alterius contradictoriarum; sciencia uero est 
certa comprehensio unius contrariorum. Et sic differunt quiescere et moueri, cecitas et uisio. Sed si 
hec differencia actionum faceret differenciam uirium, tunc priuacio et habitus non essent nata fieri 
circa idem, quod falsum est. 
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There is a power that does not use an organ, such as the intellective power; 
therefore if the difference of powers follows from a diversity of organs, since 
the intellective power does not have an organ, it does not differ from the 
other powers. Likewise, there is one organ for many powers, such as the 
tongue is the organ of taste and of the power to speak or explain. Likewise, 
there are many organs for one power, such as the organs of the powers of 
touch that are the limbs, not the bones, nails, hair and the like: therefore there 
is not a distinction between powers through a distinction of organs. 21 
 
Jean’s conclusion is that the powers are distinguished through themselves. 
They are known through acts and objects and sometimes through organs (cognicio 
tamen distinctionis virium est secundum differenciam actionum et obiectorum, et 
aliquando secundum differnciam organum).22 In support of this he relies on 
Aristotle’s statement that acts are prior to powers and objects precede the acts.23 The 
editor refers the reader to the De Potentiis animae et obiectis as Jean’s source for this 
particular paragraph. Jean refers to Aristotle as the ‘Philosopher’ whereas the 
anonymous author quotes Aristotle by name. 
 
Powers are distinguished in themselves, not through actions as through 
causes, or through objects or organs: however, the cognition of the distinction 
of powers is according to the different actions and objects, and sometimes 
through a difference of organs, and the Philosopher states that actions are 
prior to powers in the account of cognition and objects are prior to acts. It 
should be said, therefore, that some powers differ by organ or object or act; 
however, all differ by act and object, thus it does happen to a power or 
powers that they differ in the organ. 24 
                                                
21 Summa, C. 61. 46-53. Aliqua uirtus est que non utitur organo, sicut uirtus intellectiua: ergo si 
differencia uirium sit secundum diuersitatem organorum, cum uirtus intellectiua non habeat organum, 
non differt ab aliis uiribus. Item, plurium uirtutum unum est organum, sicut lingua est organum 
uirtutis gustatiue et uirtutis locutiue uel interpretatiue. Item, unius uirtutis plura sunt organa sicut 
uirtutis tangibilis organa sunt omnia membra, preter ossa et ungues et pilos et huiusmodi: non est ergo 
distinctio uirium per distinctionem organorum. 
22 Summa, C. 61. 55-57. 
23 Aristotle, De anima, II, 4, 415a18-20: ‘acts and actions are prior to powers in account; but if so, still 
prior to these are their counterparts (opposita).’ C/f. Robert Pasnau, The Cambridge Translations of 
Medieval Philosophical Texts, p. 14, n. 19. Compare: Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus 
Veneticus: De Anima, liber: 2, cap.: 3 (Bekker: 415a). Priores enim potentiis actus et praxis secundum 
rationem sunt. Si autem sic his adhuc priora opposita sunt, oportet considerare de illis primum, si 
indigens erit determinare propter eandem causam, ut de alimento et sensibili et intelligibili. 
24 Summa, C. 61, 54-61. Respondeo. Distinguuntur uires seipsis, non per actiones sicut per causas, uel 
per obiecta, uel organa: cognicio tamen distinctionis uirium est secundum differenciam actionum et 
obiectorum, et aliquando secundum differenciam organorum, et hoc dicit Philosophus quod actus sunt 
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A distinction is also made with regard to the existence of a power which acts 
without an organ or without an object; this is the first power, that is, God. His power 
of knowing is in him but it does not require an organ or an object, nor does he know 
by a likeness to things but in ‘knowing’ itself.  
 
And there is a power which acts, having an organ and an object, such as the 
powers of the soul acting through the body, as the visual power acting 
through the pupil of the eye, and has colour as its object in order to see. And 
there is a power operating without an organ, but not without an object, such 
as the intellective power, (this will be made known afterwards). Therefore the 
difference of objects, according to the mode, which is asserted, is always 
accompanied by a difference of powers.  The origin of the distinction of the 
powers of the soul is made known. For the distinction comes from the powers 
themselves, but the knowledge of the actual distinction comes from the 
objects and the actions.25  
 
The above passage in Jean’s Summa, a part of the Summa which has its source in the 
De Potentiis animae et obiectis. The author of De Potentiis animae is concerned to 
‘explain the many capacities of the individual human soul to respond to sense 
experience and come to the most abstract and universal knowledge through its own 
natural activities’.26 Jean maintains that while body and soul exist as a composite, the 
soul is no more or no less than the powers of the soul. The rational soul, however, is 
                                                                                                                                     
preuii potenciis, et obiecta actibus secundum racionem cognoscendi. Dicendum ergo quod alique uires 
differunt et organo et obiecto et actu; omnes uero differunt actu et obiecto, unde accidit uirtuti siue 
potenciis quod differant organo. C/f. De Potentiis Animae et Obiectis, p. 147, 15 – 148, 4. Questio 
autem est si recipiat diversitatem suam essentialem vel secundum esse vel secundum rationem, ab 
organo vel instrumento vel obiecto. Et sumatur obiectum communiter pro materia, cum ex parte 
essentie anime in se, cuius est illa diversitas potentiarum, non inveniatur diversitas. Et si dicatur quod 
ex seipsis diversificantur, non ex ipsis cognoscitur illa diversitas, prout dicit Aristoteles quod ‘actus 
previi sunt potentiis secundum rationem, et obiecta actibus’. Quod autem non per organa vel 
instrumenta diversificentur, aut diversificate cognoscantur, patet per hoc quod non omnis potentia 
habet organa vel instrumenta sui proprii actus. Sed sunt obiecta generaliter omnis potentie humane, et 
diversa diversarum; ex quo sumitur diversitas potentiarum secundum obiecta, cognosci aut esse, et 
maxime cum potentie sint per suos actus ad obiecta. 
25 Summa, C. 61, 100-108. Et est potencia que est operans habens organum et obiectum, sicut potencie 
anime operantes per corpus, ut potencia uisiua pupillam, et obiectum colorem ut uideat. Et est 
potencia operans sine organo, non tamen sine obiecto ut potencia intellectiua, sicut postea 
manifestabitur. Differencia ergo obiectorum, secundum illum modum qui dictus est, semper 
concomitatur differenciam uirium. Sic ergo manifestum est unde sit distinctio uirium in anima. Est 
enim distinctio ex seipsis, sed cognicio ipsius distinctionis est ex obiectis et actionibus.  
26 Coleman, p. 384. 
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separable from the body as it is does not depend on the body in the same way as the 
vegetative and sensitive souls.     
 
The agent intellect, as stated above, according to the author of De Potentiis  
animae et obiectis is not separate from the soul. It is distinguished from the possible 
or passive intellect, but both are immanent faculties of the soul.27 The anonymous 
author also rejects the theory of illumination from a separable agent intellect but 
instead holds that ‘the agent intellect is itself an interior light along with the possible 
intellect’.28 We will see how Jean uses Avicenna to prove that there exists an active 
intellect and he asks whether this active intellect is separate from the soul or whether 
it is part of it, a created intelligence, or an uncreated intelligence. His response is to 
accept all three propositions. This will be discussed in chapter five below. The next 
chapter in Jean is a discussion of the powers of the soul according to the Pseudo-
Augustine. Although it is a lengthy text Jean limits his discussion to passages coming 
from the ‘new’ medical sources and those concerned with the cognitive powers of 
the soul.  
 
SECTION THREE 
THE DIVISION OF THE POWERS ACCORDING TO THE PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. 
 
As pointed out by Bougerol, Jean wrongly attributes  the Pseudo-Augustinian work, 
De anima et spiritu to the ‘genuine’ Augustine. According to recent scholarship, as 
stated above, it is a work which was compiled c.1170 and is a string of excerpts 
                                                
27 De Potentiis animae et obiectis. p. 156, 17-20. ‘Sed quia natura intellectualis est superior rebus 
corporalibus et supra res incorporales que sunt in ipsa, ideo ad hec comprehendenda non est 
necessarium illuminatione substantie separate, sed sufficit intellectus agens, qui est lumen interius, 
cum intellectu possibili’. 
28 Coleman, p. 384. 
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taken from Augustine, Cassiodourus of Vivarium, Isidore of Seville, Alcuin, 
Anselm, Bernard, Hugh of St Victor and Isaac of Stella. Bougerol also points to the 
fact that Jean incorrectly reverses the title which should read as On the Spirit and the 
Soul and it is listed under the works of Augustine in the Patrologia Latina.29 
Augustine, however, did not assign separate powers to the soul in the same way as 
the medieval scholars and as one author states: 
 
When Augustine describes the functions of man’s soul in terms of memory, 
understanding, and will (memoria, intelligentia, voluntas), he is not at all 
thinking of different powers. Rather […] the whole soul is memory, the 
whole soul is intelligence, and the whole soul is will. This is a trinitarian 
psychology in which the diversity of functions of remembering, knowing and 
willing does not entail any real difference within the nature of the soul.30 
 
Augustine’s theory was not so much a theory of substance and accidents in the 
Aristotelian sense as much as a theory which held that the activities of the soul 
stemmed from the nature of the soul itself. It could be said that while there are three 
distinct faculties of the soul, this does not necessarily imply that they are unrelated. 
 
It is from Boethius onwards that we have what is described as ‘a wider 
anthropology of the soul and its powers’.31 Boethius had translated and commented 
upon Aristotle’s logical works and was the main transmitter of ancient logic, ‘as 
developed within the Neoplatonic curriculum, to the Latin West’.32 His theological 
treatises, the Opuscula sacra were an important influence on medieval thinking and 
we have already seen the Boethian influence on Jean where he distinguishes between 
the quod est and quo est to explain the distinction between the creator and created. 
The story of the writings that would influence the early medieval thinkers and 
                                                
29 Ibid, 220. 
30 The Essential Augustine, p. 68.  
31 Coleman, p. 156. 
32 Marenbon, p. 35. 
  127 
ultimately the twelfth centuries authors on the soul is complicated. Plotinus, for 
example may have influenced Augustine Porphyry also may have been an even 
greater influence. We do not know for certain but we do know that many neo-
Platonic texts survived into the twelfth century, Calcidius’s Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus, Martiannus Capella’s The Marriage of Mercury and Philology and the 
Commentary on the Dream of Scipio by Macrobius. The Categories of Aristotle, for 
example, provided the notion of the composite individual to the medieval scholars, 
however, Boethius’s interpretation of it ‘shifted the meaning further into a Platonic 
mode’.33  There is, in Boethius’s writing, a ‘tension between an Aristotelian logic 
and a Platonic ontology at odds,’34 a tension which, as will be seen, increases in the 
thirteenth century when the works of Aristotle and Avicenna were made available to 
the medieval scholars. Boethius’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories influenced 
the early medieval scholars of the ninth and tenth centuries. As mentioned above, 
however, there were other texts, even more influential, which were known to some 
later authors writing on the psychology of the soul. According to Coleman the 
Platonising tendencies based on the Boethian tradition of the early authors were 
supplemented by ‘renewed interest in Eriugena’s translations of the the pseudo-
Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor and Gregory of Nyssa’.35 This resulted in greater 
emphasis being placed on the soul/body dichotomy. Although such a sharp 
distinction was not present in the writings of Aristotle, some late fifth and sixth 
century neo-Platonist philosophers interpreted the distinction between the rational 
and irrational soul in Aristotle as that of a separation between body and soul.  
 
This strict dichotomy was not present in Aristotle’s account (De anima, III, 4) 
where, as we have seen, he moves in a more ambiguous way, using the 
                                                
33 Coleman,  p. 195 
34 Ibid., p. 194. 
35 Ibid., p. 198. 
  128 
language of potentiality and actuality, from discussing imagination to a 
discussion of thought. He argues that thinking is akin to perceiving and that it 
is reasonable to suppose the intellect should not be mixed with the body. The 
faculty of sense perception is not independent of body where intellect is 
distinct.36 
 
 
The tension between Aristotelian logic and Platonic ontology re-surfaces 
again in the writings of the Greek neo-Platonists, John Philoponus, Stephanus of 
Alexandria and Simplicius. Their views would be transmitted through the works of 
the Arabic philosophers, in particular, we will see Avicenna’s De anima influencing 
Jean and his contemporaries in the early part of the thirteenth century. The neo-
Platonic emphasis on the separation of body and soul would now be viewed in light 
of the reception of the Greek-Arabic texts of Aristotle and Avicenna. In particular the 
‘new’ medical theories in the writings of Avicenna and Constantine the African 
(these will be discussed below in chapter five) heralded the beginnings of the new 
physiological understanding of man which is clearly documented in the Pseudo-
Augustine’s treatment of the powers of the soul that are linked to the body through 
the arteries and the veins.  
 
Jean’s own writings and his use of his sources are testament to the growing 
interest in the physiological understanding of human nature and the body/soul 
dichotomy. Writing on this period in medieval thought: 
 
These themes on the whole were part of that century’s philosophia naturalis 
which was still of the competence of the theology masters. Later on, around 
the end of the thirteenth century, there took place an ideal handing over of 
medical, naturalistic themes from the theologians to the new scientific 
intellectual of the mediaeval universities, the “Scholastic Physician”.37   
 
 
                                                
36 Ibid., p. 198. 
37 Vico, p. 309 
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In the Pseudo-Augustine we meet the ‘new’ medical theories of the four elements 
and the four humours, the three spirits (naturalis, spiritualis, animalis) and their 
respective organs (liver, heart and brain). The origins of the physiological schemes 
will be discussed in relation to Avicenna. These are real ‘functional dynamisms and 
physiological systems causally related to specific body organs and endowed of a 
material spiritus.38  With regard to the powers that are joined to the body, Jean 
observes, 
 
The natural power acts on the blood in the liver and the other humors and 
which it transmits through the veins to all the limbs of the body, in such a 
way that they grow and are nourished. This power is divided into four parts, 
namely, the appetitive, the retentive, the expulsive and the distributive. The 
appetitive seeks those things necessary for the body; the retentive retains the 
expended food until the food is made useful by digestion; the expulsive 
expels the harmful and the excess; the distributive distributes the humors of 
the good foods to all the limbs and delivers to each in proportion.39 
 
 
Jean discusses the spiritual power which is the vital spirit and is the principle of life. 
It is sourced in the heart and it spreads through the body, through the arteries and the 
veins. The third power is the animal power which is located in the brain from where 
it invigorates the five senses. There are three ventricles of the brain, one is the 
anterior part which directs all the senses; the posterior part is that by which we have 
movement; the third is the intermediary between both of these, and is the rational 
power. In the first part of the brain the animal power is called the phantasy, that is, 
the imagination, since images and likenesses are impressed on it and contained 
therein. In the intermediary part it is called rationality or that which judges that 
                                                
38 Ibid, p. 314. 
39 Summa, C. 62, 5-12. Et uirtus naturalis operatur in epate sanguinem et alios humores quos per uenas 
ad omnia alia membra corporis transmittit, ut inde augeantur et nutriantur. Vis ista in quadrifariam 
diuiditur, scilicet in appetitiuam, retentiuam, expulsiuam, distributiuam. Appetitiua que sunt 
necessaria corpori appetit; retentiua sumpta detinet donec ex illis utilis digestio fiat; expulsiua nociua 
et superflua expellit; distributiua bonorum alimentorum humores omnibus membris distribuit prout 
cuique expedit.  
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which is represented through the imagination. In the ultimate part of the brain we 
have that which belongs to memory. Through these three powers the soul is spread 
throughout the entire body, not by extension in space but through a living presence. 
These powers are as much of the soul as they are of the body, one cannot exist 
without the other.40 
 
The next chapter dealing with the cognitive powers of the soul is also taken 
from the De Spiritu et anima and as stated by Coleman the latter provides a 
physiological analysis of cognition. The powers of the soul itself are divided into the 
rational, the irascible and the concupiscible. These are further divided into sensation, 
imagination, reason, memory, intellect and understanding. The author links the 
various elements of which corporeal objects are made with the cognitive faculties. 
The origins of this tradition go back as far as Calcidius’s translation and commentary 
on Plato’s Timaeus. Jean refers to Calcidius in a chapter from the first treatise on the 
soul, referring to the question as to how the soul which is not distended throughout 
the body feels movement in every part of the body? Calcidius gives the example of a 
spider who residing in the centre of its web feels the movement made, no matter 
what size, in any part of the web; in the same way the soul, residing as the principal 
movement in the centre of the heart feels each movement produced in the body. Jean 
posits a definite link between cognitive powers of the soul and the body. He names 
three cognitive powers of the soul through which we gain knowledge of the 
corporeal and incorporeal objects.  
 
One, he states, belongs to us in the way we sense bodies; that we do through 
the five corporeal senses; another, through understanding not bodies, but 
                                                
40 Summa, C. 62, 37-40. His tribus uiribus iam dictis, scilicet naturali, uitali, animali, anima per totum 
corpus diffunditur, non locali distensione, sed uitali intensione. Iste uires tam anime quam corporis 
dici possunt, quia ab anima in corpore fiunt, nec sine utroque fieri possunt.  
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things similar to bodies; another, in contemplating not bodies, not the 
likenesses of bodies; but those things which do not have images similar to 
themselves, such as God and the rational soul itself, and powers, such as 
prudence, justice, charity and whatever other essences we discern and define 
by out understanding. The first refers to the exterior cognitive power, which 
is called the sensitive exterior power; the second refers to the sensitive 
interior power, such as imagination; the third to the intellective power.41 
  
This is further explained in terms of Augustine’s three genera of vision.42 The first 
genera of vision is the lowest vision and refers to the seeing of bodies by means of 
the corporeal senses. The second type of light is spiritual, that is the soul views 
images or likenesses of bodily things. The third is the intellectual vision in which the  
soul sees intelligible truths without the help of any images. This refers back to the 
objects of the powers of the soul and here again we have the objects which are at 
different levels towards which we turn our gaze using our will. It is because of the 
rational power of the soul we know that there is something that is above the soul, 
something next to it, something in the soul and something below it. We are, 
therefore, capable of going towards something or fleeing it, of loving or hating it. 
This distinction has its source in the genuine Augustine and is employed by Jean in 
his argument for the existence of an active intellect that would accord with his 
Chrstian beliefs. This will be discussed in relation to the adherents of Avicennised 
Augustianism, among whom Jean may be said to be counted.  
 
                                                
41 Summa, C. 64, 1-10. Aliud, inquit, est nobis quo corpora sentimus; quod quinque corporeis sensibus 
facimus; aliud quo non corpora, sed corporibus similia cernimus; aliud quo nec corpora, nec corporum 
similitudines inspicimus; sed res illas que non habent ymagines sibi similes, sicut Deus et ipsa mens 
racionalis, et uirtutes, ut prudencia, iusticia, caritas et quecumque alie sunt quas intelligendo 
discernimus et diffinimus. Primum pertinet ad uirtutem cognitiuam exteriorem, que dicitur sensitiua 
exterior; secundum ad uirtutem sensitiuam interiorem, quemadmodum ymaginacio; tercium ad 
uirtutem intellectiuam. 
42 Literal Commentary on Genesis, XII, 6.15-11.22, 30.58-31.59; trans. J.H. Taylor, S.J., St Augustine: 
De Genesi ad Litteram, Bk XII (St Louis University Dissertation, 1948), pp. 25-29, 33, 39-43, 137-
139. Quoted in The Essential Augustine, p. 93.  
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The author of the De Spiritu et Anima, according to Coleman, develops his 
treatise to include a most interesting explanation of corporeal vision but this is 
missing in Jean. It is a theme which is also absent in his exposition of the powers of 
the soul according to Avicenna. The question as to why Jean chose not to include 
either in his treatise may be related to the scientific nature of the theories. He does 
take from the De spiritu et anima that in intellectual vision the soul is never deceived 
but in corporeal vision we are deceived in many ways. He cites the examples of those 
who gaze at the stars which seem to be stationary and are moving; how the rays of 
the sun can affect our eyes and we see double; or how an oar in water seems to be 
broken. The senses can be deceiving. In imaginary vision the soul is often deceived 
as in moments of worry or even when tranquil.  
 
Jean states that there is in us a spiritual nature in which the likenesses of 
bodies are either formed or placed upon it, once they are formed. He states: 
 
For it is certain that this spiritual nature is in us, in which the likenesses of 
bodies are either formed, or once formed, are infused; either that happens 
when we are in contact, through some sense of the body, with objects that are 
present and continually their likenesses are formed in the spirit; or when we 
think about things that are absent, things known or unknown.43 
 
He refers further to how we can often imagine that we are seeing bodies when in fact 
we are only seeing images. This can happen in cases of fever when we think we see 
things that are not there at all. Following the author of the De Potentiis Animae et 
Potentiae it is because of vis morbi that we are capable of contriving things in the 
mind, things that either do not exist or are not known to exist. 
                                                
43 Summa, C. 65, 11-15. Certum namque est hanc esse in nobis spiritualem naturam, qua corporum 
similitudines aut formantur aut formate ingeruntur; siue cum presencia aliquo corporis sensu 
tangimus, et continuo eorum similitudo in spiritu formatur; siue cum absencia iam nota, uel que non 
nouimus, cogitamus.  
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The cognitive powers are further divided according to five differences, 
sensation, imagination, reason, intellect and understanding.  
Sensation is, as Augustine stated, that power of the soul which perceives the  
forms of corporeal bodies which are present; the imagination perceives such 
forms but as absent; but the sense perceives the forms in the material, but the 
imagination perceives them outside the material; and that same power which 
is formed outside is called a sense and when carried over into the deepest part 
[of the soul] is called imagination.  And know that it acts in the same way in 
the genus of sensitive cognition. And reason is a power of the soul which 
perceives the different forms of corporeal things, proper and accidental, that 
is, belonging to all incorporeal things, but not found apart from a body, 
subsists only in reason; for it abstracts from bodies those things which are 
founded in bodies, not by action but by reflection; for the nature of a body, 
according to which a body is a body, is not itself a body, that is, it is singular. 
And the intellect is a power of the soul which perceives created invisible 
beings, such as angels, demons, souls and any created spirit. And the 
understanding is that power of the soul which discerns supreme being itself, 
the true and the immutable, God.44  
  
The explanation that reason perceives the different forms, incorporeally, but which 
are not found apart from bodies, is taken directly from the De spiritu et anima. 
Coleman’s explanation may help to explain the various stages in the theory of 
knowledge as it is very similar to Jean’s but she gives a different meaning to 
intellectus and intelligentia.   
 
Whatever the senses perceive through sense knowledge the imagination 
represents through similitudes, the cognitio forms, the ingenium investigates, 
the ratio judges, the memory delivers up, the intellectus defines or separates, 
and the intelligentia comprehends. Intelligentia is the soul’s power which 
                                                
44Summa, C. 66, 6-21.  Est autem sensus, sicut dicit Augustinus, illa uis anime que rerum corporearum 
corporeas percipit formas presentes; ymaginacio uero est uis anime que rerum corporearum percipit 
formas, sed absentes; sensus namque formas in materia percipit, sed ymaginacio extra materiam; et 
eadem uis que exterius formata sensus dicitur, usque ad intimum transducta ymaginacio uocatur. Et 
intellige eadem in genere cognicionis sensitiue. Racio uero est ea uis anime que rerum corporearum 
naturas, formas, differencias et propria accidencia percipit, scilicet uniuersalia omnia incorporea, sed 
non extra corpus nisi racione subsistencie; abstrahit enim a corporibus que fundantur in corporibus, 
non actione, sed consideracione; natura enim corporis, secundum quam corpus est corpus, nullum 
utique est corpus, scilicet singulare. Intellectus uero est uis anime que inuisibilia percipit creata, sicut 
angelos, demones, animas et omnem spiritum creatum. Intelligencia uero est uis anime que cernit 
ipsum summum, uerum et incommutabilem, Deum. 
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immediately perceives invisible things. One is led then to meditation or 
contemplation.45 
 
There are a number of common themes which will re-emerge in the course our study: 
how two substances can come together to form a third; how the dictum ‘know 
yourself’ must also include the material as well as the spiritual aspect of man’s 
nature; the influence of the medical writings on our authors. These are some of the 
themes that will be developed in the next chapter on the powers of the soul according 
to John Damascene. His study of the psychology of the human soul includes a 
discussion of free will as a means to furthering our understanding of the human 
condition.   
 
 
                                                
45 Coleman, p. 222.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY  
ACCORDING TO JOHN DAMASCENE 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the powers of the soul, according to the 
Pseudo-Augustine, are three-fold: rationality, irascibility and concupiscibility. These 
are further divided into the cognitive powers of sensation, imagination, reason, 
memory, intellect and understanding. The cognitive powers, according to Jean’s next 
source, John  Damascene, are mind, thought, opinion, imagination and sensation; 
will and choice belong to the appetitive powers. What is interesting is that 
imagination and sensation are common to both divisions; imagination being the 
power which is intermediate between body and soul according to the Pseudo-
Augustine. Jean, as we will see, quotes extensively from Damascene’s most 
important work, On the Orthodox Faith, which is Part Three of The Fount of 
Knowledge written in Greek in 743 (the first two parts of which are an introduction 
to logic entitled Dialectica and a study of heresies entitled De haeresibus). On the 
Orthodox Faith (also known as The Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith) is the 
best known part of the work.1 It is divided into four books, the second book of which 
discusses God’s creation, both invisible and visible, with special attention being 
given to man and his faculties. Jean follows Damascene’s text very closely with 
regard to the powers of the soul. The exposition on human freedom and the will are 
also taken from Damascene’s chapters on free will, sometimes verbatim. Jean’s 
account is testament to the fact that Damascene was an important source for both 
                                                
1 For details of Damascene’s life and works see pp. v-xxxviii, St John of Damascus, Writings. See 
above Introduction p. 10. 
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early and later medieval scholars as The Fount of Knowledge was the first Greek 
theological Summa. This is the work of a Byzantine scholar, who had access to the 
major ancient texts and who, because of his Greek background and language, made it 
possible for him to read the original works of the ancients. The earliest translations 
of The Fount of Knowledge were made in the East, the first of which was that of the 
Dialectica and On the Orthodox Faith in the early part of the tenth century. In the 
introduction to the Fount of Knowledge we are told that the latter was a translation 
from the Greek into Old Slavonic by John, Exarch of Bulgaria in the time of the Tsar 
Simeon. The same divisions of the work were translated into Arabic in the second 
half of the tenth century, followed by a series of Russian translations undertaken 
throughout the following centuries, up to and including the twentieth. In the West 
another long series of Latin translations began in the twelfth century. A Latin 
translation of Chapters 1–8 of Book 3 of The Orthodox Faith was undertaken in 
Hungary by a monk named Cerbanus (c. 1134–1138), followed by a complete 
translation of the entire work by Burgundio of Pisa (c1148–1150) at the request of 
Pope Eugenius III. Another Latin edition was made by Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of 
Lincoln (1235–1253), a version of the Dialectica, produced about 1240. It seems that 
there are some seventeen references to Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa in 
Grosseteste’s Hexaemeran. He also produced another Latin version of the text, based 
on Burgundio’s translation.2 It would seem that Jean had Burgundio’s version to 
hand as this is the version used by Bonaventure and, in fact, Bonaventure ‘quotes 
him over two hundred times in his Commentaries on the Sentences’.3 
 
                                                
2 Michael Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom’, in Byzantine 
Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed. by Katerina Ierodiakonou, pp. 63–95 (p. 68). 
3 Bourgerol, Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure, p. 25. 
 137 
 
The De Fide Orthodoxa left its mark on the development of Latin systematic 
theology. Damascene’s ideas on human action and freedom in particular ‘prepared 
the way for the development of the notion of will in Aquinas and other Latin 
thinkers’.4 This chapter will examine the powers of the soul according to Damascene 
and will critically assess his views on the nature of free will, deliberation and choice. 
I will also discuss those chapters in Damascene that deal with sensation, the rational 
and non-rational powers of the soul and free will as presented by Jean.5   
 
Damascene draws on Nemesius for his account of human psychology, but 
one might ask what is the relevance of his precise analysis of the different types of 
fear and anger. One interpretation may be that Damascene, ‘is here close to Pascal 
with his insistence on our grasping both the misère and the grandeur of humankind’.6 
It is the search for self-knowledge or, as Louth states, ‘the ambivalent nature of self-
knowledge’. Without this self-knowledge, ‘we shall only mis-understand ourselves, 
mistaking what is natural for what is wrong, or vice versa, or realizing only one 
aspect of human nature, and thus being dangerously elated, or equally dangerously 
downcast’.7 Damascene, it seems, had a penchant for lists; this is apparent in the 
passages selected by Jean. As we examine his discussion of human emotions and 
possible explanation for each, we can only conclude that it was his way of 
understanding the complexities of human nature; for Damascene ‘they tame the 
potentially uncontrollable nature of reality’.8   
 
                                                
4 Marenbon, 2007, p. 62.  
5 In the course of doing so, I will refer to Frede’s article, mentioned above, which will shed some 
important light on the topic of human action, the will, and human freedom.  
6 Andrew Louth, St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 135. 
7 Ibid., p. 135. 
8 Ibid. 
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 Damascene divides the powers of the soul into the cognitive powers and the 
life-giving powers (has quidem cognitivas, illas vero zoticas). The cognitive powers 
are mind, thought, opinion, imagination and sensation; those of the appetitive powers 
include will and choice. Damascene, following the Platonic tradition assumes that 
reality consists of two worlds, that of the intelligible and that of the sensible. Human 
beings straddle the two worlds since they are composed of mind and a body. 
However, the main divide for Damascene ‘is not that between the intelligible world 
and the sensible world, but the divide between God and his creation, and this creation 
contains both the intellects other than God and the visible world.9 For most of the 
ancients and for Damascene all intellects have a will in virtue of which they are able 
to make right decisions and, even if at times we fail in our efforts to choose the right 
course of action we have, at least, intellect, whereby we can justify our actions. 
Before examining his theory of the will I will give a summary of the senses and the 
intellect as it is presented by Jean and following that I will address the issue of the 
will and the important role it plays in Damascene’s understanding of human action. I 
will then compare the views of a contemporary of Jean de La Rochelle, that of John 
Blund (c. 1175-1248), who addresses the issue of free will as he understood it as 
present in human beings, in angels and in God. Blund, according to Hasse, is 
probably the first master of arts who wrote a treatise on the soul and also one of the 
few early writers who is influenced by Avicenna rather than Aristotle.10 
 
We begin with an account of the five senses in Damascene. A sense, 
according to Damascene is a faculty of the soul by which material things are 
perceived. Damascene’s account of the senses is heavily dependent on Nemesius’ 
                                                
9 Michael Frede, p. 74. 
10 Hasse, p. 18. 
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treatise, On the Nature of Man, who in turn relies on both Aristotle and Galen for the 
most part.11 Nemesius was considered an authentic source for the transmission of 
Galen’s medical texts before they were made known through the works of Avicenna. 
Thus we can understand why Jean would wish to include Damascene among his 
sources. Jean’s aim at all times would seem to be to expose in as clear and precise a 
manner as possible the views of the various traditions, that of Galen coming from the 
medical tradition and sourced in Nemesius; that of Damascene, a Father of the 
Orthodox Church, a theologian and the author of the first great Summa in theology 
who, as we will see offered a moral theory based on Aristotle’s moral psychology. 
Damascene’s contribution to the history of ancient and medieval thought should be 
highlighted, ‘because of the remarkable status John attained as an authority in 
Christianity, both Eastern and Western, an authority which also seems to give special 
weight to his account of human action and the will’.12 
 
 
SECTION ONE 
THE EXTERNAL SENSES 
 
First, Jean, follows Damascene. The latter, for instance, describes the sense of sight, 
followed by that of hearing, then smell, taste and touch. Here we are given details of 
the organs and nerves involved in each of the senses.   
The first sense is sight; its organs are those which lead from the brain, the 
nerves and the eyes; sight perceives, following its first account, colour; and it 
distinguishes along with colour, the coloured body, its size, its shape, the 
place where it is and the distance between [where] it is and the middle, its 
number, its movement and rest, its roughness and smoothness, its evenness or 
                                                
11 ‘The medical works of Galen and philosophical writings of Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonist 
Porphyry are all major influences on Nemesius, directly or indirectly; so too the contoversial Christian 
Origen.’ Nemesius, On the Nature of Man: Translated with an introduction and notes by R.W. 
Sharples and P.J. van de Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008), p. 1.  
12 Ibid., p. 65. 
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unevenness, sharpness and bluntness and its consistency, that is whether it is 
of water or of earth, that is whether it is liquid or dry.  
The second sense is hearing, sensitive to voices and sounds; it distinguishes 
between their sharpness and heaviness, their harshness and gentleness of tone 
and strength. Its organs are the nerves leading from the brain and the 
architecture of the ears.  
The third sense is that of smell which occurs through the nostrils sending 
back vapours to the brain; it is terminated at the extremities of the anterior 
ventricles of the brain; it is both sensitive to and capable of receiving odours. 
The most general differences of odours is the difference between a good and 
a bad odour and that the intermediary between them is neither a good or a bad 
one.  
The fourth sense is that of taste; it is capable of or sensitive to perceiving 
flavours. Its organs are the tongue and the palette in which the nerves which 
are led from the brain are extended, announcing the impression produced; 
those which are called the taste qualities of the flavours are; sweetness, 
tartiness, pungency, astringency, bitterness, saltiness, greasiness, stickiness; 
the sense of taste distinguishes these. 
The fifth sense is that of touch which is common to all animals. It comes 
from the nerves leading out from the brain to the entire body, and the other 
sense organs possess the sense of touch. Touch is subject to heat and cold, 
softness and hardness, stickiness and aridness, heaviness and lightness, for 
these are known only through the sense of touch; but common to both the 
sense of touch and sight are; roughness and smoothness, dryness and wetness, 
thickness and thinness, up and down, place and size, density and scarcity and 
roundness, if it is on a small scale and certain other shapes. Similarly the 
sense of touch senses the approach of a body with the memory and the 
understanding, as well as number, up to two or three, and since they are small 
objects they are known by touch. Sight, however, perceives these things more 
than touch.13 
 
                                                
13 Summm, C. 68, 10-42. Primus sensus est uisus; organa uero eius sunt que ex cerebro sunt, nerui et 
oculi; sentit autem uisus, secundum primam racionem, colorem; dignoscit autem et cum colore 
coloratum corpus, et magnitudinem eius et formam, et locum ubi est et interuallum quod est in medio, 
et numerum, et motum et quietem, asperum et leue, equale et inequale, acutum et obtusum, et 
consistenciam, scilicet si aquosa est siue terrestris, hoc est humida uel sicca. Secundus sensus est 
auditus uocum et sonituum existens sensibilis; dinoscit autem eorum acumen et grauitatem, 
asperitatem et lenitatem, et magnitudinem; organa uero eius sunt nerui qui sunt ex cerebro, et aurium 
constructio. Tercius sensus est odoratus qui fit per nares, remittens uapores ad cerebrum; finitur autem 
ad fines anteriorum uentriculorum cerebri; et est sensitiuus et susceptiuus uaporum; uaporum autem 
generalissima est differencia bonus odor et malus odor; et quod est medium horum neque bene neque 
male olens. Quartus sensus est gustus; est autem saporum susceptiuus siue sensibilis; organa autem 
eius sunt lingua et palatum in quibus sunt nerui dilatati qui a cerebro feruntur, enunciantes eam que 
facta est susceptionem; que uero uocantur gustatiue qualitates saporum sunt hee: dulcedo, acedo, 
ponticitas, stipticitas, amaritudo, salsitas, unctuositas, uiscositas; horum enim est gustus dinoscitiuus. 
Quintus sensus est tactus qui et communis animalium; hic fit a cerebro missis nervis ad totum corpus, 
sed et alia organa sensuum habent sensum tactus; supponitur autem tactui calidum et frigidum, molle 
et durum, uiscosum et aridum, graue et lene: per solum enim tactum hec cognoscuntur; communia 
uero tactus et uisus sunt asperum et leue, siccum et humidum, grossum et subtile, sursum et deorsum, 
locus et magnitudo, densum et rarum, et rotundum, cum fuerit paruum, et alie quedam figure, similiter 
autem approprians corpus cum memoria et mente sentit, numerus autem usque ad duo vel tria, et hec 
cum parua sunt cognoscuntur tactu; hec autem magis uisus comprehendit quam tactus. 
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The sense of sight follows the standard point about vision in Aristotle. Each 
of the senses has its own object of sense, colour is the object of sight, sound is the 
object of hearing, and so on. Damascene, following Aristotle (albeit via Nemesius) 
distinguishes between the proper sensibles and the common sensibles, the latter 
being the objects which are common to more than one sense as movement and rest, 
shape, size, roughness and smoothness. The senses are given to us in pairs so that if 
one is damaged the other makes up for what is lost; the tongue is divided in certain 
animals, for example in serpents, but not in man; touch, however, is present in the 
entire body (except for the bones, the nerves, the nails, horns, hair and the like). 
Sight sees along straight lines, smell and hearing not only along straight lines but 
from all directions. Touch and taste do not perceive according to a straight line, nor 
from all directions but only when they approach the proper objects of the sense.  
 
Though Damascene gives but brief descriptions of each of the senses, we can 
already see how the two traditions, the philosophical and the medical, were melding 
and were ‘meant to provide a physical and naturalistic description of man as a living 
organism’.14 Here in Damascene we meet Aristotle who, on the one hand, held that 
‘two characteristic marks have above all others been recognised as distinguishing 
that which has soul in it from that which has not - movement and sensation’.15 On the 
other hand, we have the ‘anatomical description of Galen’s medicine, based on 
human and animal dissection’.16 It could be said that Damascene was the first major 
authority who had to face the challenges posed by the new medical and biological 
systems, even long before the works of Aristotle were circulating in the thirteenth 
                                                
14 Vico, p. 310.  
15 Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus Veneticus: De anima, liber: 1, cap.: 2 (Bekker: 403b). 
Animatum igitur ab inanimato duobus maxime differre videtur; motu que et sentire.  
16 Vico, p. 310. 
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century. While it is beyond the scope of our study to investigate Damascene’s 
primary sources in a more detailed manner we can at least acknowledge that he is 
one of the most important intermediaries between the Eastern Greek fathers and the 
Western theologians of the Middle Ages.  
 
SECTION TWO 
THE COGNITIVE POWERS 
 
The cognitive powers, as we have seen, are both rational and irrational according to 
Damascene. The irrational powers, the senses, are, what we call the exterior powers 
of knowing; the interior powers of knowing are the imaginative, the excogitative, and 
the memorative power, all of which belong to the irrational part of the soul. 
Damascene, following Nemesius, provides information as to which part of the brain 
each of the faculties belong. We begin with the irrational interior powers. Damascene 
distinguishes between imagination and fantasy. Imagination is an irrational power of 
the soul but it arises from something imaginable, whereas fantasy is an empty 
passion which is not produced by an imaginable object, just as when one imagines a 
chimera. It is difficult to say if Damascene is merely referring to something like an 
over-active imagination when he refers to fantasia. This might be understood more 
clearly if we also refer to the words of Damascene in the De fide et orthodoxa.17 This 
passage is not included in Jean’s presentation. 
 
Moreover, that which comes within the province of the imagination and the 
senses is the imaginative and the sensible, just as the visible, — say, a stone 
or something of the sort — comes within the province of sight, which is the 
power of vision. An imagination, or fantasy, is an affection of the irrational 
part of the soul arising from some imaginable object. But an imagining, or 
phantasm, is an empty affection arising in the irrational parts of the soul from 
no imaginable object at all. 
                                                
17 Saint John of Damascus, Writings, p. 242. 
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This distinction also appears in later authors on the soul, e.g., Albert the Great states 
that if phantasia is understood in a broad sense, ‘there will be only a slight difference 
between phantasia, imagination and estimation with regard to function, object and 
organ’.18 It seems that for Damascene the imagination sees things that have their 
basis in reality whereas there is nothing in reality which corresponds to the images 
produced in the fantasy. What is of more interest here is that according to 
Damascene there is a link between our sensitive and imaginative powers as he states: 
that the source and origin of the exterior sensitive powers is the imaginative 
power. The organ of the imagination, as Damascene states, is the anterior 
ventricle of the brain, as Augustine states, the nerves have the origin which 
are the organs of the external senses; And following the order of acts, 
imagination is posterior to the exterior senses.19 
 
 
The distinction between imagination and fantasy is not as clear, however, if we 
consider Aristotle’s understanding of phantasia, and if we also note that, like 
imagination, phantasia has a variety of meanings in classical thought. Aristotle held 
that phantasia is among the powers of soul, ‘in virtue of which we are enabled to 
judge and arrive at truth or falsity, even though it is not an actual judgement, in any 
of the forms of judgement, about truth or falsity, and is not epistēmē or nous’.20 
Aristotle states that phantasia is a movement which will not happen unless there is 
someone or something to be perceived and ‘must be like the perception which causes 
it’. In other words, beings without perception do not possess phantasia. Phantasia is 
a movement which follows from aisthesis. It ‘is simply involved in the process of 
                                                
18 Albertus, De homine, 38.4, p. 334a: Dicendum quod si phantasia large accipiatur, tunc parva erit 
differentia inter phantasiam et imaginationem et aestimationem quantum ad actum et obiectum et 
organum. Quoted in Hasse: pp. 148-9. 
19 Summa, C. 69, 4-7. […], ex quo datur intelligi quod fons et origo uirium exteriorum sensibilium est 
uirtus ymaginatiua. Vnde organum ipsius, sicut dicit Damascenus, est anterior uenter cerebri a quo,  
sicut dicit Augustinus, originem habent nerui qui sunt organa sensuum exteriorum. 
20 Gerard Watson, Phantasia in Classical Thought (Galway: Galway University Press, 1988), p. 24. 
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supplying the materials on which the mind builds judgements’.21 It might be useful to 
quote a passage from Watson, which helps to explain the status of phantasia as a 
power in Aristotle which comes between perception and thinking. 
 
It would appear from this that in a judgement where the term ‘white’ occurs, 
there is involved the (first) thought, noema, ‘white’ (see De Anima 430a26-
8), which in turn would not exist without the phantasma of white. The 
phantasma of white would not in turn exist without the perception of white. 
For the perception to become the phantasma it is necessary for the phantasia 
to act, for this has been stated to be something between perception and 
thinking, that in virtue of which a phantasma occurs to us. The process is to 
be envisaged presumably as follows: when a colour, for instance, comes 
before the special sense of sight, the special sense reacts and causes the 
further movement of phantasia. If in a particular instance three senses will be 
affected, special, incidental and common, the three phantasiai or movements 
corresponding to each of the three initial sense movements will correspond 
also as regards veridical nature.22 
   
For Aristotle, and, as we have seen in Damascene, distinctions are made with regard 
to the senses and their objects; the objects of sight and hearing are colour and sound 
respectively; next are the common sensibles which are perceptible by more than one 
sense, e.g., movement, rest, shape and size. A third class referred to above are the 
objects that are perceived incidentally, that is, that we perceive a white object that 
happens to be a particular object or person. Thus, the objects of the first type are 
more likely to be true whereas ‘that of the objects perceived incidentally leaves room 
for error, and that of objects perceptible by more than one sense, the objects of the 
‘common’ sense, leaves most room of all’.23 
 
                                                
21 Ibid., p. 28. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., p. 25. 
 145 
 
After the imaginative Damascene posits the excogitative power which Jean 
tells us is also called ‘opinion’24 in Damascene. It is the power of judging; a sensitive 
power from which one can form opinions regarding the process of synthesising 
(composiciones), inclinations to act or to avoid actions (incessiones ad actus et 
occasiones vel actiones, et fuge actionum). Its organ is the intermediate ventricle of 
the brain and the animal spirit in it. The exterior sense perceives the species present 
in the matter; imagination perceives the form deprived of the matter. Opinion or 
excogitation then makes a judgement.25 In Damascene’s philosophical chapters (the 
chapters, commonly called the Dialecta in the West, which immediately follows the 
introduction to the Fount of Knowledge), he elaborates on the power of excogitation. 
In one respect it involves an extra thinking out of the ‘unanalysed knowledge of 
things’ as, for example, something appears to be simple through sensation but by 
excogitation it turns out to be ‘manifold and varied’. Man, for example, appears to be 
simple but by excogitation he is discovered to be two-fold, i.e. made up of body and 
soul. A second type is called ‘simple excogitation’ which is the combination of the 
sensitive and the imaginative powers which, when working from things that exist 
imagine things that do not exist and thus produce a ‘figment of thought’. This is 
going further than the imaginative power in that if it gives form to something it is 
said to produce idols.26 
 
                                                
24 It was called the calculative faculty in Aristotle and later called the faculty of opinion. Cf. Ross, 
Aristotle, p. 221. 
25 Summa, C. 70, 6-12. Circa que nota quod sensus exterior comprehendit speciem presentem in 
materia et simplicem; ymaginacio uero comprehendit formam absente materia et simplicem. 
Excogitacio uero iudicat de ea, siue opinio; et si secundum racionem ueri, ut quoniam est hoc uel 
quoniam non est hoc, sic dicuntur excogitatiue uirtutes, iudicia et composiciones; si secundum 
racionem boni et mali, sic est excogitatiua uirtus principium incessionis ad actum uel fuge.  
26 Saint John of Damascus, Writings, p.101.  
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After the imagination and excogitation comes the memorative power. 
Memory is related to imagination as Jean states: 
 
The power of the memorative, as Damascene states, is the storehouse of 
memories and recollections. Memory is a left over fantasy from one of the 
senses following the act of sensing; fantasy is a sensible form; for memory is 
the accumulation of sensation and thought. For the soul apprehends sensible 
objects through the senses, that is, it senses and an opinion is formed; on the 
other hand it apprehends intellectual objects through the mind and intellectual 
understanding occurs. Therefore, when it retains the typi, that is the forms of 
things, of those things of which it has opinions and of those of which it has 
understood, intellectually, it is said to remember.27 
 
Damascene distinguishes between the memory of intelligible and sensible objects as 
he states: 
One must note that the apprehension of intellectual things only comes 
through learning or through a natural ability; but not through the senses. For 
sensible things are committed to memory in and through themselves; 
intelligible things we do remember, if indeed we have learned of them, but 
we have no memory of their substance.28 
 
It is stated that the memory of the sensibles are remembered in themselves. 
This is perhaps a reference to Aristotle’s position that we do not learn how to see 
colours or how to hear sounds and the same with the remaining senses. These 
capacities are in us naturally. Also with regard to sensible things being committed to 
memory, Aristotle states that it is impossible to think without a phantasm. For 
example, if we have to draw a triangle we are thinking of a definite size, but, he 
states we are not really concerned with the physical dimensions but more with the 
                                                
27 Summa, C. 71, 2-9. Est autem memoratiuum, sicut dicit Damascenus, memorie et rememoracionis 
promptuarium. Memoria autem est fantasia derelicta ab aliquo sensu secundum actum apparentem; 
fantasia autem dicit formam sensibilem; uel est memoria coarceruacio sensus et intelligencie. Anima 
enim sensibilia per sensus suscipit, scilicet sentit, et fit opinio; intelligibilia uero per intellectum et fit 
intelligencia. Cum igitur typos, id est formas, eorum que opinata est, et eorum que intellexerunt, 
custodit, memorari dicitur. 
28 Summa, C. 71, 9-14. Oportet autem scire, quoniam intelligibilium susceptio non fit nisi ex 
disciplina uel naturali ingenio; non enim ex sensu est. Nam sensibilia quidem secundum seipsa 
memorie commendantur; intelligibilium uero, siquidem didicimus, memoramur, substancie uero 
earum memoriam non habemus. 
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properties of the triangle which remain the same regardless of the actual dimensions 
of its sides or angles. We do, however have a physical model before us, we have the 
thought of it and we remember it. This is a thing ‘of which we have a phantasia’29 
and which is capable of being remembered of itself, per se. As Watson further states, 
‘the properties of triangles involve the presence of such a phantasia and are capable 
of being remembered accidentally, per accidens. Hence he states that memory, even 
of intelligibles, does not take place without phantasmata’.30  
 
Next we are told that recollection (remoracio) is the term used by Damascene 
to mean the recovery of memory that has been lost by forgetting. Forgetting is 
simply the loss of memory. The imaginative power apprehends material things 
through the senses, it hands it over (tradit) to the excogitative or the distinguishing 
power which transmits it to the memory. The organ of the power of memory is the 
posterior ventricle of the brain and the animal spirit which is present therein. We will 
meet the ventricles of the brain again in Avicenna. In brief, there are three chambers 
or ventriculi: one in the front, the back and the central one. Damascene’s source for 
his physiological account of man is Nemesius whose work On the Nature of Man 
elaborates on the workings of the human body.31 It was accepted for the layman to 
possess such medical knowledge and in fact it was not until late into the thirteenth 
century that the medical themes were handed over to the ‘scholastic physician’.  
 
                                                
29 Watson, p. 30. 
30 Ibid. 
31 ‘The attraction of Galen’s work was obvious: it offered a teleological account of the structure and 
workings of the human body and its parts, showing in great detail its purposeful design and referring, 
in language very to the Christian accounts of the creation, to the craft and skill of ‘the Craftsman’ (ho 
dêmiourgos). Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, Translated with an introduction and notes by R.W. 
Sharples and P.J. van der Eijk (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), p.13. 
 148 
 
The preceding powers, memory, excogitative (or opinion) and the 
imaginative, belong to the irrational part of the soul. We now turn to the rational part 
of the soul which concerns the intellect or mind and we are told that the movement or 
the act of the rational power is determined by Damascene in a threefold way: through 
experience, through logical learning and through teaching (secundum triplicem viam, 
scilicet viam inveniendi, viam addiscendi, et viam docendi). First through sensation a 
passion is caused in the soul and this is the imagination which then forms opinions. 
The thinking faculty (excogitative) then judges the opinion as to whether it is true or 
false; it decides what is true. Hence this is called mind (mens) because of its 
estimating, its thinking and its judging and that which has been set down and 
determined as true is called the understanding (intellectus).32  
 
The second way33 we come to have knowledge is a type of logical learning, 
the via addiscendi, which is described in terms of mental motions. The first 
movement is intelligentia and whatever it is concerned with it is called the intention 
(intencio). In other words, we have learned something intellectually, but we do not 
have the substance of the memory. When the intention remains in the soul and the 
soul is adapted to the thing thought, this is excogitation. When it continues in the 
same subject and examines itself it is called prudence (fronesis or in the modern 
                                                
32 Summa, C. 72, 7-15. Via inueniendi est uia experimenti per sensus ad intelligibilia cognoscenda; 
secundum quam uiam ordinat Ioannes Damascenus uires irracionales ad racionales dicens quod per 
sensum anime constituitur passio, que uocatur ymaginacio; ex ymaginacione uero fit opinio; deinde 
mens diiudicans opinionem, siue uera siue falsa sit, iudicat ueritatem. Vnde et mens dicitur a 
meciendo, et cogitando et diiudicando; quod ergo diiudicatum est et determinatum uere intellectus 
dicitur. Hec ergo est uia inuencionis siue experimenti, incipiens a sensu. 
33 Summa, C. 72, 16-25. Alia uia est uia addiscendi, secundum quam determinat Damascenus motus 
mentales dicens: oportet cognoscere quoniam primus motus intelligencia dicitur; que autem circa 
aliquid est intelligencia, intencio uocatur; que autem permanens et figurans animam ad id quod 
intelligitur, excogitacio est; excogitacio uero in eodem manens et seipsam examinans fronesis uocatur. 
Qui motus possunt manifestari circa racionem fronesis sillogisticam et in uia discendi, ut uerbi gracia: 
omne totum est maius sua parte; omne continuum est quoddam totum; ergo omne continuum est 
maius sua parte. 
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sense it is phronesis). He gives the example; every whole is greater than its parts; 
every continuum is a whole; therefore every continuum is greater than its parts. For 
Damascene this kind of thinking which is based on logic and the mind’s working 
towards a conclusion, based as it is on the relation of ideas, is the perfection of the 
interior movement of the mind.  
 
Further still is the third way, the way of teaching, the via docendi,34 the 
passing on of knowledge from one to another. Since it is a movement towards 
perfection, either by way of acquiring knowledge through experience or of logical 
learning it will not remain still until it is passes on that which it knows to another. 
Further still is the movement of the mind to the most perfect knowledge, namely 
prudence, which is the examined certitude of truth itself. Prudence is then extended 
and produces reasoning (cogitationem) which is a disposition called ‘mental speech’, 
the most complete movement of the soul occurring in the reasoning part of the soul.35 
Mental speech occurs at times when we go through an entire discourse with 
ourselves and even in sleep we dispute in words and according to Damascene we are 
totally rational in this. Projected speech acts through the voice and in syllables. It is 
projected by means of the tongue and the mouth and is described as the messenger of 
thought (enusciativuus intelligencie). 
 
                                                
34 Summa, C. 72, 52-57. Alia uia perfectissima que consequitur ad predictas est uia docendi. Cum 
enim perfectus est interior motus intellectus aut per uiam inuencionis, aut per uiam discipline, non 
restat nisi transfundere intellectum in alterum; et hec est uia docendi. Incipit ergo tunc motus mentis a 
perfectissimo, scilicet a fronesi, que est examinata ipsius ueritatis certitudo.  
35 Summa, C. 72, 58-62. Dicit ergo Damascenus quod fronesis dilatata facit cogitacionem, id est 
interius dispositum sermonem nominatam, quam determinantes dicimus motum ipsius anime 
plenissimum in excogitatione fientem, sine aliqua enunciacione, ex quo prolatum sermonem aiunt 
provenire per linguam enarratum. 
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For Damascene the thinking faculties involved in the movement of the mind 
towards the truth, which are obvious in the example of the syllogism are linked to 
what is called practical wisdom in Aristotle, or fronesis, this is the term used by  
Damascene. This is not a moral virtue in itself but it could be said to connect the 
intellectual and the moral virtues. Damascene’s point may be that if we apply the 
same rigorous thinking to questions of morals we will arrive at a decision as to what 
is the right thing to do and by so doing we are developing the power to examine our 
conscience and practice the virtue of prudence. In a previous chapter of Book II of 
De fide et Orthodoxa Damascene states, ‘Although the virtues are referred to the 
soul, yet, in so far as the soul utilizes the body, they are common to both’.36 
Damascene links the powers of the soul to prudence; the powers are also linked to 
the emotions as we will see in the discussion of the appetitive powers.  
 
The irrational powers are further divided into two groups; those which are 
capable of obeying or being persuaded by reason and those which do not listen to 
reason and are not persuaded by it. Those that are not persuaded by reason but by 
nature, are called the pulsating power, (or the vital power), the generative or seminal 
power, the vegetative or the nutritive power, and the augmentative power. The 
generative power refers to the generation of off-spring and the conservation of the 
species, the remaining three protect the individual e.g., the pulsative power regulates 
the heat of the body and the nutritive restores energy to the body.  The group of 
powers that can be persuaded by reason or are open to persuasion by reason is 
subdivided into the power that controls and a power which effects movement. The 
latter is the movement that is associated with the movement of bodies and it is 
                                                
36 Saint John of Damascus, Writings, p. 238.  
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obedient to reason. The power which controls movement is subdivided into the 
concupiscible and the irascible powers (desire and anger) from which emotions arise. 
 
The emotions of pleasure, pity, fear and anger are held to be open to 
persuasion by Damascene. A good person will react to the emotions and behave in a 
certain way because of a ‘good’ character.  
Some pleasures are of the soul, some of the body. Those of the soul are those 
which are of the soul itself; namely those which involve study and 
contemplation. Corporeal pleasures are those which happen with the 
cooperation of the soul and the body; therefore those involving food and 
sexual intercourse and the like are called corporeal pleasures; in fact no one 
would find pleasures that belong to the body alone.37 Further, some pleasures 
are true, some are false. Those that are true are of the soul itself according to 
study and contemplation; those that are false are of the body and according to 
sensation.38 
 
Damascene ranks intellectual pleasures above those of the senses. Contrary to his 
statement, however, that ‘no one would find pleasures that belong to the body alone’ 
Plato, in his dialogue the Philebus, states that there are some ‘affections’ of the body 
alone which are quenched before they even reach the soul. However, this needs to be 
viewed in the context of Plato’s discussion of pleasure and pain.39 It seems that 
Damascene is following Plato in his reference to false pleasures which again is to be 
                                                
37 Cf., De L’âme, Vernier, p. 181 n. 4; ‘Le plaisir a une dimension nécessairement psychique comme 
l’établit Platon dans le Philèbe en 33d, 35c sqq’. 
38 Summa, C. 75, 1-11. Leticiarum quedam sunt animales, quedam corporales. Animales quecumque 
sunt solius anime secundum seipsam; quecumque scilicet sunt circa disciplinas et contemplacionem. 
Corporales uero sunt quecumque cooperacione corporis et anime fiunt; et ideo corporales uocantur 
quecumque sunt circa cibos et coitus et talia; solius quippe corporis nequaquam inueniet quis leticias. 
Alio modo sic: leticiarum quedam sunt uere, quedam mendaces. Vere quecumque sunt solius mentis 
secundum doctrinam et contemplacionem; mendaces quecumque sunt cum corpore secundum sensu
  
39 Dorothea Frede, ‘Disintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and Pain in Plato’s Philebus’, in The 
Cambridge Comanion to Plato, pp. 425-463 (p. 441). ‘The general definition of pleasure as 
restoration of natural integration is soon modified in the Philebus by an important qualification that 
appears necessary when Socrates tries to introduce the further subdivision between pleasures of the 
soul and pleasure of the body. Strictly speaking, pleasures and pains are never a matter of the body 
alone, because only those disturbances in the body are pains and those restorations pleasures that are 
perceived by the soul (33c-d; 35b). This leads to the so-called pleasures of the body as perceptions. 
They are to be distinguished from the pleasures that the soul can experience all by itself’.  
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found in the Philebus. Plato’s intention in the dialogue is to show that there are many 
different ways in which pleasures can be considered false, but as far as a moral 
philosophy is concerned he ‘insists that all our painful emotions, such as rage, 
longing, lamentation, love, jealousy, and envy, are deprivations of some sort or other 
that contain a portion of pleasure’.40 
 
Whether Damascene shares this negative view of the emotions is not clear but 
what seems to be behind his exposition of the ‘passions’ is Plato and Aristotle’s 
vision of the moral life in which the state of one’s character is paramount. If we are 
to have a proper moral character we must ensure that the rational part of our souls 
has control over the irrational parts. The question must be raised as to what extent we 
are in control of our emotions? In another chapter of the De fide Orthodoxa (not 
mentioned by Jean) Damascene describes a ‘passion’ of the soul as follows; ‘passion 
is a movement of the appetitive faculty which is felt as a result of a sensory 
impression of good or evil’.41 Passion is a ‘movement in one thing caused by 
another’ and it seems that Damascene wishes to say that it is not just our actions but 
that our passions or emotions must also be considered in moral philosophy. His 
statement that ‘the pulsating movement of the heart is action, because it is natural; 
but its palpitating movement, because it is immoderate and not according to nature, 
is passion and not action’42 marks this distinction. Actions are also subject to the 
passions and he states that ‘action is called passion when one is not moved according 
to nature, whether by himself or by another’.43 This will be discussed below in the 
discussion of the freedom of the will. 
                                                
40 Dorothea Frede, ‘Disintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and Pain in Plato’s Philebus’, p. 450. 
41 St John of Damascus, Writings, p. 246.  
42 Ibid,. p. 247. 
43 Ibid. 
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Following Damascene’s account of pleasures, Jean states that some pleasures 
are of the soul alone which others are of the body. Those pleasures belonging to the 
soul alone are those concerning learning and contemplation while corporeal 
pleasures are those which are shared by the body and the soul. Of the latter there are 
three kinds: some are natural and at the same time necessary. Those that are 
necessary are those without which life would be impossible, such as nourishment, 
digesting, replenishing, necessary covering (sine quibus vivere impossible est, ut 
nutritive, digestive et repletive et indumenta necessaria). Other pleasures are natural 
but not necessary, such as natural and lawful sexual union, since this ensures survival 
of the human race. Some pleasures are neither natural nor necessary such as 
drunkenness, lust, excess, (ut ebrietas et luxuria et plenitudo utilitatem excedens). 
For they neither contribute consistency to our lives, nor to the continuance of our 
race, but they actually do harm. The way to the good life is therefore to seek those 
pleasures which are both necessary and natural; those which are natural but not 
necessary must take second place and they can only then be sought in a suitable time, 
manner and judgement. All other pleasures must be rejected. 
 
The next emotion or passion dealt with is grief. There are four kinds of grief;  
grief, as oppression or as weighing one down (accidia); distress that renders one 
speechless (achos); envy as grief over another’s good fortune (invidia); mercy as 
sadness over another’s misfortune (misericordia). I have translated tristicia as ‘grief’ 
but in the English translation of De fide orthodoxa it is stated that there are four 
kinds of pain, the account of which correspond to those in Jean’s Summa.44  
                                                
44 St John of Damascus, Writings, p. 240.  
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Damascene also lists various types of fear, six in all: apprehension (segnicies), 
embarrassement (erubescencia), disgrace (verecundia), terror (admiracio), dread or 
consternation (stupor) and anxiety (angonia).  
 
Apprehension or alarm is fear of something going to happen in the future; 
embarrassment or shame is fear of an expected reproach; disgrace is fear on account 
of a shameful act; terror is fear that arises from a very active imagination; dread or 
consternation is fear which comes from an unaccustomed imagining; anxiety is fear 
of failure, that is to say through mis-fortune. Modesty and shame are not altogether 
negative in that both are open to redemption and a mending of one’s ways.45   
 
Anger is described in two ways; in the first way it is described as a boiling of 
blood around the heart as a result of the thickening of yellow bile (cholê); anger is 
also a desire for revenge. It is the bodyguard of reason and at the same time it is the 
avenger of desire; when a desire is frustrated it arouses anger. 46 
 
In Damascene’s distinction between the virtues of the mind and the affections 
of the body he highlights a very important fact, that is, that as far as the moral life is 
concerned we must give an account not only of our actions but also of our feelings. 
They are inseparable and as we will see they are also central to his account of 
freedom of the will, which is the next topic for discussion. Damascene’s discussion 
                                                
45 Summa, C.77, 3-7. Segnicies est timor future operacionis; erubescencia est timor in expectacione 
conuicii; uerecundia est timor in turpi actu; admiracio est timor ex magna ymaginacione; stupor uero 
est timor ex inassueta ymaginacione; agonia autem est timor per casum, scilicet per infortunium; 
timentes enim infortunate actionis agonizamur.  
46 Summa, C. 78, 1-7. Consequenter subdiuidit de ira quam diffinit secundum duos modos. Primo 
modo materialiter sic: ira est feruor eius qui circa cor est sanguinis ex euaporacione uel returbacione 
fellis fiens; secundo formaliter et hoc dupliciter; uno modo sic: ira est desiderium repugnacionis uel 
uindicte; iniuriam enim passi, uel estimantes pati, irascimur et est quasi mixta passio ex 
concupiscencia et ira; alio modo sic: ira est id quod audax est mentis uindex lese concupiscencie. 
 155 
 
of the emotions is significant if one considers that he was writing at a time in which 
the body was considered in a very negative light. His discussion of human nature 
expresses the orthodox wisdom of the day but above all it emphasises  his desire to 
understand the human condition, in all its guises. Damascene clearly gives priority to 
the soul but he is also open to the view that as humans we also share in the life of 
irrational beings. This had obvious appeal to the the medieval scholars who wanted 
to remain faithful to Augustine but at the same time wanted to follow in 
Damascene’s footsteps. They developed their own synthesis of the medical and 
philosophical learning to their Christian beliefs. We turn now to Damascene’s 
analysis of human free will and see how reason for Damascene is a corollary of 
human freedom. 
 
 
SECTION THREE 
HUMAN FREE WILL 
 
Damascene defines the rational movement of the soul according to will, reason and 
freedom of the will. The very notion, that we, human beings have a will can be 
traced back to the Stoics. Indeed, Damascene’s analysis of human psychology is of 
Stoic origin although ‘drawn immediately from Nemesios’.47 The notion of will is 
also present in Christian authors from the second century onwards.48 While Aristotle 
assumes that human beings ‘will’ things this is not to say that he believed there is a 
separate power of the soul which can be appealed to in matters of morals. To 
understand why Christian authors were interested in the concept of having a will we 
must look back to the various doctrines which challenged the Christian belief in God 
                                                
47 Louth, p. 135. 
48 Michael Frede, p. 64. 
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who created man in such a way that man could choose the right thing to do in a given 
situation. The Manichees, for example, believed that man was made in such a way 
that he could not but sin.  It is in answer to this that Christian authors would take an 
interest in the topic of the will. They wanted to explain why God would create 
human beings who would sin and as a consequence of sin they would be punished.   
 
Christians from the second century onwards had to explain this in the face of 
a variety of so-called ‘Gnostic’ doctrines, according to which the world, 
including human beings, was not created by God, but by an imperfect 
Demiurge who, with the powers subordinate to him, had created the world 
and ruled the world in such a way that human beings could not but sin, 
perhaps even systematically were made to sin.49 
 
Damascene uses the term thelesis to describe the will: 
 
He distinguishes the will according to the following; ‘one should note that 
there is a natural power in the soul, appetitive of that which is in accordance 
with the nature of the soul and that it embraces all those things which are 
linked to its nature essentially; this is called the will’ (thelesis). Substantially, 
however, natural goods pertain to the nature [of the soul], such as being, 
existing, understanding. The will is also a rational appetite for something, and 
this is called boulesis. This is the same as if he had said: there is a natural will 
and there is a rational will.50 
 
The meaning of the Greek terms may help to clarify Damascene’s position as we 
begin to examine the concept of free will as they are presented by Jean but also with 
the aid of the aforementioned author, Frede, who highlights Damascene’s 
contribution to the debate on free will among scholastic theolgians and 
philosophers.51 As he states, Damascene’s term for the will is thelesis which is to be 
                                                
49 Michael Frede, p. 72 
50 Summa, C. 79, 4-11. Voluntatem autem distinguit [Damascenus] secundum hunc modum dicens: 
‘Oportet scire quoniam anime inserta est naturaliter uirtus appetitiua eius quod secundum naturam est, 
et omnium que substancialiter nature assunt contentiua uoluntas; et hec dicitur thelesis.’ 
Substancialiter autem nature assunt naturalia bona, sicut esse, uiuere, intelligere. Est iterum uoluntas 
appetitus racionalis ad aliquam rem, et hec dicitur bulisis. Idem est ergo ac si dixisset: est uoluntas 
naturalis, et est uoluntas racionalis. 
51 Michael Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom’ in Byzantine 
Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed. by Katerina Ierodiakonou, pp. 63-95. 
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distinguished from boulesis, the latter was used in ancient times (also the form, 
boulesthai, meaning to will or to want). Damascene, however, uses thelesis as a 
general term for the will and the term boulesis to explain ‘wishing’; it is 
distinguished from thelesis as follows. Thelesis is that part of the will which cannot 
but wish for existence and understanding and everything that goes to make up the 
nature of the soul. Willing is a ‘a natural and rational desire’52 whereas ‘wishing’ is 
concerned with the end. Boulesis or rational appetite is moved towards something 
that it may or not desire and as such it includes the ability to make choices. 
According to Frede, these are two distinct functions of the rational will. The ability 
to make choices is not equivalent to saying we have a will but, as we will see, it is 
‘choice’ that is given a privileged position in Damascene’s account of wishing or 
willing something.  
 
He subdivides the rational will into things which we can will and into those 
things which we cannot will; this is, the possible and the impossible; for 
example, the things we can will, the things which are in our power, as 
fornication, being sober, to go to sleep and the like; wishing for those things 
which are in our power, may sometimes be possible, as when we wish to be a 
king or a bishop, which is possible, but not, however, in our power; at other 
times it is impossible, as when we wish never to die.53 
 
The means to the end is what we determine, for example, the means to becoming 
healthy. Thus, we begin with a rational desire and we then decide if what we will is 
in our power to attain. Then follows deliberation which is described as an 
‘inquisitive’ appetite. Deliberation seems to be the important stage as judgement is a 
matter of choosing one option over another. Once we have deliberated as to whether 
                                                
52 Louth,  p. 138. 
53 Summa, C. 79, 14-22. Voluntatem autem racionalem subdiuidit in uoluntatem eorum que sunt in 
nobis, et uoluntatem eorum que non sunt in nobis; et hec est possibilium et impossibilium; uerbi 
gracia, uoluntas eorum que sunt in nobis, est eorum que sunt in potestate nostra, ut fornicari, sobrium 
esse, dormire et huiusmodi. Voluntas uero eorum que non sunt in nobis, aliquando est possibilium, ut 
cum uolumus reges esse uel episcopi, quod possibile est, sed tamen non in potestate nostra; aliquando 
est impossibilium, ut cum uolumus nunquam mori. 
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we wish to pursue a course of action we use our judgement in choosing between the 
various options. The next criterion is that we must be inclined to, or even take delight 
in, the proposed action. It is only if we are disposed to doing something, that is, we 
like or even love it, which then involves choosing or selecting a particular course of 
action. If the proposed action is something we would like or even love to do we 
choose it from one or more options. This leads to an impulse to enjoy what is 
desired; its use brings the process to completion and the desire ceases.54 In this 
process one is either making a good use or a bad use of our abilities to deliberate. 
Referring to the above Frede writes: 
We should at least consider the possibility that John of Damascus 
presents things as if they formed a temporal sequence for reasons of 
exposition to point out at how many places things could go wrong and 
hence at how many places we had a chance to avoid wrong-doing.55 
 
Before turning to his discussion of free will we must first examine 
Damascene’s views on reason and how it is connected to freedom of the will. It was 
said earlier that for Damascene the most ‘radical’ divide is between God and his 
creation and it follows that there is a radical divide between God’s intellect and His 
will and created beings and their will. God’s willing is ‘tantamount to its being the 
case’, on the other hand, human beings, must deliberate and make choices 
accordingly. Damascene states that the contemplative and active faculties belong to 
reason: 
 
                                                
54 Summa, C. 79, 30-40. Primus ergo motus uoluntatis, respectu eorum que in nobis sunt, est 
consilium. Consilium autem est appetitus inquisitiuus de hiis rebus que in nobis sunt. Consiliatur enim 
aliquis, si debet tractare rem uel non debet. Deinde iudicat quid melius et dicitur iudicium. Deinde 
disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est, et uocatur sentencia. Si enim iudicet et non dispositus 
fuerit ad quod iudicatum est, hoc est non diligit non dicitur sentencia. Deinde post disposicionem fit 
electio: eligere autem est de duobus praeiacentibus, hoc preoptare altero. Deinde facit impetum ad 
operacionem, et dicitur impetus. Deinde utitur, et dicitur usus. Sic ergo determinat de uoluntate quam 
nichil  aliud secundum substanciam ponit esse quam liberum arbitrium. 
55 Michael Frede, p. 88. 
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He determines that which concerns reason in distinguishing the existence of a 
rational power which has for its object the truth and it is a rational power 
which has for its object the good. It is also a power that contemplates all that 
exists; and this pertains to the knowledge of things; and it is the rational 
power that distinguishes acts and this pertains to the motivating powers. This 
is what Damascene calls the rational, on the one hand it is contemplative, and 
on the other, it is active. The contemplative is what excogitates with regard to 
how things are; the active, that is, the deliberative, is what determines the 
right reason to actions; and he calls the contemplative faculty the intellect; 
and that of the active, he calls it reason. He therefore determines that which 
concerns reason inasmuch as it is a movement.56 
 
Reason therefore has both a theoretical and a practical side to it. The background to 
this, according to Frede, is the Platonic view ‘that the intellect contemplates eternal 
truth, but that the rational soul not only contemplates the truth, but also concerns 
itself with ordering the visible world in such a way as to reflect eternal truth’.57 As 
rational beings we can deliberate and make choices, sometimes the choices are good 
and right but we are also capable of making the wrong choices. We have, however, 
control over our actions; whether it is correct to call it free will or freedom in choice 
is a question which we will return to presently.  
 
According to Damascene it is because we have free will that man freely 
desires, freely wills, freely inquires, freely explores, freely judges, freely disposes 
himself, freely chooses, freely moves to act and freely acts.58 Jean states that 
Damascene asks two questions concerning free will; the first is whether there are 
                                                
56 Summa, C. 80, 1-10. De racione uero determinat distinguens quod est uirtus racionalis cognitiua 
ueri et est uirtus racionalis cognitiua boni. Et est uirtus racionalis contemplatiua encium; et hoc 
pertinet ad cognitiuas; et est uirtus racionalis discretiua operabilium et hoc pertinet ad motiuas. Et hoc 
est quod dicit Damascenus racionale, hoc est contemplatiuum, hoc autem actiuum. Contemplatiuum 
quidem est quod excogitat ut se habent encia; actiuum autem, hoc est consiliatiuum, quod determinat 
actibilis rectam racionem; et uocat contemplatiuum intellectum; actiuum uero racionem. Sic ergo 
determinat de racione secundum quod est motiua. 
57 Michael Frede, pp. 74-75. 
58 Summa, C. 81, 4-8. Libero enim arbitrio appetit, et libero arbitrio uult, quantum ad motum 
uoluntatis. Libero enim arbitrio inquirit et scrutatur, et libero arbitrio iudicat quantum ad discrecionem 
racionis, libero arbitrio disponit; et libero arbitrio eligit, et libero arbitrio impetum facit, et libero 
arbitrio agit. 
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things which depend on us? The second asks, what are the things that depend on us 
and over what things do we have power or control?  To the first question Damascene 
puts forward a number of possible causes or principles of human actions. There are 
those who say that God is the cause, or that things happen through necessity, or fate, 
or nature, or chance or spontaneity (aut Deum aiunt causam esse, vel necessitatem, 
vel fortunam, vel naturam, vel eventum, vel casum). He dismisses each in turn: 
 
God cannot be said to be the principle of all human acts, since it is not 
permitted to ascribe to God unjust acts, which are often caused by men. 
Neither to necessity, since the acts of humans are not similar, as is the case 
with necessary things. Neither to fate, for those who put fate forward as the 
principle, state that it is not the principle of contingent things, but of 
necessary things, which must be completed within a certain period of time; 
according to this fate and necessity differ inasmuch as they are principles; for 
necessity concerns the whole of time, fate concerns determined time. Neither 
to nature, for the works of nature are generation, growth, plants and animals, 
the principle of movement being in themselves, not like artificial objects 
which are the works of human beings. Neither to chance, for chance is the 
principle of actions which are unusual and inconceivable. […] Nor can 
spontaneity be posited as the principle of human actions, for they say that 
spontaneous acts are symptomatic of inanimate things or brute animals, they 
are deprived of nature or art.59  
 
It remains therefore that man himself is the principle of his own actions.60 In contrast 
to irrational animals he is master of his actions and free in his will. Irrational animals 
are, on the contrary, led by nature, that is to say they move according to their natural 
appetite. As soon as an animal desires something they move to act. Man, however, as 
a rational animal when he desires something he has the power to curb his appetite or 
                                                
59 Summa, C. 81, 14-33. Non enim potest Deus dici principium omnium actuum humanorum, quia non 
est fas ascribere Deo actus iniustos, qui frequenter fiunt ab hominibus. Neque necessitas, quia actus 
humani non semper similiter se habent sicut necessaria. Neque fortuna, nam illi qui ponunt fortunam 
principium, dicunt eam non esse principium contingencium, sed necessariorum, que habent impleri 
per tempus aliquod; et secundum hoc differt fortuna et necessitas secundum quod sunt principia; nam 
necessitas respicit omne tempus, fortuna tempus aliquid determinatum. Neque natura; nature enim 
opera sunt generacio, augmentacio plante et animalis, quorum principium motus in ipsis est, non sicut 
artificialia que sunt opera humana. Neque euentus, nam euentus est principium actuum, qui sunt rari et 
inopinabiles. […] Neque casus potest poni principium humanorum actuum, nam sicut dicunt, casus 
sunt inanimatorum et irracionabilium simptomata sine natura et arte. 
60 Summa, C. 81, 33-35. Relinquitur igitur ipsum agentem et facientem hominem esse principium 
proprie harum actionum, et arbitrium liberum. 
 161 
 
to follow it. It follows therefore that irrational animals can neither be praised or 
blamed, man however must receive praise or blame for his actions.61  
 
Being a rational human being implies, therefore, that we are in control of how 
we deal with a given situation. Animals, on the other hand, when they see an 
appetising object it is not so much that they have no choice but to go after the object 
but it is, according to Frede, that the animal simply has no choice: it follows nature. 
This has theological and moral implications for, as Frede states, if it moved by 
choice it would have control over what it is doing. This is brought out more clearly if 
we consider the view put forward by the Stoics, that ‘animals are created in such a 
way that they in general will display the desired kind of behaviour, because their 
response to a situation is fixed by the situation and the way they have been 
constructed’.62 Human beings, on the other hand, are meant to do what they do 
because they are acting of their own accord, as individuals. Because we human 
beings have been endowed with rationality our reactions are not ‘fixed by the 
situation’, but how we react and ultimately what actions we take are determined by 
rationality. Damascene emphasises the fact that, of course, we can be mistaken in our 
judgements and our choices; rationality, in other words, is subject to change. The 
term Damascene uses is trepton which Frede translates as turnable; just as a material 
substance is corruptible, so the rational soul is turnable; but that is not to say that we 
are not in control, even though the control we have is lessened. This is an important 
concept in Damascene but it is not mentioned by Jean in his exposition, however, it 
will be helpful to refer to it as we come to discuss the importance of choice and 
freedom of choice in actions.  
                                                
61 Summa, C. 81, 49-50. Vnde irracionabilia quidem neque laudantur, neque uituperantur; homo autem 
laudatur et uituperatur. 
62 Michael Frede, p. 78. 
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Damascene discusses voluntary and involuntary acts in reply to the second 
question which asks what things depend on us and what are the things over which we 
have control (ad questionem secundum qua queritur que sunt ea que sunt in nobis 
quorum potestatem habemus). The acts which depend on us are the acts which we 
are free to do or not to do; we do them voluntarily (hoc est omnia que per nos 
voluntarie aguntur) and we are said to be in control of them. Acts which depend on 
us are subject to praise or blame and may also be subject to the law (illi actus quos 
sequitur laus vel vituperacio et in quibus est lex). In principle it is all those things 
about which we deliberate. These are contingent actions which we may carry out but 
equally we may choose to do its opposite (pariter autem contingens est quod et 
ipsum possumus et oppositum eius); we may choose to move or not to move, to 
desire things or not to desire them; to act or not to act and many similar actions.   
 
Jean asks whether Damascene means that we are in control of interior 
actions, such as thinking and choosing, just as much as we are in control of the 
exterior acts, such as walking or speaking. Very often we are prohibited from 
speaking or walking or some such actions but it is important to note that Damascene 
is saying that the choice always remains with us. Even at that he states that it can be 
that God’s will intervenes and prevents us from acting in a certain way (actus autem 
multociens prohibentur secundum quemdam modum providencie). The fact that we 
have a choice is what is important and as Frede points out there are reasons as to why 
‘choice’ has this privileged position in Damascene’s account of free will.63 
                                                
63 Michael Frede, p. 81. It is choice which distinguishes created intellectual beings, that is, rational 
beings, from God on the one hand, and animals on the other. If we also take into account John’s 
doctrine of providence, it turns out that John is following a long tradition in Christian thought, already 
manifest in Origen, based in part on Stoicism, and in part on St Paul, according to which our action, as 
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Jean raises a number of questions with regard to actions that are committed out of 
ignorance and those committed also out of violence. He asks why some actions are 
subject to praise or blame while some are not? Are the insane or the inebriated to be 
blamed for wrong actions? Or what about those who are compelled to do something 
wrong against their wishes? Jean here relies on a distinction found in Damascene 
between acts that are accompanied by delight and those that are accompanied by 
distress; some acts are desired by the agent, while others are shunned. Of those 
which are desired some are always to be desired but others are only at certain times 
(et eligibilium, hii semper eligibiles, hii vero secundum quoddam tempus). The same 
applies to acts which are shunned by an agent. 
 
Again, some acts are considered worthy of pity and forgiveness, others, 
however, are considered hateful and are to be punished. Voluntary acts are 
those which are carried out with delight and are desired by the agent, either at 
all times or at the particular time that they are carrying it out and therefore 
praise or blame accompanies them. The involuntary, however, are carried out 
with distress and they are not desired, neither are they carried out by the 
agent of his own accord, although it is he who suffers the pain and for that 
reason they are worthy of pity and forgiveness.64 
 
In the case of an involuntary act which is attributed to ignorance Damascene gives 
the example of a person who is drunk and who commits a murder; he does so 
unwittingly but not involuntarily as he himself brought about the cause of his 
ignorance. An act is said to be involuntary through violence when the efficient cause 
is extrinsic, that is, when there is no co-operation from the person who suffers the 
                                                                                                                                     
opposed to what we ordinarily think, is not as free as our choice, since it, even in ideal circumstances, 
would not come to fruition without at least divine cooperation 
64 Summa, C. 81, 92–97. Et rursus hii quidem actus misericordiam consequuntur et indulgencia digni 
habentur, hii autem odio habentur et puniuntur. Voluntarii ergo actus sunt qui cum delectacione 
aguntur et eligibiles sunt agentibus uel semper, uel tunc cum aguntur, et ideo eos consequitur laus uel 
uituperacio. Inuoluntarii uero actus cum tristicia aguntur et non sunt eligibiles, nec per ipsum agentem 
perficiuntur quamuis uim paciatur, et ideo misericordia et indulgencia digni estimantur. 
 164 
 
violence (hoc est nichil cooperante illo qui patitur violenciam).  The voluntary act is 
opposed to both of these, occurring neither through violence nor through ignorance.65 
Can the acts of children and acts which we do suddenly without deliberation be 
regarded as voluntary? In principle we do deliberate if we have to choose between 
one or more options, however children act voluntarily although they do not 
deliberate on their actions. In the same way when we do things through anger we are 
doing them voluntarily, but not through choice. It is only when we have to make a 
choice that we must first deliberate.   
 
The Greek term autexousion is rendered by Jean in Latin as liberum 
arbitrium. According to Frede it is a standard translation, meaning ‘freedom of the 
will’ or ‘freedom of choice’. This translation, however, seems to Frede to be 
misleading for our understanding of Damascene.  In support of his thesis he states 
that Damascene also applies the term to God who is the very ‘paradigm of 
autexousion’ but even in the case of God there is no ‘choice’ as such as, by His 
nature he will not do but what is good. Nothing can be forced upon God and this is 
also the case for rational human beings as far as they have autexousion, ‘they have 
some kind of freedom in their activity, because their activity is not forced upon them 
and because they have some control over what they are doing’.66 There must be some 
sense of freedom in our choices, otherwise it could be said that our thoughts are not 
free, if action is said to follow thought.  
                                                
65 Summa, C. 81, 100-113. Inuoluntarium simpliciter est quod per uiolenciam uel per ignoranciam fit; 
actus autem per ignoranciam determinatur cum non ipsi tribuimus causam ignorancie, sed quia ita 
contingit; sicut si ebrius aliquis homicidium faciat, ignorans quidem occidit, non tamen inuoluntarie; 
causam enim ignorancie ipse egit. Inuoluntarium autem per uiolenciam est cuius principium, hec est 
effectiua causa, deforis est, nichil committente secundum proprium impetum uim passo, hoc est nichil 
cooperante illo qui patitur uiolenciam. Si enim cooperaretur cause cogenti, non diceretur actus illius 
inuoluntarius. Inuoluntarium igitur simpliciter est duobus modis: hoc quidem secundum uiolenciam, 
hoc autem secundum ignoranciam. Voluntarium autem simpliciter utrique opponitur; est enim 
uoluntarium simpliciter quod neque per uiolencium, neque per ignoranciam fit. 
66 Michael Frede, p. 82. 
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Choice, as we understand it, is choosing between two or more options; it may 
be a choice between good and evil or a choice that one makes in rejecting one 
situation in favour of another. Damascene is concerned to show that we, as rational 
beings, have been given the ability to do what we are meant to do in the way we have 
been created. We are, as Damascene believes, made in the image of God. We have 
the ability to remain in the good state in which we have been created even if the 
rationality we have been created with is imperfect. What is important is that we make 
the effort to use our rationality to make the right choices. God must have at least 
endowed man with the knowledge and understanding to enable him to do so but it is 
up to each to consider his or her own situation.  
 
Returning to Damascene’s statement that the will is in some respects an 
innate power: 
 
One should know that there is in the soul a natural power, appetitive of that 
which is in accordance with the nature of the soul, and embracing all those 
things which pertain to its nature substantially; and this is called the will.67 
 
The will, therefore, is what gives one ‘the ability to desire what is good for one to 
desire’, the source of which is the ability to have the right rational desires. The more 
we rationally desire the good the more attracted we are towards it. Damascene 
believes that we can go badly wrong in our choices and if we continually make the 
wrong choices that can cloud our judgement and in a sense we have then lost our 
freedom. We act and choose freely according to our rationality and will and in this 
respect we are responsible for our actions. Damascene also takes our non-rational 
                                                
67 Summa, C. 79, 5-7. Oportet scire quoniam anime inserta est naturaliter uirtus appetitiua eius quod 
secundum naturam est, et omnium que substancialiter nature assunt contentiua uoluntas; et hec dicitur 
thelesis. 
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desires into account when making a choice. With regard to the body’s need for food 
Frede comments that the rational desire for food ‘will set in process deliberation 
which will end in the choice to eat’.68 On this account, one’s appetite has its origin in 
the intellect. This re-enforces what Damascene has already stated with regard to 
pleasures, that in fact no one would find pleasures belonging to the body alone 
(solius quippe corporis nequaquam inveniet quis leticias). As Frede states: 
 
So one’s eating would have its origin in reason, in a rational desire, but the 
non-rational appetite would serve a double function: it would provoke a 
rational desire to eat, if this was appropriate, and it would help to strengthen 
the affective attitude in favour of eating in the face of a possible aversion. In 
this way, I take it, non-rational desire is made to play a substantive role in 
rational activity and rational behaviour.69  
 
He also highlights a difference between Aristotle’s theory on human action and 
Damascene. Damascene does not allow for ‘action against one’s choice’,70 but this is 
‘how Aristotle characterizes acratic behaviour, cases in which one acts on a non-
rational desire against one’s better knowledge’.71 Damascene does allow for a non-
rational desire which prevails over rational desire but, for Damascene, because we 
have a will we make choices and we are responsible for our choices. The criterion for 
whether we have made the right choice is whether we are sufficiently satisfied or 
sufficiently dissatisfied with the choice we have made, this is when we have reached 
a point of sententia. It is a word which has various meanings. For example, in 
Thomas Aquinas it is taken to mean ‘consent’. This is also found in the Stoical 
understanding of choice; it is simply a matter of assenting to a particular thought or 
                                                
68 Michael Frede, p. 91. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 93. 
71 Ibid. 
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act.72 In Damascene, it refers to choosing one situation over another, but it implies a 
weakened sense of freedom. One is free to do what one is ‘meant’ to do but this 
presupposes that one believes that one cannot but act for and seek the ‘good’. 
Damascene’s theory, however, highlights the fact that in many situations we often 
make a decision or choose to act in a certain way because we want to act as we are 
meant to, but equally there are times when temptation overcomes and we do the very 
opposite.   
 
Jean’s account of Damascene is very precise and he quotes him verbatim 
from the chapters of De fide orthodoxa dealing with free will and human actions. We 
are not told whether he agrees or disagrees with Damascene’s position, but it may be 
helpful to discuss an earlier treatise on the soul composed by one of Jean’s 
contemporaries, sometime before 1204 at Paris, some thirty years before Jean’s 
treatise on the soul was written. The work is entitled Tractatus de anima and its 
author, John Blund (ca. 1175-1248) would probably have known of Jean as both of 
them taught arts at Paris in the early years of the thirteenth century.  
 
 
 
SECTION FOUR 
JOHN BLUND. TRACTATUS DE ANIMA.  
CHAPTER XXVI.I CONCERNING FREE WILL 
 
Blund begins his enquiry by stating that, in fact, reason and free will are the same. 
The intellect begins the process by taking in ‘some things’. Reason acts upon these, 
judges them and chooses whatever seems best to it, this is described as freedom in 
the soul. If there is something in the soul which chooses between good and bad 
                                                
72 Ibid, p. 87. ‘But this single assent involves both the acceptance of one’s attitude towards this 
proposition reflected in the way on thinks of the proposition.’ 
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things it must be reason which judges and chooses. The freedom of the will is a 
power to preserve the integrity of the will; the preservation of the will comes from 
reason; therefore reason and free will are the same power of the soul.  
 
To counter the above he states that as the will appears to be free because 
there is choosing in it, that is, that it chooses good and evil and since the choice of 
evil is not from reason (it is more due to absence of reason), therefore reason is not 
the same as free will. Blund states:  
We state that reason and freewill are one and the same in essence, because 
both one and the other are the same power, but they are regarded as diverse 
because of their various relations to diverse things.73 
 
Damascene, as we have seen above, states that freedom of the will is connected with 
reason as the cognitive and the appetitive faculties come together in man. Thus as far 
as both Blund and Damascene are concerned it is one thing to be rational but another 
thing altogether to be able to choose. In fact, without reason, there cannot be free 
will, as both authors maintain. As Blund states, ‘free will has been joined to a 
rational creature to choose what is advantageous and what he ought to’.74 For both 
the ability not to sin also comes from creation. This is something we have seen 
already in Damascene and it is stated by Blund: 
 
Thus in a state such as this rational creature takes its being from the Creator, 
so that it has this freedom, namely that it can not sin and cannot be compelled 
to sin by any thing, but it is left to his will to do good or choose evil.75  
 
The ability not to sin refers back to what was said at the beginning of the 
chapter; that for Damascene and for the scholastic theologians who followed him it 
                                                
73 John Blund, Treatise on the Soul, Chapter XXVI.i Para. 385. 
74 Ibid., Para. 400. 
75 Ibid. 
 169 
 
was necessary to give reasons as to why God created man if, sooner or later, he was 
going to sin. What they had to show was that man was made in such a way that he 
could not sin, but this was not to say that human nature is not corruptible. In virtue of 
the fact that he is rational, however, man has a will. The statement that the freedom 
of the will cannot ‘be compelled to sin by any thing’ must be taken to mean that we 
have been given the abilities to remain in the state in which we were created but that, 
given we are human, it cannot be said that we will always make the right choices. In 
this connection Blund states that if human beings ‘could not sin in any way, then he 
would not obtain merit if because of a necessity of compulsion he did not sin, nor 
indeed would he lose merit’.76 The question of gaining or losing merit introduces the 
topic of the immortality of the soul which Blund argues for in his treatise on the soul. 
Damascene, as we have already seen, believes that our rationality ‘does not have the 
perfection of the divine intellect’,77 that as human beings we are limited and since we 
are created we are thus subject to corruption, as are the angels. It is only by divine 
grace that rational beings who have reached ‘a certain state of perfection of their 
rationality, […], are made to be no longer liable to corruption, and thus become 
immortal and divine, able to enjoy a life of eternal bliss’.78 The question of reward 
and punishment does not apply to irrational animals since the appetitive power in 
animals is not rational.  
 
The will in Damascene, thelesis, is distinguished from the act of willing. This 
is also the case in Blund if we consider his remarks with regard to the will and its 
lack of reason which can lead one to choose evil. For Blund, when the will chooses 
evil it is in fact the will which is evil. Following Augustine in The City of God, 
                                                
76 Ibid. 
77 Michael Frede, p. 76. 
78 Ibid. 
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Blund states ‘the choice of evil is from an evil will, and there is not any efficient 
cause of it but rather a deficient cause’.79 This underpins what is the basic message in 
Damascene, that is, because of reason we know what is the right thing to do and we 
should make every effort to do so. Constantly choosing the wrong course of action, 
however, will eventually lead to someone being incapable of making the right 
choices or as Blund states ‘a lack of reason more diminishes freedom than increases 
it’.80 The distinction between the will and volition or desiring is also brought out in 
Blund’s remark about free will that ‘through no necessity does it sin, but only by the 
will, namely insofar as it wishes what it should not and what is not advantageous’.81 
Constantly sinning, he states, man becomes a servant to sin as sin can rule over him. 
In this way, however, power is handed over to sin, which is wrong, according to 
Blund. In other words it is the responsibility of the agent to overcome his weakness. 
 
According to Blund, ‘there is no free will in brute animals since they lack that 
investigation of reason’.82 He does, however, ascribe to them the concupiscible and 
irascible powers, by which animals can discriminate between the useful and the 
harmful. He also refers to the estimative power in animals, one of the interior senses 
according to Avicenna. The estimative power was an important part of animal 
psychology in the Middle Ages and in some authors it is also seen as important in 
human psychology. This will be discussed in the next chapter on the powers of the 
soul according to Avicenna, but it is interesting to note that here we have one of the 
first references to the power of estimation, a theory which was to be one of the most 
                                                
79 Blund, Chapter XXVI.ii Para 404. ‘Indeed the choice of evil is from an evil will, and there is not 
any efficient cause of it but rather a deficient cause, as we know from Augustine in the twelfth book 
of the City of God.’ 
80 Blund, Para. 402. 
81 Ibid., Para. 392. 
82 Ibid., Para. 411. 
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influential theories to reach the Latin West in the thirteenth century. Blund’s 
understanding of intentiones in Avicenna’s theory is, ‘more accurate than modern 
interpretations.’83  
 
 Damascene, as we have seen, also discusses the concupiscible and irascible 
powers which he applies to the both animals and human beings.84  The concupiscible 
and irascible powers (also called desire and anger) are those powers which are 
obedient to reason. Human beings, however, differ from animals in that non rational 
desires in animals forces the animals to act on impulse, the animal is moved towards 
something or away from something. Rational beings, on the other hand, are 
determined by reason and by their will.  
 
The ability to sin is not a part of free will as this would compromise God’s 
goodness but that that is not to say that man does not in fact sin. Free will, according 
to Blund is the power to choose between good and evil, ‘therefore he whose will is 
left to choose whichever of the two ways he wishes, is free’.85 As we have seen in 
Damascene’s account freedom of the will is explained with regard to a number of 
moves in the process of choosing the best course of action to take when one desires 
something. Choice in Damascene’s account is not strictly a choice between two 
alternatives (as good and evil) but we reach a point where if something is to our 
liking we choose it and if it is not to our liking we do not choose it. In other words he 
wants to give an account as to why one chooses not to follow the chosen way, 
                                                
83 Hasse, p. 145. 
84 See above Chapter IV, Section Two, on The Cognitive Powers. 
85 Blund, Para. 386.
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‘because it plays a crucial role in his account of how we are not bound to act on 
inordinate non-rational desires’.86   
 
Both Blund and Damascene agree that the ability not to sin is crucial to their 
doctrines of free will and if that is ‘badly preserved’ as Blund states, then one is 
disposed to sin. Both believe that freedom of the will is concerned with what God 
wishes us to want ‘when someone wishes what God does not wish him to want, then 
he wishes for what he should not’.87 That is not to say, however, that there is any 
force or coercion involved. One is free to the extent that one does not always want 
what God wishes us to want. Both agree that ‘we cannot be forced to sin by 
anything’,88 but because it is left up to us to decide we are often mistaken in our 
choices. Blund raises the question as to whether there is free will in God and in the 
angels. Damascene distinguishes between the sense of freedom that exists in God, in 
the angels and in human beings. Just as we say that God is goodness itself we can 
also say that God is the very paradigm of freedom. Nothing is forced upon him nor 
does he have need of rational control or rational desires. The ability to sin is 
inconceivable in the case of God, not, however, in the case of angels. 
 
If someone were to object that a man is more powerful than God and angel 
because a man is able to sin, and God cannot sin, it should be said, as is clear 
from what has already been stated, that the ability to sin is not a power rather 
it is a lack of power.89 
 
According to Blund the freedom that angels possess is stronger than in man. 
Angels are also more perfect and truer ‘in the judgement of reason’ but because they 
have a will they are also subject to change and corruption. They can be moved 
                                                
86 Michael Frede, p. 85. 
87 Blund, Para. 392. 
88 Ibid., Para. 394. 
89 Ibid., Para. 405. 
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towards evil as in the case of the devil. For, as Blund states, freedom is sometimes 
impeded when one turns away from the good that was given to him and instead one 
chooses evil, ‘just as someone who is in the dark has the ability to see but he does 
not see because of the lack of light’.90 While the ability to sin is inconceivable in the 
case of God, it is not, however, in the case of angels. In the case of angels Blund 
states, ‘with the will to choose evil there is an absence of grace there’, but where 
there is grace angels can not be moved towards evil. 
 
As thinkers, Blund and Damascene agree with regard to the following: we 
have a will and it is free; free will is connected to reason; as rational beings we have 
an ability not to sin; it is lack of reason which leads one to choose evil; we are free as 
we do not always want to do what we are meant to do; the ability to sin is 
inconceivable in God, but not in the case of the angels who are subject to change and 
corruption. There is, nonetheless, one important difference between them, that of the 
criterion as to the goodness or badness of an action. For Blund it is a choice between 
good and evil, for Damascene the choice rests on whether one is sufficiently 
disposed to a chosen course of action. Damascene’s criterion must be examined in 
relation to the process which one must follow before deciding whether to follow or 
abandon a particular course of action. It demands that one think through one’s 
actions in a very careful and deliberative manner to arrive at a point where one is left 
with no other option but to proceed, or not. Blund’s theory rests on following a 
course of action which relies on the choice between good and evil, that is, that we are 
free to choose the good, but, on the other hand, we are also free to choose evil. This 
is the standard way we understand choice, yet, as Frede holds, this is not the way 
                                                
90 Ibid., Para. 410. 
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Damascene thought of choice. Whatever about the way our authors view freedom in 
choosing a course of action it is the ability to choose to do what we are meant to do 
that is central to both. This is the sense of freedom that we possess, but with this 
ability comes responsibility. Whether we live up to that responsibility, or not, is a 
matter of choice. 
   
As Frede remarks, what guaranteed Damascene a place in Western thought 
was the fact that ‘Peter Lombard in the middle of the twelfth century made extensive 
use of the Exposition as an authority in his Sentences’.91 According to Frede, there 
are twenty-six references to Damascene in Peter Lombard. It is likely that Blund was 
amongst those who regarded Peter Lombard’s views on free will as authoritative and 
although Avicenna was the authority for Blund the latter did not include a discussion 
on free will. Damascene’s influence can also be seen in the writings of Thomas 
Aquinas on the topic of the will. In the Summa Theologiae (II.1, qq. 6-17), on 
voluntary will, Frede states that Damascene is quoted at least nineteen times and 
again on the questions on the intellect and will (1, qq. 79-83) he is quoted at least 
twelve times.92 In the introduction to the De fide orthodoxa Damascene states that he 
does not wish to add anything of his own to the Summa but that he intended his work 
to be a compendium of ‘the most eminent teachers’.93 Scholars have debated the 
question as to whether he succeeded in this, or not; but he did succeed in writing the 
first great Summa, and it is testament to his influence on Western thought that Jean 
has included him alongside Avicenna, one of the great names in the Islamic 
philosophical tradition. It is to his discussion of the powers of the soul to which we 
now turn.  
                                                
91 Michael Frede, p. 68. 
92 Ibid., p. 70. 
93 St John Damascus, Writings, p. xxv. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
AVICENNA’S INFLUENCE ON THE THOUGHT OF  
JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE 
 
Jean’s primary philosophical source is Avicenna (980–1037) and in particular the 
latter’s De Anima. The text of Avicenna which Jean uses is that which was translated 
by Ibn Daud (Avendauth) and Dominicus Gundissalinus sometime between 1152 and 
1162. As stated above, there were two translations of the text identified as versions A 
and B. Version B is used by Jean in his Summa.1 In an earlier chapter (chapter II), I 
referred to Jean’s application of the ‘Flying Man’ argument to prove the existence of 
the soul but, as we shall see, Jean’s exposition of a number of doctrines also have 
their sources in Avicenna, whom he acknowledges: the power of estimation which is 
one of five internal senses; his treatment of animal movement; the theory of the four 
intellects and the reconciliation of Avicenna’s agent intellect with Augustine’s theory 
of divine illumination. Jean devotes thirty eight chapters to Avicenna, but his reading 
of Avicenna is combined with the anonymous De Potentiis animae and the Psuedo-
Augustine’s De Spiritu et anima. 
 
This chapter begins with an outline of Jean’s general interest in Avicenna’s 
psychology (section one) and then examines his treatment of the vegetative soul and 
explains how he integrates the physiology involved with his philosophical and 
theological understanding of the soul (section two). Following that, in section three I 
will discuss the five external senses in Jean and then turn in section four to the 
interior powers of the soul, namely, the common sense, the imagination, the 
                                                
1 See above Introduction, Section Four regarding the two versions of the translation. 
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imaginative, the estimative and memory and their driving forces (section five). 
Finally, I will discuss Jean’s appropriation of Avicenna’s doctrine of the agent 
intellect and show how Jean can be included among those who combined 
Augustinian and Avicennian theories on intellection to give a Christian 
understanding to the Avicennian theory of the separate agent intellect (section six).  
 
 
SECTION ONE 
JEAN’S INTEREST IN AVICENNA’S PSYCHOLOGY 
 
As we have already seen in the first Consideratio on the soul that Jean follows 
Avicenna in distinguishing the powers of the soul into the vegetative, the sensitive 
and the rational powers.2 Unlike some of his contemporaries, however, Jean 
discusses the vegetative soul at some length (the vegetative soul is often omitted by 
theologians of this period).3 Jean can be counted among those who were interested in 
the medical, the philosophical and scientific writings of this period. His exposition 
on the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul testify to his willingness to integrate the 
new learning which has been described as a philosophical anthropology of the 
thirteenth century.  In his earlier work on the powers of the soul, the Tractatus 
(1233–1235) Jean is, ‘simply confronting the traditional thought of Christian 
theology on the theme of the nature of man with the new Greek-Arab 
classifications’.4 In the Summa (1235–1236) he omits the medical section of the 
                                                
2 See Chapter 1. 
3 See, Hasse, p. 38 n. 147.  ‘Callus has collected passages in Philip the Chancellor, Hugh of Saint-
Cher and Alexander Neckam (‘The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul’),’ p. 482, n. 31, and ‘The 
Function of the Philosopher’, (pp. 157–8). Cf. also Grosseteste, Ecclesia Sancta, p. 170, line 33: 
‘…omittentes vitam eius vetetativam’; Anonymous (Callus), De potentiis animae et obiectis, p. 147, 
line 13: ‘…dimittamus autem potentiam animae vegetabilis’; Thomas Aquinas, Prima pars Summae 
theologiae, 78.1: ‘Ad considerationem autem theologi pertinet inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis 
intellectivis et appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur’. 
4 Vico, p. 311. 
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Tractatus, according to Iohannitus’s Isagoge and Avicenna’s Canon, but, instead, he 
presents a comprehensive Avicennian section on the powers of the soul in the later 
work. If we can assume, as Hasse does, that  Jean aimed at giving a presentation of 
the soul’s faculties and everything that was known about the faculties at this time, it 
can be said that the Summa is a result of his reflections and ponderings and therefore 
a clear indication that, for him, Avicenna was the philosopher par excellence. His 
work ‘is an important step towards mastering the seemingly boundless tradition of 
psychological doctrines’5 and provides at least an entry into Avicenna’s approach to 
psychology.     
 
Jean keeps the philosophical, the medical and the theological traditions apart 
but he is one of the first scholastics to include a comprehensive Avicennian section 
in his Summa, particularly on the vegetative powers of the soul and on the internal 
senses. Blund, to whom we have referred to above, was the first master of arts, as far 
as one can say, to write a treatise on the soul, the date of which is fixed at 1200 (pre-
dating Jean’s works on the soul by at least thirty years) and while it seems that both 
authors knew Aristotle’s Peri psychēs well both chose to model their theories on 
Avicenna.  
 
Jean is obviously influenced by his immediate predecessors and by their 
reactions to the new medical sources. Since it was the scientific works that were 
translated before the philosophical works, by the end of the eleventh century certain 
medical texts, containing much philosophical material, were translated from Arabic 
into Latin. The impact of the translation of one of the most important sources, 
                                                
5 Hasse, p. 48. 
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Constantine the African’s Theorica Pantegni, can be seen in early psychological 
writings and also particularly in Jean’s presentation of the four elements and the 
humours of the body. Constanstine’s Pantegni is ‘an adaptation for Latin readers of 
Alī ibn al-‘Abbas al-Majūsī’s Complete Book of the Medical Arts’,6 a huge medical 
encyclopaedia. It contains quotations from the works of Hippocrates, though it may 
be the case that al-Majūsī was also indebted to Galen’s On the Elements according to 
Hippocrates.7 The latter was ‘one of sixteen works chosen to be part of the teaching 
curriculum in Hellenistic Alexandria’.8 It is interesting to note that Galen’s work was 
translated from Greek into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa (died 1193), who, as was 
stated previously, translated John Damascene’s De Fide Orthodoxa. It is important to 
mention another medical text with respect to Jean, that is, the Ysagoge by Johannitius 
which was one of Jean’s medical sources in his earlier work, the Tractatus, but this 
was omitted from his Summa. Jean uses the medical terms commixtio, compositio, 
and complexio with regard to the generation and corruption of the animal body. The 
quotation in question appears in Jean’s discussion on the external senses. His source 
is Avicenna’s De anima, but it is clear that the Ysagoge of Johannitius and the 
Pantegni introduced Jean and his contemporaries to the new theories of the four 
elements and the humours at this earlier stage. The Ysagoge enumerates the elements 
along with their qualities; these are the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth; fire 
is hot and dry, air is hot and moist, water is cold and moist, earth is cold and dry. The 
Pantegni goes somewhat further in defining the elements as it describes an element 
as the simplest of the parts of a composite body.9  
                                                
6 Danielle Jacquart e Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, La Scuola Medica Salernitana (Sismel: Edizioni 
Del Galluzzo, 2007), p. 64. 
7 Ibid, p. 64. 
8 Ibid, p. 59. 
9 Ibid., pp. 77–78. ‘Know that the philosopher means by element the thing which is the simplest of the 
parts of a composite body, and the smallest of them in extent. The simple thing is that whose 
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Temperament refers to the balancing of the qualities of hot, cold, moist and dry 
which were applied to the constitution of body and mind. Jean follows Avicenna in 
his explanations of how different mental complexions can retain information well, 
but may be weak in recollecting. This will become clear in the discussion on memory 
in Avicenna where he distinguishes between memory, recollecting and learning. The 
Latin word for temperament, complexio, refers to the mixture of the elements, 
although, ‘there is a difference in vocabulary between the Ysagoge, which uses 
commixtio, and the Pantegni, which offers for the first time in medical terminology, 
the word complexio’.10 Commixito is related to the mixis in Aristotle: for example, it 
refers to the product of water and wine mixed together, each retaining their own 
particular qualities. Complexio, as stated above, refers to the mixture of elements and 
‘since anybody destined to “construction and destruction is born of this mixture, the 
dominant elements assign their own specific qualities to the final product”.’11 The 
Salernitan commentators removed any ambiguity by stating that ‘complexio is the 
effect of commixtio’.  
 
SECTION TWO 
THE VEGETATIVE SOUL 
 
In the first Consideratio Jean divided the powers of the soul into the vegetative, the 
sensitive and the rational powers. He now devotes three chapters to the vegetative 
soul, following Avicenna; the vegetative soul is distinguished acccording to 
                                                                                                                                     
substance is one substance and whose parts are similar, not different. These things either are truly like 
this, such as fire, air, water and earth or they are like this among what appear to the senses, such as 
stones and metals and the like. For, although the latter are simple to the senses, to the intellect they are 
composed from fire, air, water and earth.’ 
10 Peter Dronke, A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 415. 
11 Ibid. 
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nutrition, growth and reproduction. Jean begins his account with a definition which 
he attributes to Avicenna: 
The vegetative power is the principle of conservation of nature through 
generation and nutrition and its perfection is achieved through the 
augmentative power. The sensitive power is the principle of sensation and of 
local movement in the animal body. The rational power is the principle of 
intellectual speculation and freedom of actions.12 
 
Avicenna states that the vegetative soul has three distinct faculties, the generative, 
augmentative and the nutritive power. He ‘emphasizes their being different faculties 
by pointing out that unripe fruits have the faculty of nutrition and growth, but lack 
that of reproduction’13, developing Aristotle’s theory somewhat further. Aristotle 
held that the lowest level of the soul is the vegetative but he seems to say that 
nutritive and reproductive faculties are one and the same.14 Both hold that the 
generative power is that which perpetuates the species but that the nutritive and the 
augmentative powers preserve the life of the individual.  
 
The generative power is the principle of living, whether of plants, of 
irrational animals or of man, and of producing from itself what is the same 
nature as itself, as man from man and as plant from a plant. The augmentative 
power is the principle of growth of the living body, attributable to the 
perfection of quantity and consistency in accordance with nature. The 
nutritive or nourishing power is the principle of preservation of living things 
through restoring what was lost; for natural heat acting on the substance of 
the body relaxes it and the body loses it, once relaxed it empties and 
evacuates, and for this reason unless it is replenished and restored with food it 
would die.15 
                                                
12 Summa, C. 82, 6–10. Et est uis uegetabilis principium conseruacionis nature per generacionem et 
nutrimentum, et perfectionis eiusdem per augmentum. Vis uero sensibilis est principium sensus et 
motus localis in corpore animalis. Vis uero racionalis est principium intellectiue speculacionis et 
libere electionis actionum. 
13 Rahman, p. 71. 
14 De Anima, II, 416a 19 in Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle. ‘Nutrition and reproduction are 
due to one and the same psychic power.’ Compare: Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus 
Veneticus: De anima, liber: 2, cap.:4 (Bekker: 416a). Quoniam autem hec potentia anime est 
vegetativa et generativa, et de alimento necessarium est determinare primum. 
15 Summa, C. 82, 12-21. Generatiua autem est que est principium uiuendi, siue plante, siue bruto, siue 
homini, et producendi de se tale quale ipsum est, ut hominem ex homine et plantam ex planta. 
Augmentatiua uero est que est principium crementi corporis uiuentis et perfectionem debite quantitatis 
et consistencie secundum naturam. Nutritiua uero siue pascitiua est principium conseruacionis 
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The nutritive power maintains life whereas the augmentative brings about the 
actualisation of life, whether of a plant, an irrational animal or the human being. The 
former is therefore required throughout life, the latter, on the other hand, functions as 
long as it is required to bring about perfection or actualisation of a particular body.16 
Following Avicenna, Jean states that the activity of the augmentative power with 
regard to nourishment is not the same as the nutritive.  As he states: 
 
The nutritive power has [the power] in itself to give to each nutriment 
according to its greatness or smallness, and unites it to itself uniformly. On 
the other hand the augmentative power takes from one part of the body and 
adds to another part and unites to it, so that one part is increased more than 
the other, with the nutritive power being subservient to it.17 
  
In the discussion of the generative power Jean digresses and introduces a 
seminative principle which has echoes of the doctrine of seminal reasons, originally 
derived from the Stoic tradition which was transmitted down through the ages by 
Augustine. The doctrine is concerned with how human beings can produce new life 
which can be understood in terms of matter and form; it states that the form of 
                                                                                                                                     
uiuentis per reparacionem deperditi: calor enim naturalis agens in substanciam corporis resoluit illud 
et deperdit, resolutum uero exinanitur et euacuatur, et ideo nisi repleretur nutrimento et reficeretur, 
deficeret. 
16 Summa, C. 82, 22–30. Dicendum ergo quod generatiua est ad conseruacionem esse speciei et 
multiplicacionem eiusdem. Nutritiua uero et augmentatiua referuntur ad esse singularis, ut huius 
animalis et plante; sed nutritiua est ad conseruacionem, augmentatiua ad perfectionem, et ideo 
nutriuntur animalia semper, non autem semper augentur, quia semper indigent conseruatiuo et 
reparatiuo deperditi, sed non semper indigent perfectiuo; non enim indigent postquam perfecta sunt, et 
ideo cessat operacio uirtutis augmentatiue animali perfecto secundum debitum modum sue quantitatis 
et consistencie. Compare the following in Avicenna’s De Anima: Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima 
seu Sextus de Naturalibus, I-II-III, Édition Critique de la Traduction Latine Médiévale par S. Van Riet 
(Louvain: Leiden: E. Peeters; E.J.Brill, 1972), Part II, c. 1: p. 108 78–86. Omnino autem virtus 
nutritiva appetitur ad hoc ut per eam conservetur substantia cuiuslibet singularis, et augmentativa 
appetitur ut per eam perficiatur substantia singularis. Sed generativa appetitur ut per eam remaneat  
species, quia appetere permanere est res quae venit ex Deo in omne quod est; et in singulari quod non 
est aptum ad permanendum, sed est aptum ut species eius remaneat, excitatur virtus ad reparandum 
aliquid vice eius: nutritiva ergo restaurat quod resolvitur de singulari, et generativa restaurat quod 
resolvitur de specie.  
17 Summa, C. 83, 45-49. Virtus enim nutritiua ex se habet ut det unicuique membro de nutrimento 
secundum eius magnitudinem uel paruitatem, et unit ei equaliter. Augmentatiua uero tollit ab una 
parte corporis et addit alii parti, et unit ei, ut illa pars augmentetur pocius quam alia, ministrante sibi 
nutritiua.  
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‘human being’ must already be contained in the embryo. In other words something 
must be present in the matter, in the seed, which follows a certain order, it is not just 
a mass of limbs and organs, not just material extension. According to Augustine, it is 
the elements, created by God, which contain seminal reasons.18 Jean states that ‘the 
seminative is the principle of separation or derivation of the seed, which possesses 
the generative principle of everything in order to produce a likeness in a species’.19  
 
Jean returns to the language of medicine comparing the ‘plasmative power’ to 
an artificer which forms the limbs from seed. First to be created is the heart, then the 
brain, the liver and the testicles; then the parts which serve these; then the arteries 
which serve the heart; air is then conducted through these to moderate the heart and 
the body; the veins serve the liver in administrating the humours; the nerves serving 
other similar and functional parts.20 The heart was the centre of sensation in Aristotle 
and, according to Rahman, the heart is also the seat of the common sense for 
Aristotle and ‘therefore also of imagination and memory’.21 As we will see Avicenna 
located sensation in different ventricles of the brain. This will be discussed in 
connection with the internal senses of Avicenna.  
 
                                                
18 Bourke, p. 103. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis IX, 17.32; ‘The elements of this bodily 
world have their own precise force and quality, what each of them can or cannot do, what can be made 
from what, or cannot. From these elements, as the original principles of things, all things that are 
generated take their origin and development, each in its proper time; and they receive their 
terminations and decreases, each according to its kind.’ 
19 Summa, C. 82, 30-33. Sciendum autem quod generatiue uirtutis multiplicatur uis et operacio per 
seminatiuam et plasmatiuam Est autem seminatiua principium decisionis siue deriuacionis seminis 
habentis racionem tocius ad simile in specie producendum.   
20 Summa, C. 82, 34–44. Dico autem racionem tocius, quia ibi, scilicet in semine, sunt omnia membra 
secundum racionem, quamuis non secundum molem; secundum uirtualem productionem, non 
secundum materialem extensionem. Plasmatiua uero est ut artificiale principium configuracionis et 
conformacionis parcium et tocius, id est corporis et membrorum. Hec enim est que, ut artifex, membra 
plasmat ex semine; primo radicalia ut cor, cerebrum, epar, testiculos; deinde hiis deseruiencia, ut 
arterias que deseruiunt cordi; per illas enim ducitur aer ad contemperanciam cordis et corporis; et 
uenas que deseruiunt epati in ministrandis humoribus; et neruos qui deseruiunt cetera membra 
consimilia et officialia. 
21 Rahman, p. 79. 
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The three chapters on the vegetative soul in Jean’s Summa follow the text of 
Avicenna’s De anima very closely. Jean was interested in mastering and combining 
the different traditions, the medical, the philosophical and, the theological; his 
precision in transmitting the text of Avicenna is remarkable. Jean follows Avicenna’s 
account of how food is changed into the nature of that which it nourishes; it is not 
changed suddenly but is changed a little at first and through alteration in the 
substance which is responsible for nutrition, it assimilates the food by means of the 
digestive power. The latter is also the power which spreads the food evenly 
throughout the body. The nutritive power draws the food into the body, at first by 
altering it in the blood and the humours, from which the constitution of the body is 
formed. Each limb has a nutritive power proper to itself which alters the food into a 
likeness of itself and unites the food to itself; the function of the nutritive power is 
therefore to assimilate and to unite.22    
 
The first instrument of the nutritive power is natural heat; heat is capable of 
moving material bodies. There are, of course, echoes here of Aristotle where the 
latter states that heat is the principle of digestion and every living thing is in 
                                                
22 Summa, C. 83, 3–13. Primo sciendum ergo quod nutrimentum non permutatur in naturam 
nutrimenti subito, sed primo permutatur aliquantulum a sua qualitate et aptatur per mutacionem in 
substanciam eius quod debet nutriri, in quo operatur uirtus digestiua deseruiens nutritiue; et hec est 
que dissoluit nutrimentum in animali ad hoc ut diffundatur equaliter. Deinde uirtus nutritiua deducit 
illud in animali, primo permutando in sanguinem et humores, ex quibus est constitucio corporis. 
Deinde omne membrum habet nutritiuam uirtutem propriam que permutat nutrimentum in 
similitudinem membri propriam et unit ei; uirtus igitur nutritiua assimilat et unit. Compare the 
following in Avicenna’s De Anima, II, c. 1: pp. 103 10 – 104 21. Dicemus nunc quod nutrimentum 
non semper permutatur in naturam nutriti subito. Sed primo permutatur aliquantulum a sua qualitate et 
aptatur permutationi in substantiam nutriendi, in quo operatur una ex virtutibus servientibus virtuti 
nutritivae, quae est digestiva. Et haec est quae dissolvit nutrimentum in animali et praeparat illud ad 
hoc ut diffundatur aequaliter. Deinde virtus nutritiva deducit illud in animal sanguineum, primo 
permutandum in sanguinem et humores ex quibus est constitutio corporis, sicut iam ostendimus alias. 
Sed omne membrum habet virtutem nutritivam propriam, quae est in eo, quae permutat nutrimentum 
in similitudinem eius propriam et unit ei. Ergo virtus nutritiva restaurat quod solutum est, et assimilat 
et unit.  
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possession of this quality.23 Contrariety in qualities is also required in any change 
and it is stated that cold, moisture and dryness play their part in digestion. Avicenna 
replies to argue against those who say  that fire accounts for nourishment and 
increase  (nota eciam quod fuerunt qui dixerunt quod ignis nutritur et augetur). Fire 
was put forward because it grows as long as it gets or finds matter. However, this is 
stated to be incorrect for two reasons; it would mean that a body has no limit to its 
growth (sed augetur semper et crescit sine fine). In the case of the human body, it 
requires nourishment throughout its life but there is a limit which determines the size 
and growth of the body.24 This also has its source in Aristotle where he explains that 
the reason some are of the opinion that fire is the cause of nutrition and growth is 
because, ‘it alone of the bodies or elements is observed to feed and increase itself’,25 
but against that, ‘limit and ratio are marks of soul but not of fire, and belong to the 
side of account rather than that of matter’.26    
 
Jean’s account of the four powers that support the nutritive power; the 
appetitive, the retentive, the digestive and the expulsive are taken from Avicenna’s 
work the Canon. This was the standard doctrine of nutrition and digestion and is of 
Galenic origin. Arabic authors were influenced by Hippocrates and Galen whose 
                                                
23 Aristoteles Latinus: Translator: Iacobus Veneticus: De anima, liber: 2, cap.: 4 (Bekker: 416b). 
Omne autem necessarium est alimentum posse coqui; operatur autem decoctionem calor; unde omne 
animatum habet calorem. 
24 Summa, C. 83, 39–43. Corpus ergo nutribile est habens uirtutem terminatam conuertendi corpus 
aliquod in similitudinem sui et uniendi sibi pro reparacione eius quod resolutum est ex illo, et quia 
huiusmodi resolucio est corporis omni tempore uite singularis, ideo nutritiua operatur omni tempore 
uite singularis. (This contains one of the quotations in Jean’s Summa which was overlooked by 
Bougerol; see Hasse, p. 49, n. 217. Compare the following in Avicenna’s De Anima, II, c. 1: p. 105 
25–29. Ergo virtus nutritiva ex viribus animae vegetabilis operatur omni tempore vitae singularis; 
quae dum permanserit exercens suas actiones, vegetabile et animal erunt viva; cum autem destructa 
fuerit, vegetabile et animal non erunt viva. 
25 Aristotle, De anima, Book II c. 4, 416a12. 
26 Ibid., Book II c. 4, 416a17–18. 
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works were translated by Hunaïn ibn Isaac, who lived from 809–873.27 References to 
the Canon are very rare and ‘appear only after 1225’.28 For the most part Jean’s 
quotations are taken from Avicenna’s De anima. In the Tractatus, however, Jean’s 
earlier work on the powers of the soul, we find more references to the Canon. Jean 
devotes a section entitled On the division of the powers of the soul according to 
medical authors in the Tractatus. He relies on two sources, Johannitius’s Isagoge 
and Avicenna’s Canon, and gives precise references to his sources. He omits the 
chapter on the medical sources in his Summa but he ‘enlarges the already 
comprehensive Avicennian section of the Tractatus quite considerably by adding 
new quotations, often silently, in particular on the vegetative faculties and on the 
senses’.29 Jean, it seems, had first hand knowledge of Avicenna’s De Anima. I have 
referred earlier to the fact that the latter is extant in two versions, called A and B and 
it is interesting to note that the earlier Tractatus (written c. 1233–1235) is in the 
wording of version A while newly added passages in Jean’s Summa (written c. 1235–
36) follow version B. According to Hasse Jean includes passages from Avicenna’s 
De Anima which had never being referred to before in the West, further emphasising 
Jean’s first-hand knowledge of Avicenna’s writing.  
 
The emphasis on the role of the vegetative soul seems to have reached its 
peak with Jean. By the late thirteenth century, for example, Thomas Aquinas, ‘does 
not favour a psychology of faculties grounded on physiology’.30 Although he uses 
Avicenna’s De anima he ‘hardly ever mentions Avicenna’s localisation of the 
                                                
27 Michael Dunne, Magistri Petri De Ybernia: Expositio et Questiones in Aristotelis Librum de 
Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae (Louvain-Paris: 1993), p. 60. 
28 Hasse, p. 41. 
29 Hasse, p. 49. 
30 Hasse, p. 71. 
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internal senses in the different ventricles of the brain’.31 Jean, on the other hand, 
gives a detailed account in his Summa as he tries to assimilate the new learning of the 
physical processes involved in the life of the vegetative and the sensitive faculties. 
The role of the vegetative soul is prominent in his account and for him as for 
Avicenna, the animal faculties ‘are served in their entirety by the vegetative 
faculties’.32 
 
SECTION THREE 
THE SENSITIVE SOUL 
 
Next Jean presents the sensitive soul which he states, following Avicenna, has two 
powers: the motive power and the cognitive or the apprehending power. Jean adds to 
this that some apprehending follows the natural mode and some the animal or 
perceptive mode. That which follows the natural mode proceeds from the 
imagination (fantasia): this is because it is not governed by reason, such as the case 
of the vegetative soul. The animal or perceptive power is subject to reason, that is to 
say, the external senses are subject to reason (operacio vero per modum animalem 
dicitur que est virtutis subiectibilis et obtemperantis racioni, sicut est virtus visiva, 
auditiva etc.). The imagination (fantasia) is not subject to reason as is clear in the 
case of dreams when it is at its most active; imagination, as fantasy, is to be 
distinguished from imagination in a general sense, that is, as one of the interior 
apprehending senses, which is subject to reason. Imagination, in the latter sense, is 
called the compositive imagination (cogitativa when it refers to humans and 
imaginativa when it refers to animals), and is one of the interior senses. Imagination 
in man may or may not be subject to reason, but animals possess a sensitive 
                                                
31 Hasse, p. 71. 
32 Afnan, p. 140. 
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imagination alone. A discussion of Avicenna’s interior senses will follow the exterior 
senses; the former are: the common sense, imagination, compositive imagination, 
estimative and memory. The external senses are: sight, hearing, smell, taste and 
touch. 
 
5.3.1 The External Senses  
   
 
Jean discusses the five external senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch 
according to their number, their different organs, the difference in the intermediaries 
and the difference in their objects. 33 
 
The number of the senses are understood in different ways. One way to 
understand the number of senses is by examining the purpose of the senses. Some of 
the senses are ordered in relation to the soul, some in relation the body. Sight and 
hearing are ordered in relation to the soul; smell, taste and touch are ordered in 
relation to the body. Sight and hearing are organised in relation to the apprehensive 
rational power which is the power which comes to knowledge through research and 
learning, either through oneself or through another. It possesses sight which serves it 
zealously especially in searching and in practice and in the knowledge of the written 
word; hearing also serves in instruction and in learning words. The three senses 
serving the body discern what is healthy and what is harmful for the body; some 
                                                
33 Summa, C. 88, 1–19. Numerus autem sensuum multipliciter accipitur. Primo, per ordinem sensuum 
ad finem potissimum in homine: nam quidam sunt ordinati ad animam, quidam ad corpus. Ad animam 
ordinati sunt uisus et auditus; cum enim uires sensibiles ordinentur ad racionales, et apprehensiue; 
uisus et auditus ad apprehensionem racionalem; apprehensiua autem racionalis peruenit in 
cognicionem inquisicione et disciplina, per scripta, per uerba, per se, uel per alium. Habet uisum qui 
deseruit maxime in inquisicione siue experiencia et in scripto cognoscendo; habet eciam auditum qui 
deseruit discipline et uerbis. Ad corpus uero ordinati sunt olfactus, gustus, tactus; corpus enim 
saluatur nutrimento. Ad discernendum ergo salubre et nociuum in nutrimento ordinantur isti tres 
sensus. Quidam iudicant in distancia: sic olfactus per odorem bonum uel malum. Quidam in 
propinquitate, et hoc dupliciter: aut enim iudicat de nutrimento secundum qualitates elementales que 
antecedunt naturam, ut per caliditatem, frigiditatem, humiditatem, siccitatem et cetera, et sic est 
sensus tactus; aut per qualitates consequentes complexionem, ut sapor et saporum differencie, et sic 
est gustus. Sic ergo patet numerus sensuum quinque secundum finem potissimum. 
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sense from a distance, such as that of smell; some come into contact with the 
elemental qualities, such as heat, cold, humidity and dryness; such is the the sense of 
touch; others discern through the qualities, such as a flavour, this is the sense of taste.   
 
It is also possible to understand the number of the senses according to the nature of 
the intermediaries. Jean states that since sensation occurs through the composite 
body which is made up of the four elements, one comes to know the sensitive soul 
through the nature of the four elements.  
 
Therefore through the nature of a fiery light which radiates upon the eyes, 
upon an illuminated colour, and through the intermediary of a penetrating 
route, sight reaches its object. Through the nature of air, hearing. Through the 
nature of the humour, the sense of smell and the sense of taste. But a humour 
has a twofold nature; that is, through condensation, as in a surge of liquid, 
such as water; and rarefaction, as in blasts of wind, such as vapours. The 
sense of smell therefore occurs through the medium of a rarefied humour, 
that is, vapour; taste occurs through a condensed humour, as in the case of 
saliva. Through the nature of earth, that is the soil of the earth, as is the nature 
of skin, the sense of touch arises.34    
 
 
The number of the senses is also understood according to the relationships 
between the senses and the elements. The traditional opinion is, as we have seen, that 
there are four elements but Jean includes a fifth element, also called quintessence in 
his account of the principles of sensitive objects. The latter is the first of the 
principles and is associated with the sense of sight. Historically the fifth element had 
its origins in Aristotle. He situated it above the moon’s sphere and it is interesting 
that Jean equates its power with the natural light of the sun and of one of the celestial 
                                                
34 Summa, C. 89, 4–11. Per naturam ergo ignee lucis que radiat in oculis et in colore illuminato et 
mediante peruio lucido, peruenit uisus in suum obiectum. Per naturam uero aeris, auditus. Per naturam 
uero humoris, olfactus et gustus. Sed duplex est humor in natura: scilicet concretus, ut in unda labili, 
ut aqua; et rarefactus ut in aura flabili, ut uaporibus. Mediante ergo humore rarefacto, scilicet uapore, 
peruenit olfactus; mediante uero humore concreto, ut saliua, peruenit gustus. Per naturam uero terre, 
hoc est soli terrei, ut est caro, peruenit tactus. 
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bodies. Jean’s source for this would seem to be the text of the anonymous author of 
The Powers of the Soul as shown in the comparison below.35 The following passage 
is quoted in Jean’s Summa and also in the anonymous author: 
For light is that which is in a luminous body, such as the sun or one of the 
celestial bodies; when it is dispersed into a transparent body, such as air, that 
is, it is light that is emitted; < light > in a body that is dark, as in the earth and 
anything exhibiting resistence, brings about brilliance; in something mixed, it 
is colour. For that reason it is defined as follows: colour is the extremity of 
the transparent in a limited body.36 
 
Distinctions are made between the light of the sun and the light from one of 
the celestial bodies which is emitted or radiates on to bodies; and light that brings 
about brilliance; also light that manifests colour. These distinctions are central to 
Avicenna’s theory of vision as he distinguishes between natural light and light that is 
‘acquired’, but neither Jean nor the anonymous author attribute the distinction to 
Avicenna. The first, natural light is the light of the sun and of fire, as Hasse states, if 
we look at it we cannot distinguish any colour.37 On the other hand, light is acquired 
from the sun or fire, the keyword, as Hasse states, is ‘to acquire’. These two kinds of 
light are called, respectively lux and lumen. Jean does not develop Avicenna’s theory 
of vision. Neither does he give Avicenna’s ‘oft-quoted abbreviated definition of 
vision’, although a version of it is present in the anonymous author, in which sight is 
considered to be spiritual. It is, however, ‘wide of the mark to conclude that 
                                                
35 Summa, 91, 2–6. Quinque autem sunt principia in rebus sensibilibus, quattuor scilicet elementa et 
quinta essencia, et habent in se ordinem naturalem, prout unum alio nobilius est. Supremum autem est 
quinta essencia que, secundum suam uirtutem influentem, determinat sensibile uisus. Compare: 
Anonymous (Callus), De Potentiis animae et obiectis, p. 151 20-25. ‘Manifestum autem est quod 
quinque sunt principia rerum sensibilium, scilicet, quattuor elementa et quinta essentia; et hec 
ordinem habent inter se naturalem prout unum est alio nobilius: et secundum quod unum est alio 
nobilius potens est secundum hoc imprimere dispositionem super minus nobile tamquam materiale, et 
sic derelinquitur effectus in composito. Supremum autem quinta essentia est que habet posse supra 
corpora materialia, et secundum virtutem suam influentem determinatur sensibile uisus.’ 
36 Summa, C. 91, 6–11. Nam lux que est in corpore luminoso, sicut est sol uel aliquod celestium 
corporum, derelinquit in corpore transparente, sicut est aer, effectum scilicet lumen; in corpore uero 
opaco, quemadmodum est terra et omne corpus prebens resistenciam, splendorem; in corpore uero 
mixto, colorem. Unde diffinitur sic: color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato.  
37 Hasse, p. 109.  
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Avicenna, under the influence of Neoplatonism and Stoic theories of pneuma, offers 
a “spiritualist” interpretation of vision’.38 The spiritus theory in Avicenna, as we will 
see in the case of the organs of the senses, derives from the medical tradition.     
 
Following quintessence, as the first of the principles in the relationship 
between sense and object, the second principle is fire, and according to its power the 
sensitive object of smell is produced. On account of the power of heat in the 
complexity of the body a fume-like evaporation is produced, this then is odour.  
 
Then in the medium which carries, such as air, it has being from the vapour 
or from the released fume from the object that possesses the odour because of 
the power of heat, the principle of which is fire.39 
 
Avicenna gives the example of an apple and how through the evaporation of heat the 
apple is spoiled (through someone smelling the apple over time) because the vapour 
has been released from it.40 The third principle is air which is associated with the 
sensitive object of hearing. With regard to sound Jean states there are two causes: the 
extrinsic cause is the violent movement of air in a shorter time than is normal for its 
nature; the intrinsic cause is the violent movement making a resisting sound causing 
                                                
38 Hasse, p. 123. 
39 Summa, C. 91, 15–17. In medio uero deferente, quemadmodum est aer, habet esse uaporis aut fumi 
resoluti ab odorabili uirtute caloris, cuius principium est ignis. Compare: Anonymous (Callus), De 
Potentiis animae et obiectis, p. 152 21-26. ‘Secundum vero corpus est ignis, qui habet virtutem super 
inferiora corpora, scilicet, aerem, et ita de aliis; a virtute caloris est fumalis evaporatio, que est odor, et 
habet in igne, scilicet, in radice, esse caloris; in corpore vero quod est commixtum, esse odoris; in 
corpore vero medio, quemadmodum est aer aut aqua, esse fumi aut vaporis; et hoc manifestum est ex 
corporum resolutione.’ 
40 ‘Unless odor were diffused through something’s being discharged, heat (and whatever promotes 
heat due to friction, evaporation or the like) would not promote odors, nor would cold hide them. 
Therefore it is clear that odor reaches the sense of smell only on account of a vapor that evaporates 
from what has the odor, which is mixed with the air and diffused through it. Hence, when an apple has 
been smelled for some time, it spoils because of how much has been releaed from it.’ Cf., Anonymous 
(Arts Master c. 1225) ‘The Soul and its Powers’ in Robert Pasnau, ed. The Cambridge Translations of 
Medieval Philosophical Texts, Volume Three, Mind and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 9–34 (p. 21, n. 58).  
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a tremor in the air or in water.41  Jean refers to Aristotle’s distinction between two 
kinds of air; the exterior air in which sound exists, and connatural air, present in the 
chambers of the ears in which the change of sound occurs. 42  
 
The fourth element is water according to which the sense of taste is 
determined. When moisture, which flows from water, mixes with the substance of 
what is to be tasted, it produces flavour. The moisture of saliva, however, is received 
into the sponge like flesh of the tongue and reaches as far as the organ of taste; this is 
the medium of taste.  
 
The fifth and final principle is earth, according to which the sensitive object 
of touch is determined. Flesh is the medium of touch. In the compound of flesh there 
is a composition of the four elements, of which earth is the predominant. The 
sensitive objects of touch have their being in the tangible exterior objects but the 
sense of touch also exists in the flesh.  
 
The nerves play their part in each of the senses. Jean states that the nerves 
descending from the anterior part of the brain together with the sensitive spirits are 
the organs of the senses.  These are described as ‘real functional dynamisms and 
physiological systems causally related to specific body organs and endowed of 
material spiritus’.43 The nerves which form the pupils and the arrangement of the 
eyes are the organs of sight; the organs of hearing are the nerves branching out from 
                                                
41 Summa, C. 91, 22–26. Extrinseca, motus uiolentus aeris qui facit eum moueri tempore breuiori 
quam additum sit sue nature. Intrinseca uero causa est parcium densarum aeris ad raras resistencia, 
que facit tremorem in aere uel in aqua; et hec est causa immediata soni.  
42 Summa, C. 91, 31–34. Nisi uellemus distinguere, sicut distinguit Philosophus, duplicem aerem; 
aerem exteriorem, in quo habet sonus suum esse, et aerem connaturalem intra concauitatem auris, in 
quo habet fieri soni immutacio. 
43 Vico, p. 314. 
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the brain and at the end of which are formed the ‘bellows’ of the ears within the 
concavities of the ears; the organs of the sense of smell are the nerves which descend 
from the anterior part of the brain, where there are little pieces of flesh and end with 
the nostrils; the organ of taste is the tongue, it originates in the same part of the brain;  
in a serpent it is divided and it therefore has two tongues! The organ of touch is in 
every part of the body and also in the organs of the other senses. The nerves, which 
are the organs of touch, branch out into the entire body and are covered by flesh 
which is compared to the covering provided by a net or clothing.  
 
Jean follows Avicenna in stating that an intermediary is necessary in the case 
of each of the senses. According to Avicenna the intermediary is indispenable. It is 
not possible to see an object if it is applied directly on the eyes, just like it is not 
possible to hear a sound if the ears are blocked.44 In a chapter on the different 
intermediaries Jean states that the intermediaries are necessary since if one placed the 
object to be sensed on top of the sense it is not sensed, for example, colour upon the 
eye.45 In fact, following Avicenna, Jean states that sensation is produced through the 
reception of the image or the likeness of the object, not through the receiving of the 
object itself according to its essence. If a sense received the essence of an object, 
contrary sensations would not be received. It would not be possible to see white or 
black or to touch warm or cold. For if the essence of white were received in the eye, 
unless it (that is, the eye) changes, it would not receive the contrary colour of 
blackness. From experience, we know that our eyes are not changed by seeing 
whiteness or blackness and that we can see white and black at the same time. 
                                                
44 Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus I-II-III, p. 56* 
45 Pasnau, Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, p. 19, n. 38. Cf. Aristotle, De 
Anima II, 7, 419a28-30: ‘When someone positions something that has a smell or sound on the sensory 
capacity itself, this will not bring about a single sensation.’ Cf. 421b17, 423b24-25. 
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However, it is the case that an image of the sensitive object is received and in the 
case of sight this is through the medium of the transparent; in hearing through the 
medium of air; in smell through the medium of vapour; in taste, through the medium 
of the salival humour; in touch, through the medium of flesh which covers the 
nerves.46 
With regard to the object of the senses Jean distinguishes between the 
sensitive objects that are perceived per se and those that are perceived per accidens. 
Those perceived per accidens is when the object of one sense is said to be perceived 
by another sense. To perceive per accidens is to perceive the sweetness of an apple 
because of its scarlet colour,47 whereas properly speaking, the sweetness of the apple 
is only perceived by the sense of taste. The common sense, one of the interior senses,  
will be discussed in the next chapter but here Jean explains that it is through the 
common sense48 that we perceive size, length, width, figure, depth, movement, rest, 
number, time and place. These are the common sensibles and their properties. The 
common sense is not separate, however, from particulars, according to essence. For 
we often speak of seeing size, length, shortness and even touch. We speak of seeing 
movement or rest, of seeing something above or below. We perceive according to a 
particular sense, sight in this case, but in addition to the external sense the common 
sense discerns between the different sensitive objects of the senses.  
                                                
46 Summa, C. 93, 14–30. Si autem queratur quare adhibita sunt media in sensibus, ut non perueniat 
sensus in cognicionem obiecti sine medio; dicendum quod hoc est quia sensibile appositum supra 
sensum non sentitur. Sensus enim fit per receptionem speciei uel similitudinis obiecti, non per 
receptionem ipsius obiecti secundum essenciam. Si enim reciperet sensus essenciam sui obiecti, 
nunquam esset sensus contrariorum. Ergo non esset uidere album uel nigrum, uel tangere calidum uel 
frigidum; quod patet. Nam si in oculo reciperetur essencia albedinis, iam non nisi alteratus, non esset 
receptiuus nigredinis. Sed constat quod non alteratus oculus recipit uidendo albedinem et nigredinem. 
Si ergo recipit secundum essenciam, sunt contraria secundum essenciam in eodem. Relinquitur ergo, 
aut quod non erit susceptiuus nisi tantum alterius contrariorum, aut quod non recipitur color ab oculo 
secundum essenciam, sed secundum speciem suam uel similitudinem, propter haec ergo quia non 
recipitur a sensu nisi specie obiecti; apposita enim sensibilis essencia supra sensum, ut coloratum 
supra oculum, non sentitur. Necessarium ergo fuit medium in quolibet sensu.   
47 Vernier, p. 205 n. 1. 
48 Vernier, Ibid., n. 2. 
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Another distinction highlighted by Jean is that between primary and 
secondary sensitive objects. For example, hot, cold, moist and dry reach the sense of 
touch in the first place and therefore primarily. Soft and hard, thin and dense, heavy 
and light follow consequently and therefore in a secondary way. Avicenna therefore 
anticipated the primary and secondary qualities in later epistemology, particularly in 
the work of Locke. The passage we refer to is one highlighted by Hasse as being one 
among a number of passages overlooked by the editor of the Summa as having its 
source in Avicenna.49 In fact Jean draws on Avicenna for much of this chapter on the 
objects of the senses. With regard to the intermediaries the sense of touch differs 
from the other senses in that it experiences delight and sadness without an 
intermediary since the flesh or skin is the organ of touch. Jean also refers to another 
difference between the sense of touch and the other senses. For the whole of the skin 
which surrounds the entire body is sentient through touch, and not just in one part; 
since this sense is by nature that which preserves the entire body from injuries; this is 
why the entire body as constituted is endowed with tactile sensation.50 Sight 
experiences neither delight nor sadness on account of sight itself but the soul is 
pleased or saddened internally on account of what is seen. This happens in the case 
of hearing also, the pain or delight is associated with suffering of the soul. Both the 
                                                
49 Summa, C. 94, 28–32. Secundaria vero sunt que non primo sensum attingunt, sed consequenter. 
Verbi gracia, calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum primo sensum tactus attingunt, et ideo principalia. 
Molle uero et durum, rarum et densum, grave et leve, ex consequenti, et ideo secundaria. Compare:  
Avicenna’s De Anima, II, c. 3, pp. 133 25 – 134 28. Ea autem quae tanguntur, divulgatum est quod 
sunt calor et frigiditas, humiditas et siccitas, asperitas et lenitas, gravitas et levitas; sed durities et 
mollities et viscositas et solubilitas et cetera huiusmodi, non sentiuntur nisi consequentes eas quas 
praediximus.  
50 Summa, C. 94, 60–65. Nota eciam aliam differenciam tactus ab aliis secundum organum. Nam tota 
cutis que circumdat totum corpus est senciens per tactum, et non una sola pars; quia enim sensus iste 
est natura conseruans totum corpus ab accidentibus que multum nocerent si consisterent in aliquo 
membrorum cui acciderent, oportuit idcirco ut totum corpus poneretur senciens per tactum. This  
passage, (in fact the entire passage - lines 60-70 of Jean’s Summa) was overlooked as a quotation from 
Avicenna. See Hasse, p. 49, n. 217 which refers the reader to Avicenna’s De anima II, 3, p. 140, lines 
28-38. 
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sense of smell and taste, however, are delighted or saddened in a physical sense since 
they are influenced by qualities which are either suited or unsuited to their respective 
organs.     
 
It is remarkable that Jean and his contemporaries made such enormous efforts 
to integrate the various traditions that were becoming available during the twelfth 
century into their own accounts of the psychology of the soul. The challenge of 
incorporating material from Avicenna’s De anima is testament to Jean’s 
determination to understand the physical and the psychical nature of mankind. To 
understand why Jean is an exponent of Avicenna we must appreciate that ‘while a 
deep chasm is posited between sense and intellect in terms of their cognitive value, 
the Arabic philosophers offered a general theory of the nature of cognition that was 
applicable to both sensation and intellection’.51 It is Avicenna who gives the first 
systematic account of the internal senses to the Latin West and it is described as ‘an 
attempt to expand and systematize Aristotle’s account of the pre-intellectual 
capacities of the soul that could not simply be explained as functions of the five 
external senses of vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch’.52   
 
SECTION FOUR 
INTERNAL SENSES 
 
The term ‘internal senses’ is believed to be of Stoic origin.53 Alfarabi, also posited a 
principal of sensitive power in a treatise entitled, ‘Treatise on the opinion of the 
inhabitants of the ideal city in which, ‘the perceptions of the five senses come 
                                                
51 Black, ‘Psychology: Soul and Intellect’, in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, pp. 
308–326 (311). 
52 Ibid., p. 312. 
53 Rahman, pp. 77-78. 
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together, as if the five senses were warnings for it, as if the five senses were 
informers, each responsible for a “genre” of knowledge of one of the regions of a 
kingdom’.54 Alfarabi situated the sensitive principal power in the heart while 
Avicenna situated it in the brain. The treatise of Alfarbi was unknown, however, in 
the West so it can be rightly said that it was Avicenna who introduced the 
peripathetic division to the Latin West. A full account of the internal senses is to be 
found in Avicenna and while there are various combinations of the faculties in his 
different works it is stated that Avicenna “means to contrast the two ways in which 
the internal senses may be viewed, the medical or physiological and the 
philosophical, without one’s necessarily excluding the other”.55  
 
Jean’s presentation of the internal senses is taken from Avicenna’s De Anima, 
maintaining the order of the senses as it appears there. Following Avicenna, Jean 
states that there are five internal senses, each is assigned a location within the 
ventricles of the brain; the belief that the internal senses were located in the brain 
was of Galenic origin.56 The first internal sense is fantasia, also called the common 
sense (sensus communis); second is the imagination (ymaginacio); third the 
imaginative, also called the sensitive imagination and cogitative imagination 
(ymaginativa or excogitativa); fourth, the estimative (estimativa); fifth, memory 
(memorativa).  
 
 
 
5.4.1 The Common Sense 
 
                                                
54 Alain de Libera, ‘Le sens common au XIIIᵉ siècle De Jean de La Rochelle à Albert le Grand’, 
Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale 1991 Vol. 96 PT. 475 – 496 (p. 478). 
55 Harry Austryn Wolfson, ‘The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts’, in 
Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, Vol. One, ed. by Isadore Twersky and George H. 
Williams (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 250 – 314 (p. 279). 
56 Rahman, p. 79. 
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The fantasia or common sense is located in the front ventricle of the brain. It 
receives the forms which are imprinted on it by the five external senses. This power 
is the centre for all of the exterior senses and from which they lead out as if they are 
the branches of the central sense. It is called the common or central sense and the 
formal sense. Central inasmuch as it facilitates an exchange between it and the acts 
of the particular senses; I see what I hear, and I hear what I see; it also has the power 
to unite sensations of the various senses, for example, seeing black and white or, 
with regard to taste, distinguishing between sweet and savoury.57 It is called the 
formal sense because of its close connection to the second internal sense, the 
imaginacio which, as we will see, retains the forms of the sensitive objects which the 
common sense first receives from the external senses. Jean quotes a passage from 
Avicenna, almost verbatim, in which the latter uses the example of a rain drop to 
explain the roles of the external senses, the imagination and the common sense. 
 
Accordingly Avicenna proposes an experiment: when we wish to know the 
difference between the function of the exterior sense and that of the formal 
sense, that is to say the common sense, consider the relative position of a 
drop of rain which is falling, and you will see a straight line; consider also the 
relative position of anything in a straight line. Consider the relative position 
of this straight line whose summit is presented in a circle and you see a circle. 
It is impossible for you to see the line and the circle unless you look at them 
often. It is impossible even for an exterior sense to see the thing in two 
places, it is only possible that you see where it is. Since each is assigned to 
the common sense and it is removed before the form which was assigned to it 
is deleted the common sense grasps it in the place it is, the common sense 
grasps both ‘as if’ it was in that place and ‘as if’ it is also in that other place; 
in this way it sees circular or straight extension. It is impossible for this to 
occur without an exterior sense. But the common sense apprehends these two 
                                                
57 Summa, C. 97, 1–10. Sensus autem communis est uis ordinata in prima concauitate cerebri, 
recipiens per se ipsam omnes formas que imprimuntur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei. Hec autem 
uirtus est centrum omnium sensuum, et a qua deriuantur ut rami. Dicitur autem hic sensus formalis et 
communis. Communis secundum duos modos: uno modo in quantum communiter habet conuerti 
super actus sensuum particularium, prout dicitur: uideo quod audio, et audio quod uideo; et uideo 
quod odoro, etc. Alio modo secundum quod habet conferre sensibilia diuersorum sensuum, ut cum 
confertur album, nigrum, dulci uel saporato, quoniam est illud. 
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aspects, although one was destroyed. For this reason it is called the ‘sense 
which forms’ by Avicenna.58 
 
 
De Libera states that the common sense plays a role in the ‘transformation’ of 
sensation in perception. The common sense and imagination are two distinct 
faculties; anatomically the common sense, as we have already seen, is located in the 
front ventricle of the brain and the imagination is located at the extremity of the 
anterior ventricle. Yet, as Jean states (following Avicenna) the common sense and 
the imagination are also considered ‘as if’ they are one power. The first receives, the 
second retains. Avicenna’s argument is that it is one thing to receive, another to 
retain. He makes this distinction with regard to the powers of the soul. He 
demonstrates this by using the example of water that has the potential for receiving 
the images and the imprinted forms but it does not have the potential to retain them.59  
 
 
5.4.2 The Imaginative Power   
 
 
Next is the imaginative power, which is located in the middle ventricle of the brain, 
which has the power to combine and separate the forms as one wishes. When this is 
under the control of the intellect it is called the cogitative power and when under the 
control of the sensitive soul it is called the imaginative power. Avicenna uses the 
                                                
58 Summa, 97, 16–30. Vnde ponit Auicenna experimentum: cum uolumus scire differenciam inter 
opus sensus exterioris, et opus sensus formalis, id est communis, attende disposicionem unius gutte 
cadentis de pluuia, et videbis rectam lineam; et attende disposicionem alicuius recti, cuius summitas 
mouetur in circuitu, et videbitur circulus. Impossibile autem est ut apprehendas lineam aut circulum 
nisi illam rem sepe inspexeris. Impossibile eciam est ut sensus exterior uideat eam bis, nisi uidebit 
eam ubi est. Cum autem describitur in sensu communi, et remouetur antequam deleatur forma que 
descripta est in sensu communi, apprehendit eam sensus exterior illuc ubi est, apprehendit eciam eam 
sensus communis quasi esset illuc ubi fuit, et quasi esset illuc ubi est; et ita uidet extensionem 
circularem aut rectam. Hoc autem impossibile est fieri sine sensu exteriori. Sed sensus communis 
formalis apprehendit illa duo, quamuis destructa sit illa res. Hac ergo racione dicitur sensus formans 
secundum Auicennam. 
59 C. 98, 13–18. Differenciam autem hanc probat quod ex una ui est recipere, et ex alia retinere; quod 
est uidere in aqua que habet potenciam recipiendi sculpturas et impressiones figurarum, non tamen 
habet potenciam retinendi. Differentis ergo uirtutis erit retinere sensibilia et recipere ea. Alia ergo 
uirtus est ymaginacio a sensu communi; et hec est sentencia Auicenne. 
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term ymaginativa when referring to this power in animals and the term cogitativa 
when it refers to man. Jean gives a summary of how Avicenna distinguishes the 
senses as follow: 
 
For the common sense surrenders to the formal power, as if to restore 
whatever the exterior senses hand over to it. The formal power, that is the 
imagination, preserves and retains. It has thererfore, in itself, the power to 
multiply the sensitve forms. But the cogitative or imaginative power is turned 
towards the forms which are in the formal power or the imagination in order 
to combine or separate them, since they are subject to it; and according to this 
changes occur in the imaginations of things which are not subject to an 
external sense, as it happens in sleep but also in wakefulness.60  
 
It is the power that also explains how we produce images in dreams that are not 
subject to the external senses, it also happens in wakefulness, or daydreaming or 
using our imagination.  
 
5.4.3 Imagination 
 
 
It is important to stress the distinction between imaginatio and the imaginative 
faculties. The Arabic terms used by Avicenna are ẖ ayāl and qūwa mutaẖ ayyiila, 
which were translated into Latin as imaginatio and imaginativa respectively. The 
internal faculty of imaginatio does not imagine. It stores the sense data which it 
receives from the common sense while the imaginative faculty ‘is concerned with the 
combination and separation of the sense data and connotational attributes’.61 The 
imaginative power (cogitative in humans) is also called taẖ ayyul, ‘imagining’ by 
Avicenna as he ‘emphasizes the active function (combining and separating) of this 
                                                
60 Summa, C. 99, 11–19. Nam sensus communis reddit uirtuti formali quasi ad reponendum quidquid 
ei tradunt sensus exteriores. Virtus uero formalis, que est ymaginacio, reponit et retinet. Habet enim 
uirtutem multiplicandi in se formas sensibiles. Virtus uero cogitatiua sive ymaginatiua conuertitur ad 
formas que sunt in uirtute formali siue ymaginacione ad componendum eas et resoluendum, quoniam 
ei sunt subiecta; et secundum hoc accidunt fieri transformaciones ymaginacionum eorum, que non 
ceciderunt in sensu exteriori, sicut accidit in sompnis et eciam in uigilia.  
61 Hasse, p. 157. 
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faculty, which contrasts with the passive function (storing) of the faculty of 
imagination’.62  Imagining is therefore the action of the imaginative power and not of 
the imagination. The meaning of a ‘connotational attribute’ referred to above will 
become clearer as we discuss one of the most widely known theories of Avicenna, 
the estimative power. The passage quoted below clearly shows that estimation is 
connected with the internal sense of memory and reminiscence which conserves the 
‘intentions’ of the estimative power.                                   
 
5.4.4 The Estimative Power 
 
 
The estimative power apprehends these ‘intentions’ which are present in the object 
as, for example when the sheep judges that it must flee from the wolf and cherish the 
lamb. This theory influenced a number of important thinkers in the thirteenth century 
and beyond but it is Jean’s account which will be our starting point as he gives an 
almost verbatim account of Avicenna’s theory. I quote the passage in full as it will be 
helpful in explaining the activities of the estimative power. 
 
Consequently we must discuss the following two interior powers, namely the 
estimative power and the power concerned with memory. The estimative 
power is, as Avicenna states, a power located in the innermost ventricle of the 
brain, apprehending the intentions of sensitive objects, just as there is power 
in a lamb, through which it judges it must flee from the wolf, and that it must 
live with the sheep. And this power is transcendent since its apprehension 
does not concern the sensitive and material forms but the immaterial forms: 
namely, good and evil, the agreeable and the disagreeable, the beneficial and 
the harmful, which in themselves are not material, and do not rely on the 
exterior senses. They are however accidents of sensitive beings and for this 
reason they are called the intentions of the sensitive beings. The estimative 
power, which is the fourth power of the interior sensitive powers, has these as 
objects. Note therefore that the estimation of the beneficial and the harmful 
occurs in three ways: the first mode stems from a natural precaution, just as 
occurs in a child who, when raised to standing and thinks he is falling, at 
once he clings to something; and when someone’s eye needs to be cleared of 
inflammation of the eyes, which he closes at once, before he knows it, it is 
                                                
62 Ibid., p. 158. 
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gone away; and just like the sheep fears the wolf naturally, animals a lion, the 
birds a hawk, since they judge them harmful. The second mode is from 
experience, just as happens when an animal has grief or delight from 
something, whose form is inscribed in the formal power or imagination, and 
the beneficial or harmful intentions are inscribed in memory. As soon as that 
external thing appears it will be assessed as malicious or harmful. It is from 
this that dogs are terrified of sticks and stones, since they regard them as 
harmful, and they are tempted by bones, which they regard with delight. The 
third mode is a mode of likeness, through sharing a certain property, just as 
an object shares some form with an intention, an object of estimation, in 
some sensitive object, just as occurs with an apple, when it is the colour red 
that it is mature and sweet. For that reason also when we see a red apple we 
reckon it is sweet. Therefore estimation occurs in these ways. 63  
 
The estimative faculty in Avicenna’s account of the internal senses 
anticipates the modern concept of intentionality as initiated by the founder of 
phenomenology, Franz Brentano (1838–1917).64 There is also the question of its 
                                                
63 Summa, C. 101. Consequenter dicendum est de duabus uirtutibus consequentibus sensitiuis interius, 
scilicet estimatiua et memoratiua. Est autem estimatiua, sicut dicit Auicenna, uis ordinata in summo 
concauitatis medie cerebri, apprehendens intenciones sensibilium, sicut est uis in oue, diiudicans quod 
a lupo est fugiendum, et quod cum agno cohabitandum. Est autem ista uirtus transcendens quia 
apprehensio sua non est formarum sensibilium et materialium, sed immaterialium: bonitas enim et 
malicia, conueniens et inconueniens, utile et nociuum, in se sunt res non materiales, nec cadentes in 
sensu exteriori. Sunt tamen accidencia sensibilium rerum, et ideo dicuntur intenciones sensibilium. 
Horum autem est uirtus estimatiua que est quarta uirtus uirtutum sensibilium interiorum. Nota ergo 
quod estimacio utilium et nociuorum fit tribus modis: primus modus est ex cautela naturali, sicut 
accidit in puero qui, cum eleuatur ad standum et estimat cadere, statim alicui adheret; et cum oculus 
alicuius debet purgari a lippitudine, quem statim ille claudit, antequam cognoscat quid sibi accidat de 
illo; et sicut ouis timet lupum naturaliter, et leonem animalia, et aues accipitrem, quia estimant nociua. 
Secundus modus est per experienciam, sicut accidit cum animal habuit dolorem aut delicias ab aliqua 
re, cuius forma descripta est in uirtute formali siue ymaginacione, et intenciones utilitatis uel 
nocumenti descripte in memoria. Statim ut apparuerit extra res illa, erit in estimacione malicie uel 
nocumenti. Hinc est quod canes terrentur a fustibus et lapidibus, quia estimant nociua, et alliciuntur 
ossibus, quia estimant delectabiliter. Tercius modus est ad modum similitudinis per proprietatem 
quandam coniunctam, sicut cum res habet aliquam formam coniunctam cum intencione estimacionis 
in aliquo sensibilium, sicut accidit in pomo, cum est coloris coccinei, quod est maturum et dulce. Et 
ideo cum uidemus pomum coccineum estimamus dulce. Hiis ergo modis fit estimacio.  
64 Cf., Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D. 
B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), p. 88–
89; Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, originally published in 1874.  See, also, Herbert 
Spiegelberg’s essay, ‘Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl’, originally 
published in 1933/34 in German as ‘Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und 
bei Husserl’, and revised without major changes in 1969, and translated into English in 1976 as 
‘Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl’ in The Philosophy of Brentano, 
ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckwork, 1976) pp. 108–27. For the significance of Avicenna’s 
influence on Brentano’s understanding, see Richard Sorabji, ‘‘From Aristotle to Brentano: The 
Development of the Concept of Intentionality’, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Julia 
Annas (1991), Supplementary Volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition, ed. by H. Blumenthal and H. 
Robinson, pp. 227–259.  While Brentano accepts part of the meaning of the scholastic doctrine of 
‘intentional in-existence of an object’, he deviates from it also considerably. See, Hugh Lawson-
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meaning in Arabic philosophy and its use in the medieval Latin translation. 
According to Black, the English term ‘intention’ came to be applied to the Arabic 
concept through the use of ‘intentio’ as the medieval word for ma‘na.65 She states 
that although many philosophers in the Arabic world and also in the Latin West 
accepted Avicenna’s positing of the estimative faculty, al-Ghazâlî (1058–1111) and 
Averroes (Ibd Rushd, 1126–1198) found his arguments problematic. While it will be 
necessary to confine the discussion to what is presented by Jean in the Summa it is 
worth noting that Black extends the discussion to include many other contexts in 
Avicenna’s writings and she argues ‘that an adequate understanding of Avicenna’s 
reasons for positing the existence of an estimative faculty demands an integrated 
analysis of all these dimensions of Avicenna’s theory, and that such an integrated 
analysis can mitigate many of the objections of Avicenna’s critics, even if it raises 
new questions for the Avicennian perspective’.66 
 
Al Ghazâlî raises the objection that if the estimative power, which is located 
in a part of the brain, is able to grasp the immaterial intention, such as hostility, then 
the power by which intelligible forms are apprehended could also be said to be 
located in the brain, then, according to Ghazâlî, ‘all Avicenna’s rational 
demonstrations for the immateriality of the intellect are nullified.’67 Black states that, 
in fact, Avicenna only argues that since intentions are different from sensible forms, 
and since only sensible forms are directly apprehended by the senses and the 
imagination than another power besides sense and imagination is needed to 
                                                                                                                                     
Tancred, ‘Introduction’, in Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), trans. by H. Lawson-Tancred (London: 
Penguin, 1986), esp., pp. 101–3. 
65 Black, ‘Psychology: Soul and Intellect” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, p. 
312. 
66 Deborah Black, ‘Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions in 
Dialogue, Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol. XXX11, (No. 2 Spring 1993), 219–258 (p. 220). 
67 Ibid., p. 221. 
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apprehend intentions’.68 Intentions are not essentially material, they can be material 
accidentally but as Black interprets it, estimation ‘receives intentions which are not 
in their essences material’.69 
 
Avicenna gives the examples of a baby grasping at something when he is 
about to fall and of a person’s reaction to inflammation of an eye but as Hasse70 
states, commenting on this passage, these reactions are what we describe as reflex 
reactions. It is difficult to equate these examples with the famous example of how the 
sheep fears the wolf. However, this may become clearer as we examine the terms 
used by Avicenna in his theory. Jean recounts a second mode in which estimation is 
combined with memory — this explains how, for example, a dog associates a stick 
with a bad experience but then it is delighted when he sees his master. The estimative 
faculty, with the aid of memory, sensation and the imaginative combine the forms 
and intentions ‘from a given object into a perception of a concrete whole’.71 It makes 
sense to say that an animal will feel threatened if it has once been beaten or that it 
will at least be cautious of anything resembling a stick in the future. This is not a 
rational judgement as Hasse72 points out. 
 
A third mode is the mode of likeness. When, for example, I see something 
sweet, although the sweetness itself remains a sensible quality, the intentions in such 
a case are ‘not primarily in terms of their non-sensible character, but rather, as 
properties that are not conveyed to or perceived by the external senses’.73  
                                                
68 Ibid., p. 222. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Hasse, pp. 134–135. 
71 Black, ‘Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna’, p. 226. 
72 Hasse, p. 135. 
73 Black, ‘Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna’, p. 225. 
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Black provides a comprehensive account of the estimative faculty in 
Avicenna in many other contexts but we move to Hasse’s discussion of the medieval 
writers who made use of the estimative faculty in their works on the soul. Hasse74 
states that the theory of the internal sense of estimation, and its objects, the 
‘intentions’, is one of the most widely known theories of Avicenna, ‘paralleled only 
by the distinction between essence and existence and the theory of the separate active 
intellect’.75 He further explains that it is not correct to say that an ‘intention’ refers to 
certain knowledge which the internal sense possesses. The ‘intention’ is in the object 
perceived, imagined or believed. It conveys or indicates ‘the significance or meaning 
of an image with which this indicator is connected’.76 In the example of the wolf, the 
sheep perceives the outer appearance and also the ‘intention’ (in the wolf) as harmful 
and threatening, it then judges that it is harmful and flees. However, as Hasse77 
further explains, it is not the sheep’s judgement, nor its fear, nor its pleasure or pain 
that are the ‘intentions’. The intentions are in the object, as ‘hostility’ is in the wolf, 
Hasse describes it as a ‘connotional attribute’, the sheep is aware of more than the 
presence of the wolf. According to Hasse the fact that intentions exist in the sense-
object distinguishes Avicenna’s theory of ‘intentionality’ from many other theories 
on ‘intentions’ as the ‘intention’ is not in the perceiver but in the object. The 
‘intentions’ are immaterial, they refer to what is good or bad, agreeable or 
disagreeable, the beneficial and the harmful; they exist accidentally in beings and are 
the objects of the estimative power.   
Almost every writer after 1200 who wrote on the soul mentioned the main 
tenets of Avicenna’s theory, the example of the sheep and the wolf is mentioned in 
                                                
74 Hasse, p. 127. 
75 Hasse, p. 127. 
76 Hasse, p. 131. 
77 Ibid., 
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most of the authors writing before our author and it is there in later and better known 
authors such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Hasse highlights the manner 
in which John Blund, writing around 1204, interprets the intentiones as ‘qualities and 
attributes of perceived objects’.78 Blund raises a question as to how if the intentiones 
‘pass through sense perception and through the imagination until they reach 
estimation which is located behind them in the brain, why are they imperceptible to 
the senses and the imagination? It is a valid question - how can it be that the sheep 
knows that it must take action in order to avoid being attacked by the wolf if the 
wahm experience means the sheep ‘directly perceives intentiones without any 
intermediate perception by other senses’.79 Hasse provides us with a direct quote 
from Blund’s Tractatus in which he defends Avicenna:80  
 
But because this could appear difficult to understand for someone, one can 
say that a likeness of the intentio comes about in sense perception and in 
imagination, but that the soul does not perceive them with these faculties, 
since sense perception and imagination do not have a nature which is in 
accordance with the original carrier of the intentio. But the organ of 
estimation is similar in nature to that which is per se and originally the carrier 
of the intentio, and therefore the perception of the intentio happens through 
the estimative faculty.  
  
Blund is using different terminology but he is conceding that the intentiones are only 
in the object and are not perceived by the senses but what is perceived are 
representations of them. Blund is trying to understand the new psychology which 
purports to provide an explanation for how we can know something which is neither 
discernible through sense data nor through a process of reasoning. 
 
                                                
78 Ibid., p. 145. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Hasse, p. 145. Cf., Blund, Tractatus, 19, p.70, line 2. 
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The appearance of Aristotle’s works would complicate matters even further 
when the apparent incompatibilities between Avicenna’s and Aristotle’s views 
became an issue for debate in many of the well known thinkers of the thirteenth 
century. We can see how this manifested itself in the approaches which the 
Dominicans and the Franciscans took in trying to reconcile the new philosophies 
with their Christian beliefs. With regard to the faculty of estimation the question was 
asked as to whether the Avicennian theory could be traced to Aristotle. Albert the 
Great, according to Hasse, is the first to highlight the differences among the 
authorities. Albert maintained that many of the faculties in Avicenna could be traced 
back to phantasia in Aristotle’s De Anima. This was Albert’s attempt to harmonise 
Avicenna and Aristotle but this, according to Hasse, leads to a mis-representation of 
the theory of ‘connotational attributes’ since for Albert, attributes such as harmful, 
and pleasant are not perceived in the object, as Avicenna holds, but in ‘perceived 
images’.81 The faculty of phantasia, according to Albert, is based on the theory of 
abstraction, as Hasse states, ‘the theory of phantasia (in the broad sense) derives 
intentiones from sense data by combining and separating these data – a theory 
special to Albertus.’82 Thus, Hasse concludes that Albert is concerned only with the 
‘connotational’ aspect of Avicenna’s theory, not with the ‘attribute’ aspect. 
 
Thomas Aquinas83 relegates the estimative power to animal psychology. He 
explains how animals know certain things instinctively, the sheep avoids the wolf 
                                                
81 Hasse, p. 149. 
82 Hasse, p. 148 
83 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Vol 11, 1a. 78, 4. trans. by Timothy Suttor. ‘Sed necessarium est 
animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad 
sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta. Sicut ovis 
videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum 
naturae. Et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectat sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. 
Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat hujusmodi intentiones quas non percipit sensus exterior. 
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because something triggers a warning to it to flee. Aquinas, following Albert, does 
not accept that the sheep perceives the intentions in the wolf. However, he does 
assign a comparable power to humans, this is the power of cogitation, vis cogitiva. 
Also called the particular reason it compares ‘individual intentions’ in the way that 
the reasoning intellect compares ‘universal intentions’ (Summa Theologiae 1a, q.78, 
a.4, corpus). The cogitative power in man, therefore, comes under the influence of 
reason. Animals lack this power of conceptualization that enables human beings to 
see objects as belonging to this or that category, animals, unlike humans, cannot 
reason and cannot reflect on their fears and desires. The senses alone cannot directly 
know existence, nor can they perceive it. It is called particular reason because it can 
compare individual intentions, that is, it apprehends individual, concrete objects, in 
the way that the intellect conceives universal essences. There is therefore a special 
co-operation between intellect and an external sense.   
 
5.4.5 Memory 
 
 
The fifth and final internal sense, following the order given by Avicenna in the De 
anima, is memory and is located in the posterior ventricle of the brain. Jean calls it 
the memorativa but in the Latin translation of Avicenna’s De anima, the power is 
called memorialis. As we have seen, it is the power which retains what the estimative 
power apprehends of the intentions of sensitive objects. Avicenna states that the 
relationship between the estimative power and the memorative power is the same as 
that between imagination and the common sense; for just as the imagination retains, 
and is the treasure house of the sensitve forms, which the common sense apprehends, 
so the memorative is the treasure house which conserves the intentions of the 
                                                                                                                                     
Et hujus perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit 
ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum.’ 
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estimative power.84 Avicenna distinguishes between memory and reminiscence; 
memory is present in animals but recollection, the ability to search for something that 
has been forgotten is only found in man. To even know that something was present 
to oneself, but was later deleted, is none other than the rational power or if it 
belonged to any other power besides reason it may be the estimative, enhanced by 
reason.85 Therefore the differences between memory and reminscence is that 
memory retains the images or intentions of sensitive objects or their representations; 
reminscence is the searching for forms deleted from memory due to forgetfullness; 
through searching for triggers, when for example, we forget someone we have seen, 
we recall both the time, the place and the activity and we are satisfied that through 
these we recall the details and circumstances.  
 
There is also a difference between recollecting and learning. Avicenna states 
that according to some learning is nothing other than reminiscing and that 
recollecting or reminiscing and learning are the same. Avicenna distinguishes 
between them in stating that recollecting is a searching for something that one knew 
in the past and that  learning is an extension of the soul in order to gain knowledge of 
the unknown, that which was not previously known.86  
                                                
84 Summa, C. 102, 3–8. Comparacio autem uirtutis estimatiue ad uirtutem memoratiuam secundum 
Auicennam est qualis est comparacio uirtutis ymaginacionis ad sensum communem; sicut enim 
ymaginacio retinet, et est thesaurus formarum sensibilium quas apprehendit sensus communis, sic 
uirtus memoratiua est thesaurus conseruans intenciones sensibilium quas apprehendit uirtus 
estimatiua.  
85 Summa, C. 102, 11–17. Ad quod dicendum, secundum Auicennam, quod memoria est in aliis 
animalibus; sed recordacio que est reuocacio ingenii ad querendum quod oblitum est non inuenitur 
nisi in solo homine. Cognoscere enim sibi aliquid affuisse, quod postea deletum est, non est nisi 
uirtutis racionalis, uel si est alicuius uirtutis alterius preter racionem poterit esse racionem 
estimacionis, sed in quantum decoratur racionalitate. Compare: Avicenna’s, De anima, IV, c. 3, p. 40 
61–66 ad verbum. 
86 Summa, C. 102, 24–30. Nota eciam differenciam inter recordari et addiscere, quia quidam posuerunt 
quod addiscere nihil aliud fuerit quam reminisci et conueniunt in hoc quod utrobique est motus a 
cognitis ad incognita, ad hoc ut sciantur. Sed in hoc differencia est quod recordacio est inquisicio 
incognitorum ut cognoscantur de futuro, que quidem fuerunt cognita de preterito; addiscencia uero 
siue disciplina est extensio anime ad cognoscenda incognita, que tamen non fuerint cognita prius. 
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Jean presents Avicenna’s physiological account of memory. Accordingly he 
refers to the different kinds of bodily constitutions in Avicenna’s account which 
explain the various strengths and weaknesses involved in the powers of 
remembering, recollecting and learning. The question is asked as to why some 
people find it easier to learn new things than to recollect. Why do others find that 
they are the reverse of this? Avicenna states that the sort of person who have a dry 
constitution have good memories but they are weak in recollecting. A mental 
constitution that is dry is suitable for receiving and retaining the impressions but it is 
unwieldy with regard to movement.87 As Coleman states, ‘this must mean that the 
restless inquiry of recollection (recordatio) cannot be undertaken if one cannot 
creatively respond to images in the imagination, whose substance must be moist 
rather than dry.88 On the other hand, those of a warm cerebral constitution (as in air, 
that is hot and moist) recollect more easily. These are people who perceive more and 
produce movement and have ‘a greater will to grasp or hold on to mental objects, 
being more in command of sensible motion and intentions’.89  
 
Those who possess a humid cerebral matter learn more easily as it is the most 
suited disposition for the taking up of the impressions but because it is humid they do 
not possess a strong memory. Memory necessarily requires that matter which is 
imprinted on it can only be deleted with difficulty, which is the nature of a dry 
constitution.  
                                                
87 Summa, C. 102, 35–40. Ad que intelligendum est, secundum Auicennam, quod illi qui sunt sicce 
complexionis, fortes sunt in memoriter retinendo, debiles in recordando. Siccitas autem memorie est 
conueniens disposicio ad susceptionem impressionum et retencionem; inhabilis autem est ad motum, 
et ideo sicca complexio conuenit memorie, non recordacioni. 
88 Coleman, p. 355. 
89 Ibid. 
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Although children have a cerebral matter that is humid they retain the 
impressions firmly. The reason for this is that they are not occupied with so many 
objects, as adults are. As Coleman states ‘memory with its dry matter requires that 
the soul is quick to take up forms and that its matter is diligent regarding these forms 
and that having them is not possessed of anything else.90 It is not the same for young 
people for although they possess a warm cerebral matter and are therefore agile in 
movement they also possess a dry cerebral matter but their powers of remembering 
are said to be weak. Old people, on account of the humour which prevails in them do 
not remember well.91 
 
Avicenna justifies his ‘positing of each of these sense powers by a set of 
principles for differentiating psychological faculties’.92 The two most important have 
already been referred to above; the first is that the reception and retention of the 
sensitives must belong to different powers; the second refers to the sensitive objects; 
a diversity of objects requires a diversity of powers and from these two principles he 
derives the five interior senses. The common sense perceives the sensitive forms but 
it is not able to retain the forms that it perceives. As we have seen, this is the function 
of the imagination (imaginatio). Again the estimative power does not retain the 
intentions. It is the memory that retains them and is the treasure house of the 
intentions. The imaginative faculty combines and divides the forms which are 
retained in the imagination and it is what we normally understand by imagination. It 
                                                
90 Ibid., p. 356. 
91 Summa, C. 102, 60–65. Vnde est quod pueri, quamuis sint humidi, firmiter tamen retinent; anime 
enim eorum non occupantur circa multa, sicut anime maiorum, sed sunt fixe circa unum. Iuuenum 
uero, propter calorem suum, et propter motus suos agiles, debilis est memoria, quamuis sit complexio 
sicca. Senibus uero accidit, propter humorem qui preualet in eis, non memorari ea que uiderant. 
92 Black, ‘Psychology: Soul and Intellect’, p. 313. 
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can also be subject to the rational powers and it is then called the cogitative power. 
As Black states it, ‘in Avicenna the cogitative faculty – that is, the entity formed by 
the cooperation between the intellect and imagination is responsible for a good deal 
of what we would ordinarily call “thinking,” including the analysis and synthesis of 
propositions and syllogistic reasoning”.93  
 
 
     SECTION FIVE 
THE DRIVING FORCES OF THE SENSES 
 
According to Avicenna the powers of the soul are divided into the cognitive powers, 
(as we have seen they are the five external senses and five internal senses) and into 
the motive powers, the topic to which we will now turn. Jean defines the motive 
power in terms of a natural mode and an animal mode corresponding to Avicenna’s 
two kinds of motive power. According to Avicenna, ‘either it is motive in so far as it 
gives an impulse, or in so far as it is active’.94  Avicenna’s statement introduces the 
faculty of appetence ‘in so far as it provides an impulse’ and ‘in so far as it is active’ 
this refers to the workings of the body as he states: 
 
As for the motive faculty in its active capacity, it is a power which is 
distributed through the nerves and muscles, and its function is to contract the 
muscles and to pull the tendons and ligaments towards the starting-point of 
the movement, or to relax them or stretch them so that they move away from 
the starting-point.95    
 
In a similar vein Jean describes the motive faculty in the natural mode as the vital or 
pulsative power.  This is one of three powers which we have already encountered in 
                                                
93 Ibid., p. 315.  
94 Rahman, p. 26. 
95 Ibid. 
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the Pseudo-Augustine and it corresponds to the vital activities of the body in 
Avicenna.   
 
The motive sensitive power is of two modes; for one is motive in a natural 
mode, one is an animal mode; I describe the motive sensitive power 
according to the natural mode that which neither moves according to 
apprehension, nor is it subject to the command of reason, such is the vital or 
pulsative power. This power is situated in the heart as in its organ; it is a 
power for the purpose of inspiration and respiration, being the principle of a 
suitable blending of the heat of the heart and the body.96 
 
 
With regard to the animal mode Jean states that while the cognitive powers 
apprehend or judge what is good or evil there must be another power which moves 
the agent into action. He further states that according to Avicenna, there are two parts 
to the appetitive power; the concupiscible power and the irascible power.  
 
The concupiscible power is that which commands movements in order to 
approach those things that are thought necessary or useful in pleasing the 
appetite. The irascible power is that which commands movements in order to 
reject that which is thought to be harmful or corrupting, by overwhelming the 
appetite.97  
 
Jean obviously agrees with Avicenna’s definition of the concupiscible and irascible 
powers and recognises that they belong to movement as opposed to perception. 
There, however, is the point at which Jean parts company with Avicenna’s theory.  
Avicenna includes the concupiscible and irascible powers in his theory of decision-
making. It may be helpful to refer to the process involved which includes Avicenna’s 
notion of the will. According to Hasse98 the theory involves the following steps: 
                                                
96 Summa, C. 103, 2-8. Virtus autem motiua sensibilis est duobus modis: nam quedam est motiua 
modo naturali, quedam uero modo animali; et motiuam sensibilem modo naturali dico que nec mouet 
secundum apprehensionem, nec est subiecta imperio racionis, qualis est uirtus uitalis siue pulsatiua. 
Est autem hec uis in corde sicut in organo; et est uis per inspiracionem et respiracionem, principium 
existens contemperancie caloris cordis et corporis. 
97 Summa, C. 105, 2-6. Vis autem concupiscibilis est uis imperans moueri ut appropinquetur ad ea que 
putantur necessaria aut utilia appetitui delectandi. Vis uero irascibilis est que imperat moueri ad 
repellendum id quod putatur nociuum uel corrumpens appetitum uincendi. 
98 Hasse, p.139. 
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 (1) sense perception of the form (external senses, common sense) 
 (2) perception of its connotational attribute (estimation) 
(3) judgement about the connotational attribute with regard to the form 
(estimation) 
(4) development of attraction or repulsion (will = irascible and concupiscible) 
(5) decision (faculty of decision) 
(6) movement performed with the help of nerves and muscles 
 
Some of the above actions are accompanied by mental states such as fear, anger, joy, 
hunger and as we have seen hostility and friendliness are perceived by the power of 
estimation. Further in De anima, IV, 4, Hasse tells us that Avicenna states that some 
of these mental states ‘are accidents of the irascible and concupiscible faculties’.99 It 
seems that Avicenna’s remarks are ‘a bit sketchy’ but the point is to show how these 
mental states trigger a positive or a negative reaction towards something.  
 
Jean’s interest in the concupisciple and irascible powers is naturally grounded 
in moral philosophy. He confines his discussion to the positive and negative aspects 
of the appetitive power. The appetitive powers can help to explain the conflicts that 
arise because of these two powers.  
 
In order to know the difference between the irascible and the concupiscible it 
is necessary to note that the good is spoken of in two ways: there is the pure and 
simple good, and there is also what Jean calls the expedient good. The good purely 
and simply is delight, while an expedient good is described as saddening and 
difficult. Nevertheless it is a good since it useful. An example of a good that is a 
delight is food while an expedient good is medicine or an incision in order to save 
the body. Therefore, the concupiscible is the power which desires the good; the 
irascible is the power which desires the expedient but difficult good. Just as there are 
                                                
99 Ibid. 
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two aspects to existence, existence according to nature and the existence according to 
an order, there is also two aspects to the good. The first is the concupiscible power 
which aims at delectation; the second the irascible which aims at excellence or 
honour.  
 
The concupisible power finds rest in the possession of the good. On the other 
hand, the taking away of a desired good causes a disturbance in the irascible power 
and this is considered bad. When an evil is apprehended the irascible power, if it is 
strong, will hope for the desirable and will be both courageous and angry. Jean 
quotes from Damascene ‘anger is the spearman of reason and the avenger of desire’. 
If it is weakened the irascible power despairs and both fears and flees.  
 
The question might be asked as to why there should be a distinct power for 
pursuing the good and another which resists anything that prevents one from 
pursuing the good? Aquinas, for example, would not agree that the will ‘is 
distinguished into a concupiscible and irascible component’.100 For Aquinas, the will, 
contrary to sensitive appetites, has ‘a single unifying object’ whereas the appetitive 
power has two sides to it and therefore can be described as two separate powers.  
 
Jean outlines the acts and movements which arise from the command of the 
concupiscible and the irascible powers. Since the concupiscible powers seek what is 
delightful to the senses, its acts are those of desiring, rejoicing, loving and acts of this 
kind. Their opposites are to be avoided. These include such acts as despising, sorrow, 
sadness, hatred, namely, acts that are contrary to loving and valuing. Jean 
                                                
100 Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, p. 240. 
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differentiates between different modes of pleasure and displeasure. He discusses how 
pleasure can be related to good or to evil; either it can refer to one’s own pleasing or 
to the pleasing of another but he states no one would want to seek evil for himself. 
Therefore, evil or displeasure only arise in respect of another and it generates hatred. 
Jean presents a list of possible acts of the concupiscible power, the positive and the 
negative. He states, however, that these and all other acts of the concupiscible power 
are reducible to one criterion, that is, whether they generate a pleasing or a 
displeasing result and therefore, whether one must pursue the former and shun the 
latter.   
 
Jean continues his discussion of the irascible power and the acts that follow 
from it. The acts of the irascible, since they refer to the arduous and the difficult have 
a two fold disposition, that is, a weak and a strong disposition. According to the 
strong disposition of the acts that arise from the command of the irascible power; 
some act for the good, some against evil. Acts that are directed towards the good are 
acts that demonstrate excellence and honour. These include acts of ambition and 
hope, pride, domination, contempt. Jean discusses how each of these acts can help 
one towards achieving excellence and honour. Acts that are aimed at overcoming 
evil are acts that call for courage and anger at whatever is the cause of the evil. The 
contrary position holds with regard to the weak disposition of the irascible power. 
Fleeing from what is good causes a lack of spirit, despair, humiliation and reverence. 
Jean raises an obvious question, since good attracts the appetite, how is it possible to 
flee from the good? In reply he states that it is not fleeing from the good inasmuch as 
it is good, but inasmuch as it is difficult.  
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Jean poses the question as to whether appetite and emotions refer to the same 
thing? He distinguishes between them as he states that appetite is a movement, a 
command, whether of the irascible or the concupiscible. On the other hand, emotions 
arise after the apprehension of the good or the bad. Following a four-fold division of 
desires of the soul Jean states: 
 
Consequently feelings are multiplied according to four differences, and this is 
according to the saints and the philosophers, that is, joy or happiness, grief or 
sadness, desire or hope, dread or fear; the number of them is evident. Two 
come from an apprehension of the good, two come from the apprehension of 
the bad. From an apprehension of the good, comes joy or happiness, desire or 
hope. Joy or happiness concerns a present good, desire or hope concerns the 
future. From the two that come from an apprehension of the bad, grief or 
sadness concerns a present evil, dread or fear concerns the future.101   
 
Although Jean does not mention the source of this doctrine it is to be found in 
Isaac of Stella and, more significantly, in the Pseudo-Augustine’s De spiritu et 
anima, which, as we have seen, was one of Jean’s sources on the powers of the soul. 
The four divisions are also to be found in William of St Thierry, but were originally 
derived from Stoic moral theory and were ‘available to the medievals through a wide 
variety of sources’.102 The four powers, ‘serve as the basis for the virtues and vices; 
when well ordered, they are the sources of the four cardinal virtues, which quoting St 
Augustine, are asserted to be nothing more than different modifications of the power 
of love’.103  
 
                                                
101 Summa, C. 108. 7-14. Vnde affectiones multiplicantur secundum quattuor differencias, et hoc 
secundum sanctos et philosophos, scilicet gaudium seu leticia, dolor seu tristicia, cupiditas seu spes, 
metus seu timor; quarum patet numerus. Nam due sunt ex comprehensione boni, due ex 
comprehensione mali. Ex comprehensione boni, gaudium seu leticia, cupiditas seu spes. Sed gaudium 
siue leticia est de bono presenti, cupiditas uel spes de futuro. Due ex comprehensione mali, dolor seu 
tristicia de presenti malo, timor uel metus de futuro.  
102 McGinn, p. 53. Sources cited are Chalcidius, Commentarium, chap. 194 (ed. Waszink, pp. 216-
217); Augustine, De Civitate Dei XIV, 6 (ed. cit. II, p. 421); Nemesius, Premnon physicon, XVII, 1-6 
(ed. cit., pp. 95-96); and Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae I, met, 7 (ed. Rand, pp. 168-170). 
103 Ibid. 
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According to Jean differences in emotions originate from three causes. One is 
the disposition of the person, another is the disposition of the motive power and the 
third is the dispositon of the complexion of the body. The first refers to how feelings 
can have a positive or negative effect on a person. The positive dispositon of a 
person who is ill but believes he is getting better can have a beneficial effect on the 
person’s health. The second aspect is that the more we exercise a power, according to 
its proper nature, the more it becomes a habit and it is re-enforced in us. The third 
aspect is the disposition of the humours, the blood and the spirits, all of which 
influence the feelings. Melancholia, as Jean states, is characterised by an excess of 
black bile in the body which was believed to affect the cognitive capacities. It is the 
imbalances between the elementary qualities which predisposes one to a good or bad 
physical state but they also affect the mental states associated with joy, anger, fear 
and sadness.  
 
Before moving on to the cognitive and motive faculties of the sensitive soul 
mention must be made of another topic which seems to have intrigued the writers of 
the early thirteenth century. This is Avicenna’s theory of the shellfish and nerves, 
two topics which feature in the latter’s theory of touch. We have see that Jean 
follows Avicenna in his account of the organs, the intermediaries and the objects of 
the senses in which the nerves figure in a very prominent way. He is also interested 
in a new kind of voluntary movement which is introduced by Avicenna as a critical 
response to Aristotle’s theory that touch ‘is the only faculty shared by all animals and 
not touch and movement as Avicenna says’.104 Avicenna’s main argument is that it is 
impossible that an animal should have the sense of touch but no voluntary 
                                                
104 Hasse, p. 94. 
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movement. There is, according to Avicenna a kind of voluntary movement which is 
to be distinguished from progressive movement, that is movement from place to 
place. 
 
As Avicenna states, there are two kinds of animal movement: since there is 
local movement from place to place and the movement of contraction and 
extension of the animal’s limbs. For it is impossible that an animal has the 
sense of touch, and does not have the power of movement of some kind in 
itself.105  
 
Avicenna’s main point is that in the case of the shellfish, ‘the shellfish contract and 
dilate in the interior of their shell’ and does not move from its position. While Jean is 
interested in the new kind of movement he refers to it as ‘animal movement’ and not 
as ‘voluntary movement’ as Avicenna had called it. Despite the misunderstanding 
Hasse states that Avicenna’s theory was successful, one reason is that it was in 
disagreement with Aristotle and secondly he maintains that it was of particular 
interest to writers concerned with the faculties of the soul. It is interesting to note that 
Jean does not refer to the disagreement with Aristotle. As Hasse states, Avicenna’s 
views often differ from those of Aristotle; he highlights the fact that with regard to 
the sense of touch for example, ‘Aristotle would oppose the view that there is no 
medium and that the organ of touch is affected directly by the object. Also, he would 
not locate the organ in the nervous flesh, but inside the body, close to the heart’.106  
 
The topic of the nerves was also of great importance since they also serve as 
an example to demonstrate the success of Avicenna’s psychology. It was in the third 
century BC that Herophilus and Erasistratus made the great discovery by carrying 
                                                
105 Summa, C. 110, 11-15. Sicut enim dicit Auicenna, motus animalis duplex est: quia est motus 
localis de loco ad locum, et est motus contrahendi et extendendi membra animalis. Impossibile enim 
est ut animal habeat sensum tangendi, et non habeat in se uirtutem motus aliquo modo. 
106 Hasse, p. 101. 
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out dissections ‘which enabled them to distinguish between nerves, veins and 
arteries’.107 It is not, however, until the eleventh century that the medical tradition 
begins to impact on philosophical and theological writings. The writings of 
Constantine the African were available in the eleventh century yet, at that time, few 
authors on the soul incorporated the newly available knowledge. With the arrival of 
Avicenna, however, the situation changed to a physiological understanding of the 
soul which can be seen in the case of the vegetative and sensitive soul and the very 
concrete example in the case of the nerves.   The Arabic influences were at their peak 
in the early half of the thirteenth and this will be even more obvious as we approach 
the topic of the intellect in Avicenna and its impact on the scholastic writers at a very 
specific time in the history of philosophy.  
 
 
SECTION SIX 
THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL 
 
While Jean holds to Aristotle’s active and passive intellect as proper to the individual 
human being our study will show that he faithfully followed Avicenna with regard to 
the intellectual soul; one with regard to the doctrine of the Four Intellects and 
secondly with regard to the Agent Intellect. Aristotle’s doctrine was interpreted by 
some Greek commentators as saying that both the active and passive intellects 
belonged to each individual soul. However, Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 AD) 
held that the active or agent intellect was separate and one for all minds. Following 
Alexander, Avicenna regarded the active intellect as a separate substance, however 
his doctrine of the agent intellect was placed within the context of his theory of 
                                                
107 Ibid., p. 99. 
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emanation. Jean, as we shall see, tries to incorporate the distinction between the 
different levels of intellection into his Christian beliefs while accepting the active 
intellect of Avicenna.  
 
Having considered the cognitive and motive faculties of the sensitive soul, 
Jean states, that the intellective soul also has two faculties; the theoretical and the 
practical.108 Jean’s main argument for stating that the intellective power is immaterial 
is taken from Avicenna’s De anima, where it is stated that the intellect does not 
employ any organ in its activity. As it is stated by Jean: 
 
Likewise, no power that is embodied, that is, no power that is determined or 
acts in a part of the body, knows itself through its organ, since it cannot 
reflect upon itself, since it is in the body. Therefore, the eye does not see 
itself; the imagination does not imagine itself; therefore, since the intellective 
power is capable of knowing itself; it therefore knows itself when it reflects 
upon itself. Therefore the intellective power is not embodied not does it act 
through an organ.109 
 
Another argument which is put forward for the immateriality of the 
intellective soul is that whatever is known is in the knower according to the nature of 
the knower and not according to the nature of the known object. Jean states that ‘all 
that is received is in that which receives according to the nature of the recipient and 
                                                
108 Summa, C. 111, 1-3. Consequenter est dicere de uiribus racionalibus et humanis que primo 
diuiduntur per apprehensiuas et motiuas siue per intellectum secundum speculatiuum et practicum. 
Compare the following lines from Avicenna’s De anima, Book I, c. 5: p. 90, 61-63. Quotation 
highlighted by Hasse as being attributable to Avicenna: ‘Sed animae rationalis humanae vires 
dividuntur in virtutem sciendi et virtutem agendi, et unaquaeque istarum virium vocatur intellectus 
aequivoce aut propter similtudinem.’  
109 Summa, C. 112, 19-24. Item, nulla uirtus incorporata, id est parti corporis determinata siue operans, 
per organum est cognitiua sui, quia non potest reflecti supra se, cum sit incorporata. Vnde oculus non 
uidet se; nec ymaginacio ymaginatur se; cum ergo uirtus intellectiua sit cognitiua sui; intelligit enim 
se cum reflectitur supra se. Ergo uirtus intellectiua non est incorporata, nec operans per organum. 
Compare the following lines from Avicenna’s De anima, Book V, c. 2: p. 93, 60 – 94, 67. It is also 
highlighted by Hasse as being attributable to Avicenna: ‘Dicemus igitur quod virtus intellectiva, si 
intelligeret instrumento corporali, oporteret ut non intelligeret seipsam, nec intelligeret instrumentum 
suum, nec intelligeret se intelligere: inter ipsam etenim et essentiam suam non est instrumentum, nec 
inter ipsam et instrumentum eius est instrumentum, nec inter ipsam et id quod intelligit est 
instrumentum; sed intelligit seipsam, et ipsum instrumentum quod adscribitur ei, et intelligit se 
intelligere: ergo intelligit per seipsam, non per instrumentum.’ 
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not according to that which is received’.110 The statement that sensation perceives 
‘neither its own organ, nor itself, nor its activity’111 has its source in Aristotle. 
According to Rahman: 
 
Aristotle’s reply to this question is that the faculty of sensation exists only 
potentially until some actual sensible object brings it into actuality. This is, 
however, difficult to understand, for according to Aristotle the sensible object 
becomes actual only in the act of sensation and before that it exists only 
potentially. The question is not really answered at all. If other bodies can 
become actual objects of sensation, why not the organs themselves? 
Avicenna’s reply is that sensation must use a bodily organ, and there being no 
such organ between it and its organ, it cannot know its own organ.112 
 
 
In fact this leads Rahman to say that Aristotle failed ‘to formulate the idea of 
an individual central ego’ for two reasons. The first is because of his ‘general 
doctrine that the soul in itself, being form, is universal and is individualised only 
through matter’, and secondly, because he attributed ‘self consciousness to a sensual 
principle’.113 This contrasts with Avicenna’s Flying Man experiment which, as we 
have seen, was employed by Avicenna to prove that self awareness is non-sensory.  
 
Since the intellective power is immaterial its object is immaterial. The 
intellective power abstracts the form of the object from matter and from all its 
material conditions. This is the work of the theoretical intellect which grasps the 
intelligible forms and by combining Avicenna’s theory of abstraction with the 
Pseudo-Augustine Jean differentiates between coming to know intelligible forms of 
the corporeal and spiritual spheres. For example, he states that the form by which 
God is known is a likeness or an image of a first truth impressed on the soul from 
                                                
110 Summa, C. 112, 24-28. Item, quod comprehenditur uel cognoscitur est in cognoscente secundum 
naturam cognoscentis, et non secundum naturam rei cognite, ut patet in omnibus, et generaliter omne 
quod recipitur est in recipiente secundum naturam recipientis, et non secundum naturam recepti. 
111 Rahman,  p. 103. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., p. 104. 
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creation. In other words there are some forms which are abstracted by nature and the 
soul simply receives them. As he states, according to the Pseudo-Augustine ‘the soul 
knows that God is above it, that it can know itself and that it can know an angel 
which is near to it’ which helps Jean to explain how we know the forms of spiritual 
beings.114 Other forms are abstracted through contemplation through which we know 
corporeal things and those things which have their foundation in bodies.  
 
However forms which are abstracted through contemplation are the forms 
through which we know corporeal things and those which have their 
foundation in bodies. For since the nature of the intellect is superior to 
corporeal things and it has power over the corporeal forms because of its 
extrordinary way of abstracting them; for at first it abstracts from the senses, 
then from the imagination and from all material conditions, such as shape, 
location and the like. And once all the material conditions are removed and 
the particular subsistences, it receives these abstracted and universal, 
generally and immaterially, as genera, as species, as differences between 
proper or accidental properties. However, this abstraction does not occur by 
action but by contemplation.115 
 
 
Abstraction can occur through the imagination and through estimation, but as 
Jean explains following Avicenna, imagination does not strip the form of all the 
material conditions since forms that are in the imagination are imagined together 
with their  quantity, quality and other qualities. Imagination abstracts the particular 
form. Estimation abstracts the intentions, which, as we have seen, are present in 
matter, such as the hostility which is present in the wolf when it is perceived by the 
                                                
114 Summa, C.113, 24-25. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, quod, ‘anima cognoscit Deum supra se, se 
in se, angelum iuxta se’.  
115 Summa, C. 113, 33-41. Forme uero que sunt per consideracionem abstracte sunt forme quibus 
cognoscuntur corporalia et ea que in corporibus fundantur. Cum enim natura intellectus superior sit 
rebus corporalibus, et potestatem habet super corporales formas miro modo abstrahendi eas; abstrahit 
enim eas primo a sensibus, postea ab ymaginacione et condicionibus materialibus omnibus, ut figure, 
situs et huiusmodi. Et sic expoliatis omnibus condicionibus materie et singularis subsistencie, accipit 
eas abstractas et uniuersales, communes et immateriales, ut genera, species, differencias per propria 
uel accidencia. Abstractio autem ista fit non actione sed consideracione. 
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lamb. It is only at intellectual level, when the form is stripped of all its material 
conditions that the ‘apprehension of the form is most true’.116  
 
Jean refers to Avicenna’s statement that on account of matter ‘many 
dispositions accrue to material forms’,117 however they do not possess them because 
of their essence. This is best explained by Rahman118 when he refers to the ‘quiddity 
of man’, which is in itself an immaterial form, but when present in matter it is subject 
to material accidents, such as, Jean states, shape, place, quantity, quality and 
position. These are not essential to the quiddity of man, they do not belong to the 
essence of the form of man, if they did then all men would have the same qualities, 
quantities and similarly for other qualities.  
 
 In addition to abstraction the intellectual soul knows by means of the active 
and the possible intellects.  
 
Therefore, it should be known that there is a passive and corruptible intellect 
which is called the material intellect by Aristotle; there is also an 
incorruptible and separable intellect. The passive intellect is the inferior 
power of the intellective part joined to the sensitive power which receives 
intelligible species in the phantasms.119  
 
Jean adds to this that the intellective power is also distinguished according to higher 
or lower reason (ratio superior et inferior) or the superior and inferior intellect. This 
is a well known distinction from Augustine which enjoyed something of a renewal 
                                                
116 Summa, C. 113, 93-94. Cum ergo sic apprehenditur, uerissima est ipsius forme apprehensio. 
117 Summa, C. 113, 68-70. Notandum tamen est secundum Auicennam, quod formis materialibus 
propter materiam accidunt disposiciones multe quas non habent ex sua essencia, scilicet ex hoc quod 
sunt forme. 
118 Rahman, p. 95. 
119 Summa, C. 114, 2-5. Sciendum igitur quod est intellectus passiuus et corruptibilis qui dicitur ab 
Aristotele materialis; et est intellectus incorruptibilis et separabilis. Intellectus autem passiuus est uis 
inferior partis intellectiue coniuncte sensibili que recipit species intelligibiles in fantasmatibus. 
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among the medieval scholars. It may be associated with the distinction made by 
Avicenna, (which was referred to above with regard to the immortaility of the soul) 
as the doctrine of the two faces of the soul. The distinction appealed to Jean although 
he seemed to favour the Augustinian distinction between the inferior and superior 
reason of the soul.120  
 
5.6.1 Doctrine of the Four Intellects 
 
 
Avicenna is indeed indebted to Aristotle for his distinction between the active and 
passive intellect. Avicenna, however, goes further as he divides the possible intellect  
into what is called the ‘doctrine of the four intellects’. Described as ‘four different 
categories of relating to the universal forms’121 the doctrine is also based in a theory 
of syllogistic intellection. Avicenna distinguishes between the various phases of the 
human intellect. This appealed to Jean as he incorporates the doctrine in full.  
 
The first is the intellect having possibility only; and it is like a material power 
in relation to the likeness of prime matter which of itself does not have any 
form, but is the subject of all forms. The second is the intellect having a 
disposition; this is when the principles are already held in the intellect, that is 
, propositions which it comes to believe, not from somewhere else, but they 
are known by their very nature; such as every whole is greater than its parts, 
and if from an even quantity you take away an even quantity the remaining 
quantities are even. The third is the actualised intellect, which already has the 
knowledge of the conclusions which follow from principles, but there is no 
conversion in the act towards them through deliberation. The fourth is the 
intellect in practice, when it deliberates immediately the doing of an action.122 
 
                                                
120 See Chapter II, Section 5: The immortalilty of the soul. 
121 Hasse, p. 178. 
122 Summa, C. 115, 10-19. Prima est intellectus habens possibilitatem tantum; et est sicut potencia 
materialis ad similitudinem materie prime que ex se non habet aliquam formam, sed est subiectum 
omnium formarum. Secunda est intellectus disposicionem habens; quod est cum iam habentur in 
intellectu principia, hoc est proposiciones quas contingit credere non aliunde sed per se note; sicut 
omne totum est maius sua parte, et si ab equalibus equalia demas, que relinquantur sunt equalia. 
Tercia est intellectus perfectus, cum iam habet intellectus conclusionum eorum que secuntur ad 
principia, sed non est conuersio actu ad illa per consideracionem. Quarta est intellectus in usu, cum 
iam considerat in actu. 
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Jean’s discussion of the four intellects begins with a reference to an analogy made by 
Avicenna with regard to learning to write.123 The first stage is a state of absolute 
potentiality when the child has no knowledge of the art of writing or of anything 
connected with the art. The second stage, ‘marks the rudiments of the art of writing’ 
when the child has learnt simple letters. The third stage is when the child has 
mastered the art of writing ‘the whole art has been learnt in its completeness’. 
 
The analogy helps to explain the four intellects with regard to the acquisition 
of knowledge, the first stage is the intellect beginning from a state of absolute 
potentiality. It is a ‘mere potentiality for thinking and is the first stage given to us at 
the time of birth. The second is the intellect in habitu, that is, once the intellect has 
acquired some primary intelligibles it can proceed to secondary intelligibles. From 
the premisses of a syllogism such as, ‘The whole is bigger than the part’, one can 
make further deductions. The third is the intellect in effectu, when the intellect has 
gone through an act of syllogistic reasoning. Thus the intellect has passed through 
two stages of potentiality to a third stage which is the ‘perfection of this 
potentiality’.124 In the fourth stage (this stage is not referred to in the analogy) the 
intellect ‘passes into absolute actuality’, and while the second and third stages can 
know the various parts of the syllogism the fourth stage, intellect accomodatus is the 
actual thinking of ‘the syllogistic order which corresponds to reality’.125 This is 
absolute actuality which occurs when the intelligible forms are actually present in the 
soul and connects with the separately existing active intellect.  
 
                                                
123 The analogy is adapted by Jean but here I refer to the explanation by Rahman, p. 87. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Hasse, p. 183. 
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Avicenna’s doctrine of the four intellects proved to be very successful but 
‘comparing the fate of this Avicennian doctrine with that of others, notably theories 
of the external and internal senses, one finds that it was transformed rather than 
accepted, even as a piece of Peripathetic teaching.’126 Initially, the fact that it was a 
theory about syllogistic reasoning was not realised. However, due to the anonymous 
treatise De anima et de potentiis eius, ‘Avicenna’s idea fell on fertile ground for the 
first time’.127 This treatise influenced both Jean and Albert the Great. Jean 
‘understood the connection between Arabic intellect theory and Western discussion 
of the axiomatic method’.128  The following is quoted by Hasse from Jean’s 
Tractatus, it appears also in Jean’s Summa, with some slight differences between 
them.   
 
Then follows the activity of the [already formed] possible intellect, with 
respect to, first, the quiddities, second, the first pieces of knowledge which 
are the principles of the sciences, third the conclusions. For example: first 
[the intellect] knows what is a whole, what is a part; then it knows the 
proposition (which is a principle known per se) that ‘Every whole is bigger 
than its part’, and likewise in other cases; third, it knows the conclusion 
which follows, namely that evey continuous [thing] is bigger than its part, 
and likewise in other cases. Hence, it is in the way of induction that the form 
abstracted from particulars is collected, through which the possible intellect is 
formed; it is in the way of a syllogism that the already formed possible 
intellect proceeds. 129 
 
Jean adapts the Avicennian doctrine slightly. As Hasse explains, ‘in Jean’s theory, 
the formation of the possible intellect through abstraction precedes the act of 
                                                
126 Ibid., p. 200. 
127 Ibid., p. 191. 
128 Ibid., p. 195. 
129 Hasse, p. 196, n. 657. Jean de La Rochelle, Tractatus, 2.22, p. 94. ‘Et tunc subsequitur operatio 
intellectus possibilis, prima circa quidditates, secunda circa comprehensiones primas, quae sunt 
principia scientiarum, tertia circa conclusiones. Verbi gratia: Primo cognoscit quid totum, quid pars; 
secundo propositionem, quae est principium per se notum: omne totum maius est sua parte, et sic in 
ceteris; tertio conclusionem, quae consequitur, scilicet quod omne totum continuum est maius sua 
parte, et sic in ceteris. Per viam ergo inductionis colligitur ipsa forma abstracta a singularibus, qua 
formatur intellectus possibilis; per viam vero sillogismi proficit operatio intellectus possibilis iam 
formata.’ 
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syllogistic intellection’.130 Avicenna, states Hasse, holds that the primary intelligibles 
are innate knowledge, while the conclusions are abstracted through contact with the 
agent intellect.  
 
5.6.2 The Active Intellect 
 
 
The active intellect is ‘an external intelligence which is always in actuality and 
which makes the potential human intellect actual’.131 It does not belong to the 
individual intellectual soul as does the possible intellect. As we will see this was a 
major challenge to the Latin authors who were interested in maintaining the role 
played by the active intellect but some could not accept the fact that the active 
intellect remained outside the soul.  Jean, on the other hand, found a way to take a 
mediating standpoint. For this he can be counted among those medieval thinkers who 
held the doctrine which was later to be called ‘Avicennized Augustianism’132 which 
is described as ‘one of the most significant medieval fusions of philosophical and 
theological doctrine’.133  
 
Following Avicenna, Jean proves the existence of the agent intellect: 
 
With regard to the agent intellect’s existence, it is proved as follows by 
Avicenna. The human soul is at first the intellect in potentiality and later the 
intellect in actuality. All that passes from potentiality into actuality, only 
passes through a cause which leads it from potentiality into actuality. This is 
the cause whereby our souls, in the case of intelligible objects, passes from 
potentiality into actuality. But the cause of the act of giving the intelligent 
form is none other than the intelligence in actuality; the agent intellect, 
therefore, exists.134 
                                                
130 Hasse, p. 196. 
131 Rahman,  p. 88. 
132 See above p. 67, n. 17 regarding the origin of the term Avicennised Augustianism. 
133 Hasse, p. 190. 
134 Summa, C. 115, 27-33. De intellectu autem agente quoniam sit, sic probatur ab Auicenna. Anima 
humana prius est intelligens in potencia et postea intellectus in effectu. Omne autem quod exit de 
potencia in effectum, non exit nisi per causam que educit illud de potencia in effectum. Est ergo hec 
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Jean asks whether the agent intellect is separate from the human soul, and if it is 
separate or a part of the human soul, whether it is a created intelligence, as is an 
angel, or whether it is an uncreated intelligence, which is God. Jean accepts all three 
positions, holding that there is no contradiction involved in the following; that God, 
the angels and an interior light within the soul are different agent intellects which are 
distinguished according to their respective objects of knowledge; that some are 
above the soul, some below the soul, some near the soul and some within the soul.  
 
First he proves that the agent intellect is God; Jean relies on Augustine’s 
theory of illumination and quotes directly from the Soliloquia:  
 
Augustine states in The Soliloquies: ‘That just as we observe three things 
about the sun, that is, that it is, that it glistens, that it illuminates; so there are 
three things in the most secret God that we ought to know, that he is 
something which exists, that he is something which knows and that he is 
something which makes everything else know’.135 
 
Jean makes reference to the Gospel of John 1,9, ‘there was the true light which 
lighteth every man coming into the world’. This reference helped to identify Jean as 
belonging to a group of theologians who identified God with the active intellect.136 
Thomas Aquinas, in his early Commentaries on the Sentences, attributed the opinion 
                                                                                                                                     
causa quare anime nostre in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potencia in effectum. Sed causa dandi 
formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligencia in effectu; necessario igitur est agens intellectus. 
135 Summa, C. 116, 5-7. Nam dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloquiorum: ‘Sicut in isto sole tria 
animaduertimus, scilicet quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat; sit in secretissimo Deo tria intelligere 
debemus: quod est, quod intelligit, quod cetera intelligere facit’, quoted in Hasse, p. 210, n. 739 where 
he states that both Jean and the anonymous author of the Liber de causis primis et secundis, edited by 
de Vaux (dating from the turn of the thirteenth century) read intelligit instead of intelligitur in 
Augustine. Cf., Augustinus, Soliloquiorum, c. 8, n. 15 (Patrologia Latina: 32, 877). See above p. 90, n. 
86 regarding the authorship of the Liber de Causis. 
136 Hasse, p. 203, n. 697. Adam of Buckfield, Sententia de anima, MS Oxford Bodl. Canon. Misc. 
322, f. 54ra: ‘Alii autem concedunt secundum modum concedentes aliam esse substantiam […]. Et 
huius opinionis sunt multi theologi qui dicunt intellectum agentem in nobis esse intellectum primi, qui 
quidem intellectus est lux scilicet secundum quod dicitur “erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem 
hominem venientem in hunc mundum” (John I. 9) et quod lux ista lux videtur intimior animae nostrae 
quam sit ipsa sibi.’ 
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to ‘quidam catholici doctores’, and ‘signals agreement, never repeated in his later 
works’.137 
 
The agent intellect above the soul is God himself, as Jean states: 
Therefore it should be said that in order to know those things which are above 
it, those which concern the divine essence and the Persons of the Trinity, 
which are understood in a divine way, the soul needs illumination from the 
ray of light itself of the first eternal truth upon the highest power itself, which 
is called mind or intelligence, of which Augustine states, it is formed by the 
first truth itself, with no intervention from nature.138 
 
In order to know those things that are near to the soul, such as essences, 
powers, orders and angelic acts, the soul needs the angelic revelation or instruction, 
according to this an angel may be an agent intellect inasmuch as it instructs the 
human intellect. The agent intellect at this level looks not to the highest form of the 
human intellect which refers to the eternal and the uncreated, but to the inferior form, 
inasmuch as Augustine distinguishes between intelligence, intellect and reason. 
 
To know what is within the soul, the soul itself is the agent intellect. Jean 
states that by an innate light the soul knows that it exists, that it can reason, sense, 
that it knows or does not know something, that it is just or unjust. Following 
Augustine he states that it is a turning towards one’s inner self. Finally to understand 
the nature of corporeal beings the agent intellect as the supreme power of the human 
soul, suffices. 
 
                                                
137 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis, II.17.2.1.c, p. 423. Ref. in Hasse, p. 204, n. 701. 
138 Summa, C. 116, 41-46. Dicendum ergo quod ad intelligenda ea que sunt supra se, sicut sunt ea que 
de divina essencia et Trinitate personarum intelliguntur diuino modo, indiget anima irradiacione ab 
ipsa luce prime veritatis eterne super supremam uim ipsius que dicitur mens uel intelligencia, de qua 
dicit Augustinus quod nulla interposita natura formatur ab ipsa prima ueritate. 
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Jean, therefore, maintains the doctrine of the separate agent intellect. He is 
certainly an exponent of Avicennised Augustinianism. This can be proved if we 
return to Gilson’s criterion for the application of the phrase: ‘the term is appropriate 
if a medieval thinker (1) teaches that God is the active intellect, and (2) affirms that 
this can be proved by establishing the concordance of Augustine with Aristotle as 
interpreted by Avicenna’.139 Jean establishes his position on the basis of Augustine 
and Avicenna.  We have seen how he interprets Avicenna’s agent intellect according 
to a distinction which is to be found in Augustines’s Soliloquia, that is, Jean locates 
the agent intellect not only above the soul but also beside, within and below the soul. 
With regard to the act of the agent intellect Jean follows Avicenna as he states: 
 
It should be noted, following Avicenna, that the function of the active 
intellect is to illuminate or to diffuse the light of the intelligence upon the 
sensitive forms which exist in the imagination or in estimation; and by 
illuminating to abstract them from all material circumstances, and to join the 
abstracted forms or set them in an order in the possible intellect, just as 
through the action of light the form of colour is somehow abstracted and 
joined to the pupil of the eye.140  
 
According to Hasse, the above, ‘is a faithful interpretation, which surpasses much of 
what has been said on Avicenna’s theory of abstraction in modern times’.141 In some 
respects the active intellect is the Augustinian theory of illumination; for example, 
Jean compares the sun to God, in the passage from Augustine’s Soliloquia. In other 
respects the agent intellect plays an intermediary role in the abstraction of forms, 
which, according to Avicenna, exist in the imagination and estimation. For Jean the 
positing of many different agent intellects would not be difficult to explain. He 
                                                
139 Hasse, p. 205. 
140 Summa, C. 117, 1-7. Notandum ergo secundum Auicennam, quod operacio intellectus agentis est 
illuminare siue lumen intelligencie diffundere super formas sensibiles existentes in ymaginacione siue 
estimacione; et illuminando abstrahere ab omnibus circumstanciis materialibus, et abstractas copulare 
siue ordinare in intellectu possibili, quemadmodum per operacionem lucis species coloris abstrahitur 
quodam modo et pupille copulatur. 
141 Hasse, p. 202.  
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wanted to explain his Christian belief in the forms that were completely separate 
from all the material and temporal conditions.  There is just one agent intellect above 
the soul, which is God, but so many separate agent intellects which are needed to 
know what is beside, within and below the soul.  Hasse poses an interesting question: 
how did Avicenna come to be identified with the doctrine of the separate active 
intellect? The scholastic thinkers of the early thirteenth century linked Avicenna’s 
analogy of the sun with Augustine’s, and, according to Hasse, ‘it also implied 
Avicenna’s conviction of the separateness of the active intellect’.142 However, ‘the 
active interest in the agent intellect was originally posited to explain thought in 
man’143 which, as we have seen, was also Jean’s main interest, including that of 
imparting a Christian meaning to a theory which helped to explain how we can know 
forms of knowledge that cannot be known empirically. Jean transformed the theory 
of the active intellect and although Avicenna might have reacted negatively to Jean’s 
identification of God with a separate active intellect, it is a testament to Jean’s 
intellectual skill that he does not confine the active intellect to knowledge of the 
divine. Instead, his fusion of Avicenna and Augustine leads to, ‘a refined 
epistemological position which discriminates between different kinds of intellection 
depending on the ontological status of their object’.144  
 
Jean is indeed indebted to Avicenna’s psychology of the soul, and the 
Avicennian influence is particularly clear in Jean’s presentation of the external and 
internal senses and his positing of the agent intellect as having both an external and 
an internal role in his understanding of the mind. Jean could be accused of being too 
free in his use of the doctrine of the agent intellect as, ‘it would imply an 
                                                
142 Hasse, p. 222. 
143 Davidson,  p. 18. 
144 Hasse, p. 231. 
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intermediary between the soul and God in some aspects of illumination’.145 Jean is 
certainly less indecisive regarding certain Avicennian doctrines, particularly in his 
reconcilation with the doctrine of illumination from St Augustine. He is, however, 
writing at the time before the views of Averroes had been assimilated, causing a 
major problem for Christian authors on the soul. Averroes agreed with Avicenna that 
the active intellect was separate and one for all men, but he held the same view with 
regard to the possible intellect. As with the agent intellect, the possible intellect was 
separated from matter in order to know universals. This was Averroes response to 
rescuing Aristotle from a Neoplatonic interpretation. His views, however, could not 
be renconciled with Christian teaching, particularly with regard to the immortality of 
the soul.      
 
 
                                                
145 Leonard J. Bowman, ‘The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan 
School of the Thirteenth Century’, The Modern Schoolman (March 1973), 251–279 (p. 257). 
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CONCLUSION  
 
Jean’s Summa is an important witness to the encounter between three different 
sources of reflection; the theological, the medical and the philosophical, marked, for 
the most part, by Augustine, Avicenna and Aristotle respectively. This encounter was 
one of the most significant to have occurred in the history of medieval philosophy 
and Jean can be placed among a few authors who wrote on the soul at this very 
specific moment in time. The writings of both Aristotle and Avicenna offered an 
alternative approach to the way the soul had been understood under the influence of 
Neo-Platonism and Augustine. This had to be taken into consideration, it was 
unavoidable, but, Jean, like so many medieval thinkers, remained substantially 
faithful to the teaching of Augustine.  He frequently cites Augustine in his treatise on 
the soul (albeit from the work which is wrongly attributed to Augustine but, 
nonetheless, a very influential source in the thirteenth century) and, as we have seen, 
he successively created, in his discussion of the agent intellect, a synthesis between 
Augustine and Avicenna. Aristotle’s definition of the soul ‘as the first actuality of a 
physical body having life potentially in it’ is taken up by Avicenna and it is this 
account which we find in Jean. In the Najat, Avicenna describes the three parts of 
soul (the vegetable, the animal and the specific human parts) as entelechy 
respectively, of their natural functions. Jean, in his discussion of the three faculties, 
following Avicenna, states that ‘soul is the name of perfection’.1 The vegetative soul 
is the perfection in plants; the sensitive soul (or animal soul in Avicenna) is the 
perfection in brute animals; rationality is the perfection in man. Aristotle’s definition 
of the soul (probably the first definition of soul) was obviously regarded by 
                                                
1 Summa, C. 26, 38-40. Et quamuis sint tres substancie, non tamen tres anime in homine, quia anima 
nomen est perfectionis. 
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Avicenna as a comprehensive definition of the soul and, as Rahman remarks, ‘when 
added to the differentiae, would yield the definition of the species, so to speak’.2  
 
What impact did such philosophical sources have on Jean’s understanding of 
the soul? The first chapters of the Summa, relying on Jean’s original combination of 
Avicenna’s famous ‘Flying Man’ argument for the existence of the soul and the 
Augustinian account of ‘interiority’, establishes, argumentatively, that the soul has 
self awareness and is capable of reflecting upon itself. The editor of Jean’s Summa 
compares the latter’s interpretation of the Canticle of Canticles with the very topic of 
self-knowledge. It is a reminder to the reader of the Delphic oracle to ‘know thyself’, 
but following Augustine in the Confessions it is more true to say that Jean is 
referring not just to the self reflective nature of the soul but also to the fact that the 
mind can be ‘unconscious of itself’ and, therefore, as Augustine stressed, must 
‘return from over absorption in self images which cause forgetfulness of self’.3 The 
first consideratio of the Summa is a theological study of the soul but as we have 
seen, Jean was one of the first Franciscan authors to have attempted to integrate the 
Greek and Arabic philosophical works to the work of a theologian. It is precisely 
because Jean gives philosophy such a high status that he should be given a prominent 
place in the history of medieval philosophy. This can be seen is his use of logic and 
of the Aristotelian categories of substance and accident; matter and form; causality 
with regard to the soul; possible and necessary existence in relation to the existence 
of God. In particular, Jean shows himself to be an original thinker when he applies 
the Avicennian distinction between ‘being’ and ‘essence’ to the soul. He maintains 
that, a priori, the human soul is an immaterial substance, if and only if it is 
                                                
2 Rahman, p. 72. 
3 Mary T. Clark, ‘De Trinitate’, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. by Stump and 
Kretzmann (2001), pp. 99–102 (p. 98). 
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understood in terms of its being and its essence. The notion of essence, which plays a 
key role in Avicenna’s philosophy, was not an important theme at this time and it 
was not until the thirteenth century, as one commentator points out, ‘did this theme 
enter the philosophy and theology of the Western Christian world, in particular with 
the use made of it by St Thomas in his De ente et essentia’.4 This distinction, 
nevertheless, is already present in Jean’s account of the formal cause of the soul. The 
notion of quo, as an instrumental cause, is picked up again by Jean in relation to the 
intelligible species, and it is stated that ‘the characterization of the species as an 
instrumental quo is a remarkable trait of his thought’,5 and perhaps it anticipated the 
species theory in St Thomas. Jean’s interpretation of the intelligible species reads as 
follows: 
 
And since it [the intellective power] is an immaterial substance its object is 
immaterial and this is the intelligible [species]. The intelligible [species] is 
the form abstracted from matter and from the conditions of matter. Of the 
images or forms abstracted from matter, some are abstracted through their 
own nature, as spiritual beings, some, however, through the action of the 
intellective power itself, that is through reflection, as the images or likenesses 
through which corporeal beings are known.6 
 
It is stated, however, that the ‘mediating role of abstracted species is not elaborated 
any further in his [Jean’s] works’.7 Jean, as we have seen, follows Avicenna and 
Augustine to form his theory of abstraction. St Thomas, however, offered his own 
interpretation of the intelligible species. It is interesting to note that, for St Thomas, 
the intelligible species is characterised as ‘quo intelligitur’, and thus it may be 
concluded that Jean was a possible source for St Thomas’s epistemological account, 
either directly or indirectly.  
                                                
4 Jean Jolivet, ‘The Arabic Inheritance’, in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. by 
Peter Dronke, pp. 113–148 (p. 130). 
5 Spruit, p. 127. 
6 Summa, C. 113, 1-8. 
7 Spruit, p. 127. 
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The question of the unity of body and soul was a major issue for theologian 
and philosopher alike. How could an immaterial substance, such as the soul, be the 
form or perfection of a corporeal substance, such as the human body? Jean maintains 
that there is a colligatio between the soul and the body. He states that because the 
soul is the form or perfection of the body it is united directly with the body. However 
in order to explain the unity of a spiritual substance with a material substance Jean 
states that the powers of the soul are the intermediaries between the body and soul. 
Following Philip the Chancellor, he states that the union takes place by means of the 
vegetative and sensitive powers. More specifically, and following the Pseudo-
Augustine, Jean states that it is the imaginative faculty which links the soul and the 
body. For Damascene it is the memory which links the senses to the intellect as 
memory is the power of retention of both sensitive and intellectual objects.  
 
For Avicenna, the lowest level of abstraction is at the level of the senses, the 
highest is intellection, ‘and the two middle grades occupied by the faculties which 
were known in the Arabic tradition as “internal senses”’.8 Of the internal senses, the 
estimative faculty, appealed to the medieval authors of the early thirteenth century; 
however, it was also one of the most controversial for later medieval authors. It is a 
faculty which deserves our further study, as it helps to explain the ‘fight or flight’ 
concept. It also helps to explain how sensing in not only triggered by physical 
external causes but also how we can also perceive the real causes of things in an 
immaterial way. It also has implications for contemporary philosophy of mind 
‘where it refers to the directedness of mental states towards objects’, a theory 
elaborated in the work of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) who introduced his own 
                                                
8 Black, p. 312.   
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interpretation of intentionality which, he, in turn, inherited from the ancient and 
medieval commentators on Aristotle and Avicenna.9  
 
It can be concluded, therefore, that, for Jean, Avicenna simply offered more 
in his account of the cognitive faculties of the soul. Jean’s account of the powers of 
the soul according to Avicenna surpasses in length his account of the division of 
powers that he accorded to Augustine and John Damascene. This is why Jean 
provides a detailed account of the interior senses in Avicenna before moving his 
discussion to the nature of abstraction as a stripping of forms from their 
individuating accidents. His exposition of the various levels of intellect, known as 
the ‘doctrine of the four intellects’, is an important example of a doctrine that shows 
that Avicenna was simply preferred to Aristotle. Jean is also identified as one of a 
few authors who accepted the doctrine of the separate active intellect thereby 
achieving ‘a refined epistemological position which discriminates between different 
kinds of intellection depending on the ontological status of their object’.10  
 
Jean, in other words, had an open mind with regard to the new medical and 
philosophical sources but he, like his contemporaries, realised that they had to take 
sensations of the body into account, if they wanted to understand man in his physical 
and psychical nature. This was an enormous challenge to the theologian, given the 
often negative view of sensation and the body in the early years of the Christian 
Church. The very word ‘soul’ itself had a different meaning in the medical tradition 
to the philosophical or theological sense. Soul, in the medical sense, referred to the 
rational, living human being which points ‘towards an evident mechanism while the 
                                                
9 Ibid, p. 311.  
10 Hasse, p. 231. 
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philosophical model, even if it is sometimes ambiguous, seems to manifest the 
intuition of the main characteristic of the rational processes, that is to say, their 
metaphysical dimension’.11 It may mean that there will always be a difference 
between the physical and the psychical, but what Jean and his contemporaries 
achieved by their engagement with the Greek and Arabic authors was an 
understanding of man which went beyond seeking a reconciliation between the two 
models. They made great efforts to make sense of the relationships between the 
various sensations and powers of both body and soul. The impact of the first 
encounter between Augustine, Aristotle and Avicenna gave rise to heated arguments 
on the relationship between body and soul, with the Arabic texts as their basis. 
Following Avicenna, Jean argues for the immortality of the soul yet there are the 
obvious tensions between the Avicennian notion that the essence of the soul can be 
understood apart from its union with the body, and the Christian belief in the 
resurrection of the body. This must be understood, however, as coming from 
Avicenna’s refusal to believe in the literal acceptance of passages in the Koran and 
that for him, the intellectual apprehension of God was the purest joy or happiness for 
man.  
 
For our study I have focused on Jean’s reflections on the nature of the human 
soul and its powers as documented in his Summa de anima (1235-1236). This is 
arguably his most significant contribution to Medieval thought in general and to 
philosophical psychology in particular. Over the last thirty years there has been a 
renewal of interest in the psychological doctrines of the Middle Ages. It is hoped that 
the study presented here will be a worthwhile contribution to said renewal.  
                                                
11 Vico, p. 316. 
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APPENDIX (I) 
 
LATIN TEXT WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SELECTED PASSAGES FROM THE  
SUMMA DE ANIMA OF JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE  
 
 
THE FIRST CONSIDERATIO  
I. Prologue 
II. That the Soul exists (Chapter 1) 
III. On The Formal Cause of the Soul (Chapter 17) 
IV. That the Soul is One in Three Powers (Chapter 26) 
V. On the Differences between the Intermediaries of Union (Chapter 39) 
 
 
 
THE SECOND CONSIDERATIO  
Pseudo-Augustine 
VI. Division of the Powers with regard to the Soul Itself (Chapter 26) 
VII.  On the difference between Truth and Falsity (Chapter 29) 
 
 
John Damascene 
VIII. On Imagination (Chapter 69) 
IX. IX.  On Memory (Chapter 71) 
 
 
Avicenna 
X. On Common Sense (Chapter 97) 
XI. On Imagination 
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(I)  Prologus 
 
  
(I) Prologue 
Si ignoras te, o pulcherrima 
mulierum, uade et abi post greges 
caprarum etc.  Tibi, anima 
racionalis, proponitur uerbum istud, 
que es mulierum pulcherrima, quia 
omnium creaturarum speciosissima, 
tenens ymaginem et similitudinem 
summe pulchritudinis et decoris; 
hanc tuam si ignoras pulchritudinem, 
irracionabilibus gregibus 
compararis: unde uade et abi post 
greges caprarum. Tibi ergo, anima, 
de te ipsa consideranda sunt tria: 
substantia uidelicet tua, uirtus et 
operacio, in quibus consistit tua 
admirabilis pulchritudo. Da michi 
ergo, amantissime Ihesu, sedium 
tuarum assistricem sapienciam et 
noli me reprobare; sed da michi 
sapienciam que mecum sit et mecum 
laboret, considerantem doceat et 
instruat, reuelans oculos meos, et 
considerabo mirabilia de anima 
mea. 
 
I. AN SIT ANIMA 
CAPITULUM I 
(II) QUOD ANIMA SIT 
 
Imprimis ergo, adiuuante Ihesu 
Christo, ostendendum est ipsam 
 If you ignore yourself, most beautiful of 
women, go and follow after the herds of 
she-goats etc. Rational soul, this very 
speech is addressed to you, you who are 
the most beautiful of women, since you are 
the most splendid of creatures, possessing 
an image and likeness of the highest 
beauty and elegance; if you ignore your 
beauty, you are compared to the irrational 
herds: whence go and follow after the 
herds of she-goats. For you, therefore, O 
soul, concerning yourself three things must 
be considered: namely your substance, 
power and activity, in which your 
admirable beauty exists. Give me, 
therefore, most loving Jesus, the wisdom 
which attends upon your thrones and do 
not  reject me; but give me the wisdom that 
will be with me and assist me, that it may 
teach and instruct the one contemplating, 
uncovering my eyes, and I will consider the 
wonders concerning my soul. 
 
 
 
I. WHETHER THE SOUL EXISTS 
CHAPTER I 
 (II) THAT THE SOUL EXISTS 
 
First, therefore, with the help of Jesus 
Christ, it must be shown that the soul 
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esse, ut nunquam contingat de ea 
dubitare an sit, hoc modo. Cum 
uideamus quedam corpora que non 
nutriuntur, nec augmentantur, nec 
generant, nec mouentur motu 
uoluntario, ut lapides; et videamus 
alia corpora que nutriuntur, et 
augmentantur, et generant sibi 
similia, ut plantas; et videamus alia 
que sentiunt et mouentur uoluntarie; 
relinquitur ut in essencia eorum sit 
principium harum actionum, preter 
corporeitatem. Quia si principium 
harum esset corporeitas, inueniretur 
tunc in omnibus corporibus. Cum 
ergo illud, a quo emanant iste 
actiones, ab omnibus dicatur anima: 
anima igitur est. Preterea, nos 
uidemus actiones in quibus 
conueniunt uegetabilia et animalia et 
homines tantum, sicut nutrire et 
generere; et actiones in quibus 
conueniunt animalia tantum, aut 
plura ex eis, et homines in quibus 
non conueniunt uegetabilia, ut 
sentire, ymaginari et moueri 
uoluntarie; et actiones que sunt 
proprie hominum, sicut raciocinari, 
intelligere, discernere inter uerum et 
falsum et bonum et malum, 
adinuenire artes, et consiliari et 
libere eligere. Erit ergo in 
uegetabilibus principium nutrimenti 
exists, so that it may never happen for it to 
doubt if, in this way, it exists. Since we see 
certain bodies which are neither nourished, 
nor increased nor generated, nor moved by 
voluntary movement, such as stones: and 
we see other bodies which are nourished, 
both increased and generating others like 
themselves, such as plants: and we see 
others which sense and are moved 
voluntarily: it remains that the principle of 
their actions is in their essence, besides 
corporeality. Because if the principle of 
their actions were corporeal, then it would 
be found in all bodies. Therefore, since 
that from which those actions emanate is 
called soul by everyone: therefore, the soul 
exists. Besides, we see actions in which 
plants, animals and human beings only 
share such as nourishing and begetting; 
and actions in which only animals share, or 
many of them, and human beings share in 
and which plants do not, such as sensing, 
imagining and being moved voluntarily; 
and there are actions which are proper to 
human beings such as reasoning, 
understanding, discerning between both 
truth and falsity and good and evil, 
discovering the arts, and both deliberating 
and choosing freely. Therefore, there is a 
principle of nutrition and generation in 
plants, indeed, a principle we call the 
vegetative soul; in animals a principle of 
sensing, of imagining and of being moved 
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et generacionis, quod quidem 
principium dicimus animam 
uegetabilem; in animalibus 
principium senciendi, ymaginandi et 
mouendi secundum appetitum, quod 
dicitur anima sensibilis; in 
hominibus vero principium 
raciocinandi et intelligendi etc., quod 
dicitur anima racionalis. Ergo anima 
uegetabilis est et sensibilis et 
racionalis.  
Ad hoc est racio Avicenne 
talis: posito quod subito esset homo 
creatus perfectus et, uelato uisu suo, 
non uideret exteriora, et taliter 
creatus esset quod non tangeret eum 
spissitudo aeris quam ipse sentire 
posset, et membra sic essent 
disiuncta ut non concurrerent sibi, 
neque contingerent; constans est, 
quod sic conditus homo, cogitans de 
se, non dubitaret affirmare se esse: 
non tamen affirmaret exteriora 
suorum membrorum, uel occulta 
suorum interiorum, sicut cerebrum 
uel alia; immo si possibile esset ei 
ymaginari manum, uel aliud 
membrum, non ymaginaretur illud 
membrum sui, nec necessarium sue 
essencie. Cum ergo omne quod 
affirmatur aliud est ab eo quod non 
affirmatur, et concessum aliud est ab 
eo quod non conceditur, essencia 
according to desire, which is called the 
sensitive soul; and in man the principle of 
reasoning, and of understanding etc., 
which is called the rational soul. Therefore, 
there is the vegetative soul, the sensitive 
and the rational. 
 For this purpose the argument of 
Avicenna is as follows: given that a man 
was created immediately and, his vision 
has been veiled, he would not see exterior 
objects, and that he was made in such a 
way that the breadth of the air which he 
himself could feel would not touch him, 
and the limbs were separated in such a way 
that they do not meet nor touch each other; 
it is clear that man made in this way, 
thinking about himself, would not hesitate 
to affirm that he exists: he would not, 
however, affirm the outer parts of his 
organs nor the hidden parts of his interior 
organs, such as the brain or other inner 
organs; indeed if it were possible for him 
to imagine a hand, or another limb, he 
would not imagine that limb as his own, 
nor as necessary to his essence. Since, 
therefore, everything that is affirmed is 
different from that which is not affirmed, 
and that which is conceded is different 
from that which is not conceded, the 
essence, however, which he affirms, is his 
own, because it is his very self: however, 
this essence is apart from his body, since 
he does not affirm his body. Once 
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autem quam affirmat est propria illi, 
eo quod illa est ipsemet; tamen est 
preter corpus eius, quod non 
affirmat. Expergefactus igitur ab 
huiusmodi statu, habet uiam 
euigilandi et cognoscendi quod esse 
anime aliud est quam esse corporis. 
 Item, Augustinus, in libro De 
anima et spiritu: ‘Nichil tam novit 
mens uel anima quam id quod sibi 
presto est; nec menti nec anime 
quicquam magis presto est quam 
ipsa sibi. Ergo nichil tam novit quam 
se: cognoscit enim uiuere se, 
meminisse se, uelle, cognoscere, 
scire, iudicare; et hec omnia 
certissime novit de se’. Impossible 
est igitur quod ignoret se esse. 
Item, ‘cum querit mens uel 
anima quid sit mens uel anima, 
profecto novit quod seipsam querit; 
et novit quod ipsa sit mens que se 
ipsam querit uel anima; nec aliud 
querit de se, sed seipsam. Cum ergo 
querentem se novit, se utique novit 
esse’. 
 
 
III. DE ANIMA QUANTUM AD 
FIERI 
CAPITULUM 17  
(III) DE CAUSA FORMALI ANIME 
 
Consequenter querendum est de 
forma, que est pars rei per quam est 
actu. Queritur ergo an anima habeat 
awakened, therefore, from a state of this 
kind he has a way to realise and know that 
the existence of the soul is different from 
the existence of the body.  
Likewise, [Pseudo]Augustine in the 
book On the Soul and Spirit: [states] ‘The 
mind or soul knows nothing except that 
which is present to itself; nothing 
whatsoever is more present to either the 
mind or the soul than itself. Therefore, it 
knows nothing as much as it knows itself: 
for it understands that it lives, that it 
remembers, wishes, understands, knows, 
judges; and it most certainly knows all of 
these things about itself ‘. Therefore, it is 
impossible that it does not know that it 
exists. 
Again, ‘when the mind or soul asks 
what is the mind or soul, it certainly knows 
that it is asking itself; and it knows that it  
is the mind or soul which is questioning 
itself;  nor does it ask something else about 
itself, but itself. Since, therefore, it knows 
that it is itself questioning, it certainly 
knows that it exists’. 
 
 
 
 
III ON THE SOUL WITH REGARD TO 
BECOMING 
CHAPTER 17  
ON THE FORMAL CAUSE OF THE SOUL  
 
Next we should investigate the form, 
which is the part of a being through which 
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formam, quia, cum forma sit aliquid 
unum componencium, si non habet 
formam, uidetur quod habeat 
materiam; et si habeat formam et 
materiam, tunc est compositum quid. 
Hoc uidetur per Boecium, in libro, 
De Trinitate: ‘In omni eo quod est 
citra Primum, est hoc et hoc’. Sed 
non materia et materia, forma et 
forma: ergo materia et forma. Ergo 
anima est composita ex partibus 
essencialibus, scilicet materia et 
forma. Item, beatus Dionysius: Post 
monadem sequitur dyas: ergo cum 
prima dualitas sit materie et forme, 
post monadem divinam erit in 
qualibet creatura dualitas materie et 
forme. Item, nichil est agens et 
recipiens ipsius materie. Cum igitur 
agere sit proprium forme, recipere 
ipsius materie, anime autem sit agere 
et recipere; anima igitur est 
composita ex materia et forma. Item, 
esse accidentis ponit esse substancie: 
ergo composicio accidentalis ponit 
composicionem substancialem. Cum 
igitur in anima sit composicio 
accidentalis, quae attenditur in 
composicione accidentis cum 
substancia, ut sunt in anima scientia 
et virtutes, tunc erit in anima ipsa 
composicio substancialis. 
 Contra. Augustinus, in libro 
it is in act. Therefore, it is asked if the soul 
has a form, since form is a certain one of 
the components, if it does not have form, it 
seems that it has matter; and if it has form 
and matter then it is something that is a 
composite. This is apparent through what 
Boethius states in the book On the Trinity: 
‘in everything that is below the First there 
is this and this’. But there is not matter and 
matter, form and form: therefore there is 
matter and form. Therefore the soul is 
composed of essential parts, namely matter 
and form. Likewise, blessed Dionysius: 
‘After the monad comes the dyad’: 
therefore, since the first duality is that of 
matter and form, after the divine monad 
there will be a duality of matter and form 
in every creature whatsoever. Likewise, 
nothing produces or receives matter itself. 
Therefore, since acting is proper to form, 
receiving proper to matter itself, however, 
it is proper to the soul to act and to receive; 
therefore, the soul is composed of matter 
and form. Likewise, accidental being needs 
substantial being: therefore, accidental 
composition needs substantial 
composition. Therefore, since an 
accidental composition is present in the 
soul, which is considered in accidental 
composition with substance, just as 
knowledge and the virtues are in the soul, 
accordingly, there will be a substantial 
composition in the soul itself. 
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De quantitate anime: Simplex anime 
natura dici potest, quia ex aliis 
naturis non est: ergo non habet 
partes essenciales. Item, omnis 
substancia nobilior est quam sua 
potencia. Cum ergo nobilitas essendi 
sit maior penes simplicitatem quam 
penes composicionem, erit omnino 
substancia simplicior, uel ad minus 
eque simplex, sicut sua potencia; sed 
potencia anime intellectiva simplex 
est et immaterialis, sicut infra 
probatur, capitulo de viribus 
racionabilibus cognitiuis: ergo 
simplex est substancia anime. 
 Ad hoc dicendum quod 
partes entis essenciales dicuntur 
dupliciter: uno enim modo partes 
entis dicuntur quod est et quo est; et 
iste partes entis inueniuntur in omni 
eo quod est citra Primum, in omni 
scilicet creatura. Quod manifestatur 
sic: quia omne illud quod est citra 
Primum est ens per participacionem. 
Est ergo in qualibet creatura ens 
differens quod est, scilicet ipsum 
ens, ab eo quo est, scilicet sua 
essencia; quia cum sit ens per 
participacionem, non est sua 
essencia. Quod manifestatur sic: 
sicut enim bonum quod est Deus, est 
bonum per essenciam, quia est se 
ipso bonum, nec est ei aliud esse et 
On the contrary. Augustine, in his 
book, Concerning the quantity of the Soul: 
The nature of the soul can be called 
simple, since it is not derived from other 
natures: therefore, it has not got essential 
parts. Likewise, every substance is more 
noble than its potency. Therefore, since the 
nobility of being is greater in respect of 
simplicity than in respect of composition, 
the substance will be entirely more simple, 
or at least as equally simple as its potential; 
but the potency of the intellective soul is 
simple and immaterial, as was proved 
above in the chapter on the cognitive 
rational powers. Therefore, the substance 
of the soul is simple. 
In reply to this it must be said that 
the essential parts of being are spoken of in 
two ways: for in one way the parts of being 
are called ‘that which exists’ and ‘that 
through which it exists’; and these parts of 
being are to be found in everything which 
is below the First, that is in every creature. 
This is shown thus: because everything 
that is below the First is a being through 
participation. Therefore, in every creature  
‘that which exists’ namely, being itself, is 
different from ‘that through which it 
exists’, namely its essence; since it is a 
being through participation, it is not its 
essence. This is shown as follows: for just 
as the good that is God is good through 
essence, since by his very nature he is 
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bonum esse: ideo in eo indifferens 
omnino bonum et bonitas. Creatura 
autem, cum sit bona, non est ex 
seipsa bona, nec ipsa bonitas; immo 
ex hoc est bona quod ordinabilis ad 
summam bonitatem; et ideo non est 
bona per essenciam, sed per 
participacionem ipsius summe 
bonitatis, quam habet ex ordinacione 
ad ipsam, bona est. Ideo differt in 
creatura quod est bonum et quo est 
bonum, et hoc ipsum bonum et ipsa 
bonitas. Similiter ens quod est Deus, 
cum sit ens se ipso, est ens per 
essenciam. Ens uero creatum, cum 
sit ens ab alio quod est Deus, est ens 
per aliud, est ens per 
participacionem. Et ideo erit 
differens in ente creato quod est et 
quo est. Sicut enim ex hoc quod 
bonum creatum non est bonum nisi 
ex hoc quod ordinatum est ad 
summam bonum; et in hoc apparet 
quod differt in creatura bonum et 
bonitas; sic ens creatum, licet non sit 
ens nisi ab alio quod est Primum, et 
per illud a quo dependet, apparebit 
quod differt in eo quod est et quo 
est, scilicet ens et essencia. Item, 
essencia que creatura est non dicitur 
nisi respectu eius quod est essenciale 
creature. Quod est uero respicit 
essenciale et accidentale, ut patet in 
good, and to be and to be good are the 
same for him; therefore in him the good 
and goodness are entirely without 
distinction. However, a creature, although 
it is good, it is not good from its own 
goodness, nor is it goodness itself; rather it 
is good because it can be ordered toward 
the highest good; and, therefore, it is not 
good through essence, but it is good 
through the participation in the highest 
good itself, which it possesses from its 
being ordered towards the good. Therefore, 
‘that which is good’ and that ‘through 
which’ it is good are different in a creature, 
and this good itself and goodness itself 
also differ. Similarly, the being that is God, 
because he is a being in itself, he is a being 
through essence. However, a created being, 
since it is a being from another, which is 
God, is a being through another, it is a 
being through participation. Therefore, 
‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which 
it exists’ is different in a created being. For 
just as from the fact that a created good is 
only good from the fact that it is ordered 
for the highest good; and it is evident in 
this that the good and goodness differ in a 
creature; in the same way since created 
being is not a being except by another 
which is the First, and through that upon 
which it depends, it will be apparent that 
‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which 
it exists’ is different in him, namely being 
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angelo et anima; quod dicitur de eo 
quod est anima, et quod racionalis 
est, et hoc est essenciale ei; et quod 
est iusta, quod est accidentale. Patet 
ergo quod differt in anima quo est, 
scilicet essencia et quod est. Unde 
regulariter in omni eo quod est 
possibile respectu esse accidentalis, 
erit differens quod est et quo est. 
Tale autem est esse creatum. 
Preterea, omne ens creatum est ens a 
Deo de nichilo. In eo autem quod 
dicitur quod est creatura, intelligitur 
quod est ens de nichilo. In eo autem 
quod dicitur quo est, intelligitur 
essencia a Deo sive quam accipit a 
Deo. Secundum primum modum, est 
in creatura potencia receptiua et 
passsiua; iuxta secundum modum, 
potencia activa. Alio modo dicuntur 
partes essentiales materia et forma; 
et hee partes solum inueniuntur in 
illis solis que a Deo sunt de aliquo, 
non autem in hiis que a Deo sunt de 
nichilo. Corporalia ergo, que sunt de 
aliquo composicionem habent 
materie et forme; materia enim est 
de qua est aliquid uel fit aliquid; 
forma uero per quam est aliquid. 
  
 Dicendum est ergo quod 
spiritualia et anima racionalis 
composicionem habent ex partibus 
essencialibus que partes sunt quod 
and essence. Likewise, the essence by 
which a creature is, is only said in respect 
of that which is essential to a creature. 
However ‘that which is’ refers to the 
essential and accidental, as is clear in an 
angel and in the soul; because it is said 
about it that it is a soul, and that it is 
rational, and this is essential to it; and that 
it is just, that this is accidental. Therefore, 
it is clear that ‘that which exists’ and ‘that 
through which it exists’, namely the 
essence, differ in the soul. Hence, regularly 
‘that which exists’ and ‘that through which 
it exists’ will be different in everything 
that is possible with regard to accidental 
being. But this is created being. Besides, 
every created being is a being created by 
God from nothing. But insofar as a 
creature is called that ‘that which exists’, it 
is understood that it is a being made from 
nothing. But insofar as it is called ‘that 
through which it exists’ one understands 
the essence as from God or that it receives 
from God. According to the first mode, 
there is a receptive and passive potential in 
a creature, according to the second there is 
an active potential. In another way, the 
essential parts are called matter and form; 
and these parts are only found in those 
things alone which are from God out of 
something, but not in those which are from 
God out of nothing. Therefore, corporeal 
beings which are made out of something, 
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est et quo est, quia sunt a Deo et de 
nichilo; et non habent 
composicionem que est ex materia et 
forma proprie dictis, quia non sunt a 
Deo creata de aliquo. Sic ergo a 
Boecio intelligitur hoc et hoc, et a 
beato Dionysio dyas sequens 
monadem; et secundum hoc recipere 
et agere in anima differens est, 
scilicet recipere per naturam eius, 
quod dico quod est, agere per 
naturam eius quo est. Sic eciam 
intelligendum est quod composicio 
essencialis precedit accidentalem. 
Sed queritur, cum anima sit 
composicio eius quod est et quo est 
(quo est ut forme et quod est ut 
subiecti et quasi materie), utrum quo 
est angelus, et quo est anima 
racionalis sint idem secundum 
speciem; et cum uterque sit spiritus 
racionalis, nec differant nisi in hoc 
quod alter est spiritus unibilis 
corpori, alter uero non, sed 
separatus: unitum autem et 
separatum non uidetur inducere 
differenciam secundum speciem, sed 
alium modum essendi: erit anima et 
angelus idem secundum speciem. 
Sed contra. Quoniam angelus per 
hoc quod separatus est, habet esse 
persona; anima per hoc quod 
unibilis, habet esse forma et 
have a composition of matter and form; for 
matter is that from which something exists 
or from which something becomes; form, 
however, is that through which something 
exists.  
Therefore, one should say that 
spiritual beings and the rational soul have a 
composition made from the essential parts, 
which are the parts ‘that which exists’ and 
‘that through which it exists’, since they 
are from God and made from nothing; and 
they do not have a composition which is 
from matter and form, properly speaking, 
since they are not created by God from 
something. Therefore, it is in this way that 
the one and the other is understood by 
Boethius, and the dyad following the 
monad by blessed Dionysius; and 
according to this to receive and to act is 
different in the soul, namely through its 
nature it receives, what I call ‘that which 
exists’, acting through its nature I call ‘that 
through which it exists’. Also it must also 
be understood that the essential 
composition precedes the accidental. But 
the question arises, since the soul is a 
composition of ‘that which exists’ and of 
‘that through which it exists’ (‘that through 
which it exists’ as form and ‘that which 
exists’ as subject and as a kind of matter), 
whether that through which an angel exists 
and that through which the rational soul 
exists are the same according to species; 
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perfectio et non persona: ergo 
differens est esse hinc et inde 
secundum speciem. Item, anima 
racionalis habet differentes virtutes 
secundum speciem, scilicet uegetare, 
sentire, ab angelo cuius solum est 
intelligere; ergo et essenciam 
differentem secundum speciem; 
quod concedendum est. Et dicendum 
ad obiecta, quod cum dico spiritum 
unibilem, hoc quod dico unibilem 
facit differenciam secundum 
speciem, et non solum differenciam 
secundum modum essendi; nam 
unibile facit speciem hominis esse 
animam, non unibile uero in angelo 
facit angelum spiritum esse tantum. 
  
 Sed queritur utrum quo 
angelus est spiritus (hoc est creatura 
racionalis uel intellectualis), et quo 
anima est spiritus differenciam faciat 
secundum speciem; et cum angelus 
quo est racionalis faciat angelum 
deiformem in intellectu, secundum 
quod dicit beatus Dionysius et 
secundum actum, quia ab inicio sue 
condicionis habet formas impressas 
ad intelligendas rerum naturas; quo 
vero anima humana est racionalis 
non facit ipsam deiformem nisi 
potencia, ut in ipsa prima condicione 
sit quasi tabula nuda in qua est 
possibilitas ad formas et non actus; 
and since both are a rational spirit, 
differing only in that one is a spirit that can 
be united to the body, and the other is not, 
rather it is a separated spirit: but being 
united and separated does not seem to 
introduce a difference according to species, 
but according to another mode of being: a 
soul and an angel will be the same 
according to species. But against that. 
Whereas an angel, from the fact that it is 
separated, has being as a person; a soul, 
from the fact that it can be united, has 
being as a form and a perfection and not as 
a person: therefore there is a difference 
according to species between one and the 
other. Likewise, the rational soul has 
different powers according to species, 
namely, vivifying, sensing, which is 
different from an angel to whom only 
understanding belongs; therefore it has 
also a different essence according to 
species; which must be conceded. And in 
response to the objections, when I speak 
about a spirit that is capable of unity, that 
which I say is capable of unity causes a 
difference according to species, and not 
only a difference according to the mode of 
being; for being capable of unity makes the 
species of man to be a soul, and not being 
capable of unity in an angel makes an 
angel to be spirit alone. 
But the question is asked whether 
that by which an angel is a spirit (that is, a 
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ergo differt racionale secundum 
speciem in anima et in angelo. Item, 
racio et intellectus angelicus non 
indigent sensu, nec habent 
ordinacionem ad sensum; intellectus 
autem humanus essencialiter 
quantum ad materiam inferiorem qua 
percipit creaturas esse in ordine ad 
sensum; ergo differunt secundum 
speciem. Item, intellectus angelicus 
prima relacione suscipit 
illuminacionem a Primo, sicut 
predictum est; humanus autem 
secunda relacione. Item, intellectus 
angelicus cum non sit ordinatus ad 
sensum non est collatiuus 
sensibilium et intelligibilium; 
intellectus uero humanus est 
collatiuus: cum ergo racionale dicat 
intellectum conferentem, 
intellectuale uero dicat intellectum 
absque collacione contemplantem 
ueritatem, erit differencia specifica 
intellectus humani racionale, et 
intellectus angelici intellectuale; ut 
quo angelus est sit intellectualitas, ut 
loquamur secundum quod possumus; 
et quod est ipse angelus, sit 
substancia intellectualis; quo anima 
humana est, sit racionalitas; et quod 
est sit substancia racionalis, 
quemadmodum dictum est; et inde 
est quod differencia specifica 
rational or an intellectual creature), and 
that by which the soul is a spirit makes a 
difference according to species; and since 
that by which an angel is rational makes 
the angel Godlike in its intellect, according 
to what blessed Dionysius states; and 
according to act, since from the beginning 
of its condition it has the forms imprinted 
on it for the purpose of knowing the nature 
of things; but that by which the human soul 
is rational does not make it Godlike except 
in potency, in such a way that in the 
original condition it is like a clean writing 
tablet in which there is the possibility for 
the forms and not the act; therefore, the 
rational differs according to species in the 
soul and in the angel. Likewise, reason and 
the angelic intellect do not need sensation, 
neither are they ordered in respect of 
sensation; but the human intellect as 
regards the lower way in which it 
perceives creatures, is essentially ordered 
towards sensation; therefore, they differ 
according to species. Likewise, the angelic 
intellect, in its original orientation receives 
illumination from the First Being, as has 
already been said; but the human intellect 
receives it through an ulterior orientation. 
Likewise, since the angelic intellect is not 
directed towards sensation it does not 
compare the sensitives and the 
intelligibles; but the human intellect does: 
therefore, since by rational is meant the 
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hominis est racionale. 
 
 
 
 
 
intellect in the act of comparing and by 
intellectual is meant the intellect 
contemplating the truth without 
comparing, there is a specific difference 
between the rational human intellect and 
the intellectual angelic intellect; so that 
that through which an angel exists is 
‘intellectuality’ insofar as we can talk 
about it;  and ‘that which is’, the angel 
itself, is an intellectual substance; and ‘that 
by which’ a human person is, is rationality; 
and ‘that which exists’ is a rational 
substance, in the way that was stated; and 
so it is that the specific difference of a 
human being is rationality. 
 
 
IV DE ANIMA QUANTUM AD 
ESSE 
CHAPTER 26 
(IV) QUOD ANIMA SIT UNA IN TRIBUS 
POTENTIIS 
 
 IV ON THE SOUL WITH REGARD TO 
BEING 
CHAPTER 26 
(IV) THAT THE SOUL IS ONE IN THREE POWERS  
 
Consequenter ostendendum est de 
anima quod sit una in tribus 
potentiis: uegetabili, sensibili, 
racionali. Ad quod procedendum est 
sic: sicut se habet perfectibile ad 
perfectibile, sic perfectio ad 
perfectionem; sed non differt in 
homine perfectibile a uegetabili, 
sensibili et racionali, quia unus 
homo secundum rem est uegetabilis, 
sensibilis, racionalis; ergo una est 
perfectio secundum substanciam. 
 Consequently it should be shown 
concerning the soul that it is one in three 
powers: the vegetative, sensitive and the 
rational. With regard to this we should 
proceed as follows: in the same way that 
the perfectible is constituted in relation to 
the perfectible, so perfection is constituted 
in relation to perfection; but the perfectible 
in man does not differ from the vegetative, 
the sensitive and the rational, since a man, 
according to his essence is vegetative, 
sensitive, rational; therefore, there is one 
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Item, similis est proportio uegetatiui 
ad sensitiuum, et sensitiui ad 
racionale, sicut est trianguli ad 
quadrangulum et quadranguli ad 
pentangulum; quia sicut triangulus in 
quadrangulo, sic uegetatiuum in 
sensitiuo et sensitiuum in racionali. 
Sed cum triangulus est in 
quadrangulo, sic non differt 
secundum substanciam, immo sunt 
idem in substancia; ergo similiter 
uegetatiuum, cum est in sensitiuo, et 
utrumque in racionali, non differunt 
secundum substanciam. Item, si 
essent multa secundum substanciam 
et secundum potenciam in uno 
genere, actus unius non impediretur 
per actum alterius; ut si aliud est 
subiectum in quo est potencia 
sensibilis, et aliud in quo est 
potencia racionalis, actus non erit 
dependens ab actu ut si esset 
differens secundum substanciam et 
subiectum uis sensibilis interior et 
exterior non impediretur actio 
interioris per occupacionem 
exterioris, et e conuerso. Occupata 
ergo anima racionalis circa sensibilia 
non impediretur ad spiritualia; cum 
contrarium sit, quia occupata illa 
circa actum unius impeditur ab actu 
alterius, relinquitur ergo quod sint 
idem subiecto et substancia 
perfection in relation to substance. 
Likewise, the proportion of the vegetative 
to the sensitive, is the same as the sensitive 
to the rational, just as the proportion of a 
triangle is to a square, and a square to a 
pentangle; since just as a triangle is in a 
square, so the vegetative is in the sensitive 
and the sensitive in the rational. But 
although the triangle is in the square, they 
do not differ according to substance, in fact 
they are the same in substance; therefore, 
in the same way, the vegetative, since it is 
in the sensitive, and both of these are 
present in the rational, they do not differ 
according to substance. Likewise, if they 
were many with regard to substance and in 
one genus according to power, the act of 
one would not be impeded by the act of the 
other; so if one is the subject in which the 
sensitive power is present, and another in 
which the rational power is present, the act 
of one will not be dependent on the act of 
the other so that, if the interior sensitive 
power and the sensitive exterior power 
were different according to substance and 
subject, the action of the interior power 
through the activity of the exterior would 
not be impeded and vice verso. Therefore, 
the rational soul, being occupied with 
regard to sensible objects would not be 
impeded from turning towards spiritual 
affairs; since the opposite is the case, 
because when it is occupied with  the act 
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uegetabilis, sensibilis et racionalis, 
differentes potencia. Item, si essent 
differentes secundum substanciam et 
potenciam et operacionem, in nullo 
convenirent et sic impossibilis esset 
unio in homine: non enim uniuntur 
que in aliquo non conueniunt. Item, 
si hoc esset, esset homo diuersarum 
specierum; differenciam enim 
speciei facit diversitas substancialis 
perfectionis. Item, essent tres anime, 
quod dampnat Augustinus, in libro 
De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus. 
Concedendum est ergo eamdem 
substanciam in homine: animam 
uegetabilem, sensibilem et 
racionalem; secundum potenciam 
tamen differentem.  
 Fuerunt tamen qui dixerunt 
tres substancias incorporeas, sicut 
tres uitas, scilicet uitam uegetatiuam, 
sensitiuam et intellectiuam. Habet 
enim homo substanciam 
incorpoream, qua uiuit, crescit et 
nutritur; et hoc ex traduce in 
generacione, in qua convenit cum 
plantis. Habet substanciam 
incorpoream, qua sentit, ex celo et 
stellis, secundum quam conuenit 
cum brutis. Habet eciam 
substanciam incorpoream, qua uiuit 
et intelligit, immediate a Deo per 
creacionem. Et quamuis sint tres 
of one it is impeded by the act of the 
another, therefore, it follows that the 
vegetative, the sensitive and the rational 
are the same in subject and in substance 
but  differing in power. – Likewise, if they 
were different according to substance, 
ability and operation they would not share 
in anything and in this way their union 
would be impossible in man: for things 
which cannot share in anything cannot be 
united. Likewise if this were the case, a 
man would belong to different species; 
because a difference of species causes a 
difference in substantial perfection. 
Likewise there would be three souls, which 
Augustine condemns in the book On 
Ecclesiastic Dogmas. Therefore, we must 
concede that there is one and the same 
substance in man: the vegetative, the 
sensitive and the rational soul; it is 
different, however, according to power. 
 There are those, however, who 
have said that there are three incorporeal 
substances, just as there are three ways of 
living, namely, the vegetative life, the 
sensitive and the intellectual. For man has 
an incorporeal substance through which he 
lives, grows and is nourished; and this is 
passed on in reproduction, something he 
shares in common with plants. He has an 
incorporeal substance, through which he 
senses, under the influence of the sky and 
the stars, inasmuch as he has it in common 
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substancie, non tamen tres anime in 
homine, quia anima nomen est 
perfectionis. Ideo substancia 
uegetabilis non est anima, nisi in 
plantis quarum est perfectio, 
sensibilis uero nisi in brutis; in 
homine autem sunt quasi materiales 
ad racionalem, et racionalis est 
complecio; et ideo ipsa sola est 
anima in homine, aliis existentibus 
ut disposicionibus materialibus ad 
ipsam. De unione autem illarum 
adducunt exemplum in radiis ignis et 
solis qui quandoque uniuntur in aere, 
in quo non sunt nisi quasi unus, et 
hoc propter eorum simplicitatem; et 
sicut contingit quod radius ignis cum 
igne corruptibilis est, et radius 
solaris cum sole incorruptibilis est, 
sic due corrumpuntur cum corpore, 
scilicet uegetabilis et sensibilis; 
tercia remanet et separatur a corpore, 
ut radius ab aere. Dicunt eciam, 
secundum Aristotelem, quod prius 
tempore est in semine ipsa 
uegetatiua, qua nutritur et crescit; 
deinde cum creuerit, subsequitur per 
influenciam corporis celestis, 
sensitiua; ultimo uero infunditur per 
creacionem racionalis ut perfectio 
ultima. Nec sequitur: ante 
infusionem anime racionalis, qua est 
homo, est sensibile et animatum: 
with brute animals. He has also an 
incorporeal substance through which he 
lives and understands, which comes 
immediately from God through creation. 
And although there are three substances, 
however, there are not three souls in man, 
since soul is the name of perfection. For 
this reason the vegetative substance is not 
a soul except in plants, of which it is the 
perfection, and the sensitive substance is a 
soul only in brute animals; but in man they 
are like the material qualities for the 
purpose of rationality, and rationality is the 
full actuality; and because of that reason 
alone is the soul in man, the others existing 
as material dispositions for the purposes of 
the soul. Concerning their union they give 
the example taken from the rays of fire and 
of the sun, which are sometimes united in 
the air, in which they only exist as if they 
were one, and this because of their 
simplicity; and just as it happens that the 
ray of a fire can be destroyed with the fire, 
so the ray of the sun is incorruptible with 
the sun, in this way two substances are 
corrupted with the body, namely, the 
vegetative and the sensitive; the third 
substance remains and is separated from 
the body, as a ray is separated from the air. 
They also say, following Aristotle, that at 
the beginning the vegetative soul itself is 
in the seed, by which it is nourished and 
grows; then when it has grown, the 
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ergo leo uel capra etc., quia est 
animal imperfectum; imperfectum 
dico, non sicut dicitur animal 
imperfectum simpliciter, quod non 
habet omnem sensum, sed 
imperfectum quod est materiale ad 
ultimum complementum. Non sunt 
eciam species differentes, quamuis 
sint differentes substanciales 
perfectiones; quia una est materia 
uel disposicio ad aliam, et ideo est 
simplex perfectio una, scilicet 
ultima, racionalis. Adducunt autem 
ad hoc raciones: primo quia non est 
eadem substancia corruptibilis et 
incorruptibilis; sed corruptibilis est 
sensitiua; incorruptibilis, racionalis; 
ergo non sunt idem secundum 
substanciam. Item, separabilis et 
inseparabilis, mixta corpori et 
immixta, eadem non est substancia: 
ergo primum. Responderi potest 
quoniam sensibilis non corrumpitur 
in homine nec secundum essenciam, 
nec secundum potenciam, sed 
secundum actum tantum, cum 
separatur anima a corpore. Unde 
Augustinus, in libro De anima et 
spiritu, dicit quod anima trahit 
secum sensum et ymaginacionem in 
separacione. Item, misceri corpori 
secundum operacionem et uirtutem 
aliquam, non misceri secundum 
sensitive soul, through the influence of the 
celestial body, comes next; and lastly, the 
rational soul is infused through creation as 
the final perfection. It does not follow: 
before the infusion of the rational soul, by 
which a man is, that a sensitive and a 
living thing exists: and so there is a lion or 
a she-goat etc., since it is an imperfect 
animal; I say imperfect, not in the way that 
an animal is called imperfect simply, 
because it does not have any sense, but 
imperfect inasmuch as it is potential in 
respect of ultimate completion. They are 
again not a different species, even though 
they are different substantial perfections; 
since one is the matter or a disposition in 
respect of other matter, and therefore it is 
one simple perfection, namely the final 
perfection, the rational. However they 
produce reasons for this: in the first place 
that a corruptible substance and an 
incorruptible substance are not the same; 
but the sensitive is the corruptible; the 
rational is the incorruptible; therefore, they 
are not the same according to substance. 
Likewise, the separable and the 
inseparable, mingled with the body and not 
mingled with the body are not the same 
substance: therefore as before. It can be 
replied that since the sensitive soul is not 
corrupted in man, neither according to 
essence or according to power, but 
according to act only, when the soul is 
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operacionem uirtutis alterius, et 
separari secundum habitum, et non 
separari secundum actum uel 
diuersas potencias, nichil prohibet 
esse unius substancie. Secundo 
obiciunt: non est eadem substancia 
prius ens tempore, et succedens 
tempore; sed uegetabilis est prior 
tempore, quod patet in semine et 
embrione, quod prius uegetatur quia 
nutritur et crescit, antequam anima 
racionalis infundatur; ergo primum. 
Et dici posset quod est uegetatiua 
disponens et uegetatiua perficiens; 
una est forma in fieri, alia est in 
esse: prima autem traducitur et 
seminatur cum corpore, secunda 
uero infunditur cum racionali anima. 
Prima ergo transit completo fieri, id 
est corpore formato et organizato; 
secunda autem manet in esse 
potencia racionalis anime; et 
similiter distinguendum est de 
sensibili. Tercio objiciunt: 
substancie separabilis non est 
potencia inseparabilis: ergo anime 
racionalis non est potencia 
uegetabilis uel sensibilis. 
  
 Respondeo ut supra, quia 
potencia sensibilis in homine aliter 
est quam in brutis; quia in brutis 
cum sit forma substancialis 
separated from the body. Hence Augustine, 
in his book On the soul and spirit, states 
that the soul takes sensation and 
imagination with it after the separation. 
Likewise, mingling with a body according 
to the activity and some power, not 
mingling according to the activity of 
another power, and being separated 
according to a disposition, and not being 
separated according to an act or diverse 
powers will not stop anything being a 
single substance. In the second place they 
object: what exists before and what exists 
afterwards is not the same substance; but 
the vegetative soul comes first in time, 
which is clear in the seed and the embryo, 
because it is first brought to life since it is 
nourished and grows, before the rational 
soul is infused: therefore as before. And it  
can be said that there is a vegetative soul 
that orders and a vegetative that completes; 
one is a form present in the becoming, the 
other is present in being: however the first 
is handed on and sewn with the body, the 
second, however, is infused with the 
rational soul. Therefore, the first passes 
away, once its becoming is completed, that 
is, the formed and organised body; the 
second however remains in the being 
power of the rational soul; and similarly 
one must make a similar distinction with 
regard to the sensitive soul. Thirdly, they 
object: an inseparable power does not 
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incorporea non est separabilis a 
corpore, nec secundum potenciam, 
nec secundum actum; in homine 
uero cum sit potencia in substancia 
anime racionalis, separabilis est 
secundum potenciam, non secundum 
actum. Dicamus ergo, secundum 
Augustinum in libro De anima et 
spiritu: ‘Una et eadem est anime 
substancia’, uegetabilis, sensitiua, 
racionalis; sed ‘secundum diuersas 
potencias diuersa sortitur uocabula’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. DE ANIMA QUANTUM AD 
CORPUS 
CAPITULUM 39 
(V) DE DIFFERENCIA MEDIORUM 
UNIENCIUM 
 
Consequenter querendum est de 
differencia mediorum uniencium. 
Nam constans est quod non erit 
ponere medium unius nature; si enim 
esset unius nature, non posset unire 
et confederare tam dispares et 
distantes naturas sicut est corpus 
elementatum, habens mixtionem, 
complexionem et composicionem et 
belong to a separable substance: therefore 
the vegetative or the sensitive powers do 
not belong to the rational soul. 
 I respond as before, that the 
sensitive power in man is different to that 
in brute animals; since in animals, 
although it is a substantial incorporeal 
form, it is not separable from the body, 
neither according to power, nor according 
to the act; however in man since it is a 
power present in the substance of the 
rational soul, it is separable according to 
power, not according to act. Let us say, 
therefore, following Augustine in his book 
On the soul and spirit: ‘the substance of 
the soul is one and the same’, the 
vegetative, the sensitive, the rational; but, 
‘according to the different powers it is 
assigned different names’. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 39 
(V) ON THE DIFFERENCES OF THE 
INTERMEDIARIES OF UNION  
 
The differences between the intermediaries 
of union should be examined. It is agreed 
that one cannot propose an intermediary of 
one nature. For if it is of one nature it 
would not be possible to unite and join 
such different and distant natures, such as a 
body composed of elements, having a 
mixture (mixtio) a combination 
(complexio) and something that is  brought 
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ipsam substanciam racionalem. 
 Queritur ergo de differencia 
que est in medio. Notanda est ergo 
distancia anime racionalis et 
corporis: est ergo substancia 
racionalis, id est anima, natura 
simplex, non contraria, incorporea, 
cognoscitiva, non dependens. 
Corpus vero humanum est natura 
compositum, contrarium, hoc esse ex 
humoribus contrariis, corporeum, 
obtusum, dependens. Vt per 
composicionem opponatur 
simplicitati, per contrarietatem non 
contrarietati seu equalitati 
omnimode, per corporeitatem 
incorporeitati, per obtusionem 
cognicioni, per dependenciam qua 
dependet ab anima racionali, sicut a 
suo rectore et gubernatore, 
opponatur non dependencie, hoc est 
absolute libertati, que est in anima 
racionali secundum intellectum et 
libertatem arbitrii. Hee autem sunt 
quinque opposiciones sive distancie. 
Si ergo debeant hee nature distantes 
in confederacionem unionis uenire, 
necesse est intercurrere media 
quattuor, quatenus, quattuor mediis 
conuenientissima proporcione sibi 
inuicem coniunctis, quinto loco 
nature anime racionalis et corporis 
quinque distanciis seiuncte ualeant 
together (composicio) and the rational 
substance itself. 
 Therefore, one seeks the difference 
which is in the intermediary. Therefore, the 
distance between the rational soul and the 
body must be indicated: the rational soul, 
that is, the soul, is, therefore, by nature, 
simple, non contrary, incorporeal, 
knowledgeable, independent. The human 
body, on the other hand, is, by nature, 
composite, contrary, that is, [it has] being 
from contrary humours, corporeal, 
powerless, dependent. Through 
composition it is opposed to simplicity, 
through contrariety to non contrariety or to 
equality of every kind, through 
corporeality to non corporeality, through 
powerlessness to cognition, through the 
dependence by which it depends on the 
rational soul, such as from its ruler and its 
governor, it is opposed to independence, 
that is, to absolute freedom, which is in the 
soul according to intellect and free will. 
These are, however, five oppositions or 
distances. Therefore, if these distant 
natures ought to reach an agreement of 
union it is necessary to bring together the 
four intermediaries, so that, once the four 
intermediaries are joined in the most 
suitable proportion they, in turn, are joined 
together in a fifth place, they have the 
power to unite the natures of the rational 
soul and the body, having joined the five 
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copulari. Quia ergo media debent 
habere equaliter convenienciam cum 
extremis, quattuor autem sunt media 
necessaria; ergo duo debent esse ex 
parte anime et duo ex parte corporis, 
ut autem melius appareat racio, 
nominemus illa.  
 Ex parte anime sunt duo, 
natura sensibilis et uegetabilis, et est 
natura sensibilis simplex, non 
contraria, incorporea, cognoscitiva, 
dependens. Simplex enim est, aliter 
species et ymagines sensibiles 
facerent distanciam in ea et replerent 
istam. Est eciam incorporea, cum sit 
carens dimensione, quia si haberet 
dimensionem esset maior in maiori 
corpore et minus in minori; et maior 
esset sensus in maiori corpore. 
Incontraria est eciam, hoc est non 
habens contrarium sicut elementa, 
uel ex contrariis sicut elementa. Ipsa 
enim est susceptiva omnis 
contrarietatis corporalis ut secundum 
tactum, calidi, frigidi, humidi et 
sicci, etc.; secundum uisum, albi et 
nigri et sic de ceteris. Cum ergo sit 
receptiva contrarietatum ex natura, 
in se nullam habet contrarietatem. 
Dependens eciam est, non solum a 
natura racionali, que in homine est 
rectrix ipsius et gubernatrix, immo 
eciam a natura corporis cui unitur 
distances. Therefore since the mediums 
ought to have an equal share with the 
extreme parts, and that there are four 
necessary intermediaries; therefore two 
ought to be [proposed] on the part of the 
soul and two on the part of the body, but 
for a better account, let us name them. 
 On the part of the soul there are 
two, the nature of the sensitive and the 
vegetative, and the nature of the sensitive 
is simple, non contrary, incorporeal, 
cognisant, dependent. And it is simple, 
otherwise the species and sensitive images 
would create a distance in it and would fill 
it up. It is also incorporeal, since it is 
lacking in dimension, since if it had 
dimension it would be greater in a greater 
body and lesser in a lesser one; and 
sensation would be greater in a greater 
body. It is also non contrary, that is, it does 
not have contrariety such as the elements, 
neither is it from contraries such as are the 
elements. For it is receptive of all the 
contrarieties of the body as follows, touch, 
heat, cold, wet, dry etc., according to sight, 
white and black and it is the same for the 
others. Therefore, since it is receptive of 
the contrariety from nature, in itself it has 
no contrariety. It is also dependent, not 
only on the rational soul, which in man is 
its ruler and governor, but also indeed, on 
the nature of the body to which it is united, 
as is [the nature of matter],  through which 
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sicut materie et per quod operatur. 
 Natura uero uegetabilis est 
incorporea, simplex, non contraria, 
obtusa, dependens. Simplex est; hic 
enim simplicitatem dicimus que 
opponitur composicioni que est in 
elementatis; racione contrarietatis 
qualitatum ex elementis, non 
contraria est, quia contrarietatem 
non dicimus racione contrarietatis 
que est in elementis, sed racione 
contrariarum qualitatum, ut ignis 
contrarius aque caliditatis et 
frigiditatis, aeri et terre racione 
humiditatis et siccitatis. Incorporea 
eciam est, ut ostendatur differencia 
ipsius a natura celi et corporum 
celestium, que quamuis non habeant 
composicionem ex elementis nec 
subiaceant contrarietati, corpora 
tamen sunt. Obtusa vero est, ad 
differenciam anime ipsius sensitiue 
nature que est cognoscitiua. 
Dependens uero est ad differenciam 
racionalis que est absoluta. Sic ergo 
manifesta sunt duo media ex parte 
anime racionalis: natura scilicet 
sensibilis et uegetabilis. 
 Ex parte uero corporis 
ponenda sunt duo media: unum 
pertinens ad naturam celestem, que 
est quinta essencia, quod dicitur 
spiritus: dicitur a phisicis uehiculum 
it acts. 
 But the vegetative nature is 
incorporeal, simple, non contrary, 
powerless, dependent. It is simple; for here 
we describe simplicity as that which is 
opposed to the composition  which is in 
things composed of elements; by reason of 
the contrariety of the qualities from the 
elements, it is non contrary, since we do 
not speak about contrariety by reason of 
the contrariety which is in the elements, 
but by reason of the contrary qualities, as 
fire is contrary to water on account of the 
heat and the cold, [it is contrary] to air and 
earth because of humidity and dryness. It is 
also incorporeal, as is shown by its 
difference from the nature of the sky and 
of the celestial bodies, which although they 
do not have composition from the 
elements, nor are they subject to 
contrariety, nevertheless they are bodies. 
And it is powerless, in relation to the 
difference from the sensitive nature of the 
soul itself which is cognisant. And it is 
dependent as regards the difference from 
the rational soul which is absolute. 
Therefore, the two intermediaries are 
shown in this way on the part of the 
rational soul: namely the sensitive nature 
and the vegetative nature. 
 And on the part of the body two 
intermediaries must be posited: one 
pertaining to the celestial nature, which is 
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uirium anime; et est corpus subtile, 
spirituale, diffusam in concauitatibus 
membrorum a natura quinte 
essencie; unde motus ipsius a 
fontibus est, sicut motus 
irradiacionis et illuminacionis a 
corporibus luminosis: fontes autem 
dicuntur principalia et radicalia 
membra, cor scilicet, cerebrum et 
epar. Secundum quod distinguitur 
triplex differencia spiritus, naturalis 
in epate, uitalis in corde, animalis in 
cerebro. 
 Aliud medium pertinet ad 
naturam elementalem que fundatur 
in humoribus, et maxime in 
equalitate et contemperancia que est 
in sanguine, quod melius inferius 
apparebit. Est ergo natura spiritus 
simplex, non contraria, corporea, 
obtusa, dependens. Simplex quia non 
composita ex elementis; non 
contraria, quia nature celestis, non 
elementaris; corporea ad 
differenciam naturarum uegetabilis, 
sensibilis, racionalis; obtusa ad 
differenciam sensibilis et racionalis; 
dependens ad differenciam 
racionalis. Natura uero elementalis 
est simplex, contraria, corporea, 
obtusa, dependens. Simplex ad 
differenciam nature elementate; 
contraria uero ad differenciam 
the fifth essence, which is called spirit: the 
naturalists call it a vehicle of the powers of 
the soul; and it is exquisite, spiritual, 
diffused into the concavities by the nature 
of the fifth essence; therefore its movement 
comes from sources, in the way that the 
movement of irradiation and illumination 
comes from  luminated bodies: the sources 
are called the principal and fundamental 
parts, namely, the heart, the brain and the 
liver. Inasmuch as a triple difference of 
spirit is distinguished, natural in the liver, 
vital in the heart, animal in the brain. 
 Another intermediary belongs to 
the nature of the elemental which is 
founded in the humours and especially in 
the level and mixing which is in the blood, 
which will be more apparent below. The 
nature of the spirit is therefore simple, non 
contrary, corporeal, passive, dependent. 
Simple, since it is not a composite from the 
elements; it is non contrary, since it is of 
the celestial nature, it is not composed of 
elements; it is corporeal in relation to the  
different natures of the vegetative, the 
sensitive, the rational; powerless in relation 
to the difference between the sensitive and 
the rational; dependent in relation to the 
difference from the rational soul. The 
nature of the elemental is simple, contrary, 
corporeal, powerless, dependent. Simple in 
relation to the difference from the 
elemental nature; but contrary in relation to 
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predictorum, etc., ut patet. In hiis 
ergo uides naturalem ordinem et 
proporcionem, ut primo natura 
racionalis quasi unum extremum, 
deinde ordinantur media, primum 
natura sensibilis, secundum natura 
uegetabilis, tercium natura spiritus 
celestis, quartum natura elementaris, 
ultimum vero natura elementati 
corporis, quod conuenientissima 
armonia, mediis dispositis, 
copuletur, cum natura anime 
racionalis. Hoc autem quod iam 
diximus probatur sic: racione sumpta 
ex natura mediacionis in ordine 
rerum: nam cum sit simplex nature, 
non contraria, ut anime racionalis, et 
natura composita, contraria, ut 
humani corporis, medium erit inter 
hec natura simplex contraria, uel 
composita non contraria. Sed hec 
ultima non potest esse, scilicet 
composita non contraria; quia 
composicionem hic dicimus que est 
in elementatis ex elementis, que 
omnino est ex contrariis. 
 Relinquitur ergo alterum, 
scilicet natura simplex contraria, que 
est natura elementaris; simplex, quia 
non est elementata, et contraria 
propter contrarias qualitates; ut ergo 
copuletur corpus humanum anime 
racionali; necessarium est medium 
what was said before etc., it is clear. In 
these you see a natural order and 
proportion, as in the first place the rational 
nature is one extreme, then the 
intermediaries are ordered, first the 
sensitive nature, second the vegetative 
nature, third, the nature of the celestial 
spirit, fourth the elemental nature and the 
last, the nature of the body composed of 
elements, that of a harmony that is most 
suited, once the intermediaries are 
arranged, to unite with the nature of the 
rational soul. And that which we have 
already discussed is proved as follows: the 
account, taken from the nature of 
mediation in the order of things: for since 
simple nature exists, non contrary, as the 
rational soul, and a composite nature, 
contrary, as the human body, the 
intermediary between these is a simple, 
contrary nature or a composite, non 
contrary nature. But this last one cannot 
be, namely a composite, non contrary 
nature; since here we are calling 
‘composition’ that which is present [in 
beings] composed of elements from 
elements, which are entirely made from 
contraries. 
 Therefore, another remains, namely 
the simple, contrary nature, which is the 
elemental nature; simple, since it is not 
composed of elements and contrary, 
because of contrary qualities; therefore, in 
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nature elementaris. Item, inter 
naturam non contrarium 
incorporeum, que est anime 
racionalis et naturam contrarium 
corpoream, que est humani corporis, 
medium est natura non contraria 
corporea uel incorporea contraria; 
sed hoc quartum non potest esse, 
scilicet incorporea contraria; nam 
cum omnis contrarietas fundetur 
super naturam corpoream et 
elementarem, si est natura 
incorporea, erit abstracta a 
contrarietate.  
Relinquitur ergo tantum 
tercium, hoc est natura corporea non 
contraria, et hec est natura celestis. 
Vt ergo copuletur corpus humanum 
anime racionali necesse est ponere 
corpus aliud quod sit nature celestis. 
Item, inter naturam incorpoream 
cognoscitiuam anime racionalis et 
naturam obtusam humani corporis, 
medium est natura incorporea obtusa 
uel corporea cognoscitiua; sed hoc 
quartum non potest esse: si enim est 
cognoscitiua, de necessitate est 
incorporea, sicut probatum est supra. 
 Relinquitur ergo tercium, 
scilicet incorporea et obtusa, et hec 
est natura uegetatiua; in unione ergo 
corporis et anime racionalis ponetur 
tercium medium, scilicet natura 
order that the human body be united to the 
rational soul, an intermediary of an 
elemental nature is necessary. Likewise, 
between the non contrary, incorporeal 
nature, which is the rational soul and the 
contrary, corporeal nature, which is the 
human body, the intermediary is by nature, 
a non contrary, corporeal, nature or an 
incorporeal contrary; but this fourth 
[possibility] cannot be, namely an 
incorporeal contrary; for since all 
contrariety is founded upon corporeal and 
elemental nature, if it is an incorporeal 
nature it is abstracted from contrariety. 
 Therefore, only the third possibility 
remains, that is, a non contrary corporeal 
nature, and this is the celestial nature. 
Therefore in order that the human body be 
united to the rational soul it is necessary to 
posit another body which is the celestial 
nature. Likewise, between the 
knowledgeable, incorporeal nature of the 
rational soul and the powerless nature of 
the human body, the intermediary is an 
incorporeal, powerless nature, or a 
corporeal, knowledgeable nature; but this 
fourth possibility cannot be: for if it is 
knowledgeable, out of necessity it is 
incorporeal, as was proved above. 
 Therefore, the third possibility 
remains, namely the incorporeal and 
powerless nature, and this is the vegetative 
nature; therefore, a third intermediary is 
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uegetatiua. Item, inter naturam 
cognoscitiuam non depenentem 
anime racionalis et obtusam 
dependentem humani corporis, 
medium est natura cognoscitiua  
dependens uel obtusa non 
dependens; sed hoc quartum non 
potest esse, quia si est obtusa, de 
necessitate est dependens; quia 
natura obtusa regitur a natura 
cognoscitiua; et eciam si est non 
dependens, de necessitate erit 
cognoscitiua, quia spiritualis et 
absoluta. 
 Relinquitur ergo tercium, 
scilicet natura cognoscitiua 
dependens. Sed hec est natura 
sensitiua. Ponetur ergo de 
necessitate adhuc quartum medium 
ut copuletur natura corporali cum 
anima racionali. Quattour ergo erunt 
media uniencia, natura sensitiua, 
uegetatiua, spiritus qui est natura 
celestis, et natura elementaris.  
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posited in the union of the body and the 
rational soul, namely the vegetative nature. 
Likewise, between the knowledgeable, non 
dependent nature of the rational soul and 
the powerless, dependent nature of the 
human body, the intermediary is a 
knowledgeable, dependent nature or a 
powerless, non dependent nature; but this 
fourth nature is not possible, since if it is 
powerless, out of necessity it is dependent; 
since a powerless nature is ruled by a 
knowledgeable nature; and equally if it is 
non dependent, out of necessity it is 
knowledgeable, since it is spiritual and 
independent. 
 Therefore, the third possibility 
remains, namely the knowledgeable, 
dependent nature. This is the sensitive 
nature. Therefore, out of necessity a fourth 
intermediary is posited in order to unite the 
corporeal nature with the rational soul. 
There are, therefore, four intermediaries of 
unity, the sensitive, the vegetative, the 
spirit, which is the celestial nature, and the 
elemental nature. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 63  
ON THE DIVISION OF THE POWERS OF THE 
SOUL WITH REGARD TO  ITSELF  
 
Consequens est dicere de 
distinctione uirium quas habet anima 
 One should speak then about the 
distinction of the powers which the soul 
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quantum ad se, secundum 
Augustinum. Diuidit autem uires per 
racionalem, irascibilem et 
concupiscibilem. Per racionabilem 
est habilis illuminari ad 
cognoscendum aliquid supra se et 
iuxta se et in se et infra se; cognoscit 
quidem Deum supra se, se in se, 
angelum iuxta se, et quidquid celi 
ambitu continetur infra se. Per 
concupiscibilitatem et 
irascibilitatem, habilis est affici ad 
aliquid appetendum uel fugiendum, 
et amandum uel odiendum. Et ideo 
de racionabilitate anime omnis 
sensus oritur; de aliis autem omnis 
affectus. Nota ergo quod illam 
termembrem diuisionem reducit 
Augustinus ad bimembrem, sicut si 
diceretur : uirium anime quedam 
sunt cognitiue, quedam affectiue; et 
cognitiue ad uerum, affectiue ad 
bonum. Cognitiuas autem uirtutes 
generaliter subdiuidit duobus modis : 
uno modo per per tres differencias, 
alio modo per quinque. 
 
possesses with regard to itself, following 
Augustine. He divides the powers into the 
rational, the irascible and the 
concupiscible. On account of the rational 
power it is predisposed to being 
illuminated to know that there is something 
that is above it, something near to it, 
something in it and something beneath it; 
indeed it knows that God is above it, it 
knows itself in itself, it knows that an 
angel is close to it, and that whatever is 
contained within the range of the sky is 
below God. On account of the 
concupiscible and the irascible [powers] it 
is predisposed to going towards something 
or fleeing it, it loves or hates it. And for 
that reason every sensation arises from the 
rationality of the soul; from the other 
powers then, all the emotions  arise. Note 
therefore that Augustine reduced the three 
part division to a two part division, as he 
states: that certain powers of the soul are 
cognitive, certain affective; also the 
cognitive powers are for finding the truth, 
the affective for the good. But he 
subdivides the cognitive virtues generally 
into two ways: in one way through three 
differences, in the other way through five.  
 
CAPITULUM 65 
(VII) DE DIFFERENCIA SECUNDUM 
UERITATEM ET FALSITATEM 
 
 Chapter 65 
On the diffence between truth and falsity 
 
In intellectuali uisione nunquam  In intellectual vision the soul is never 
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fallitur anima. Aut enim intelligit 
anima quod uerum est, aut si uerum 
non est, non intelligit. In uisione 
autem corporali sepe fallitur anima, 
cum in ipsis corporibus fieri putat 
quod sit in corporeis sensibus: sicut 
nauigantibus uidentur moueri que 
stant in terra; et intuentibus celum 
sidera stare que mouentur; et 
diuariatis oculorum radiis, res una 
habere duas formas, ut unus homo 
habere duo capita, et in aqua remus 
fractus, et multa huiusmodi. In 
uisione autem spirituali siue 
ymaginaria aliquando fallitur et 
illuditur anima, aliquando non. Nam 
aliquando uidet uera, aliquando 
falsa, aliquando perturbata, 
aliquando tranquilla. 
 
Certum namque est hanc esse 
in nobis spiritualem naturam, qua 
corporum similitudines aut 
formantur aut formate ingeruntur; 
siue cum presencia aliquo corporis 
sensu tangimus, et continuo eorum 
similitudo in spiritu formatur; siue 
cum absencia iam nota, uel que non 
nouimus, cogitamus. Innumerabilia 
enim pro arbitrio et opinione nostra 
fingimus, que non sunt, uel esse 
nesciuntur. Innumerabiles quoque et 
alie forme rerum in animo nostro 
deceived. For either the soul knows that 
something is true, if it is not true, it does 
not know. But in corporeal vision the soul 
is often deceived, since it thinks that what 
happens in the corporeal senses is what 
happens in actual bodies: just as to those 
who sail things seem to be moving which 
are stationary on land; and to those gazing 
at the sky the stars seem to be stationary 
whereas they are  moving; and through the 
various rays of the eyes, one thing has two 
forms, as one man has two heads, and in 
water an oar seems broken, and many of 
these kinds. On the other hand, in spiritual 
vision or imaginary vision the soul is 
sometimes deceived and deluded, 
sometimes it is not. For sometimes it sees 
true things, sometimes false things, 
sometimes it is perturbed, sometimes it is 
tranquil.  
 
For it is certain that this spiritual nature is 
in us, in which the likenesses of bodies are 
either formed, or they are infused already 
formed; either that happens when we are in 
contact, through some sense of the body, 
with objects that are present and 
immediately their likenesses are formed in 
the spirit; or when, in [their] absence, we 
think about things that are known or not 
known. For we imagine innumerable 
things in our judgement and opinion, 
things which do not exist or are not known 
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uersantur, uel cum aliquid facimus 
uel facturi sumus. Aliquando eciam, 
spiritu rapiente, tollitur anima in 
spiritu huiusmodi, uidendo siue 
bona, siue mala, siue intencione 
cogitacionis, siue aliqua ui morbi, ut 
frequencius per febrem accidere 
solet, siue commixtione cuiusdam 
alterius speciei siue boni siue mali. 
Ita per corporalium rerum ymagines 
in spiritu exprimuntur, tanquam  
corpora ipsis corporeis sensibus 
representantur. A dormientibus 
eciam multa uidentur, uel nichil, uel 
aliquid significancia; quorum 
omnium uisorum natura siue 
dormientibus, siue uigilantibus, 
eadem est; quoniam non ex alio 
genere sunt que vident, quam ex 
natura spiritus, hoc est spiritualis 
uirtutis, siue ymaginatiue, in qua 
fiunt uel sunt. 
 
 
III. DE DIVISIONE VIRIUM 
ANIME SECUNDUM 
DAMASCENUM 
CAPITULUM 69 
(VIII)  DE YMAGINACIONE 
 
De ymaginacione autem que est 
uirtus sensibilis interior, que 
secundum ordinem uirtutis 
principium est sensuum exteriorum, 
sicut dicit Damascenus : ymaginacio 
to exist. The innumerable things and also 
other forms of things whirl around in the 
soul, either when we do something or are 
about to do something. Sometimes also, 
with a snatching by the spirit, the soul is 
lifted up into a spirit of some kind, [this is] 
either by seeing good, or evil, or from the 
intention of thought, or by some violence 
of disease, as usually happens more often 
through fever, or by a mixture of certain 
kinds of good or bad. Thus the images of 
corporeal things are themselves expressed 
in the spirit, just as bodies are represented 
by the corporeal senses themselves. Also 
many things are seen by those who sleep, 
either it is of no importance or it is 
something significant; and the nature of all 
visions, whether in those sleeping or in 
those awake are the same; since that which 
they see does not arise from a different 
genus other than the nature of spirit, that is, 
the spiritual or imaginative power, in 
which they occur or exist. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 69 
ON IMAGINATION 
 
And on the imagination which is an 
interior sensitive power, which, according 
to the order of a power, it is the principle 
of the exterior senses, as Damascene 
states: imagination is an irrational power of 
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est uirtus irracionalis anime, per 
sensus operans que dicitur sensus, 
supple : interior, ex quo datur 
intelligi quod fons et origo uirium 
exteriorum sensibilium est uirtus 
ymaginatiua. Vnde organum ipsius, 
sicut dicit Damascenus, est anterior 
uenter cerebri a quo, sicit dicit 
Augustinus, originem habent nerui 
qui sunt organa sensuum exteriorum. 
Secundum autem ordinem actuum, 
posterior est ymaginacio sensibus 
exterioribus ; nam, sicut dicit 
Damascenus, per sensum constituitur 
passio que dicitur ymaginacio. 
Tamen ipse distinguit inter 
ymaginacionem et fantasiam, quia 
ymaginacio est passio irracionalis 
anime, que ab ymaginabili aliquo fit 
; fantasia uero est passio inanis que a 
nullo ymaginabili facta est, sicut 
cum aliquis ymaginatur chimeram. 
 
Capitulum 71 
(X) De memoria 
 
Post ymaginacionem et 
excogitatiuam uirutem, ordinat 
Damascenus memoratiuam. Est 
autem memoratiuum, sicit dicit 
Damascenus, memorie et 
rememoracionis promptuarium. 
Memoria autem est fantasia derelicta 
ab aliquo sensu secundum actum 
the soul, operating through a sense which 
is called sensation, supply: interior, from 
which it is given to be understood that the 
source and origin of the exterior sensitive 
powers is the imaginative power. 
Consequently its organ, as Damascene 
states, is the foremost protuberance of the 
brain from which, as Augustine states, 
have as their origin the nerves which are 
the organs of the exterior senses. And 
following the order of acts the imagination 
is posterior to the sensitive exterior 
powers; for as Damascene states, through a 
sense a passion is constituted which is 
called imagination. However he himself 
distinguishes between imagination and 
fantasy, since imagination is a passion of 
the irrational soul, which is produced 
through what is imaginable; but fantasy is 
an empty passion which is not produced by 
the imaginable, such as when one imagines 
a chimera. 
 
Chapter 71 
On Memory 
 
After the imagination and the excogitative 
power Damascene  pronounces the [power 
of] memory. Memory is, as Damascene 
states, a storehouse of memories and 
recollections. And memory is the fantasy 
separated from some sense in accordance 
with a visible act; and he calls the fantasy a 
sensible form; or memory is a collection of 
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apparentem; fantasia autem dicit 
formam sensibilem; uel est memoria 
coarceruacio sensus et intelligencie. 
Anima enim sensibilia per sensus 
suscipit, scilicet sentit, et fit opinio; 
intelligibilia uero per intellectum et 
fit intelligencia. Cum igitur typos, id 
est formas, eorum que opinata est, et 
eorum que intellexerunt, custodit, 
memorari dicitur. Oportet autem 
scire, quoniam intelligibilium 
susceptio non fit nisi ex disciplina 
uel naturali ingenio; non enim ex 
sensu est. Nam sensibilia quidem 
secundum seipsa memorie 
commendantur; intelligibilium uero, 
siquidem didicimus, memoramur, 
substancie uero earum memoriam 
non habemus. Rememoracio uero 
dicitur memorie ab obliuione 
restitucio; obliuio autem est 
memorie ablacio. Igitur fantasticum 
quidem, id est ymaginatiuum, per 
sensus suscipiens materias, tradit 
excogitatiuo uel discretiuo; idem 
enim sunt, quod suscipiens et 
diiudicans transmittit memoratiuo. 
Organum autem memoratiui est 
posterior uentriculus cerebri et 
animalis spiritus qui est in ipso. 
 
 
 
 
 
sensations and of thoughts. For, on the one 
hand, the soul apprehends sensitive things 
through the senses, that is, it senses, and 
opinion is formed; on the other hand, it 
receives intelligible things through the 
intellect, and understanding occurs. When 
it preserves the images, that is, the forms, 
those which are expressed as opinion and 
those which are understood, it is called 
memory. It must be known that the 
apprehension of intelligibles only occurs 
from learning or from a natural ability; for 
it does not come from sensation. For 
indeed sensitive things are commended to 
the memory according to themselves; on 
the other hand, we remember intelligibles, 
if indeed we have learnt them, but of their 
substance, we do not have a memory. 
Remembrance is said to be the restitution 
of memory from oblivion; and oblivion is 
the taking away of memories. Therefore 
the fantasy, that is, the imagination, 
apprehending material [forms] through the 
senses, hands over to the excogitative or 
discerning power; for they are the same, 
since it entrusts to the faculty of memory 
what it receives and judges. And the organ 
of the [power of] memory is the posterior 
ventricle of the brain and the animal spirit 
which is present in it. 
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IV. DE DIVISONE VIRIUM 
ANIME SECUNDUM AVIENNAM 
 
CAPITULUM 97 
(X) DE SENSU COMMUNIS 
 
Sensus autem communis est uis 
ordinata in prima concauitate 
cerebri, recipiens per se ipsam 
omnes formas que imprimuntur 
quinque sensibus et redduntur ei. 
Hec autem uirtus est centrum 
omnium sensuum et a qua deriuantur 
ut rami. Dicitur autem hic sensus 
formalis et communis. Communis 
secundum duos modos: uno modo in 
quantum communiter habet conuerti 
super actus sensuum particularium, 
prout dicitur: uideo quod audio, et 
audio quod uideo; et uideo quod 
odoro, etc. Alio modo secundum 
quod habet conferre sensibilia 
diuersorum sensuum, ut cum 
confertur album, nigrum, dulci uel 
saporato, quoniam est illud. 
Secundum ergo hoc duos 
actus, quorum primus est absolutus, 
secundus comparatus, dicitur sensus 
communis. Sensus uero formalis 
dicitur racione ymaginacionis sibi 
coniuncte que dicitur uirtus formalis, 
eo quod remouetur antequam 
deleatur forma que descripta est in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 97 
On the common sense 
 
The common sense is the power located in 
the first cavity of the brain, receiving, 
through itself, all the forms which are 
imprinted by the five senses and 
transmitted to it [from them]. This power is 
the centre of all the senses, and from which 
they are derived as its branches. It is called 
the formal sense and the common sense. 
Common according to two modes: in one 
mode inasmuch as it is able to turn towards 
the acts of the particular senses, according 
to which it is stated: I see what I hear, and 
I hear what I see; and I see what I smell 
etc. In the other mode according to which 
it can gather together the sensitive objects 
of the diverse senses, as when white is 
united to black, or sweet to savoury, since 
it is this [power]. 
Therefore, following these two 
acts, the first of which is independent, the 
second is relational, it is called the 
common sense. It is called the formal sense 
by reason of the imagination joined to it, 
which is called the formal power, in the 
way that it moves to preserve the form, 
which is received through the exterior 
sense before the form is destroyed and in 
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sensu communi, quia format, siue 
formam receptam per exteriorem 
sensum, re absente, continet. Vnde 
ponit Auicenna experimentum : cum 
uolumus scire differenciam inter 
opus sensus exterioris, et opus 
sensus formalis, id est communis, 
attende disposicionem unius gutte 
cadentis de pluuia, et uidebis rectam 
lineam; et attende disposicionem 
alicuius recti, cuius summitas 
mouetur in circuitu, et uidebitur 
circulus. Impossibile autem est ut 
apprehendas lineam aut circulum 
nisi illam rem sepe inspexeris. 
Impossibile eciam est ut sensus 
exterior uideat eam bis, nisi uidebit 
eam ubi est. Cum autem describitur 
in sensu communi, et remouetur 
antequam deleatur forma que 
descripta est in sensu communi, 
apprehendit eam sensus exterior illuc 
ubi est, apprehendit eciam eam 
sensus communis quasi esset illuc 
ubi fuit, et quasi esset illuc ubi est; et 
ita uidet extensionem circularem aut 
rectam. Hoc autem impossibile est 
fieri sine sensu exteriori. Sed sensus 
communis formalis apprehendit illa 
duo, quamuis destructa sit illa res. 
Hac ergo racione dicitur sensus 
formans secundum Auicennam. Allis 
uero placet, ut sensus communis 
the absence of the object. Consequently 
Avicenna posits an experiment. When we 
wish to know the difference between the 
function of the exterior sense and that of 
the formal sense, that is to say the common 
sense, consider the relative position of a 
drop of rain which is falling, and you will 
see a straight line; consider also the 
relative position of anything in a straight 
line. Consider the relative position of this 
straight line whose summit is presented in 
a cirle and you see a circle. It is impossible 
for you to see the line and the circle unless 
you look at them often. It is impossible 
even for an exterior sense to see the thing 
in two places, it is only possible that you 
see it where it is. Since each is assigned to 
the common sense and it is removed before 
the form which was assigned to it is 
deleted, the common sense grasps it in the 
place it is, the common sense grasps both 
‘as if’ it was in that place and ‘as if’ it is 
also in that other place; in this way it sees 
circular or straight extension. It is 
impossible for this to occur without an 
exterior sense. But the common sense 
apprehends these two aspects, although 
one was destroyed. For this reason it is 
called the ‘sense which forms’ by 
Avicenna. And it is acceptable to others 
that it is called the formal common sense, 
by reason of its proper apprehension which 
is of the common sensibles which are size, 
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formalis dicatur, racione sue proprie 
apprehensionis que est sensibilium 
communium que sunt magnitudo, 
motus, quies, numerus, etc. 
 
 
Capitulum 98 (XXIII) 
(XI) De ymaginacione 
 
Secunda uirtus est ymaginacio. Est 
autem, sicut dicit Auicenna, uis 
ordinata in extremo concauitatis 
anterioris partis cerebri, retinens que 
recipit sensus communis a quinque 
sensibus, et remanet in ea post 
remocionem illorum sensibilium. 
Vult ergo dicere quod sensus 
communis est apprehendere formas 
omnium sensibilium. Virtutis uero 
que uocatur ymaginacio, retinere. 
Dicit ergo quod sensus communis et 
ymaginacio sunt quasi una uirtus, et 
quasi non diuersificantur in subiecto, 
sed in forma. Hec enim recipit, illa 
retinet. Quod autem recipit, non est 
hoc quod retinet. Virtus ergo que est 
ymaginacio que eciam uocatur 
formalis sensus, formam sensibilem 
retinet et non discernit illam nullo 
modo. Sensus eciam communis et 
sensus exteriores discernunt ea, 
dicentes hoc esse album uel nigrum, 
etc.  
Differenciam autem hanc 
probat quod ex una ui est recipere, et 
movement, rest, number, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 98 
On the imagination 
 
The second power is the imagination. It is, 
states Avicenna, a power located in the 
furthest  part of the front ventricle of the 
brain, retaining what the common sense 
receives from the five senses and it 
remains in it after the removal of those 
sensitive objects. He wants to say therefore 
that the [function] of the common sense is 
apprehending the forms of all the sensitive 
objects. On the other hand, the function of 
the power, which is called imagination, is 
to retain. He states therefore that the 
common sense and the imagination are as 
if they are one power, and, as if they are 
not distinguished in subject but in form. 
For one receives, the other retains. And 
that which receives is not that which 
retains. The power, therefore, which is the 
imagination is also called the formal sense, 
it retains the sensitive form and does not 
separate it in any other way. Again the 
common sense and the exterior senses 
discern those things, stating this is white or 
black etc. 
         He proves this difference, that 
receiving is in accordance with one power 
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ex alia retinere; quod est uidere in 
aqua que habet potenciam recipiendi 
sculpturas et impressiones 
figurarum, non tamen habet 
potenciam retinendi. Differentis ergo 
uirtutis erit retinere sensibilia et 
recipere ea. Alia ergo uirtus est 
ymaginacio a sensu communi; et hec 
est sentencia Auicenne. Aliis uero 
uidetur quod ymaginacio sit 
conuersio ipsius uirtutis sensibilis 
interioris super ymaginem, tanquam 
rem; quorum utrumque est uerum, 
sed secundum diuersos modos 
accipiendi hoc nomen: ymaginacio 
 
 
and retaining is in accordance with 
another; one can see that water has the 
potential for receiving images and 
imprinted forms, it does not, however, 
have the potential to retain. It belongs 
therefore to different powers to retain 
sensitive objects and to receive them. 
Imagination is therefore, a different power 
from the common sense: and this is the 
opinion of Avicenna. But to others it seems 
that imagination is the conversion of the 
interior sensitive power itself upon the 
image, as it were, the object; both of these 
positions are true, but according to 
different ways of accepting this name: 
imagination. 
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APPENDIX (II) 
OUTLINE  
OF CHAPTERS OF THE SUMMA DE ANIMA 
 
Prologue 
FIRST CONSIDERATION. 
 ON THE SOUL ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE 
   
 
I. Whether the Soul Exists 
 I. That the Soul Exists 
 
II. What is the Soul 
 2.  What is the Soul according to Definition 
3.  Explanation of the First Definition 
           4. A Doubt 
           5. Another Doubt 
6.  Explanation of the Second Definition 
7.  A Doubt arising from the Above 
8.  Explanation of the Third Definition 
9.  Explanation of the Fourth Definition 
10.  Explanation of the Fifth Definition 
11.  Explanation of the Sixth Definition 
12. Explanation of the Seventh Definition 
 
III. On the Soul with regard to Being 
13.  What is the Soul according to Essence 
14.  That the Soul is not from the Divine Substance 
15. That the Soul is not made from Matter 
16.  That the Soul is not from a Soul 
17.  On the Formal Cause of the Soul 
18. On the Efficient Cause of the Soul 
19.  On the Final Cause of the Soul 
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20.  On the Origin of the Soul with regard to Duration 
 
IV. On the Soul with regard to Being 
21. On the Soul with regard to Being 
22. That the Soul is a Substance 
23. That the Soul is Incorporeal 
24.  That the Soul is Simple 
25.  That the Soul is Simple according to which it excludes essential parts 
26.  That the Soul is One in Three Powers 
 
V.  On the Soul with regard to Image 
27.  On the Soul with regard to Image 
28.  What is the Image in the Divine Persons Essentially 
29.  What is the Image in the Divine Persons Personally 
30.  What is the Account of Image in Man 
31.  What is Being in relation to Image 
32.  What is the Difference between Image and Similitude 
33.  In regard to what is Man said to be made in the Image 
34.  In What consists the Being of an Image 
35. How is the Soul Representative of the Trinity 
 
VI. On the Soul in relation to the Body 
36.  On the Soul in Relation to Being in the Body 
37.  If the Soul is united to the Body through a Intermediary or without 
       an Intermediary 
38.  On Unity on the part of the Body 
39.  On the Differunt Intermediaries of Unity 
40. On the Mode of Union 
41.  Why is the Soul united to the Body 
42.  On the mode in which the Soul is present in the Body 
 
VII. On the Immortality of the Soul 
43. On the Soul after the Separation of the Body 
44.  On the Immortality of the Soul 
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45.  On the Removal of Error with regard to Immortality 
VIII. On the Passibility of the Soul 
46.  On the Passibility of the Soul 
47. On the Passibility of Punishment 
48.  How the soul, present in the body, suffers because of the body 
49. How the soul suffers outside the Body 
 
IX. On the Place of the Soul 
50.  On the Place of the Soul 
51,  Should a Spiritual Substance have a place? 
52.  Whether a Spiritual Substance should have a Corporeal Place 
53.  Whether a Spiritual Substance should have a Spiritual Place 
54.  Can two Spiritual Substances be in the same Place? 
55.  On the Place of the Soul separated from the Body 
 
X. On the Movement of the Separated Soul 
56.  On the Movement of the Separated Soul 
57.  On the Sudden or Successive Movement of the Soul 
58.  Whether the Soul moves through an Intermediary Space 
 
 
SECOND CONSIDERATION. 
ON THE POWERS OF THE SOUL 
 
I. On the Soul and its Powers 
59.  On the Soul and its Powers 
60.  Whether the Soul is its Powers 
61.  On the Differences and the Distinctions of the Powers of the Soul 
 
II. On the Division of the Powers according to Augustine 
62.  Division of the Powers according to Augustine 
63. Division of the Powers according to Itself 
64. On the Powers of the Soul through three differences 
65.  On the Differences between Truth and Falsity 
66. On the Cognitive Powers distinguished by Five differences 
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67.  On the Affective Powers 
III. ON the Division of the Powers of the Soul according to John Damascene 
68.   On the Division of the Powers according to John Damascene 
69.  On Imagination 
70.  On Opinion 
71.  On Memory 
72.  On Mind 
73.  On Mind which is described in two ways 
74.  Division of the Appetitive Irrational powers 
75.  On Joy 
76. On Sadness 
77. On Fear 
78. On Anger 
79. On the Rational Motive Power 
80. On Reason 
81. On Free Will 
 
IV. On the Division of the Powers according to Avicenna 
82. On the Vegetative Power as Independent 
83.  On the Vegetative Power as Relational 
84.  On the Function of the Generative Power 
85.  Division of the Sensitive Powers 
86.  On Fantasia 
87. On the Cognitive Power according to the Animal Mode 
88.  On the Number of the Senses in the Order of Purposes 
89.  On the Number of the Senses according to the Nature of Intermediaries 
90. On the Number of the Senses according to the Mode of Sensing 
91.  The Number of the Senses according to the Number of Principles 
92.  On the Different Organs of the Senses 
93.  On the Differences between the Intermediaries of the Senses 
94.  On the Objects of the Senses 
95. On the Apprehending Interior Power 
96. On the Division of the Sensitive Interior Power 
97. On the Common Sense 
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98. On Imagination 
99. On the Imaginatiive Power 
100. On Sleep 
101. On the Estimative Power 
102.  On the Memorative Power 
103.  On the Motive Sensitive Powers 
104. On the Motive Power according to the Animal Mode 
105. On the Distinction of the Motive Powers 
106. On the Difference between the Irascible and the Concupiscible Power 
107. On the Act and Movement of the Irascible and the Cocupiscible Power 
108. Whether the Affective Powers are identical with the Appetitive Powers 
109. On Power and on Aptitiude 
110. On the Motive Exterior Power 
111. On the Rational Powers 
112. On the Organ of the Intellective Power 
113. On the Object of the Intellective Power 
114. On the Distinction of the Intellective Power from the  
        Apprehensive Power 
115. On the Differences between the Possible and Agent Intellect 
116. Whether the Agent Intellect is separate 
117. On the Function of the Agent Intellect 
118. On the Differences of the Intellective Apprehending Power  
         according to the Account of Order 
119. On the Intellective Motive Power 
 
 
 
 
